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Abstract 
Translation/interpreting has long been one of the media for spreading and 
(re)shaping ideology in the battlefield of ‘power’. The inextricable relationships 
between power and translation/interpreting also contribute to hegemony and resistance 
demonstrated through translation and interpreting or by translators and interpreters. 
While the link between ideology and translation in unequal power relations has almost 
been fully disclosed in translation studies, the same issue in interpreting remains much 
less explored.  
To address ideology issue in interpreting, this study chooses to put such research in 
the setting of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait,  with China and Taiwan on either 
side. China, as an overwhelming hegemony in terms of politics, economy and culture, 
has always reiterated its One China policy on international occasions, insisting that 
Taiwan, an island off southeast China, has long been part of it. Yet, it is undeniable that 
Taiwan  and  China,  in  both  of  which  Mandarin  is  used  as  the  official  language  and  
Chinese culture is practiced and developed, are two separate political and economic 
entities at present. In light of the power inequality and linguistic resemblance between 
the  two  entities,  this  study  uses  ‘hegemony’  and  ‘resistance  to  hegemony’  as  two  
analytical dimensions in examining whether signs of hegemony or resistance to 
hegemony are embodied in simultaneous interpreting renditions of the student 
interpreters from China and from Taiwan through critical discourse analysis (CDA). By 
uncovering the embodiment of political ideologies in simultaneous renditions of 
Mandarin-speaking student interpreters and how national identities are discursively 
constructed through SI, this study hopes to raise awareness of interpreting as a site for 
different ideologies and identities to compete against one another in relations between 
hegemony and resistance and provide some constructive thoughts of investigating the 
relationship between ideology and interpreting in a scientific and systematic manner.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Aims and Objectives of the Thesis 
 
Translation/interpreting has long been one of the media for spreading and 
(re)shaping ideology and identity. The term ‘ideology’, since it was first coined in 1796 
by French Enlightenment aristocrat and philosopher Destutt de Tracy to refer to his 
“science of ideas” (Kennedy, 1978: 47), has been variously defined and given both 
positive and negative connotations. Ideology, according to van Dijk (1998), does not 
exclusively serve as a tool of the domination or contain inherent negative attributes; 
instead, it is the set of factual and evaluative social beliefs shared by a group and it can 
“control or organize the more specific knowledge and opinions (attitudes) of a group 
(ibid: 48-49)”. A group of people who share certain ideologies may also develop and 
share certain identities as identity, or self-definition, is developed through interpersonal 
and intergroup interactions (Vignoles, et al., 2011: 2). And both ideologies and identities 
are developed, maintained or reinforced through discourse (speech in writing and 
speaking). The ideologies and identities that one holds can control or organize the way 
in which s/he thinks, interprets, and acts, which is why the dominant tend to consolidate 
their domination and obtain subordination by manipulating ideologies and identities of 
the dominated and why translation/interpreting, as a form of discourse bridging one 
culture with the Others, has been particularly used as an instrument for power struggles. 
Since ideologies and identities are constructed through discourse, an analysis of 
discourse of a certain group of people should disclose the ideologies and identities held 
by this group of people as well as the power struggles behind the discourse. The critical 
discourse analysis (CDA), which emerged in the early 1990s and becomes one of the 
most widely used methods to uncover hidden ideologies, identities and power relations 
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in  discourse,  is  (has  been)  particularly  suitable  for  studying  the  relationships  among  
translation/interpreting, ideology, identity, and power. While the link among ideology, 
identity and translation in unequal power relations has almost been fully disclosed in 
translation studies, the same issue in interpreting, especially simultaneous interpreting, 
remains much less explored.  
To address ideology issue in interpreting, this study chooses to put such research in 
the setting of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait,  with China and Taiwan on either 
side.  The  special  status  quo  across  the  Taiwan  Strait  may  be  argued  to  be  one  of  the  
most suitable sites for the research of ideology in interpreting studies. China regards 
Taiwan as part of its territory and insists on the One China policy, while Taiwan, which 
strives  to  be  widely  recognized  as  a  country  and  in  fact  is  a  ‘nation’  according  to  
Smith’s  definition  of  a  nation  (1991:  14;  see  Chapter  2.1.3),  has  never  been  in  effect  
governed by China. Despite the fact that Taiwan is a small but independent nation, 
Chinese hegemony has made many other countries in the world acknowledged Taiwan 
as part of China by exercising its “ascendancy…not only in the economic sphere, but 
through all social, political and ideological spheres, and its ability thereby to persuade 
[others] to see the world in terms favourable to its own ascendancy” (Scruton’s 
definition of hegemony, 2007: 295; see also Chapter 2.2). The different political and 
social development in both nations of unequal power relations as hegemony and 
resistance has led to the formation of different ideologies and identities among both 
peoples although Mandarin Chinese has been adopted as the official language and 
Chinese culture is developed and practiced in both regions. As a result, the aim of this 
study is to investigate whether the conflicts of ideologies and identities between 
interpreters of two nations of unequal power in relations as hegemony versus resistance 
may be embodied in simultaneous interpreting (SI) renditions. The objectives are listed 
as follows: 
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1. To investigate whether the relations between two nations in unequal power relations 
as hegemony versus resistance may be embodied in SI renditions produced by 
interpreters from either nation. 
2. To investigate how national identities of both groups of interpreters are discursively 
constructed through SI renditions. 
3. To investigate how both groups of interpreters discursively construct the image of 
the Other nation. 
4. To investigate whether an interpreter’s national identity may influence his/her 
feelings towards the speakers of either nation.  
5. To investigate whether deviant SI renditions are caused by the conflicts of 
ideologies and identities of both groups of interpreters.  
6. To investigate what interpreting and discursive strategies are used to produce 
ideologically deviant renditions.   
 
1.2 Ideology Research in Translation and Interpreting Studies 
 
Translation has long been one of the media for spreading and (re)shaping ideology 
in the battlefield of ‘power’. In fact, translation by nature is a political act, cultural 
bound, and “has to do with the production and ostentation of power and with the 
strategies used by this power in order to represent the other culture” (Alvarez & Vidal, 
1996: 2). Translation, on micro-level, involves ideologies of different agents who create, 
produce, edit, revise, review or appreciate translated texts (Tahir-Gürça÷lar, 2003: 113), 
while on macro-level, translation is usually sponsored or controlled by the ruling 
authorities, whose attitudes towards the Others tend to play a decisive role in translation 
development. The link between translation and power is made manifest in what Alvarez 
& Vidal maintain: 
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Translation is not the production of one text equivalent to another text, but rather a 
complex process of rewriting that runs parallel both to the overall view of language 
and of the ‘Other’ people have throughout history; and to the influences and the 
balance of power that exist between one culture and another (1996: 4; original 
emphasis). 
 
Also,  ideology remains one of the most essential  elements that  trigger power struggles 
in that ideology, or socially-shared ideas and beliefs, helps “legitimate the interest of a 
ruling group or class by distortion or dissimulation (Eagleton, 1991: 30)”. Therefore, 
translation may be promoted under the influence of ‘patronage’ (Lefevere, 1992) and/or 
hindered by ‘censorship (Schäffner, 2007: 138-40).  
In recent decades, the link between ideology and translation on micro-level has one 
of the main research foci in translation studies. Bassnett (1996: 22) suggests the need 
for reassessing the role of the translator, whose intervention in the process of linguistic 
transfer is “crucial” as translated texts are hardly free from adulteration. More 
specifically, every decision or choice translators make in the process of translating is 
under the influence of their surrounding “socio-political milieu”, which in other words 
is their own “culture” (Alvarez & Vidal, 1996: 5). Therefore, translators may be 
‘partisan’, steering ideologically-motivated translation movement towards their desired 
geopolitical results. Translators may help reviving or boosting hegemony; they may also 
make their translations as resistance against oppression. Yet, translation on micro-level 
involves not only ideology of the translator but also ideologies of authors, critics, 
publishers, editors, and readers (Tahir-Gürça÷lar, 2003: 113) as well as the power 
relations in society. More precisely, although translators shoulder the responsibility of 
producing translated texts, ideologies of other agents, such as publishers, readers or 
those in power, may be put ahead of the translator’s ideology or taken into consideration 
before the finalization of a translation. The idea that a translator’s behaviour is governed 
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by their ideology (Robinson, cited from Calzada-Pérez, 2003: 7) has been confirmed by 
various studies; Toury (1999: 19) even argues that “it is always the translator herself or 
himself,  as  an  autonomous  individual,  who  decides  how  to  behave,  be  that  decision  
fully conscious or not”. Yet, given the increasingly strong power of world hegemony in 
the  form  of  various  agents  or  patrons  of  translation  (Venuti,  1995,  1998;  see  also  
Chapter 2.3.2), the freedom of the translator to exercise his/her discretion seems to be 
inevitably restricted. In other words, the translator’s ideology may not play the most 
decisive role in the finalized version of his/her translation. What may need to be more 
aware are the power struggle behind translation and the ideologies behind that power 
struggle. The link among power, ideology and translation has been disclosed fully in the 
field of translation studies. Yet, the link among power, ideology and interpreting, which 
may be seen as the oral counterpart of translation, remains much less explored. Previous 
interpreting studies have investigated the reasons why interpreters choose what not to 
interpret or how to interpret source texts at their discretion but few have addressed the 
link between an interpreter’s ideology and his/her renditions.  
Translations in written form frequently come under ideological influences of 
various agents. By contrast, interpreting is characteristic of evanescence. People do not 
know exactly how they are going to express themselves until they open their mouths; 
once spoken, words are fading and only meanings may stay in the minds of the listener 
(Seleskovitch, 1994: 12-18). Therefore, little prior censorship could apply to 
interpreting. Arguably, simultaneous interpreting, which is supposed to synchronize 
source delivery, may be most likely to escape censorship compared with the other 
interpreting modes. In light of the extensive employment of SI at international settings 
and the relative lack of SI ideology research, an investigation into the effect of an 
interpreter’s ideology on his/her SI renditions may provide valuable information for 
those who would like to ensure the legitimization of their side of stories in the SI mode. 
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1.3 Ideologies and Identities in Discourse 
 
It has been widely recognized that ideology, identity and discourse are inextricably 
intertwined. Fairclough’s definition of ideology may fully demonstrate such close link 
among these elements: 
 
Ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which contribute to 
establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation. They 
may be enacted in ways of interaction (and therefore in genres) and inculcated in 
ways of being identities (and therefore styles).  Analysis of texts [discourse]…is an 
important aspect of ideological analysis and critique…(2003: 218) 
 
Seeing  discourse  as  a  form  of  social  practice  that  develops,  sustains,  strengthens  and  
reflects ideologies and identities, practitioners of the critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
strive to uncover ‘hidden’ and ‘seemingly neutral’ ideologies of dominant powers 
embodied in discourse in order to raise public awareness of the negative effects of these 
hidden ideologies and in turn eliminate inequality that is reproduced and reinforced 
through discourse. According to Fairclough (1989: 20), “CDA is an interdisciplinary 
approach to the study of discourse which views language as a form of social practice 
and focuses on the ways social and political domination are reproduced by text and talk.” 
CDA, as a highly-flexible discursive analysis tool, has been widely used by many 
famous scholars across Europe, such as Ruth Wodak and Gunther Kress based in the 
U.K., Teun van Dijk based in the Netherlands, or Utz Maas and Siegfried Jäger based in 
Germany, to name but a few.  
To deal with the multiple ideologies and identities that may be embodied in the SI 
renditions of this study, the discourse-historical approach (DHA) within CDA will be 
adopted as the main research method in this study. Elaborated by Ruth Wodak in 
collaboration with some other researchers in the 1990s, DHA focuses on ‘the change of 
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discursive practices over time and in various genres1’.  However,  in light of the lack of 
the  interpreting  renditions  of  different  times,  it  is  difficult  to  examine  the  change  of  
discursive practices in interpreting. Just as Bowen et al. (1995: 245) note, 
 
The  spoken  word  is  evanescent.  Our  knowledge  of  the  past  performance  of  
interpreters tends to be derived from such sources as letters, diaries, memoirs and 
biographies of interpreters themselves, along with a variety of other documents, 
many of which were only marginally or incidentally concerned with interpreting. 
 
Therefore, in this study, a ‘historical’ approach is adopted in the literature review, where 
a review of the post-1945 Chinese translation development may unmask the relationship 
among ideology, discourse and translation in China, and the reasons behind the current 
identity crisis in Taiwan may be sought by discussing the development of the identities 
and ideologies held by the people of Taiwan particularly since 1945, which in turn may 
enable the collected SI renditions to be analyzed as ‘discourse’ within particular 
historical, social, political and cultural contexts. Just as Schleiermacher (2004: 51) 
observes, “For just as language is a historical entity, so too is it impossible to appreciate 
it rightly without an appreciation of its history”. 
Meanwhile, to avoid common criticism of CDA as subjectively and ideologically 
interpreting discourse, a CDA Filter Process is specially designed, which involves the 
cross-referencing of the results of several questionnaires and/or in-depth interviews 
given by the interpreter subjects, in order to seek solid evidence for confirming the 
existence of ideological signs and to determine whether the signs are those of hegemony 
or resistance to hegemony. More specifically, the researcher incorporates other research 
methods, both qualitative and quantitative, .into the CDA method in order to enhance 
the validity of the CDA results. The ideologically deviant renditions produced by either 
                                               
1 Information retrieved 9 September 2012 on the website of the Department of Linguistics and English 
language, Lancaster University from http://www.ling.lancs.ac.uk/profiles/265. 
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group of interpreter subjects in this study will be examined collectively, which may 
disclose how ideologies and identities of the interpreter subjects are discursively 
constructed through simultaneous interpreting. The CDA qualitative results will be also 
represented through the Chi-square statistical analysis, which may not only demonstrate 
power struggles between China and Taiwan as hegemony and resistance but also 
provide clear insights into the issue of ideology in simultaneous interpreting. It is the 
researcher’s belief that with survey questionnaires and statistical instruments, the 
application of the CDA method in the present study can adequately investigate the 
influence of one’s ideology and identity on his/her SI renditions. 
 
1.4 Geo-political Situation and Background of Interpreter Subjects 
   
China, since ancient times, has generally remained a unified and totalitarian 
country  with  a  strong  sense  of  Sinocentrism  and  cultural  superiority.  The  use  of  
language in China has been under the control of the ruling authorities, which in turn 
strengthens political sensitivity and shapes collective ideologies. By contrast, Taiwan, a 
place of linguistic and cultural diversity on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, was not 
made subject to a single ruler until the Dutch arrived in the seventeenth century, which 
inaugurated the long-lasting colonial history of Taiwan. The colonial fate of Taiwan left 
the ideologies and identities of the people of Taiwan (re)shaped constantly with the 
change  of  ruling  regimes.  In  1949,  the  R.O.C.  (the  Republic  of  China)  Nationalist  
(Kuomintang, KMT) government, which had overthrown Qing China and became the 
main ruling power of China proper since 1912, lost a civil war to the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and fled to Taiwan. Since then, the Chinese mainland has been 
taken over by the People’s Republic of China (the P.R.C. or ‘China’ hereinafter), and 
Taiwan has become the base of the R.O.C., starting the situation where both sides 
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compete to be the only legitimate China. China regards Taiwan as part of its territory, 
while Taiwan has never been in effect governed by China and enjoys its autonomy 
despite not being recognized widely as a country.  
In light of the difference in political and social reality between China and Taiwan, 
it is very likely that the people of China may not see eye to eye with the people of 
Taiwan on whether Taiwan is part of China. As Sapir suggests, “the network of cultural 
patterns of a civilization is indexed in the language which expresses that 
civilization…the ‘real world’ is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language 
habits of the group (1929: 209; original emphasis)”. The language use of both peoples 
may reflect different social realities of their own nations. In order to investigate this 
situation, forty-two trainee interpreters who registered with the Mandarin-English 
simultaneous interpreting program in the U.K., half from China and the other half from 
Taiwan, are recruited as the subjects of the present study. All but two of the subjects are 
aged between 20 and 30 at the time of participating in the data collection. Two of the 
subjects  are  male,  and  the  others  female.  As  the  main  aim  of  this  study  is  to  observe  
whether there is an ideological tug of war between hegemony and resistance among the 
interpreters across the Taiwan Strait, the study needs to recruit from either side a 
relatively large and equal number of interpreters who are willing to have their renditions 
analyzed in order to confirm the existence of such ideological war. Given the lack of 
funding and professional connections, it would be more feasible and cost-efficient to 
use trainee interpreters in this study. 
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1.5 The Reflexivity and Positionality of the Researcher in This Study 
 
Reflexivity, which is one of the issues that face ethnography since the 1960s, 
concerns some fundamental problems and solutions to the difficulties of ethnography as 
a methodology for collecting, interpret and present data of human life (Brewer, 2003). 
One of the most criticized problems of ethnography is that researchers as observers may 
tend to neglect their social involvement in their ethnographic fieldwork and in the real 
world, the power relations behind the fieldwork and between researchers and the 
researched, and the hermeneutic subjectivity of the ethnographic representation of 
reality (Inghilleri, 2005: 130-131). The presence of researchers in their fieldwork as 
well as the relationship between researchers and the researched has raised doubt on 
whether the collected data can remain ‘uncontaminated’. Also, like the researched, 
researchers are socially situated and interpret the world around them through their own 
ideologies and identities, which makes it possible that the reality represented through 
ethnographic data is “partial, partisan and selective (Brewer, 2003: 259)”. In 
consequence, reflexivity may generally involve two crises: the crisis of representation 
and the crisis of legitimation (ibid: 259). To solve the crises, some measures are 
proposed. For instance, the textual construction of ethnographic data may be presented 
in its original form, such as notebook entries or quotations, which suggests the 
possibility  of  other  more  versions  of  reality  and  interpretation  (Sperber,  1985;  cited  
from Inghilleri, 2005: 132). Reflexivity itself also offers solutions to the crises as long 
as one acknowledges that reflexivity 
 
requires a critical attitude towards data, and recognition of the influence on the 
research of such factors as the location of the setting, the sensitivity of the topic, 
power relations in the field and the nature of the social interaction between 
researcher and researched (Brewer, 2003: 259).       
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In other words, researchers should make clear their social positions and positioning 
while presenting their version of reality obtained from their fieldwork. Reflexivity has 
already drawn attention from translation and interpreting studies, as not only acts of 
translation may be seen as “ethnographic encounters” (Inghilleri, 2005: 139) but also 
translators and interpreters are social actors in specific historical, social, and cultural 
context and inevitably need to interact with other agents involved in the translation or 
interpreting process. Jones (2004) has particularly focused on this issue in his study of a 
literary translator acting as a participant-interpreter in the ex-Yugoslavia context. 
Acknowledging the difficulty of claiming his objectivity as both researcher and the 
researched in his study, Jones explicates how a literary translator, who possesses divided 
or conflicting loyalties to the country, culture and source texts and is faced with ethical 
and ideological dilemmas of being fully faithful to the writer or translating with social 
factors taken into consideration, makes less harm decisions and serves as a cultural 
gatekeeper in the translation process. The self-analysis of researchers in specific context 
of their fieldwork can indeed help achieve a greater degree of scientific objectivity of 
the studies concerned. Given the significance of reflexivity issue, I shall articulate my 
own positionality as the researcher of this study and discuss the measures I take to 
reduce bias because of my ideological involvement. 
The selection of the research topic concerning the status quo across the Taiwan 
Strait  is  mainly  attributed  to  my background as  a  citizen  of  Taiwan (the  R.O.C.).  The  
experience of growing up and receiving ‘Chinese’ education and culture in a forbidden 
nation under the threat and pressure from the neighbouring Chinese hegemony makes 
me sensitive to the unequal power relations between China and Taiwan, the mentalities 
of  the  ruling  power  on  either  side,  and  the  difficulties  of  the  dominated  to  resist  the  
dominant. The points or measures I take to deal with this sensitive topic are discussed 
below: 
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1. Power relations in and behind the field:  
The topic on (Chinese) hegemony and (Taiwanese) resistance may be highly 
sensitive in both nations. Conducting such research in either nation may inevitably 
raise doubt over the issue of whether one’s hegemonic or resistance tendency may 
be strengthened or reduced because of his/her relations and interaction with the 
surrounding world. The interpreter subjects recruited in this study are students from 
three SI programs offered by two UK universities. Those from the same program are 
classmates and attend the experiment as a group. The previous in-group power 
relations among the subjects are unknown to the researcher, but it should be 
reasonable to presume these subjects are studying in the U.K. on an equal footing 
and in competing and/or cooperative relationships at their class. The researcher has 
never had any contact or private relationships with the first two groups of interpreter 
subjects before this study. The researcher and the third group of interpreter subjects 
are in a teacher-student relationship. The recruitment is on a voluntary basis with 
some monetary rewards. Basically, the relationships between the researcher and the 
researched are cooperative and equal. Arguably, it should be appropriate to conduct 
this research in the U.K. where both Chinese and Taiwanese are (presumably) 
treated equal and both the researcher and the researched are the Others in the third 
nation.    
2. The nature of simultaneous interpreting: 
Simultaneous (conference) interpreters usually carry out their tasks in a booth 
without direct contact with the speaker and the listener, which the researcher thinks 
might let interpreters enjoy greater autonomy and encounter less outside interference. 
Also,  the  SI  experiment  of  this  study  is  carried  out  in  the  SI  labs  where  the  
interpreter subjects attend class and do practices, which in turn should not put the 
subjects under unusual pressure during the experiment. The researcher does not 
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make any comments on the performance of the subjects but act as an equipment 
operator and data collector, and the SI data are solely produced by the subjects in 
individual booths without any interference or assistance from the researcher. 
3. The literature review: 
In Chapters 2.4 and 2.5, I discuss how ideologies and identities are (re)shaped and 
spread among the general public of Taiwan and China. Note that my point is to show 
how the ruling authorities manipulate the public ideologies to consolidate their 
domination. Both Chinese and Taiwanese general public are objects of ideological 
manipulation. Also, the literature review that concerns Taiwan and China ranges 
from the historical records of the ancient times to the most recent news events and 
survey results, which may contribute to a thorough and less biased representation of 
the realities in both nations.   
4. The research design: 
The  basic  and  foremost  principle  of  the  research  design  of  this  study  is  to  strike  a  
balance in as many aspects as possible. The number of the subjects from either 
nation,  the  quantities  and  genres  of  the  source  texts,  and  the  political  status  of  the  
speakers are equal or balanced across the Taiwan Strait. Each and every subject is 
asked  to  fill  in  the  same  questionnaires.  The  SI  data  are  produced  solely  by  the  
subjects, each in an individual booth. Due to time and space limits, only some of the 
subjects give an interview after the experiment, but they are only asked to clarify or 
explain their deviant renditions or their responses in the surveys. None of the 
subjects know the real research aim until the end of the data collection, which is to 
prevent the subjects from interpreting awkwardly or purposefully. The subjects are 
fully briefed afterwards and offered options of withdrawing from the research.     
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5. The reality represented in the findings 
In Chapter 5 the CDA analysis of the SI renditions, the researcher strives to 
demonstrate the SI deviant renditions in their original form and explain them on the 
basis of the previous literature review and the survey and interview data. In most 
cases, the research gives descriptive rather than interpretative narratives. The 
findings generally echo with the literature review and the current status quo across 
the Taiwan Strait, and the exceptional renditions concerning ‘Chinese resistance’ or 
‘Chinese hegemony on Taiwanese side’ are presented as well. The researcher does 
not attempt to cover any ‘deviant’ results but aims to show how people’s behaviour 
is controlled or influenced by their ideologies. And after all, these exceptional 
renditions are not completely unexpected; their possible causes have already been 
addressed in the literature review.  
It should be made clear in this beginning chapter that the researcher views both 
hegemonic and resistance renditions as ideological, which should not have appeared 
during SI sessions according to the SI professional norms (see Chapter 2.3.3.1), and this 
study is mainly aimed at uncovering a certain phenomenon and trying to provide 
possible explanation instead of encouraging or condemning the act of using interpreting 
as a tool for power struggles.   
 
1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
 
The organization of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, the relationships among 
ideology, power, identity and discourse, the conceptions and phenomena of hegemony 
and resistance, the relationships among power, ideology and translation/interpreting, 
and some previous studies of simultaneous interpreting will be briefly discussed. Also, 
how the ruling authorities of China and Taiwan manipulate the ideologies and identities 
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of their people as well as the status quo across the Taiwan Strait will be presented in the 
last two sections of Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, the research methods used in this study for 
investigating whether a trainee interpreter’s ideology may be embodied in his/her 
simultaneous renditions will be discussed. Based on the research aim and literature 
review, the research methods adopted in the study will include a simultaneous 
interpreting experiment for collecting renditions, survey questionnaires, post- 
experiment interview, and critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the renditions. The 
results of the survey questionnaires and the in-depth interview will be used to obtain the 
extra-linguistic information related to the experiment, such as the trainee interpreters’ 
retrospective comments on what they have rendered in the experiment, their specific 
opinions about the cross-strait issues, and their explanations for the possible ideological 
signs found in their renditions. In Chapter 4, the results of the survey questionnaires and 
the in-depth interview will be presented and discussed. In Chapter 5, the CDA analysis 
and discussion will be presented according to the interpreting strategies adopted by the 
subjects. The extra-linguistic information obtained in the simultaneous interpreting 
experiment and in the in-depth interview will be used in the process of the CDA 
analysis in order to increase the validity of the analysis results. The discursive strategies 
and devices used in the ideological renditions will be analyzed individually and 
presented collectively in Chapter 5.5. The qualitative results of the CDA analysis will be 
also presented statistically to highlight the significance of the results. The summary and 
conclusion of the present study will be presented in Chapter 6, which will be followed 
by a discussion of the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
The  main  aim  of  this  study  is  to  investigate  whether  ideologies  of  hegemony  or  
resistance may be embodied in language use (discourse) of simultaneous trainee 
interpreters of China and Taiwan as two nations in unequal power relations. Evidently, 
the aim involves several key concepts: ideology, hegemony, resistance, discourse, 
power, identity and simultaneous interpreting, which should be discussed separately as 
well as holistically in this chapter.  
Translation/interpreting has long been one of the means for intercultural exchanges. 
That translated texts themselves are the very medium directly gives translation 
producers the power to (re)shape ideologies of the audience, which is why 
translation/interpreting has been inextricably linked with power and ideology, in the 
West and East, in ancient times and modern times. Why translation/interpreting as 
discourse, which refers to language use in speech and writing, plays an important role in 
ideology (re)shaping and spreading is that discourse is a form of social practice. By 
interacting with others, sharing knowledge or experience, and expressing feelings and 
thoughts through discourse, people are being socialized and socializing one other. They 
are either consciously or unconsciously developing a system of beliefs in coming to 
terms  with  the  world  around  them.  It  means  that  in  the  process  of  socialization,  
discourse of a group of people reflects not only real situations of the society where they 
are being socialized but also the way in which they look at the world around them, 
namely ideology, which, in a broad sense, is the knowledge and the opinions shared by 
a group of people (van Dijk, 1998: 48). The link between discourse and ideology has 
become one of the main research foci in social sciences, particularly the critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) and translation studies and an emerging one in interpreting 
studies. A review of previous literature in these research fields may provide a clear 
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picture of how discourse becomes a site of ideology and power struggle. Also, ideology 
is highly connected with identity, one’s self-definition, as the latter is usually achieved 
in  relation  to  the  surroundings  and  the  people  concerned.  Those  who  share  the  same  
knowledge and opinions in certain aspects should develop a specific identity. There are 
various identities and they may not be exclusive to one another. As the setting of this 
study is the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, which concerns the relations between 
China and Taiwan as two separate and independent political and economic entities, the 
‘national identity’ of both peoples will be particularly discussed and why the unequal 
power status of these two nations results in their relations as hegemony versus 
resistance should also be reviewed. It is hoped that the review and discussion of all of 
the above key concepts, elements, and previous studies concerned may lay a solid basis 
for interpreting and explaining the ideological signs of hegemony or resistance that may 
be found in simultaneous interpreting within the cross-strait context. 
 
2.1 Ideology, Power, Identity and Discourse: Definitions and Inextricable 
Relationships  
 
It has been widely recognized that ideology, power, identity and discourse are 
inextricably intertwined. Fairclough’s definition of ideology may fully demonstrate such 
close link among these four: 
 
Ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which contribute to 
establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation. They 
may be enacted in ways of interaction (and therefore in genres) and inculcated in 
ways of being identities (and therefore styles). Analysis of texts [discourse]…is an 
important aspect of ideological analysis and critique…(2003: 218) 
 
As the main aim of this present study is to investigate whether political ideologies of 
unequal powers may be embodied in simultaneous renditions of the interpreters from 
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Taiwan and China, the four elements will be discussed and previous studies particularly 
on political ideologies and national identities embodied in discourse will be reviewed in 
the following sections. 
 
2.1.1 Ideology 
 
The term ‘ideology’ has been variously defined with time. Coined in 1796 by 
French Enlightenment aristocrat and philosopher Destutt de Tracy to refer to his 
“science of ideas”, the term ‘ideology’ is “positive, useful, and susceptible of rigorous 
exactitude (Kennedy, 1978: 47)” and “would place the moral and political sciences on a 
firm foundation and cure them of error and ‘prejudice’ (Thompson, 1990: 30; original 
emphasis)”. Soon the term ‘ideology’ is exploited around the early nineteenth century 
by Napoleon Bonaparte against the ‘idéologues’, the metaphysical faction which 
included de Tracy and his associates connected with republicanism. The negative 
denotations of ideology are made manifest in Napoleon’s speech to the French Council 
of State in 1812: 
  
We must lay the blame for the ills that our fair France has suffered on ideology, 
that shadowy metaphysics which subtly searches for first causes on which to base 
the legislation of peoples, rather than making use of laws known to the human 
heart and of the lessons of history. These errors must inevitably and did in fact lead 
to the rule of bloodthirsty men…When someone is summoned to revitalize a state, 
he must follow exactly the opposite principles (Kennedy, 1978: 215). 
 
After the fall of Napolean in 1814, the term ‘ideology’ is no longer used to refer to the 
science of ideas. Instead, it refers to “the ideas themselves” or more specifically “a body 
of ideas which are alleged to be erroneous and divorced from the practical realities of 
political life” (Thompson, 1990: 32). The concepts of ideology are then transformed, 
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though in an ambiguous and varied way, into a very important part of political 
assumptions in Karl Marx’s writings. Drawing inspiration from Napolean’s use of the 
term ‘ideology’, Marx and Engels compare the Young Hegelians to the idéologues and 
describe the Young Hegelians’ viewpoints as ‘the German ideology’, in which ideology 
becomes the “polemical conception” and is defined as “a theoretical doctrine and 
activity which erroneously regards ideas as autonomous and efficacious and which fails 
to grasp the real conditions and characteristics of social-historical life” (ibid: 34-35). 
This polemical conception of ideology is renewed (in 1859) as what Thompson calls the 
“epiphenomenal conception”, according to which, ideology is defined as “a system of 
ideas which expresses the interests of the dominant class but which represents class 
relations in an illusory form” (ibid: 37). Thompson further suggests another latent 
conception  of  ideology  in  parts  of  Marx’s  work  and  defines  it  as  “a  system  of  
representations which serves to sustain existing relations of class domination by 
orientating individuals towards the past rather than the future, or towards images and 
ideals which conceal class relations and detract from the collective pursuit of social 
change  (ibid:  40-41)”.  All  of  Marx’s  conceptions  of  ideology  are  linked  with  class  
power and domination in the Marxist economic base and superstructure model of 
society. The superstructure develops dominant ideology, or false consciousness, into the 
economic base of production, and the power of the dominant is consolidated and 
maintained through control of the ideology of the dominated.  
Marx’s negative conceptions of ideology are then interpreted and expanded to have 
varied but more neutralized denotations by his associates and followers, such as Lenin 
and Lukacs, which have become not only an essential part in Marxism but a theoretical 
base of some disciplines of social sciences (ibid: 44-61). Lenin maintains that mankind 
has created two ideologies: bourgeois ideology and socialist ideology. To prevent the 
domination of bourgeois ideology, it is necessary to combat “the spontaneous 
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development of the working-class”, or “trade-unionism”, in that the trade-union 
consciousness is actually leading the working class to be ideologically enslaved by the 
bourgeoisie (Lenin, 1969: 41). Sharing similar views with Lenin, Lukacs emphasizes 
the significance of proletarian ideology as “the objective and the weapon itself” for 
liberating proletarian class (Lukacs, 1971: 70). Both Lenin and Lukacs regard ideology 
as consciousness of a certain class, which is not exclusively held by the dominant class, 
and thus give more positive traits to the term ‘ideology’ than Marx (Thompson, 1990: 
46).  
In later times, ideology continues to be defined variously and becomes a very 
important element in social sciences. The term ‘ideology’, after its bumping ride in 
social  sciences,  is  reformulated  by  Thompson  as  consisting  of  two  types  of  
conceptions – neutral conceptions of ideology and critical conceptions of ideology. 
While depicting phenomena as “ideology or ideological”, neutral conceptions do not 
imply these phenomena are inherently “misleading, illusory or aligned with the interests 
of any particular group (ibid: 53)” but critical conceptions do and also implicitly 
criticize or condemn the phenomena characterized as ideology or ideological (ibid: 54). 
What Thompson also suggests in the early 90s is that to study ideology in particular 
social and historical contexts is “to study the ways in which meaning serves to establish 
and sustain relations of domination (ibid: 56)”, which echoes the main objective of the 
critical  discourse  analysis  (CDA):  to  study  how  inequality  of  power  is  embodied,  
reproduced and sustained linguistically.  
The  term  ‘ideology’  continues  to  be  variously  defined  and  studied  by  the  CDA  
practitioners. For instance, van Dijk (1998) proposes a comprehensive theory of 
ideology by discussing ideology in the conceptual triangle formed by cognition, society 
and discourse from perspectives of different disciplines, such as psychology, sociology 
and political science. As far as van Dijk is concerned, ideology does not exclusively 
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serve as a tool of the domination or contain inherent negative attributes. There are also 
“ideologies of opposition or resistance”, “ideologies of competition between equally 
powerful groups”, “ideologies that only promote the internal cohesion of a group”, or 
“ideologies about the survival of humankind” (ibid: 11). Also, ideologies are not 
necessarily “individual” or “only mental”; they are socially shared and involve a set of 
both factual and evaluative beliefs, or more specifically, the knowledge and opinions 
(ibid:  48-49).  Hence, on the basis of van Dijk’s analysis of the concepts of ideologies,  
‘ideology’ in this study is defined as what van Dijk proposes: 
 
[…] an ideology is the set of factual and evaluative beliefs – that is the knowledge 
and the opinions – of a group […] In other words, a bit like the axioms of a formal 
system, ideologies consist of those general and abstract social beliefs, shared by a 
group, that control or organize the more specific knowledge and opinions (attitudes) 
of a group (ibid: 48-49). 
 
Van Dijk further points out that not every kind of ideology is ideologically. An 
ideology, such as political ideology, can be seen as ‘ideologically’ when it determines 
“how the world is understood” and “where group interests may be involved”, faces 
challenges from a specific group within a culture or society,  or needs to compete with 
alternatives (ibid: 50-51). In this study, the political ideologies held by trainee 
interpreters from Taiwan and China in terms of One China policy are thus certainly 
ideological as Chinese culture and language is practiced in both nations in a broad sense 
but both peoples generally have conflicting belief of whether Taiwan is part of China.  
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2.1.2 Power 
 
The definitions of power are multifaceted. The term ‘power’ may be generally 
defined as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position  to  carry  out  his  own  will  despite  resistance,  regardless  of  the  basis  on  which  
this probability rests” (Swedberg, 2005: 205). There is also “counter-power” in 
bottom-up relations of resistance (van Dijk, 1998: 11). Power is often demonstrated, 
maintained, and reproduced through discourse, and power inequality may be seen in 
terms of nation, race, gender, ethnicity, age, social status, and many more. For instance, 
‘euro-racism’ spread by European colonial powers to Latin America became a 
legitimate basis of slavery of and discrimination against the natives as ‘Others’. Even 
until nowadays, the racist ideologies towards Latin American natives are still prevailing 
and causing mistreatment of the natives. To raise awareness of racial inequality, some 
CDA practitioners analyze the structures and strategies of racist text and talk and find 
that generally ‘we’ group is positively emphasized while ‘others’ are ignored or linked 
with negative attributions in discourse (van Dijk, 2005). Note that why the CDA 
practitioners particularly focus on ‘hidden’ and ‘seemingly neutral’ ideologies of 
dominant powers embodied in discourse is that unmasking these ideologies is the first 
step before public awareness of the negative effects of these hidden ideologies may be 
raised and then the elimination of inequality that is reproduced and reinforced through 
discourse may be achieved. Power inequality between Taiwan and China is one of the 
main reasons that contribute to ideological conflicts of both peoples over the One China 
policy (see Chapters 2.4 and 2.5).  Therefore,  in this study, the researcher will  examine 
the collected simultaneous interpreting (SI) data as discourse and see how power 
inequality is embodied or maintained in SI.  
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2.1.3 Identity 
 
When it comes to studying the discursive struggle between unequal powers, 
‘identity’ is also one of the key elements. ‘Identity’ may vary with the number of the 
people involved, such as personal identity (an individual’s self-definition), and vary 
with interpersonal and intergroup relationships. By reviewing previous studies, Vignoles, 
et al. (2011: 2) suggest an integrated definition of identity, which is also adopted in this 
study: 
 
…identity comprises not only “who you think you are” (individually or 
collectively), but also “who you act as being” in interpersonal and intergroup 
interactions – and the social recognition or otherwise that these actions receive 
from other individuals or groups  
 
Identity is being constructed and demonstrated through language choice or language 
used in the interactions with different people on different occasions. A man may be 
someone else’s son, father, grandfather, husband, friend, boss, subordinate, and so on. 
His identity will vary with the person(s) he is addressing or interacting with, and his 
language choice will therefore vary with his identity within the context(s). In other 
words, what identity he has or how he is constructing or demonstrating his identity 
within a specific context should be revealed through analysis of his/her language choice 
within that specific context.  
As this present study is to investigate ideological conflict between peoples of 
Taiwan and China as two different and independent political entities and that conflict 
partly or mostly arises from national identities held by these two peoples, it is therefore 
necessary to define the terms ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’ in this section. Smith (1991: 
14) discusses necessary elements of a nation and defines a nation as  
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a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and 
historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal 
rights and duties for all members. 
 
Note that Smith does not give a very specific definition of national identity; instead, he 
clarifies the nature of national identity by discussing its functions and problems. Based 
on his definition of a nation, Smith further points out that national identity is 
multi-faceted, and once developed, it “can never be reduced to a single element, even by 
particular factions of nationalists, nor can it be easily or swiftly induced in a population 
by artificial means (ibid: 14)”. National identity is also multi-functionally powerful to 
both individuals and groups. There are both external and internal functions. The external 
ones are related to territory, economy and politics. For instance, one of the most 
important political functions of national identity is “its legitimation of common legal 
rights and duties of legal institutions, which define the peculiar values and character of 
the nation and reflect the age-old customs and mores of the people (ibid: 16)”. The 
internal functions of national identity are intended for individual members of a nation. 
The most obvious internal function is to socialize these members as “nationals and 
citizens” by inculcating “national devotion and a distinctive, homogeneous culture” 
through education systems and mass media, which may shape strong collective beliefs 
in “cultural authenticity and unity” of the nation (ibid: 16). Therefore, it may follow that 
one’s strong sense of national identity may indicate his/her relatively strong willingness 
to promote social solidarity, to truly believe or pride in the common shared values and 
assets  of  the  nation,  to  follow  what  the  nation  expects  him/her  to  do,  or  to  defend  or  
justify his/her nation in various aspects in the face of outside threats or challenges.  
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 Although Smith provides a very clear explanation of national identity, a more 
specific definition of national identity suggested by Guibernau (2007: 11) will be 
adopted in this study, which is: 
 
National identity is a collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the 
same nation and of sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other 
nations. National identity is a modern phenomenon of a fluid and dynamic nature. 
While consciousness of forming a nation may remain constant for long periods of 
time, the elements upon which such a feeling is based may vary. 
   
One of the most salient traits of national identity defined by Guibernau – the fluid and 
dynamic nature of national identity in modern times – indicates that although national 
identity cannot be developed or (re)shaped easily and quickly, nowadays it can never 
remain unchanged under the influence of globalization. More specifically, national 
identity in modern times is “simultaneously more solidly constructed by efficient 
strategies of nation-building and much more open to alien influences impossible to 
control and exclude from the national space (ibid: 189). The dynamic conceptualizations 
of national identity have become one of the complex issues that studies on national 
identity of modern times often need to deal with. ‘Narrative identity’ in Ricoeur’s 
identity theory (1992) may be suitable for explaining the dynamic nature of national 
identity. Ricoeur first distinguishes identity as sameness (Latin idem) from identity as 
selfhood (Latin ipse) in his personal identity theory. The former is “a concept of relation 
and a relation of relations (ibid: 116)”, with three components forming its conceptual 
articulation: numerical identity, qualitative identity, and uninterrupted continuity. 
Numerical identity corresponds “the notion of identification, understood in the sense of 
the  reidentification  of  the  same,  which  makes  cognition  recognition:  the  same  thing  
twice, n times (ibid: 116)”. Qualitative identity involves “extreme resemblance” and 
corresponds the “operation of substitution without semantic loss, salva veritate” (ibid: 
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116). As time may be a factor causing dissemblance, divergence or difference, the 
uninterrupted continuity functions as “a supplementary or a substitutive criterion to 
similitude” (ibid: 117). Ricoeur suggests that there should be “an intervention of 
narrative identity” in the polarity between idem-identity and ipse-identity (ibid: 
118-119). Narrative identity is “by linguistic convention, the identity of the character 
(ibid: 141)”. The space limit prevents the researcher from giving a detailed explanation 
of Ricoeur’s concept of narrative identity; instead, the description of narrative identity 
given by Wodak, et al. (2009: 14) may make it clear why the concept of narrative 
identity may be used to explain the dynamic nature of national identity: 
 
Narrative identity allows various, different, partly contradictory circumstances and 
experiences to be integrated into a coherent temporal structure, thus making it 
possible to sketch a person’s identity against the background of a dynamic 
constancy model which does justice to the coherence of a human life. Thus the 
concept of narrative identity can go beyond the one-sided model of an invariant, 
self-identical thing. It can take into account the idea that the self can never be 
grasped without the other, without change. 
  
The concept of narrative identity may explain repeated rectification of one’s perception 
of identity amid changes of the world around him/her and still present one’s identity as a 
whole. In this study, how national identity is developed or (re)shaped in Taiwan and 
China will be discussed in Chapters 2.4 and 2.5. 
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2.1.4 Ideology, power, and identity in discourse 
 
One of the popular definitions of ‘discourse’ in the CDA field is: 
 
CDA  sees  discourse  –  language  use  in  speech  and  writing  –  as  a  form  of  ‘social  
practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship 
between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institutions(s) and social 
structure(s), which frame it: The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also 
shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially 
conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social 
identities  of  and  relationships  between  people  and  groups  of  people.  It  is  
constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status 
quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so 
socially  consequential,  it  gives  rise  to  important  issues  of  power.  Discursive  
practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and 
reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women 
and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which 
they represent things and position people (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 258). 
 
This definition not only fully explains the aims, viewpoints, and significance of the 
CDA in studying ‘discourse’ but also points out the inextricable relationships among 
ideology, power, identity and discourse. The detailed introduction of the CDA history, 
content, and method will be discussed in Chapter 3 as it will be the main research 
method in this study. In this section, the researcher would like to look at some previous 
CDA studies particularly on political ideologies and national identities. 
Of all the famous contemporary CDA practitioners, Ruth Wodak may be one of the 
leading roles in addressing issues of both political ideologies and national identities in 
the CDA field. As a Europe-based scholar with Austrian roots, Wodak particularly 
focuses on the discursive construction of Austrian national identity (e.g. Wodak, et al., 
2009) and the changes of national and transnational identities with the evolution of the 
European Union (EU) (e.g. Wodak, 2004). As a landlocked country in Central Europe, 
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Austria has been susceptible to changes of European political landscape and climate. 
Once as part  of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (962-1806) and one of 
the great powers of Europe around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, its ill and 
bumping fate since the end of World War I, particularly its occupation by Nazi Germany 
between 1938 and 1945 and its redefinition as a neutral sovereign state in 1955, has 
caused a great impact on the development of Austrian national identity, which is subject 
to diverse powerful influence from both inside and outside and suffers constant needs of 
(re)shaping. To investigate how Austrian national identity is being constructed through 
discursive strategies and shifts of Austrian national identity amid EU integration, 
twenty-two public commemorative speeches given by several representative Austrian 
political leaders on special national days involving identity management and public 
self-reflection are critically analyzed (Wodak, et al., 2009). Commemorative speeches 
on special national anniversaries tend to be used to “legitimate ways of dealing with the 
past,  by  selecting  affirmative  elements  from  the  past  which  seem  useful  for  justifying  
present interests (Staudinger, 1994: 21; cited from Wodak, et al., 2009: 70). Analyzing 
commemorative speeches often help identify how politicians express their political 
values, construct common identities, and promote public consensus. In addition to the 
political speeches, Wodak et al. (2009) also examine discursive utterances of individuals 
generated in a semi-public context - from seven focus group interviews on the same 
topic, each with eight to ten participants and lasting about two hours, in order to 
investigate attitudes and statements about identities on an individual basis. The analysis 
of the discursive data shows that some linguistic strategies and devices are used for 
discursively constructing national identities. For instance, the deictic ‘we’ and its other 
dialectal forms are frequently used in the focus group discussions to signify 
inclusiveness as opposed to ‘they’, which is used to referred to ‘others’. Another 
linguistic means of constituting groups is the use of “anthroponymic generic terms”, 
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such as ‘Austrian’s’, ‘German’s’, and so on. The participants are also found to link ‘they’ 
groups with derogatory and negative attributions (ibid: 141-142). Meanwhile, another 
twenty-four participants are given semi-private interviews in which questions about 
national identity, such as “What does Austria mean?” and “Who is an Austrian?”, are 
answered. A review of all the data obtained respectively in public, semi-public, and 
semi-private settings shows that different linguistic strategies and devices are used to 
construct Austrian national identity and that in-group power relations may affect how 
people express themselves. For instance, the “explicit discursive exclusion and 
ostracism of non-Austrians living in Austria” is deemed as a “taboo” at a public setting, 
while at the other two settings, the exclusionary usage is frequently employed for 
identity construction (ibid: 192). Also, the past Austrian history is found to be crucial to 
constructing a collective identity although the perception of which part of the history is 
significant varies (ibid: 194). In terms of the content of the public speeches, they mainly 
focus on narrating a common political past and discursively constructing a common 
political present and future, while the focus group discussions and interviews focus on 
the construction of a common culture (ibid: 74). One of the concerns that Wodak et al. 
would like to address is whether European integration would pose a threat to Austrian 
identity, and the findings show that at the time of investigation, the majority of the 
Austrian participants still “favoured EU-membership for economic and security reasons” 
(ibid: 198). It is also found that “real or perceived power relations in the group seem to 
have influenced participants towards expressing opinions they believe to be socially 
desirable and towards avoiding taboo subjects”, and the participants tend to “avoid open 
conflicts in the group and to work towards achieving group consensus, even in 
heterogeneous groups” (ibid: 109).   
Wodak’s another study (2004) investigating construction of national and 
translational identities against the background of EU integration may serve as another 
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good example of how identity shift or construction is embodied discursively. Assuming 
that “similarity of responses to certain question types may be indexical of orientation to 
a similar type of identity or identities” and being aware that “even the same person may 
have multiple contradictions and ‘ideological dilemmas’ in his or her statements” (ibid: 
103), Wodak analyzes twenty-eight interviews with fourteen Austrian members of the 
European Parliament, with a focus on certain discursive strategies used to construct 
sameness and difference. The study finds that EU organizational identities are being 
formed as ‘We’ group, especially in contrast with the US and Japan as out-groups, 
which can be observed from some linguistic strategies, such as the patterns of reference.    
The above CDA research results indicate elements of identity, power and ideology 
may be embodied in discourse. Likewise, translated texts as discourse should reflect the 
relationships among these elements, which will be discussed further in Chapter 2.3. 
 
2.2 Hegemony and Resistance 
 
2.2.1 Concepts of hegemony and resistance  
 
The distribution of power has been one of the major issues in human world. A 
dominant power may lead to hegemony, which may in turn cause resistance to such 
hegemony. The word ‘hegemony’ derives from the Greek word ਲȖİȝȠȞȓĮ (literally rule 
or leadership), which generally means “the pre-eminence or supremacy that a state, a 
social group, or even an individual may exercise over others (Fontana, 2006: 24)”. It 
should be noted that ‘hegemony’ in ancient Greece originally involves reciprocal 
consent between the dominant and the subordinate, which may be exemplified in the 
Peloponnesian War between the Peloponnesian League organized with Sparta as the 
hegemon and the Delian League under the leadership of hegemonic Athens. Both 
rivaling hegemons organize respectively an alliance of neighboring states which freely 
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give consent to the hegemonic leadership (Thucydides, 1910). Hegemony which is 
rightfully achieved through consent of free citizens is recognized by Aristotle as a 
means to prevent slavery and benefit the ruled (Fontana, 2006: 25). In Greek cases, 
hegemony may be formed to fight against another hegemony and prevent the former 
from slavery. Thus, hegemony may be a form of resistance to another hegemony and is 
not inherently negative or harmful, while resistance may not be inherently in bottom-up 
power relations with hegemony but a rivaling power against hegemony.  
At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century, ‘hegemony’ becomes one of 
the prominent political terms in the Russian Social-Democratic movement. Plekhanov 
first  urges the Russian working class to fight against  the “domination (gospodstvo)” of 
Tsarism and absolutism, and later on his colleague Axelrod emphasizes the pre-eminent 
role of the proletariat in helping Russian Social-Democracy gain hegemony 
(gegemoniya) in the Russian bourgeois revolution (Anderson, 1976: 15-16). Lenin, in 
his letter addressing Plekhanov in January of 1901, also proposes achieving “real 
hegemony” of the Russian working class through establishment of a political newspaper 
(Lenin, 1974: 56). Clearly, hegemony in Marxism refers particularly to “rule or 
domination to relations between social classes” (Williams, 1977: 108). Hegemony may 
not be exclusive to upper classes or the privileged; similar to what has happened in 
ancient Greek times, gaining hegemony through revolution may be another form of 
resistance. The concept and purview of hegemony is then redefined by Antonio Gramsci, 
one of the prominent Marxist theoreticians in the twentieth century, who has drawn 
inspiration partly from the Russian revolution and Niccolò Machiavelli’s ideas of 
politics and history. Pondering over the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Gramsci sees 
the activeness rather than the predetermination of historical events overcome ideologies: 
 
In Russia, Marx’s Capital was more the book of the bourgeoisie than of the 
proletariat.  It  stood  as  the  critical  demonstration  of  how  events  should  follow  a  
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pre-determined course: how in Russia a bourgeoisie had to develop, and a capitalist 
era had to open, with the setting up of a Western-type civilization, before the 
proletariat  could  even  think  in  terms  of  its  own revolt,  its  own demands,  its  own 
revolution. But events have overcome ideologies. Events have exploded the critical 
schemas determining how the history of Russia would unfold according to the 
cannons of historical materialism (Gramsci, 1977: 34). 
 
And that activeness of history lies in “not raw economic facts, but man, men in societies, 
men in relation to one another, reaching agreements with one another, developing 
through these contacts (civilization) a collective, social will (ibid: 34-5)”. Gramsci’s 
argument that power is gained and maintained through force and consent is also under 
the influence of Machiavelli’s masterpiece The Prince:    
 
You must know there are two ways of contesting, the one by the law, the other by 
force; the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first 
is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore 
it is necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the 
man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe 
how Achilles  and  many other  princes  of  old  were  given  to  the  Centaur  Chiron  to  
nurse, who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as they had 
for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to 
know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not 
durable (Machiavelli, 2006 [1515]: Chapter XVIII). 
 
Bearing the dichotomy of force and consent in mind, Gramsci proposes a State equals 
political society plus civil society. While political society imposes “authoritarian and 
forcible interventions”, in civil society all men are “equally rational and moral” and 
“capable of accepting the law spontaneously, freely, and not through coercion, as 
imposed by another class, as something external to consciousness” (1971: 263). Here, 
Gramsci’s idea of civil society has transformed traditional Marxists’ concept of 
hegemony into something that denotes the ascendancy of a class in every sphere and its 
ability to obtain subordination of other classes by having them take values and beliefs of 
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that dominant class and give consent to the domination of that class. Hegemony is not 
only gained from using force against the disobedient but maintained by the consent of 
the dominated. Just as Williams (1977: 110) elaborates Gramsci’s concept of hegemony: 
 
Hegemony is then not only the articulate upper level of ‘ideology’, nor are its 
forms of control only those ordinarily seen as ‘manipulation’ or 
‘indoctrination’ …It is a lived system of meanings and values – constitutive and 
constituting – which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally 
confirming. It is thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a 
sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for 
most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives (original 
emphasis).   
 
Why hegemony becomes powerful and long-lasting lies in its deep-rootedness as a form 
of ideologies. Once hegemony is ideologically accepted as something natural, neutral, 
or  even  beneficial,  it  is  difficult  to  challenge  or  resist  it.  Scott  (1985:  236)  points  out  
hegemony has the “vital impact of power on the definition of what is practical” so that 
people are “no longer speaking of justice and legitimacy, but only of the more or less 
rational understanding of what is  achievable in a given situation”.  Hegemony does not 
only coerce or persuade people to accept the fact of being dominated but also makes the 
domination of the ruling power legitimated or justified by those who think it’s practical 
or realistic to do so. Nowadays, the deepening globalization and advancing technology 
are contributing to overwhelmingly powerful hegemony affecting many aspects of 
human life in more and more sophisticated and persuasive manners. Hegemony now 
also represents the “capacity to mobilize consent and cooperation internationally, by 
acting in such a way as to make at least plausible to others the claim that …[it is ] acting 
in the general interest” even when it actually puts its interest first (Arrighi, 2005: 33). 
The national boundaries can no longer confine the influence of hegemony, particularly 
in  terms  of  politics,  economy,  and  culture,  to  certain  corners  of  the  world.  And  the  
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globalization makes ‘hegemony’ more ideologically powerful than ever. Based on the 
nature and function of ‘hegemony’ in this modern time and Scruton’s definition of 
hegemony (2007: 295), ‘hegemony’ may be defined in this study as “the ascendancy of 
[a power], not only in the economic sphere, but through all social, political and 
ideological spheres, and its ability thereby to persuade [others] to see the world in terms 
favourable to its own ascendancy”. Nowadays, the overwhelming power of hegemony 
has also made a profound impact on the form of resistance. One may resist coercion or 
force through physical efforts, but to fight against deep-rooted ideological influence of 
hegemony can never be achieved through force only, especially when the public are not 
aware that the public consent given to some hegemony has been built on false 
consciousness.  As  a  result,  if  one  would  like  to  resist  or  challenge  some  hegemony  
nowadays, to break the spell of hidden hegemonic ideologies imposed on the public 
may be the first and the most significant step, which may be why more and more 
researchers or scholars call for active ideological resistance from the public against 
ideological manipulation of whatever form of hegemony (see also Chapter 2.3.2).   
 
2.2.2 Chinese hegemony and resistance 
 
Nowadays with increasing globalization, global hegemony, particularly in terms of 
politics, culture or economy, could have a profound impact on most people in the world. 
It may be argued that China, originally a regional hegemon in the East, is turning (or has 
turned) into a global hegemon in all of the three aspects mentioned above. ‘Hegemony 
with Chinese characteristics’ has already aroused global concern. In his article 
Hegemony with Chinese characteristics, Friedberg points out that competing with the 
U.S. for world power and influence, China has its desire to “reestablish a Sino-centric 
system” widely regarded as “natural and appropriate” in China (2011: 20). Friedberg, 
just as many other Westerners, attributes this Chinese sense of superiority to China’s 
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long and glorious past but does not specify why and how Chinese leaders and people 
develop such hegemonic attitude. 
Similar to what Gramsci holds for his concept of a state and civil society, Chinese 
hegemony has also been achieved through force and consent, except that the public 
consent  is  partly  (if  not  largely)  developed  and  obtained  through  force.  The  first  
emperor to unify ancient China as a centralized empire was Qin Shi-huangછۈࣤ
(259-210 BC), who was notorious for his dogmatism and tyranny. Under his rule, the 
public’s freedom of expression was increasingly restricted (Sima, 1981: 236). In 213 
BC, Qin ordered across the empire that books be burned, except those held by the 
imperial court or concerned with such practical subjects as divination, agriculture and 
medicine, and intellectuals with different ideologies from his be executed (ibid: 255). 
Since the Qin period, it has become one of the unwritten rules in China that punishment 
may be imposed on whoever offends emperors or those in power through use of 
language. The ‘use of language’ here does not mean only written or oral criticism but 
also simple, unintentional use of words in writing. The persecutions for wording, known 
as literary inquisitionЎӷᅢ, have been occurring on a quite regular basis in China (Hu, 
1993). Arguably, by persecuting dissidents, China’s literary inquisition serves as a 
means to achieve a public ‘consensus’ of opinion, and China’s ruling class may 
manipulate people’s thinking, which in turn strengthens political sensitivity and shapes 
collective ideologies.  
While using force to obtain the subordination of the dominated, China develops 
and maintains its cultural hegemony by spreading its state philosophy - Confucianism. 
In terms of ruling a state, Confucius gives the top priority to establishing social order by 
rectifying incorrect wording for different social statuses and having everyone act 
according to his/her status (1980: 135, 140). Also, Confucius’s distinction between the 
Han people (Chinese) and the non-Han people (barbarians) ๮Ӯϐᒣ (ibid: 160; Liu, 
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2000: 128-32) has also been widely adopted as the basis of Sinocentrism and fostering 
the Chinese sense of cultural superiority (Terrill, 2003). While Confucianism promotes 
the concept:  ‘do as you would be done byρ܌όటǴϮࡼܭΓ’, the Han people hail 
consumption of barbarian flash and blood as heroic deeds. For instance, one of the 
sentences of a Chinese must-read poem Mӽn JƯang HóngᅈԢआ, which is considered to 
be  written  by  General  Yue  Feiۢ० (1103-1142) of the South Sòng China, explicitly 
describes the Han people’s great hostility or hatred towards non-Han ethnicities: “[Our] 
ambition  is  to  satisfy  [our]  hunger  by  eating  the  flesh  of  barbarians  and  quench  [our]  
thirst by drinking the blood of the Xiongnu1 while laughing and talking֧דବᓓचဥ
ԺǴઢፋ෰໯ӎѩՈ (see Yao, 1995: 547; my translation)”. Confucianism has also 
taught people to ‘emulate those better than themselvesـ፣ࡘሸ’, which, on the surface, 
holds a liberal attitude towards learning from Others. However, ancient China tended to 
take those introduced foreign cultures as part of its own invention. For example, the 
Han people were not keen in inventing musical instruments, which is probably because 
most music was considered to be lewd and decadentᜧᜧϐॣ under Confucianism (Yu 
& Sun, 1987: 34). Yet, those musical instruments introduced from foreign cultures, such 
as Huqinचถ(a bowed string instrument), Yangqinඦถ(a hammered dulcimer) and 
SuonaⒽ֑(similar to oboes), in the end became part of the ‘national’ music instruments 
of China, which means they are widely thought of as China’s national heritage passed 
down  from  ancient  times.  Arguably,  Confucianism,  which  seems  to  promote  social  
stability, contains strong hegemonic thinking. On the one hand, Confucian plausible 
doctrines for obtaining and maintaining social order hold a hegemonic attitude towards 
the general public and guide them to act ‘properly’ through education and examination 
systems; on the other hand, Confucianism shapes and develops Confucian identity 
among Confucian communities by promoting discrimination against the non-Han 
                                                        
1 Nomadic tribes near the north of China proper. 
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people or against those who do not practice Confucianism. Nowadays, Confucius 
Institutes (CIs) sponsored by the Chinese government for Chinese language(s) and 
Confucianism learning are mushrooming worldwide as one of China’s soft power 
initiatives. Concerns and controversies about the purpose of Confucius Institutes have 
arisen outside China. While some countries, such India, reject the CIs establishment 
plans for suspecting China of using culture as a tool for propagating Chinese soft power 
(Marklein, 2009, 7 December), others consider the establishment of CIs to be a sign that 
China would like to express its good will and promote “harmonious society” - an 
essential Confucian concept (Paradise, 2009: 648). Yet, when people fear that CIs may 
(have) become a mouthpiece for China’s policies (ibid: 659-62), they may not be aware 
of the ideological effects of the hegemonic denotations and connotations embedded in 
the classics of Confucianism. 
Notably, Chinese hegemony encounters domestic resistance from time to time. The 
overthrow of despotic or corrupt rule is not unusual in Chinese history but often ended 
up with the rise of another hegemonic Chinese empire. In addition to military force, 
people inside China also show their resistance to Chinese hegemony in more subtle or 
diverse ways. For instance, resistance through Chinese translation has caused a 
profound impact on Chinese culture and politics. The ‘foreignizing’ strategy in Chinese 
sutra translation between the mid-second century and the early twelfth century has been 
largely attributed to incompetence of translators, most of whom were of foreign origin 
(Ma, 2004: 33-6). Yet, the existence of ‘biàn wénᡂЎ,’ a kind of vernacular script of 
religious stories or songs elaborated by Buddhist preachers, who might be translators as 
well, on the basis of the sutra translations (Song, 1983), indicates the bilingual 
competence of translators. As the sutra translators were found to have been “extremely 
sensitive to Chinese norms and practices in order for their work to be correctly 
positioned (Hung, 2005: 48)”, it is likely that the sutra translators may show their 
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resistance to Chinese hegemony by providing obscure and foreignized texts. While 
China pursues and safeguards the ‘purity’ of the Chinese language (e.g. Mai, 2011), the 
foreignized Chinese sutra translation has changed much of Chinese language use (Zhu, 
1989; Chu, 1992: 177-178). Centuries later, the Chinese translations even contributed to 
overthrowing ancient China and modernizing China. More specifically, the Chinese 
translators in the first half of the twentieth century awaken China to the danger of 
sticking to its old ways by introducing foreign thinking or bringing a literary and 
linguistic revolution through ideologically motivated and manipulated translations (e.g. 
Yang, 2006). The modernization of China in the end gives birth to another totalitarian 
hegemony – the People’s Republic of China, and the constant domestic resistance to 
Chinese hegemony, which appealed for freedom and democracy, has led to the Chinese 
government’s serious violations of human rights, such as the military suppression of the 
1989 Tiananmen Square Protests. At the time of writing, the persecution of Chinese 
artist Ai Weiwei Ն҂҂,  who  is  a  well-known  critic  of  the  Chinese  government,  has  
aroused global concern.2 It is likely that domestic resistance in whatever forms calling 
for freedom and human rights under the totalitarian Chinese hegemony will hardly 
cease.   
 
2.3 Power, Ideology and Translation/Interpreting 
 
2.3.1 The link among power, ideology and translation 
 
Translation has long been one of the media for spreading and (re)shaping ideology 
in the battlefield of ‘power’. In fact, translation by nature may be seen as a political act. 
Alvarez & Vidal (1996: 2) consider translation to be a political act as translation is 
“culture bound” and “has to do with the production and ostentation of power and with 
                                                        
2 The information retrieved on 1 September 2012 from the BBC website at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13016289. 
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the strategies used by this power in order to represent the other culture”. Translation, on 
micro-level, involves ideologies of different agents who create, produce, edit, revise, 
review or appreciate translated texts (Tahir-Gürça÷lar, 2003: 113), while on macro-level, 
translation is usually sponsored or controlled by the ruling authorities, whose attitudes 
towards the Others tend to play a decisive role in translation development. For instance, 
the Roman Empire destroyed ancient Greece but refined its own literary culture by 
inheriting and spreading the Greek culture through systematic translation. The Romans 
were ambivalent about such a contradiction that the powerful Romans bowed to and 
benefited from the hegemonic Greek culture. Yet, Cicero (106-43BC) a linguist, 
translator and philosopher of the Roman Empire, recognized the ambivalence and 
promoted translation of Greek texts, which “creates a place for translation in the Roman 
curriculum and also in the higher reaches of Latin rhetorical and literary theory 
(Copland,  1995:  11)”.  In  the  Middle  Ages,  Christian  philosophy  rose  as  a  form  of  
hegemony. Religion became the pretext for power struggles. In addition to staging wars 
against the Others, such as the Crusades (1096-1291), the powerful Church 
monopolized the interpretation of the Bible. Except those recognized and promulgated 
Bible versions, such as St. Jerome’s Vulgate (Rebenich, 2002: 50-51), other Bible 
translations  as  well  as  their  translators  were  forbidden  and  persecuted.  Martin  Luther  
(1483-1546) of German and William Tyndale (1494-1536) of England could be the most 
famous of the persecuted Bible translators (O'Sullivan & Herron, 2000). Martin 
Luther’s German Bible translation was made in the language of the people, which not 
only made the Bible accessible to the public but also built a solid foundation for the 
modern German language. Likewise, William Tyndale, under the influence of Martin 
Luther, first translated the Bible from original Greek and Hebrew into early modern 
English and contributed a lot to the English reformation. Although both Luther and 
Tyndale were accused of heresy at the time, their Bible translations made a profound 
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impact on the language development within their own countries. European translators 
enriched their vernaculars by translating the Bible from Latin, Greek or Hebrew, which 
further contributed to the rise of the Renaissance and nationalism that brought the 
Middle Ages as well as Christian hegemony to an end (Bassnett, 2002: 53-57). 
Translation  in  the  East  is  also  closely  linked  with  power.  For  instance,  the  ups  and  
downs of the sutra translation activity in China, with its peak around the Táng Period 
(618-907) and significant decline around the late North Sòng Period (960-1127), was 
subject  to  whether  the  ruling  class  of  ancient  China  used  it  as  a  means  to  control  the  
mind of people and consolidate the ruling power (Ma, 2004: 18). Yet, faced with 
Chinese Sinocentrism and strong sense of cultural superiority, sutra translators quietly 
staged their resistance to Chinese hegemony through the use of foreignizing translation 
strategies (see also Chapter 2.2.2). Note that translation is not necessarily a site of 
power struggles. For instance, even during the era of the Crusades, a large number of 
scholars  on  either  side  in  the  Crusades,  who  were  Christians,  Jews,  or  Muslims,  
gathered in Toledo and engaged in translating scientific and philosophical texts from 
Arabic to Latin (Grant, 1996: 23-24). Just as Alvarez & Vidal (1996: 4) maintain: 
 
Translation is not the production of one text equivalent to another text, but rather a 
complex process of rewriting that runs parallel both to the overall view of language 
and of the ‘Other’ people have throughout history; and to the influences and the 
balance of power that exist between one culture and another. 
 
Whether it’s nation, race or religion that serves as the pretext for power struggle or 
alliance through translation, ideology remains one of the most essential elements that 
drive or trigger such struggle or alliance in that ideology, or a system of socially-shared 
ideas and beliefs, helps “legitimate the interest of a ruling group or class by distortion or 
dissimulation (Eagleton, 1991: 30)”. Therefore, translation may be promoted under the 
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influence of ‘patronage’ (Lefevere, 1992) and/or hindered by ‘censorship (Schäffner 
2007: 138-40)’. For instance, to build a common cultural basis and a new literary 
repertoire for the newly established Turkish nation, a Translation Bureau was set up in 
Turkey around the mid-twentieth century, where a total of 1,247 ideologically selected 
Western classics were translated for political mission (Tahir-Gürça÷lar, 2003). For 
another instance, Gonzalez Ruiz’s study (2000; cited from Schäffner, 2007: 139) finds 
that film titles translation into Spanish under the Franco regime was ideologically 
manipulated through censorship in order to promote Catholic values. Translation as a 
medium for spreading and (re)shaping ideology is thus by nature ideological. As 
Schaffner (2003: 23) maintains, “any translation is ideological since the choice of a 
source text and the use to which the subsequent target text is put are determined by the 
interests, aims, and objectives of social agents”. 
 In recent decades, the link between ideology and translation on micro-level has one 
of the main research foci in translation studies. Bassnett (1996: 22) suggests the need 
for reassessing the role of the translator, whose intervention in the process of linguistic 
transfer is “crucial” as translated texts are hardly free from adulteration. More 
specifically, every decision or choice translators make in the process of translating is 
under the influence of their surrounding “socio-political milieu”, which in other words 
is their own “culture” (Alvarez & Vidal, 1996: 5). Therefore, translators may be 
‘partisan’, steering ideologically-motivated translation movement towards their desired 
geopolitical results. They may help reviving or boosting hegemony. John Denham’s 
translation entitled The Destruction of Troy: An Essay upon the Second Book of Virgils 
Æneis. Written in the Year, 1636, which was published in 1656, may be one of the 
examples. By adopting a neoclassical translation method, which was, by nature, the 
same as free translation or domesticating translation method, Denham asserted his 
translation to be representation of truth and asserted himself as part of the aristocratic 
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literary culture. The deliberate omission of his authorship on the title page was aimed at 
effacing his identity and concealing his political motivation behind the translation. The 
time gap between the translation year and the publication year indicated on the title page 
implied his continual royalist loyalty and support which attempted to arouse nostalgia 
for those good old days under royal hegemony and to be prepared for the comeback of 
hegemony. Denham’s domesticating translation has indeed shown that translation is not 
just a form of writing or rewriting but a cultural-political practice (Venuti, 1995: 44-65). 
Translators may also make their translations as resistance against oppression. For 
instance, Tymoczko (2000), by focusing on the translation of narratives of medieval 
Irish hero, Cu Chulainn, demonstrates how the translation of Irish literature into English 
at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century was manipulated to help boost Irish 
cultural  nationalism.  Cu  Chulainn,  a  son  of  a  mortal  woman  and  the  God  Lug,  was  
originally “a louse-ridden youth, whose battle-rages cause him to become distorted and 
grotesque” and was found to neglect his duty of guarding the territory border “in pursuit 
of a woman’s backside”. Yet, some patriotic Irish translators turned him into a flawless 
heroic model who desperately resisted oppression (ibid: 29). In a similar vein, to urge 
Chinese people to stand up against the QƯng China Empire, Su Manshu᝵ୗਸ in his 
Chinese translation of Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables left out the original sections that 
could not serve his patriotic purposes, turned the original benevolent character Bishop 
Myriel into a greedy hypocrite (in order to compound the suffering of the oppressed), 
added a lot of plots and lines that had not been found in the original and created several 
characters that did not exist in the original. For instance, the heroic character Míng Nán 
Dé ܴتቺ  (literally Míng Male Virtue), who hated injustice and attempted to 
overthrow the monarchic tyranny, was invented in order to awaken backward China 
through criticism made by Nán Dé (Wong, 2004) and to stimulate a democratic 
revolution in the QƯng China Empire (Deng, 2010).  
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 Yet, translation on micro-level involves not only ideology of the translator but also 
ideologies of authors, critics, publishers, editors, and readers (Tahir-Gürça÷lar, 2003: 
113) as well as the power relations in human world. Lefevere (1992: 59-67) takes 
Anneliese Schütz’s German translation of the Dagboeken van Anne Frank (the Anne 
Frank’s diaries) as an example under the influence of a mixture of old-school ideology 
and commercial ideology. One of the most famous ‘mistranslations’ in Schütz’s version 
is that she translated the Dutch sentence “er bestaat geen groter vijandschap op de 
wereld  dan  tussen  Duitsers  en  Joden  [there  is  no  greater  enmity  in  the  world  than  
between Germans and Jews]” into “eine grössere Feindschaft als zwischen diesen 
Deutschen und den Juden gibt es nicht auf der Welt!  [there is  no greater enmity in the 
world than between these Germans and the Jews]. Schütz defends her mistranslation by 
saying, ‘a book you want to sell well in Germany…should not contain any insults 
directed at Germans” (ibid: 66). The reprinting of Schütz’s translation version further 
indicates that the publisher’s commercial deliberations are much more important than 
the quality of translation. In addition, Chan’s study (2007)3 involves a much-debated 
event where there are two different Mandarin versions of Hilary Clinton’s memoir 
translated by the same group of the translators, which may serve as another translation 
example subject to the influence of political and commercial ideologies. Through back 
translation, Chan finds the Mandarin version published in Taiwan (hereinafter the 
Taiwan version) quite faithful to the original English version while the other Mandarin 
version published in China (hereinafter the China version) omits, shortens or changes all 
the politically sensitive passages. Chan maintains that nowadays “self-censorship has 
replaced state sanction as the form of information control” in China (ibid: 127), and 
then attributes the unfaithfulness of the China version to market forces, which drive the 
                                                        
3 While discussing Chan’s study, the researcher would like to point out that the title of her article, One 
Nation Two Translations, is very likely to mislead those unfamiliar with cross-strait relations into thinking 
that Taiwan is part of China and is being governed and controlled by China, which is not true of the 
current status quo across the Taiwan Strait. 
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publishing company to shorten translation for a quick release and to modify the original 
content “in the name of readership, or business (ibid: 128)”. However, according to 
Chan, the China publishing company, Yilin Press, bought the copyright of the Taiwan 
version for the purpose of a quick release instead of producing its own translation 
version. It seems strange that instead of directly publishing the Taiwan version in 
simplified Mandarin for an even quicker release, Yilin Press spent time revising the 
translation. Furthermore, Chan suggests Yilin Press’s tendency to forsake translation 
quality for quick release by giving another example of Yilin Press’s simplified Chinese 
version of The Lord of the Rings as evidence (ibid: 128). However, according to Chan’s 
own back translation analysis, the Taiwan version has stayed close to the source texts. 
Since the quality of the Taiwan version is good, why did the China publisher still 
abandon translation quality by making changes to the Taiwan version for the purpose of 
quick release? As Chan points out, everything in the source texts that is “damning for 
the Communist regime” has been deleted in the China version. She considers it to be 
caused by the China publisher’s self-censorship for the sake of readership as nowadays 
few state-run media companies are subject to advance state censorship in China (ibid: 
128). Yet, given the fact that China’s record of human rights is not considered 
acceptable by many nations, it may be reasonable to assume that the adulterated China 
version of Hilary Clinton’s memoir is subject to both commercial and political 
ideologies.  
 The idea that a translator’s behaviour is governed by their ideology (Robinson, 
cited from Calzada-Pérez, 2003: 7) has been confirmed by various studies; Toury (1999: 
19)  even  argues  that  “it  is  always  the  translator  herself  or  himself,  as  an  autonomous  
individual,  who  decides  how  to  behave,  be  that  decision  fully  conscious  or  not”.  Yet,  
given the increasingly strong power of world hegemony in the form of various agents or 
patrons of translation (Venuti, 1995, 1998; see also Chapter 2.3.2), the freedom of the 
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translator to exercise his/her discretion seems to be inevitably restricted. In other words, 
the translator’s ideology may not play the most decisive role in the finalized version of 
his/her translation. What may need to be more aware are the power struggle behind 
translation and the ideologies behind that power struggle. The link among power, 
ideology and translation has been disclosed fully in the field of translation studies. By 
contrast, the link among power, ideology and interpreting, which may be seen as the 
oral counterpart of translation, remains much less explored. In the following Chapter 
2.3.3.3, the researcher will review previous interpreting studies which have found 
interpreters choose what not to interpret or how to interpret source texts at their 
discretion and present the difference between translation and interpreting in some 
aspects before investigating the link among power, ideology and interpreting.  
 
2.3.2 Hegemony and resistance in translation 
 
 Using translation/interpreting as a tool of hegemony or resistance has long existed 
in human history (see also Chapter 2.3.1). For instance, Cronin has observed the act of 
translation itself may be a form of resistance:  
 
We are familiar with the figure of loss, infidelity and treason. Less current […] is 
the figure of resistance. By resistance, we mean the desire of an individual or group 
not to translate a language or be translated into another language. The act of 
translation is consciously or unconsciously resisted. The motivations for this 
resistance vary, but two dominant forms are what we might call aesthetic 
translation resistance and political translation resistance, […] This aesthetic 
resistance to translation is […] directed at a re-ordering of the senses to quicken 
and intensify the experience of the foreign reality. Political translation resistance is 
an unwillingness to translate or be translated as a means of protecting an identity 
that is perceived to be under threat from another language group (1998: 39-40). 
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  Political translation resistance may be demonstrated by minority languages which 
are on the verge of extinction. Cronin (2003) examines minority languages in a global 
setting and urges people to note the difference between ‘translation-as-assimilation’ and 
‘translation-as-diversification’ as he observes: 
 
 Minority languages that are under pressure from powerful major languages can 
succumb at lexical and syntactic levels so that over time they become 
mirror-images of the dominant language. Through imitation, they lack the 
specificity that invites imitation. As a result of continuous translation, they can no 
longer be translated. There is nothing left to translate (2003: 141). 
 
As a result, refusing to translate or be translated may be a means for these minority 
languages to resist losing their identity to the dominant cultures and languages. 
 In terms of aesthetic translation resistance, the foreignizing translation strategy 
advocated by German scholar Friedrich Schleiermacher (2004) and Walter Benjamin’s 
‘pure language’ of translation (2004) may be two good examples. The foreignizing 
translation strategy is to retain as much foreignness of the source work as possible and 
open a window to the outside world for the target reader, while its opposite strategy, 
domesticating translation, attempts to make the author speak the target language as 
fluently as the target readers. Schleiermacher advocates the former in that it can help 
enrich and refine the target culture and language through proper choice of foreign text 
and adoption of a specific discursive strategy. In Schleiermacher’s sense, foreignizing 
translation seems to appreciate otherness and resist dominant culture, but fundamentally 
it is no more than another means to practice hegemony in that why Schleiermacher, in 
the nineteenth century, promotes foreignizing translation is to serve his Prussian 
nationalist purpose of resisting French cultural hegemony and realizing global 
domination of German culture through absorbing essence of the foreignness provided 
by translation en masse (Venuti, 1995: 99-147; Schleiermacher, 2004). 
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Schleiermacher’s advocacy of foreignizing translation has been echoed by some 
renowned  translation  scholars  in  favour  of  retaining  the  style  or  spirit  of  source  
language in the early twentieth century, such as Walter Benjamin. Benjamin suggests 
that a translation should represent the original with the pure language instead of 
rendering it in the way as if the author him/herself had spoken the target language, and 
that ‘fidelity as ensured by literalness’ can make a translation reflect ‘the great longing 
for linguistic complementation (2004: 81).’ Generally, both Schleiermacher and 
Benjamin appeal for using translation as a means to resist or challenge domestic cultural 
values.  
  However, at the turn of twentieth and twenty-first centuries, translation has turned 
into a tool for spreading Anglo-American cultural hegemony. Venuti observes the 
adverse effect of Anglo-American culture on global cultural exchanges through 
translation in post-colonial context, which is manifest in the dangerous disproportion 
between English translations and other language translations in a recent world 
translation publications survey (1995: 14-15). What’s worse, Venuti finds that not only 
has transparency dominated the criteria for evaluating appropriateness of English 
translation but also domesticating translation has been used to serve ideological 
purposes of the domestic culture. Perceiving that the domesticating method commonly 
adopted in English-language translation has contributed to reducing the original values 
of foreign texts and reinforcing the Anglo-American cultural hegemony, Venuti suggests 
that the translator be visible by adopting a foreignizing method as ‘a strategic cultural 
intervention’ to resist ‘the hegemonic English-language nations and the unequal cultural 
exchanges (ibid: 20)’ and that the reader be active in engaging in ‘symptomatic reading4’ 
                                                        
4 Symptomatic reading is to look critically at translated texts which are produced through a domesticating 
method and detect the inconsistent dictions which reveal the interpretative choice of the translator under 
the influence of social and cultural values of the target culture. In brief, symptomatic reading is to 
foreignize a domesticating translation and disclose ethnocentric violence embedded in that domesticating 
translation (Venuti, 1995: 24-39). 
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to demystify what lies behind the transparency of English-language translation (ibid: 
24-29). In his following work The Scandals of Translation: Towards an Ethics of 
Difference, Venuti explicitly points out that due to its ethnocentric nature, translation 
can never be cultural exchanges between ‘equals’ and that ‘minoritizing translation’, 
which is to translate marginal foreign texts by adopting a foreignizing method, can 
release linguistic ‘remainder5’  that  may subvert,  remold or innovate the major form of 
language, which in turn boost the equal status of language variants and of different 
cultures (1998: 9-11; my emphasis). Looking critically at how English-language 
translation has contributed to the formation and reinforcement of Anglo-American 
cultural hegemony and suggesting the visibility of translators and the active 
interpretation of readers, Venuti aims to address the issue of hegemony and resistance 
between unequal powers by minoritizing the dominant, promoting equality of cultures, 
and reducing ethnocentrism within translation. 
 
2.3.3 Simultaneous interpreting: norms, roles and strategies of interpreters 
 
2.3.3.1 Norms of interpreters  
 
Interpreting has been used to facilitate intercultural communication since ancient 
times. Although the status and function of interpreters may vary with time and space, 
the norms that govern the practices of interpreters seem to remain unchanged. Around 
the sixteenth century, interpreters in Latin America under the Spanish rule were asked to 
take an oath that they would “interpret clearly and openly, without omission or addition, 
without bias (Gargatagli, 1992; cited from Bastin, 2009: 489)”, which seems to be a 
simplified version of the norm suggested by Brian Harris in the late twentieth century. 
                                                        
5 According to Venuti (1998: 10), a variety of language uses form a ‘semiotic regime’, where the major 
form gains dominance over other linguistic variants, and the latter is referred to as the ‘remainder’ by 
Lecercle (1990).  
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Considering interpreters should be an “honest spokesperson”, Harris states the “true 
interpreter” norm: 
 
This norm requires that people who speak on behalf of others, interpreters among 
them, re-express the original speakers’ ideas and the manner of expressing them as 
accurately as possible and without significant omissions, and not mix them up with 
their own ideas and expressions (1990: 118; original emphasis). 
 
Such true interpreter norm, as Harris reiterates, has become an implicit consensus in 
circles of interpreting practices and studies as well as a foundation for mutual trust 
between interpreters and their clients. Also, the norms of interpreting do not vary with 
the modes of interpreting. In Sweden, the dialogue (community) interpreter should 
interpret “everything said…the way it was said (Wadensjo, 2002[1993]: 355). The 
norms for conference interpreting (or simultaneous interpreting in conference settings) 
are more specified. In giving some thoughts on the evaluation of simultaneous 
interpreting, Dejean le Feal summarised the professional standards for conference 
interpreters agreed among the members of AIIC (Association Internationale des 
Interprètes de Conférence): 
 
What our listeners receive through their earphones should produce the same effect 
on them as the original speech does on the speaker’s audience. It should have the 
same cognitive content and be presented with equal clarity and precision in the 
same type of language (1990: 155). 
 
2.3.3.2 Roles of interpreters 
 
As indicated above, one of the common emphases of interpreting norms is on the 
accuracy of rendition, which may explain why Roy finds that the roles of interpreters 
have been described as “a machine, a window, a bridge, and a telephone line 
50 
 
(2002[1993]: 347)”, which should convey original messages accurately, when she 
reviews how the interpreting process and the role of interpreters have been described or 
defined in previous studies. Historically, interpreters tend to serve as “all-round 
intermediaries”, which means they not only do interpreting and translating but also 
perform “a number of variegated and diffuse functions” (Pöchhacker & Shlesinger, 
2002: 339). For instance, Malinche, also known as Malintzin and Dona Marina, who 
contributed a lot to Hernán Cortés’ conquest of Mexico in the sixteenth century, served 
as not only his interpreter and secretary but also “his companion, advisor, secret agent, 
and the mother of his child (Bastin, 2009: 487). In modern times, interpreting becomes a 
profession and the job of an interpreter is  generally limited to interpreting. The role of 
interpreters used to be thought of as mechanic. Solow considers (sign language) 
interpreters should act as a telephone: 
 
The sign language interpreter acts as a communication link between people, 
serving  only  in  that  capacity.  An  analogy  is  in  the  use  of  the  telephone  –  the  
telephone is a link between two people that does not exert a personal influence on 
either (1980: ix). 
 
Meanwhile, Wadensjo (2002[1993]: 357) points out that according to the common code 
of conduct for interpreters, the idealized roles of dialogue interpreters may be a copying 
machine, a telephone, or a cook, all of which should strive to preserve and represent the 
original without personal involvement. In terms of conference interpreting, the role of 
conference interpreters, which is mainly “mediators or channels between languages”, 
has not undergone drastic changes (Roy, 2002[1993]: 348-349). In other words, 
conference interpreters are still widely seen as a conduit without any personal 
involvement (Angelelli, 2004: 14), which echoes Kopczynski’s finding (1994) that a 
conference interpreter is largely expected to play the ‘ghost’ role instead of the intruder 
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role, especially when the users are diplomats.  
However, there have been a number of (non-SI) interpreting studies focusing on 
how interpreters play their role in the rendering process, or more specifically, how 
interpreters participate in the interaction among those they provide interpreting services 
for, and all of them suggest that interpreters are playing their role as a co-participant and 
hardly remain neutral all the way through such interaction. For instance, while 
investigating how a Russian-Swedish dialogue interpreter deals with her task between a 
female police officer and a male Russian speaker who wishes to apply for an extended 
residence permit in Sweden, Wadensjo finds that dialogue interpreters provide not only 
service but also control over the interaction on interpreting occasions in that they 
“takes/is given a unique, and potentially a powerful, middle position (2002[1993]: 
367-368)”. The manifestation of such control may be embodied in their “deviations 
from originals…in specification or despecification relative to the original utterances 
(ibid: 364)” or in their roles as a co-ordinator or gatekeeper in between the parties 
concerned. Likewise, Roy maintains that interpreters can hardly remain detached during 
interpreting: 
 
…the interpreter is an active, third participants with potential to influence both the 
direction and the outcome of the event, and that the event itself is intercultural and 
interpersonal rather than simply mechanical and technical (2002[1993]: 352). 
 
There is also discrepancy between users’ expectation of an interpreter and the ‘third 
party’ role of interpreters under professional norms. More and more studies suggest the 
participatory or active role of interpreters in the interpreting process. Collados Ais 
investigates whether a German-Spanish interpreter’s intonation may affect the 
assessment of the users. 42 legal experts are asked to rate three renditions of the same 
source text in order to find whether intonation influences end-users’ perception of 
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simultaneous interpreting quality. It is found that the users prefer lively interpreting 
intonation even when the speaker delivers with monotonous intonation, which indicates 
that interpreters may be expected to provide “a certain degree of intrusion or active 
involvement” during interpreting (2002[1998]: 336). 
 
2.3.3.3 Strategies of interpreters 
 
Not only have the idealized roles of interpreters been proved to be unrealistic but 
also the ‘accuracy’ of rendition does not necessarily mean word-for-word interpretation. 
For instance, Stanzl does not hail completeness as one of the most important factors in 
evaluating quality of interpreting renditions. Instead, she argues that “a clear and 
intelligible text with some information loss may be more useful to the audience”, which 
should ease listening burden of the audience as “not every item of information is 
equally important” to the audience (1983: 29f.). Minor ungrammatical errors may be 
tolerable, especially in the simultaneous mode. Kurz (1993) investigates the 
expectations of several user groups towards English-German simultaneous interpreting 
performance given at a medical conference and finds that as a whole, “sense consistency 
with original message” is the most emphasised among the quality criteria, and by 
contrast,  correct grammatical  usage is not given top priority among the quality criteria 
as ungrammatical mistakes are not irregular in spoken language and they do not 
necessarily undermine comprehension of an oral rendition, which also echoes 
Seleskovitch’s viewpoint that “minor linguistic errors are only perceived on second 
hearing” and may not be “noticed by those who are listening for substance (1986: 236)”.  
The unlikelihood of achieving 100% accuracy or completeness in simultaneous 
interpreting is also reflected in a large number of previous studies of a variety of 
interpreting strategies that are used or needed to cope adequately with SI cognitive 
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demands. For instance, dissimilarities in linguistic structure between different languages 
are one of the major reasons why SI interpreters fail to keep simultaneity and thus may 
compromise completeness or accuracy. To carry out SI tasks adequately, interpreters 
may need to wait longer for a meaningful segmented unit delivered by the speaker, fill 
the waiting periods with padding expressions, omit, reduce or compress source 
information, etc  (Kirchhoff, 2002 [1976]). Anticipation is another very important 
strategy to cope with dissimilarities in linguistic structures between the source and the 
target languages. Linguistically or syntactically, anticipation is usually “used for 
countering verb-last or Head-noun-last structures (Setton, 1999: 52)”. Anticipation also 
involves  extralinguistic  aspects  as  well,  which  is  “a  function  of  the  rhetoric  of  the  
discourse and the interpreters’ extralinguistic knowledge” and “varies according to 
situational and personal factors which have been little explored” (Lederer, 1981; cited 
from Setton, 1999: 52). Here the extralinguistic knowledge can be seen as part of one’s 
schema, a detailed definition of which may be given by Taylor and Crocker (1981: 91): 
 
A schema is a cognitive structure that consists in part of the representation of some 
defined stimulus domain. The schema contains general knowledge about that 
domain, including a specification of the relationships among its attributes, as well 
as specific examples or instances of the stimulus domain. 
 
Schema theory, which is widely applied to constructive learning, emphasizes 
organization of past experiences on which knowledge may be built and expanded. 
Rumelhart (1980: 34) defines the word ‘schema’ as ‘a data structure for representing the 
generic concepts stored in memory’. Schemata are results of previous knowledge or 
experience in every aspect of one’s life. When people need to process information, they 
trigger their existing schemata. The best situation of simultaneous interpreting is that 
interpreters faithfully and adequately interpret the source-language speeches into the 
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target-language ones for target audience. However, Chilton (2004) maintains that people 
tend to interpret text on the basis of their previous knowledge, interest, or presumptions, 
or more specifically, schemata. Since schemata vary with individuals, it is likely that 
interpretation of the same text vary with individuals. Also, as simultaneous interpreting 
takes place at the same time of the source language speech, interpreters sometimes may 
produce the surface-oriented rendering (Kohn & Kalina, 1996), which implies that 
interpreters may utter whatever can be retrieved in the easiest or quickest way from their 
schemata. Yet, when an idea is commonly accepted and shared by a group of people, it 
is not just part of their schema but becomes a more deeply rooted ideology, which may 
exert greater influence on one’s interpreting rendition.  
An interpreter’s previous knowledge, be it schema or ideology, has been found to 
influence his/her attitude or strategies adopted during interpreting. For instance, by 
looking at how four Russian-English dialogue interpreters respectively deal with the 
same English-speaking police interviews with Russian witnesses, Krouglov (1999) finds 
that interpreters tend to avoid or change colloquialisms and hedges, which are 
commonly seen in informal Russian, through strategies of mitigation or omission, which 
means interpreters fail to retain the original stylistic markers. In terms of consecutive 
interpreting studies, Baker (1997) investigates the effects of psychological and cultural 
constraints on interpreter performance during a consecutive interpreting of a British 
televised interview with Saddam Hussein in late 1990. The live interview was recorded 
in Baghdad around the time between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the start of the 
Gulf War, with a main interpreter rendering Hussein’s words into English6 and a 
back-up interpreter nearby, both of whom were possibly hired by the host country. 
Through a careful review of the rendering process, Baker finds possible ‘implications of 
                                                        
6 Baker also mentions that in some countries, especially those in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, interpreters often render from their mother tongue into a foreign language as properly 
understanding source speeches is more emphasized than properly interpreting in the target language (1997: 
113), which may also be the case in the Chinese-language world. 
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the  use  of  certain  strategies  in  terms  of  reinforcing  cultural  stereotypes,  constructing  a  
convenient image of the enemy, and enabling or obstructing an understanding of the 
other’s points of view and priorities (1997: 112). Baker’s another study (2006) looks, 
through narrative theory, at how translators and interpreters participate in circulating or 
resisting  the  narratives  which  contribute  to  political  conflicts  at  a  global  setting,  while  
Pöchhacker (2006), through a review of a few historical examples, finds that interpreters 
have been made actively involved in, rather than just playing an intermediary role 
between powerful ideologies.  
Although SI interpreters are widely regarded as playing just a conduit role in light 
of their lack of interaction with the speaker and the listener and their involvement in 
monologic discourse, SI interpreters in fact have been found not to be as ‘neutral’ or 
‘faithful’ to the original. Schjoldager (1995) suggests that SI interpreters may produce 
deviant renditions in order to maintain their output fluency and credibility. Attempting 
to investigate translational norms in simultaneous interpreting, Schjoldager evaluates 
performance of interpreters of different levels, particularly on the translation of the 
Danish word “gravol” into English and finds that her interpreter-subjects may say 
something irrelevant to source text but “contextually plausible (ibid: 84)”, which 
indicates interpreters may follow operational norms rather than normative norms when 
rendering something difficult to them. Directionality is also found to have an impact on 
the  choice  of  SI  strategies.  In  Chang  &  Schallert’s  study  (2007),  ten  professional  
interpreters, who are Mandarin native speakers and freelance conference interpreters 
mainly working in Taiwan, are asked to simultaneously interpret two speeches from 
English to Mandarin and two other speeches the other way round in a laboratory setting. 
All of the speech texts are non-political. It is found that when interpreting into one’s B 
language (from Mandarin to English in their study), professional interpreters tend to 
generalize, omit or summarize the Mandarin source texts, “express both the explicit and 
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implicit messages conveyed by the text (ibid: 152)”, employ anticipation strategies 
based on their “prior knowledge about the speaker or the topic (ibid: 153), and avoid 
“expressions  they  were  not  familiar  with  or  not  able  to  retrieve  immediately  from  
memory  (ibid:  154)”.  It  is  also  found  that  some  interpreters  may  be  critical  of  source  
texts and produce negative feelings toward the speaker or the source texts, which Chang 
& Schallert consider to be “a by-product of the participant’s search for coherence in the 
source speech (ibid: 159)”. The rendering data provided in their study may also give a 
general picture of the SI conversion from Mandarin source texts (ST) to English target 
texts (TT) performed by professional Mandarin interpreters. The following shows one 
ST with a translation of Chang & Schallert and its corresponding TTs produced by three 
of the participating interpreters (ibid: 163-165): 
 
ST: ךགྷԃᇸܻ϶ӧػѴଣکԴΓӼᎦύЈவ٣דπ୍ܺǴ΋ۓ཮଺ள׳ӳ 
Ӣࣁԃᇸܻ϶ၨᔉளӵՖᆶλܻ϶ϕ୏ǴΨ׳ૈ୼ᡣԴΓৎᆂЈ 
  (I think if young people volunteer in orphanages and nursing homes for the  
elderly, they can definitely do a better job, because they know how to interact  
with children and can warm the hearts of the elderly.) 
 
TT 1: When young people work in orphanages and in elderly homes, they will be 
 able to do a better job than anyone else, because the young will know how to  
interact with children much better than an adult and they also know how to  
connect with elderly (Interpreter S; original emphasis). 
 
TT 2: I believe, for young people, they can do a better job in volunteering works at  
nursery schools, orphanage or uh in the service for elderly people [pause]  
(Interpreter R). 
 
TT 3: I believe with your help, we will do a much better job in nursing home and  
some child-care facilities (Interpreter N). 
 
As indicated by these TT examples, SI rendering from Mandarin to English is usually 
meaning-based and interpreters may interpret the source meaning based on their prior 
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knowledge and experience, which is why strategies of addition, omission, compression, 
syntactic transformation, or use of different pronouns can be found in these renditions. 
While Chang and Schallert’s study focuses on the link between language direction and 
SI strategies, Beaton’s study (2007) may be one of the few that address ideology issue 
in  SI  studies  in  a  genuine  political  setting.  Analyzing  the  renditions  of  some  SI  
interpreters working from German into English during European Parliament plenary 
sessions, Beaton finds that EU institutional hegemony is being strengthened by SI 
interpreters through lexical repetition and metaphor strings and suggests the existence 
of the ideological struggle between EU institutional hegemony and interpreter axiology. 
Beaton’s study sheds light on the effects of institutionalized ideology in SI practices, 
but to what extent freelance SI interpreters who work at a non-institutional setting 
would have their own ideology interfere with their renditions remains uncertain.  
 
2.3.3.4 Differences between novices and professionals in interpreting studies 
 
The difference between trainee interpreters (or novice interpreters) and 
professional interpreters in various aspects is also one of the main foci of interpreting 
studies. Some researchers investigate the difference from physiological or cognitive 
perspectives. For instance, examining the stressfulness under SI tasks, Kurz (2003) 
measures the pulse rate and the skin conductance level of two professional interpreters 
and three trainee interpreters carrying out German/English SI tasks, suggesting that 
trainee interpreters suffer higher physiological stress. Daro & Fabbro (1994) and Padilla 
et al. (1995) find that professional interpreters perform better than trainee interpreters in 
terms of working memory. Yet, Liu et al. (2004: 36) argue that the differences in 
working memory capacity may not be a reliable distinction between professional and 
trainee interpreters although in the same study, where 11 professional interpreters and 
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22 trainee students, all of whom are Mandarin native speakers, are asked to 
simultaneously interpret source texts from English to Mandarin, it is found that 
professional interpreters maintain a higher level of performance than the other two 
trainee interpreter groups, which the researchers conclude may be because professional 
interpreters are more experienced in selecting essential source messages and making 
quick adjustments to difficult units of the source texts. Kopke & Nespoulous (2006) 
also investigate the difference in working memory performance between professional 
and trainee interpreters and find that trainee interpreters perform better than 
professionals in such complex memory tasks as free recall with articulatory suppression, 
the category probe task, and the listening span test.  
There are some other interpreting studies investigating the difference between 
novices and experts from linguistic or pragmatic aspects. For instance, investigating 
coherence in consecutive interpreting, Peng (2009) compares the Chinese-English 
consecutive renditions produced by eight trainee interpreters and three professional 
interpreters and finds that trainee interpreters lay stress on local cohesion while 
professionals focus on global structure of the discourse. To investigate the phenomenon 
of verb anticipation in SI from German into English, Jörg (1997) makes six professional 
interpreters and six trainee interpreters interpret into English simultaneously an 
abridged version of the German President Roman Herzog’s speech marking the 50th 
anniversary of the end of the Second World War and suggests that professional 
interpreters generally produce more consistent anticipation performance than trainee 
interpreters and that “verb anticipation skills were better developed in native speakers 
of the SL (ibid: 228)”. To investigate whether translational norms may be applied to 
simultaneous interpreting, Schjoldager (1995) has a group of beginner student 
interpreters and a group of advanced student interpreters simultaneously interpret the 
same speeches between Danish and English. Through a source-target text comparison, 
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Schjoldager finds that the former group encounters severe difficulties, particularly in 
terms  of  the  simultaneity  of  the  task,  and  therefore  omits  something  tricky  in  their  
renditions. By contrast, the advanced student interpreters group performs better, but 
they are found to produce something irrelevant to source text but “contextually 
plausible (ibid: 84)”, which makes their output seemingly fluent and credible. The issue 
of interpreters’ linguistic autonomy is further explored by Setton & Motta in 2007, who 
investigate quality and reformulation in simultaneous-with-text interpreting by 
examining the renditions from English into French produced by 11 professional 
interpreters and 13 trainee interpreters and asking four French professional users of 
conference interpreting to judge and rate the collected interpreting data. Although 
experience proves to be a predictor of quality appreciated by the users, professional 
interpreters are more linguistically autonomous than trainee interpreters only in terms of 
lexical elaboration and explication. It is found that trainee interpreters are more 
linguistically autonomous than professional interpreters in terms of restructuring or 
reformulation. Also, although professional interpreters may generally give a higher 
level of performance than trainee interpreters, three of the latter group participants 
“came out ahead of experts (ibid: 221)”, which may indicate that it is not a rule that 
trainee interpreters always give poorer performance than professional interpreters. What 
is also worth noting is that one of the professional interpreters is highly praised for her 
rhythm by the four users and for her word choice and mastery of professional 
terminology by two of the four users and therefore is rated to be the second best 
performer of all the interpreters. However, the transcription of her rendition reveals that 
“she made significantly more errors, solecisms and so on than the other eight top 
performers, as well as significantly more elaboration and paraphrase than most other 
user’s favourites (ibid: 221-222)”. This finding indeed echoes Seleskovitch’s comment 
that linguistic errors may not be of significance to users (1986: 236) and reflects the 
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discrepancy between users’ expectation and professional norms. Pio (2003) makes 10 
trainee interpreters and five professional interpreters simultaneously interpret from 
German into Italian two source speeches which are delivered at different rates and see if 
the delivery rate of source speeches may have an impact on SI interpreters’ performance. 
It is found that trainee students encounter greater problems than professionals when 
interpreting a source text delivered at high rate. Similarly, Korpal (2012) finds that the 
faster speech delivery speed is, the more omissions trainee interpreters make during 
their simultaneous interpreting task. However, Korpal’s study suggests that if the 
speaker’s delivery rate is not taken into consideration, there is no significant difference 
between the groups of professionals and trainees in terms of the use of the omission 
strategy. 
As indicated above, most of the studies which compare the performance of 
professional interpreters and trainee interpreters report that the former group 
outperforms the latter. Yet, the efficacy or validity of these comparison results has 
generally been discounted by the limited number of the participating subjects, not to 
mention that trainee interpreters are sometimes found to outperform professional 
interpreters in certain aspects. It should be also noted that most of such comparison 
studies aim to improve the quality of interpreting by investigating an interpreter’s 
ability to cope with SI difficulties.  In terms of the ideological implications which may 
be embodied in SI renditions, still few have paid attention in this regard.   
 
2.3.3.5 Importance of investigating ideology impact on SI renditions 
 
Translations in written form frequently come under ideological influences of 
‘patronage (Lefevere, 1992)’ and/or ‘censorship (Schäffner, 2007: 138-40). By contrast, 
interpreting is characteristic of evanescence. People do not know exactly how they are 
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going  to  express  themselves  until  they  open  their  mouths;  once  spoken,  words  are  
fading and only meanings may stay in the minds of listener (Seleskovitch, 1994: 12-18). 
In consequence, little prior censorship could apply to interpreting. Arguably, 
simultaneous interpreting, which is supposed to synchronize source delivery, may be 
most likely to escape censorship compared with the other interpreting modes. In light of 
the extensive employment of SI at international settings and the relative lack of SI 
ideology research, an investigation into the effect of an interpreter’s ideology on his/her 
SI renditions may provide valuable information for those who would like to ensure the 
legitimization of their side of stories in the SI mode. 
Although the research interest in the impact of ideology on interpreting is growing, 
few studies have provided sufficient and strong evidence for how an interpreter’s 
ideology influences his/her renditions especially in terms of simultaneous interpreting 
of political texts. It may be argued that of all the interpreting modes, simultaneous 
interpreting may be under the greatest influence of ideology since ideology usually 
works invisibly especially when simultaneous interpreters, compared with consecutive 
interpreters or dialogue interpreters, have to work under tighter time constraints and 
count on their knowledge acquired prior to their interpreting tasks (Gile, 2009: 52). Just 
as Baker (2006: 1) states, 'In this conflict-ridden and globalized world, translation is 
central  to  the  ability  of  all  parties  to  legitimize  their  version  of  events,  especially  in  
view  of  the  fact  that  political  and  other  types  of  conflict  today  are  played  out  in  the  
international arena and can no longer be resolved by appealing to local constituencies 
alone.’ The increasing importance of translation and interpreting within the political or 
cultural context is immediately evident. In light of the extensive employment of 
simultaneous interpreting in international political and economic settings, it is necessary 
to investigate empirically and scientifically the effects of an individual interpreter’s 
ideology on his/her simultaneous renditions. 
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2.3.4 Identity in interpreting 
 
Interpreting, whose development precedes that of translation, has also been used as 
a tool for power struggles. For instance, interpreters were indispensible for the 
spreading of Euro-colonialism. Whether the success of the maritime empire of the 
Dutch East  India  Company  (VOC) (e.g. Campbell, 1903) or the Spanish conquest of 
Latin America (Bastin, 2009) could be partly, if not largely, attributed to the service of 
interpreters, who had played a significant role in consolidating the ruling power by 
spreading the ideology of the dominant among the dominated and preventing or 
pacifying resistance from the dominated. The historical role of interpreters as “all-round 
intermediaries (Pochhacker & Shlesinger, 2002: 339)” well explains the link between 
interpreting and power. Meanwhile, just as translation, interpreting development is also 
subject to the attitudes of the ruling authorities towards the Others.  The  use  of  
interpreting, on the one hand, serves as tool for spreading hegemony; on the other hand, 
it  is  a  means  for  the  ruling  authorities  to  gain  ‘consent’  to  their  hegemony  from  the  
Others linguistically rather than forcibly. 
The intermediary role of interpreters between one’s own culture and the Other used 
to put interpreters in a precarious situation. For instance, in ancient China, interpreters, 
who were called shé rénՁΓ (literally tongue man), were often looked down upon by 
both elite and general public (Li, 2002: 1-5). Even in the early to mid nineteenth century, 
interpreters (and translators) were often labelled as traitors or evil-doers due to their 
connection with foreigners (Wong, 2007: 54). Interpreters are often caught in struggles 
over divided loyalties, and their identities are often questioned by either side that counts 
on interpreting service (Cronin, 2006), which may be exemplified by the case of Italian 
Dominican-turned-interpreter Victorio Riccio in the seventeenth century. Having 
carried out his missionary work around southeast China for seven years, Riccio was first 
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summoned (by force) to Taiwan by Koxinga7 in April 1662 and ordered to go to Manila 
as an envoy with Koxinga’s letters requesting the surrender of the Spanish 
administration to Koxinga. While Riccio’s appointment as Koxinga’s envoy was viewed 
as  an  honour  by  the  Chinese  (Lian,  1984:  35-36),  Riccio  was  extremely  terrified  of  
working for tyrannical Koxinga, which was manifested in Riccio’s talk about his 
dispatch with Koxinga in Taiwan: 
 
[Koxinga] gave him the open letters…, bidding him never to return if his 
[Koxinga’s]  demands  were  not  met.  He  gave  him  the  money  for  the  trip  and  the  
father [i.e., Riccio], unable to say anything, or to protest – for this would mean 
having his throat cut – departed in tears…(cited from Borao Mateo, 2002: 600) 
 
Since then, because of some unexpected twists and turns, Riccio travelled among 
Taiwan, Manila and China several  times as an envoy negotiating among and on behalf 
of the three parties separately: the Chinese Cheng regime, the Spanish administration in 
Manila, and the Dutch who recovered the northern tip of Taiwan and hoped for 
reclaiming Taiwan from the Cheng regime. Riccio was lucky enough to escape death 
during his interpreting career. However, his extraordinary experiences drew suspicion 
from  the  Qing  China  authorities  of  his  previous  collaboration  with  the  Cheng  regime  
and prevented him from carrying out missionary work in China. When he finally left 
China for Manila in 1666 in the hope of continuing his mission work there, the Spanish 
authorities received him with suspicion as well (Borao Mateo, 2002: 598-600; Borao 
Mateo, 2009: 61-62, 198-199). 
Compared with that of translation, resistance of interpreters against hegemony may 
be arguably more direct or consequential in that interpreting renditions reach the listener 
almost immediately after they are produced or interpreters tend to be in direct contact 
                                                        
7 Koxinga, or Cheng Cheng-kung, was a Ming China loyalist who seized Taiwan from the Dutch in 1662 
and established the Cheng regime in Taiwan as a stronghold against Qing China. See also Chapter 2.5.1. 
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with the listener. Although the evanescent nature of interpreting makes it difficult to 
study the past performance of interpreters (Bowen et al. 1995: 245), however, “power is 
everywhere in the definition, context and practice of interpreting (Cronin, 2002: 387)”, 
and whenever there is hegemony, there may be resistance in whatever forms. There have 
been some examples in which interpreters show resistance in various manners to 
hegemony. For instance, Levi in his book Se questo è un uomo (1958: 21) describes how 
a Jew named Flesch in Auschwitz reacted to the humiliating task of interpreting 
derogatory words from German into Italian: 
 
Parla breve, l’interprete traduce. ‘Il maresciallo dice che dovete fare silenzio, 
perche questa non e una scuola rabbinica.’ Si vedono le parole non sue, le parole 
cattive, torcergli la bocca uscendo, come se sputasse un boccone disgustoso. Lo 
preghiamo di chiedergli che cosa aspettiamo, quanto tempo ancora staremo qui, 
delle nostre donne, tutto: ma lui dice che no, che non vuol chiedere. Questo Flesch, 
chi si adatta molto a malincuore a tradurre in italiano frasi tedesche piene di gelo, e 
rifiuta di volgere in tedesco le nostre domande perches a che e inutile, e un ebreo 
tedesco sulla cinquantina. 
 
[He speaks briefly, the interpreter translates, ‘The Officer says you should be quiet 
because this is not a rabbinical school.’ The words are not his, bad words, making 
his  mouth  writhe  in  disgust  as  if  he  was  spitting  out  a  horrible  drink.  We request  
him to ask what to expect, how long will we be here, about our wives, everything; 
but he says no, he does not want to ask. This Flesch, who very reluctantly 
translates into Italian German sentences full of ice and refuses to translate our 
questions into German because he knows it is useless, is a German Jew around 
fifty years old.] (cited from Cronin, 2006: 77). 
 
The German interpreter chose to keep silent when he was asked by his fellow inmates to 
interpret some questions into his mother language. His refusal is actually a gesture of 
resistance against hegemonic humiliation. Another example of interpreters’ resistance 
results in more profound consequences. The resistance of Chinese interpreter Pinqua 
against the Dutch was said to be significant in making the Dutch lose Taiwan to a Míng 
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China loyalist Koxinga in early 1662 (see also Chapter 2.5.1). Pinqua, who was a 
Chinese headman in the service of the Dutch authorities, had been relied on heavily by 
the  Dutch  in  terms  of  dealing  with  the  Formosans8 and the Chinese. Yet, he betrayed 
the trust of the Dutch by instigating and assisting Koxinga’s seizure of Taiwan 
(Campbell, 1903: 475). No matter what drove Pinqua to transfer his loyalty to Koxinga, 
his betrayal of the Dutch authorities might be seen as resistance to the colonizer. 
Notably, the two examples of interpreters’ resistance may be partly attributed to identity 
issue. More specifically, while interpreters provide service for the Other, their identities 
may play a significant role in how they undertake their interpreting tasks. 
 
2.4 Chinese Hegemony in the One China Policy/Taiwan Issue 
 
The Taiwan (independence) issue has always been one of the main concerns for 
China, which always claims that Taiwan has long been part of China and that China will 
attack Taiwan by force if Taiwan formally declares independence. Here, the historical 
relations  between  Taiwan  and  China  should  be  clarified  first.  Originally  part  of  the  
territory of QƯng China, Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 after the defeat of QƯng 
China in the First Sino-Japan war. In 1945, the defeat of Japan in the Second Sino-Japan 
War (part of the Second World War) caused the handover of Taiwan to the Republic of 
China (the R.O.C.), which had overthrown Qing China in 1911. In 1949, the R.O.C. 
government  lost  the  civil  war  to  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  (CCP)  and  fled  to  
Taiwan. Since then, the CCP has established the People’s Republic of China (the P.R.C.) 
and claimed that the P.R.C. represents legitimate China. In the 1950s, China made 
several unsuccessful military attempts at seizing Taiwan. Since that, China has been 
working to decrease Taiwan’s international status. It is presumed in this study that the 
                                                        
8 Taiwan was better known to the West as Formosa, a name given by the Portuguese mariners who 
exclaimed ‘Ilha Formosa (beautiful island)’ when discovering Taiwan in the early sixteenth century 
(Mackay, 1900: 47). The natives on Taiwan were generally termed Formosans. 
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political speeches involving the Taiwan issue or the One China policy may have an 
impact on Mandarin trainee interpreters from Taiwan and China. Before investigating 
the link between a Chinese or Taiwanese interpreter’s political ideology and his/her SI 
renditions of cross-strait political texts, it should be necessary to discuss the relationship 
between ideology and language use in either nation especially in the post-1949 period. 
In this chapter, the researcher will discuss how translation/interpreting has been used as 
a tool in China for shaping and manipulation of ideology, with a focus on the One China 
policy. 
 
2.4.1 Chinese translation development in the early period of the P.R.C.  
 
The fact that translation has been used as a means to develop and diffuse specific 
ideologies since the very beginning of the birth of the P.R.C. is made manifest in some 
opinions or instructions of a number of key CCP founding leaders in terms of translation 
practices. As early as in 1945, Mao Zedong Л䬪䛵(1893-1976) recognized the 
contribution of translation to the introduction of Marxism to China and in turn to the 
birth of the P.R.C. (Chen, 1992: 382). Zhou Enlaiڬৱ䗂(1898-1976), the first prime 
minister of the P.R.C., maintained in late 1970 that one should be necessarily equipped 
with  a  strong  political  sense,  a  high  level  of  language  proficiency,  and  a  variety  of  
cultural knowledge while doing translation (Zhou, 1984: 232). Chen Yi 劧ኾ
(1901-1972), one of the founders and leaders of China’s People’s Liberation Army, 
considered tasks involving foreign languages (or more specifically, translation and 
interpreting tasks) to be political by nature and viewed foreign languages as an 
instrument for political struggles (FLTREO, 1962). To use translation in a more 
effective and organized way for political purposes, Mao Dun त࣯, then cultural 
minister of the P.R.C., proclaimed in the first National Conference on Literary 
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Translationӄ㡚Ў䗄ᙌ促πբ㜘侠 in 1954 that literary translation in China had to 
proceed under the leadership and supervision of the CCP and the Chinese government 
in order to solve the translation-related problems existing in China. For instance, Mao 
Dun was concerned that publishers, who had the final say in selecting source works, 
seldom took into consideration whether the selected works were conducive to education 
in ideology and politics (Mao, 1984 [1954]: 506). Under the political control, China’s 
translation policy during the 1950s was “overall Sovietizationӄ䱗亄ϯ”, focusing 
mainly on translation of Marxist-Leninist, socialist and proletarian literature in order to 
popularize and reinforce socialism across China (Fang, 2005: 433-76). China’s 
translation practice during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) saw the darkest age in 
its  translation  history.  Many  Chinese  writers  and  translators  suffered  political  
persecution, including famous Mandarin-French translator Fu Leiഡႜ (ibid: 256) and 
Mandarin-English translators Yang Xianyi䩵䤄੻ and his wife Gladys Margaret Tayler 
(Lei, 2007). Also, some literary works of high artistic value were stigmatized just 
because they did not fit in with the mainstream ideology. For instance, The Scarlet 
Letter by Nathaniel Hawthorne and Le Rouge et le Noir by Stendhal were both labelled 
as pornographic novels (Fang, 2005: 435). Despite a sharp decline in translation activity 
of the time, the publication of translated texts was not brought to a halt but “launched 
internally㚵೽䠁Չ” under the manipulation of the Chinese government (Xie, 2009). 
The selection of source texts was politically motivated in response to the mainstream 
ideology of the Cultural Revolution leadership that aimed to prevent the comeback of 
capitalism and to reflect the sour relations between China and the Soviet Union. In 
consequence, the content of the selected works, the majority of which were still from 
the Soviet Union, was about the suffering of the working people under the capitalist 
mentality of the deteriorating Soviet Union leadership or about the dark sides of the 
hegemonic Soviet  Union (ibid).  It  is  clear that  right from the beginning of the birth of 
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the P.R.C., translation has become one of the instruments for power struggles at home 
and abroad, and translation practices could be manipulated through political control and 
persecution.  
 
2.4.2 The link among ideology, education and translation in the P.R.C.  
 
With the end of the Cultural Revolution and the implementation of ‘socialism with 
Chinese characteristics’ initiated by Deng Xiaoping㜅λѳ, which is considered to suit 
the Chinese social context and facilitate China’s economic reform and opening-up, 
China’s translation practice became more and more prosperous and diversified, and 
translation from Mandarin into foreign languages has gradually assumed its prominence 
in China.  
Seemingly granted much more freedom than before, translation practice in China, 
from translation education to translated text publication, is still under great political 
influence and control. The Chinese government develops pure and practical ideology 
that can stimulate an individual’s strong commitment to the country and make him/her 
know “how to act ‘correctly’ on the basis of his/her commitment (Schurmann, 1968: 39; 
original emphasis)” and uses the inclusive educational and propaganda systems for 
shaping and instilling such ideology. Students at every level of educational programs, 
from as young as kindergarten children, are taught and trained to develop a deep sense 
of patriotic duty (e.g. Zhao, 1995; Wang & Xu, 2011), and almost every subject at 
school, including physical education, chemistry and English, can be linked with 
patriotism and socialist education (Li, G., 2011; Li. Y., 2011; Shi, 2011). For instance, 
specific political ideologies are embedded in English sentences or materials used in 
English class or tests at every educational level to develop students’ patriotism, such as 
the English sentence “We love our motherland” at primary school (Li. Y., 2011), the 
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lesson on “The Great Wall of China” at high school (Tang, 2010), or the test item on ‘\Ư 
guó li΁ng zhì (one country two systems)’ for senior high school students (Zhang, 1997). 
Apart from the educational system, every medium that involves transmission or 
communication of information for Chinese people is subject to the control of the 
Chinese government (Shambaugh, 2008: 107), which results in the 'unanimous’ voices 
of most Chinese media or institutions, whether they use Mandarin or foreign languages. 
For instance, with the joint effort of a variety of governmental bodies, academic 
institutions and mainstream news media, the Translators Association of Chinaύ㡚ᙌ促
㜧㜘, the only nation-wide translation association in China, has established “䩯࠶便䥶
(literally authoritative phrase bank)”, or “Bilingual Terms” on its English version 
website, where official and standardized English translations of a wide range of Chinese 
sentences or phrases concerning national policy, diplomacy, or political propaganda are 
made public. Some of them, if not many, carry explicit ideologies, such as䢊࡭ᵫ䦧䨙
ӄֽǵ㜧俵ӚБޑ勷䤐ਡЈբҔ uphold the Party's central role in exercising overall 
leadership and coordinating work in all sectors9 orך䜹όૈപ㯑҇௼ޑЎϯՈ㧺We 
must never sever the cultural vein of our nation.10 As indicated, not only the English 
translations but also the ideologies embedded in these translations are under clear 
guidance of the authorities concerned.  
 
2.4.3 The hegemonic implications of China English 
 
In addition to specific translation guidance, Chinese-English translation practice is 
also under the influence of ‘China Englishύ㡚म俟’. The concept of China English 
was first proposed by Ge Chuanguiလ䝀佤 in 1980 (Ge, 1980) and then elaborated by 
                                                        
9 Retrieved 8 June 2012 on the website of Translators Association of China from 
http://www.tac-online.org.cn/en/tran/2010-12/23/content_3917753.htm. 
10 Retrieved 8 June 2012 on the website of Translators Association of China from 
http://www.tac-online.org.cn/en/tran/2010-12/23/content_3917711.htm. 
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Li (1993: 80) into “mainly used as an international language in China, with Chinese 
borrowings, nativized lexicology as well as unique syntax and discourse structure as its 
major features, [which] contributes much to the international communication”. In brief, 
China English is different from Chinese English; the former is deemed as English with 
Chinese social and cultural characteristics while the latter is similar to pidgin English or 
known as Chinglish (Jiao, 2009). Since the 1980s, there has been a growing trend 
towards recognition of China English (e.g. Pan, 2002; Wu, 2008). Although a few 
Chinese researchers are worried that China English, which is deviant from standard 
English, may hinder intercultural communication (Qiu & Ning, 2002), it is widely 
maintained in China that the use of China English can enhance China’s international 
status, promote Chinese culture to the world, strengthen Chinese national identity and 
solidarity, contribute to expansion of English vocabulary, and suit China’s social reality 
(Liu, 2006; Zhou, 2007; Jiao, 2009; Luo, 2010). Some further insist that the English 
language, which represents the Anglo-American culture, is not appropriate for Chinese 
society, and that only by using China English can Chinese people adequately express 
themselves and communicate Chinese culture (Du, 1998; Li, 2010). Chinese translators 
and interpreters are urged to adopt such translation approaches as transliteration, literal 
translation, or transliteration/literal translation with explanation when dealing with 
Chinese-English translation by using China English, which Chinese translation 
researchers argue can retain complete cultural meanings and characteristics of Chinese 
words (Jin, 2001: 16; Bao, 2008; Luo, 2010: 54-6), increase China’s cultural status and 
influence on the international stage (Lin, 1999; Li, 2010), demonstrate the confidence of 
Chinese translators/interpreters in their domestic culture (Bao, 2008: 322), enable 
Chinese translators/interpreters to be a competent cultural mediator and make 
translation from Mandarin into English easier (Liu, 2006; Luo, 2008: 97), and win wide 
acceptance by foreigners (Li, 2010: 105). The debate over China English may be well 
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illustrated  by  the  political  term  ‘\Ư guó li΁ng zhì ΋㡚㝫ڋ’, which was proposed 
formally by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s and initially aimed at solving the Taiwan 
issue by wooing Taiwan to become one of China’s special administrative regions that 
may  retain  their  capitalist  system  (Li,  K.,  1995).  Also,  by  promoting  an  ‘emotional  
bonding’ between Taiwan and the people of China and emphasizing the link between 
territorial integrity and national dignity, the Chinese government has made ‘liberating 
Taiwan’ a general consensus among its people (Wachman, 2007: 122; original 
emphasis).  The  literal  translation  of  the  term  in  China  English,  ‘one  country  two  
systems’, is widely accepted and used in China. Yuan (1997) suggests that the literal 
translation  of  the  term  be  corrected  into  ‘one  country  with  two  systems’  by  following  
the way in which some foreign media translate the term. However, strongly disagreeing 
with Yuan’s viewpoint, Du (1997: 55) explains why the original China English 
translation must not be changed: 
 
 "΋㡚㝫ڋ” όࢂ΋㚚便䵽ǴԶࢂ΋ѡ俏ǶѬࡰޑࢂ΋ᳪբݤǴࢂ΋勪ཀ㚜ు
僴ޑ୷ҁ㡚฼ǴڀԖ᫾㳾ޑགєΚǶ…ϐ܌аाע “two systems” ӟ࿼Ǵࢂ
Ӣ䜀Ѭࡽࢂ㛱 “΋㚚㡚ৎ” ޑڀᥟ௃㝽ک㡚฼ޑ劓ॊǴΞࢂ㡵䯢ύ㡚㤄㪰 
“΋㚚㡚ৎ” ޑ䶘΋ޑ߻ගǴӧԜόૈόբ䜀俏俟ख़Јϒа੝㞄㳾俵Ƕ 
    (Literal  translation.  “<Ư guó li΁ng zhì” is not a phrase but a sentence. It refers to a 
way [of doing something], a basic national policy with profound meanings, and 
has an extremely strong force of impelling…The reason why “two systems” is 
post-positioned is that it not only elaborates the specific situation and national 
policy  of  “one  country”  but  also  realizes  the  premise  of  unification  of  “one  
country” as China. Here [the phrase ‘one country’] must be specially emphasized 
as the focus of the sentence.) 
 
Du (1997: 55) further points out that when people outside China adopt the China 
English translation of ‘yƯ guó liӽng zhì’, which is ‘one country two systems’, it means:  
 
 ԴԴ㡵㡵ӦௗڙΑύ㡚Γޑ俦ݤǴ䪌ד㰢㛱ύ㡚੝Ԗޑޗ㜘䯢㡵ک俟ق䯢㡵
ޑ܍侖Ƕ 
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    (Literal translation. [They] accept Chinese people’s statement without affectation, 
signifying [their] acknowledgement of China’s special social reality and linguistic 
reality.) 
 
The widespread support for Du’s argument within China (e.g. Wang, 2006) indicates 
that the use of China English is highly associated with China’s assertion of its political 
and cultural superiority. The ‘foreignizing’ strategy adopted in Chinese-China English 
translation is actually a means through which hegemonic and ethnocentric China resists 
foreign  cultures,  as  on  the  one  hand  it  cannot  tolerate  the  global  domination  of  the  
Anglo-American culture (Lin, 1999: 80) and on the other hand it claims that China 
English helps not only promote Chinese culture but also contribute to the world 
diversity (Kong & Tang, 2008: 95). Nonetheless, to native English speakers, China 
English may sound very silly and often meaningless or at least ambiguous. Far from 
presenting China as a superpower, it presents China as a target for ridicule (Valerie 
Pellatt, personal communication, 8 June 2011).  
 
2.4.4 Translation/Interpreting under the One China policy  
 
While China boasts of the positive effects of its Chinese-China English translation, 
interpreting as a career in China also features ‘Chinese’ characteristics. With the 
increasing importance of China in global economic and political arenas, there is a huge 
demand for interpreters who can help non-Mandarin speakers communicate with the 
Chinese government and people. Unlike the interpreters in ancient China, who were 
often looked down upon in Chinese society (Li, 2002), Mandarin interpreters nowadays 
enjoy high social status and lucrative pay, which in turn promotes the growing trend of 
interpreting education inside China. From public sectors to academic circles, many 
people pay attention to and provide their opinions about the code of interpreting ethics, 
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and  one  of  the  basic  and  foremost  principles  that  should  be  followed  by  Chinese  
interpreters is to be ‘patriotic’. Li Zhaoxing׵ᆬࢃ, former foreign minister of the 
P.R.C., explicitly states that Chinese interpreters and translators must develop a strong 
passion for their motherland and align themselves with the Chinese government. In his 
speech given to university students in the 2010 CTPC Cup All China Interpreting 
Contest held in Sichuan University, Li highlighted the importance of being a patriotic 
interpreter/translator by taking the Taiwan issue as an example. He said: 
 
 ȨԖ΋㚚䯢ຝǴԖ٤ЎҹύததעѠ㵈㛙ԋΑȬಃΟ㡚ȭǴԶ促ޣӧᙌ促ޑ㟭
ংόݙཀǴ൩ޔௗᙌ促ԋΑȬಃΟБȭǴ㤄ࢂ㚚ࡐ䛸ख़ޑ剱匉Ǵ㤄ᥟ䯢΋㚚促
ޣޑࡹݯન䞇ό㳾Ƕ܌аך㛱գ䜹ޑಃ΋㚚යఈ൩ࢂࡹݯ΋ۓा㠤ฯǴा䮔
䮫઒㡚ǵ䮔䮫Γ҇Ǵ੝㞄ࢂ㛱བᙌ促ޑΓ䗂俦Ƕȩ (Yu, 2010, 25 October) 
     [Literal translation. There is a phenomenon: Taiwan is often described as “a third 
country” in some documents. Some careless translators/interpreters would directly 
render  it  into  “a  third  party”.  It  is  a  very  serious  problem  as  it  shows  a  lack  of  
strong political literacy in a translator/interpreter. Therefore, my first expectation 
of you all is that you must be tough politically, love your motherland, and love 
your people. It’s particularly important to those who are engaged in 
translation/interpreting.]       
 
Well-known for his strong and straightforward political stance on the One China policy, 
Li Zhaoxing was reiterating to those would-be interpreters/translators that Taiwan is 
neither  a  third  country  nor  a  third  party  but  part  of  China.  How  to  act  as  a  patriotic  
interpreter is also detailed in another article entitledα促ᅐ俺 About Oral Interpretation, 
which has been widely circulated and posted on many websites, such as the website of 
the Foreign Affairs Office of People’s Government of Yunnan Province. As suggested in 
the article, one of the guidelines for competent Chinese interpreters is to develop strong 
passion and love for their motherland and hold a ‘politically correct’ attitude. For 
instance, if a foreign client supports the independence of Tibet, a patriotic Chinese 
interpreter must refute such a ‘wrong’ idea (Chen, 2004). Similar advice on how 
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patriotic Chinese interpreters should safeguard the interest and dignity of their country 
are widely provided in academic circles (e.g. Zhong, 2008).  
 The One China policy, particularly concerning the Taiwan issue, has exerted its 
great ideological forces on translation/interpreting. Official or recommended English 
translations on the Taiwan issue are published and discussed widely. A standardized 
Mandarin-English cross-strait relations terminology (Ѡੇ䞄س࣬䞄便䬗) can be found 
on not only private English learning and translation/interpreting learning websites, such 
as Ѧ俟௲ػ᥊  (literally Foreign Language Education Website) and MicroMice 
Translation but also the websites or forums of some educational institutions, such as the 
College of Foreign Languages, China Three Gorges University (CTGU) Ο㥨ε䗄Ѧ㡚
俟䗄ଣ.11 The terminology ranges from short bilingual phrases, such asૌӜࡿ๱ޑϩ
຋Ь㚜ޣ infamous separatist and 㝫۞΋ύ Two sides, one China, to long sentences, 
such as  
  
Шࣚ΢ѝԖ΋㚚ύ㡚ǴѠ㵈ࢂύ㡚όёϩപޑ΋೽ϩǶ 
There is only one China, and Taiwan is an integral part of China.  
 
کѳှ㜞Ѡ㵈剱匉಄ӝхࡴѠ㵈ӕझӧ㚵ޑӄᥟύ㡚Γ҇ޑਥҁճ੻Ƕ 
A peaceful solution to the Taiwan question serves the interests of all Chinese people, 
including our compatriots in Taiwan. 
 
ԐВ㡵䯢ύ㡚ޑֹӄ䶘΋ࢂӄᥟύ㡚Γ҇ޑӅӕЈᄉک䢊ۓཀדǶ 
The complete reunification of China at an early date is the common aspiration and 
firm resolve of the entire Chinese people. 
 
Specific guidelines or examples for diplomatic interpreting on cross-strait relations are 
also highlighted by China's governmental bodies and academic organizations. Shi 
Yanhuaࡼᐪ䟠, a former Chinese interpreter-turned-diplomat, clearly points out that 
                                                        
11 The terminology was retrieved 10 July 2012 on the Foreign Language Education website at 
http://www.for68.com/new/2006/8/zh75787132912860021003-0.htm, the MicroMice Translation website 
at http://www.xiaoyishu.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=470, and the CTGU webpage at 
http://210.42.38.214/wgyxy/fyxh/w058.asp. 
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when it comes to the Taiwan issue, China should be referred to as “China’s mainland” 
or “the mainland of China” rather than “the mainland China” in order to avoid an 
implication of two Chinas (Shi, 2007: 57). Also, as detailed in the book Wài JiƗo K΅u Yì
ѦҬα促 (literally Diplomatic Interpreting), one of the interpreting textbook series 
developed under the supervision of China’s National Committee and intended for the 
Master of Translation and Interpreting (MTI) programs in China, the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait should be referred to as ‘Taiwan and the mainland’ in English in order not 
to damage China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (He & Li, 2011: 8-9). Arguably, 
by taking these English equivalences as ‘standard’ translations, one may consciously or 
subconsciously take the political stance on cross-strait relations manifested in these 
translation examples.  
There are some other ‘specific’ terms or phrases concerning the Taiwan issue 
frequently used in China. For instance, as China insists that Taiwan be seen as a 
renegade province of China’s, ‘Taiwan’ is often referred to in China as ‘Taiwan Island’, 
evidence of which can be found in some English abstracts of Chinese journal articles 
concerning the Taiwan issue or cross-strait relations (e.g. Zhu, 2005). By reducing 
Taiwan’s  status  to  an  ‘island’,  China  may fully  imply  its  status  as  a  ‘mother  country’.  
By contrast, in Taiwan, the term ‘Taiwan Island’ is mainly used in a geographical sense 
in scientific studies (e.g. Chan & Ma, 2004). Jiang Yi-huahԢەᐇ, former Minister of 
Interior and incumbent Vice-Premier of Taiwan, once received severe criticism for 
asking the people “on Taiwan Island” not to make protests against the cross-strait talks 
held in Taiwan as the usage of the term ‘Taiwan Island’ within the political context has 
been widely seen in Taiwan as degrading Taiwan’s sovereign status and flattering China 
(Huang, 2009, 14 December; original emphasis). The adjective ‘so-called’ is also 
commonly  used  in  China  as  a  disapproval  expression  in  talks  or  discussions  about  the  
Taiwan issue. For instance, Taiwan’s constitutional reform during the Chen Shui-bian 
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administration is described as “so-called ‘constitutional reform (original emphasis)’” in 
an article entitled Top advisor reiterates resolute opposition to "Taiwan independence" 
on the website of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United Statesύ
䟠Γ҇Ӆک㡚厉ऍճ䢊ӝ㜚㡚ε٬卞12. For another instance, Yang Jiemian䩵Ბࠀ, 
current President and Senior Fellow of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies 
(SIIS)  and  Member  of  Shanghai  Committee  of  People's  Political  Consultative  
Conference, in his five-page journal article entitled Cross-Strait Relations in a New 
International Setting, used the adjective ‘so-called’ four times:  
 
The leadership in Taiwan is trying to use the ‘so-called’ democracy issue to 
achieve its purpose of independence…Owing to a variety of reasons, the 
‘so-called’ Taiwan identity is gathering momentum…the Chinese mainland will 
continue to pursue peaceful unification while firmly opposing 'so-called’ Taiwan 
independence…some political forces in the United States are trying to blame the 
current tense situation concerning the Taiwan Strait on the 'so-called’ China threat 
(Yang, 2004; my emphasis).    
 
For another extreme example, during a brief newspaper interview on the Taiwan issue 
with Yang Lixian 䩵ҥ䤄, a Chinese researcher and expert in Taiwan studies, the 
adjective ‘so-called’ was used thirteen times (People’s Daily, 2001, 14 December). 
 The long-lasting emphasis on the patriotic trait within Chinese interpreters and 
translators and on the ‘politically correct’ translation and interpreting tradition that the 
Chinese government and people hold dear has been embodied frequently in genuine 
context, particularly on the One China issue. For instance, in Chinese prime minister 
Wen Jiabao’s joint press conference with then Japanese prime minister Yasuo Fukuda 
held on 28 December 2007 in Beijing to outline the results of a Sino-Japan summit, a 
Chinese interpreter misinterpreted Wen’s explanation of Fukuda’s stance on the Taiwan 
                                                        
12 The article was published on 9 March 2007. Retrieved 12 August 2012 from 
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t302494.htm. 
77 
 
issue from “Ѡ㵈喘㧆ҥ喬Ѝ࡭喁喐啮喔啮(literally [Prime Minister Fukuda] does not 
support the independence of Taiwan)”  into  “ᅽҖ२࣬喙Ѡ㵈㧆ҥ喕ϸ㟂喃喵喒喘ҥ
൑喼໩Ӻ(literally Prime Minister Fukuda will continue to take the stand of opposing 
the independence of Taiwan)”. Surprised at the misinterpretation, Fukuda himself at the 
end of the press conference made a special clarification on Japan’s stance on the Taiwan 
issue by publicly correcting the phrase “ϸ㟂喃喵(oppose)” into “Ѝ࡭喁喐啮喔啮(not 
support)” (Sakai, 2007, 29 December). Another example took place in a ‘less’ political 
context. In a 2006 World Baseball Classic pre-game press conference held for the 
Chinese Taipei team, the Chinese interpreter, who was hired by the host organization, 
always said ‘zhǀng guó tái bČi (literally China Taipei)’ instead of ‘zhǀng huá tái bČi 
(literally Chinese Taipei)’ when interpreting into Mandarin (Luo, 2006, 28 February). 
Note that due to the pressure from China, Taiwan is allowed to take part in some 
international events, such as annual APEC economic leaders' meetings and the 
Olympics, only under the name of Chinese Taipei, which China considers does not 
imply to the other countries that Taiwan is not part of China (Woods, 1993: 133-6). The 
Chinese interpreter’s ‘misinterpretation’ provoked a strong protest from the Chinese 
Taipei team after the press conference in that ‘zhǀng guó tái bČi’ in Mandarin terms 
explicitly means that Taipei is a city of China and accordingly Taiwan is part of China. 
The fact that professional Chinese interpreters may give a higher priority to their own 
political ideology than to faithfulness to source texts when interpreting the One China 
issues indicates that the One China ideology has become a socially shared belief (at 
least) in Chinese society and may be produced and reproduced by those who share this 
belief in the way Fairclough maintains (1989: 85): 
 
…when ideologies are brought to discourse not as explicit elements of the text, but 
as the background assumptions which on the one hand lead the text producer to 
‘textualize' the world in a particular way, and on the other hand lead the interpreter 
to interpret the text in a particular way. Texts do not typically spout ideology. They 
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so position the interpreter through their cues that she brings ideologies to the 
interpretation of texts - and reproduces them in the process! 
 
2.5 Identity Crisis in Taiwan 
 
An independent political entity as Taiwan is, it is not widely recognized as a 
country on the international stage13. The political predicament of Taiwan may be best 
described by the term invented by Jonathan Manthorpe (2005) -- a forbidden nation. 
However,  while  China  claims  Taiwan  to  be  part  of  its  territory,  it  is  undeniable  that  
Taiwan and China are two separate and different political and economic entities at 
present. Taiwan adopts a democratic system while China is one of the few entities in the 
world that practice communism and totalitarianism. Yet, the contradictory attitude that 
most  of  the  countries  in  the  world  hold  towards  Taiwan  –  echoing  China’s  claim  that  
Taiwan is a province of communist China while acknowledging Taiwan’s status as an 
autonomous democracy – compounds the national identity crisis that the people of 
Taiwan14 have long been faced with. Some researchers have explored the identity crisis 
that Taiwan is being faced with in modern times, but without a review of the history of 
Taiwan  under  the  rule  of  different  external  powers,  their  attempts  might  lead  to  
oversimplistic or partial interpretation of the factors that have contributed to the 
formation of national identity in Taiwan. For instance, Corcuff (2004) investigates the 
changes of national identity in the Mainlanders15 in Taiwan against a background of 
increasing public awareness of Taiwanization and diminishing possibility of the 
R.O.C.’s comeback in the Chinese mainland. While revealing the economic and cultural 
                                                        
13 As of 8 August 2012, Taiwan has diplomatic ties with another twenty-three countries. Information 
retrieved 22 August 2012 from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the R.O.C. (Taiwan) at 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Official/Regions/AlliesIndex/?opno=777f1778-f578-4148-b22a-b62f81be5f57 
14 In light of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity in Taiwan, the term ‘the people of Taiwan’ in this 
chapter refers to the inhabitants of Taiwan in a broad sense. 
15 After 1945, a large number of Chinese people fled to Taiwan with the R.O.C. government and these 
new Chinese settlers and their next generations are generally termed ‘Mainlanders’. According to the 
1956 census data, the number of the Mainlanders in Taiwan was around 1.21 million at the time (Huang, 
1995: 430). 
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predicaments of the Mainlanders who fled to Taiwan and settled down in a new society 
with cultural and linguistic diversity, Corcuff, however, does not address how the native 
inhabitants of Taiwan, because of the arrival of these Chinese newcomers, have been 
treated unfairly and deprived of what had belonged to them. In this chapter, the 
researcher will seek reasons behind the current identity crisis in Taiwan by discussing 
briefly  the  identity  shifting  in  Taiwan since  it  was  first  subject  to  a  single  ruler  in  the  
seventeenth century and how the ideologies and identities of the people of Taiwan has 
been shaped and manipulated since the R.O.C. rule in 1945 amid the military threats 
from the neighboring P.R.C.  
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2.5.1 Identity shifting and ideology shaping in pre-1945 Taiwan  
 
It is widely thought that the current identity crisis in Taiwan is highly related to the 
relations between China and Taiwan. However, while China keeps claiming that Taiwan 
has  belonged  to  China  since  ancient  times  (Zhou,  2006),  it  is  the  Dutch  that  came  to  
Taiwan in  the  seventeenth  century  and  became the  first  single  ruler  of  this  place.  The  
Dutch rule of Taiwan, which lasted nearly forty years, actually inaugurated the history 
of Taiwan under the rule of different external powers as shown in the following table 1. 
 
Period External Powers 
1624-1662 The Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) 
1626-1642 Spain16 
1662-1683 The Cheng Regime 
1683-1895 4Ưng China  
1895-1945 Japan 
1949-1996 The Republic of China (the R.O.C.): One Party Dictatorship Period 
Table 1 The External Powers as the Ruler of Taiwan 
 
Since the Dutch rule, the people of Taiwan have been under the domination of the 
powers from outside one after another. Under the rule of different foreign powers17, the 
revolt of the people of Taiwan never stopped but usually ended up with military 
suppression, and the people of Taiwan were forced to deal with drastic and constant 
                                                        
16 The Spaniards only occupied the northern tip of Taiwan for about sixteen years, and therefore, the 
Spanish occupation will not be discussed in this chapter. For the detail of the Spanish experience in 
Taiwan from 1626 till 1642, see Borao Mateo (2009). 
17 Lee Teng-hui, former President of the ROC, explicitly stated that Taiwan has always been under the 
control of foreign powers, including the KMT (Shiba, 1995: 531). The KMT is also known as the Chinese 
Nationalist Party. It unified modern China and established the R.O.C. government in the 1920s. In the 
wake of its defeat in the civil war with the CCP, the KMT-led R.O.C. government fled to Taiwan and 
started its one-party dictatorial rule of Taiwan until 2000, when the DDP became the ruling party through 
direct elections. 
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changes of politics, language and culture. The colonial fate of Taiwan in turn left the 
ideologies and identities of the people of Taiwan shaped and reshaped constantly, and 
what ideologies and identities were instilled or reshaped in the people of Taiwan was 
mainly decided by the mentalities of the rulers.  
The Dutch, as the first single ruler of Taiwan, viewed it as a subject nation where 
they  could  obtain  profits  for  the  VOC  maritime  empire,  and  thus  they  did  not  aim  to  
build a national identity in the people of Taiwan towards the VOC but to make peace 
with and among a variety of ethnic groups on this land (Campbell, 1903). At the time, 
the natives spreading over the island in mutually exclusive and autonomous tribal 
communities were the majority of the island inhabitants and were generally termed the 
‘Formosans’ by the Dutch (Chiu, 2008: 5). The Dutch were convinced that the 
Formosans, who had no concept of political hierarchy and couldn’t read or write 
(Campbell, 1903: 89-91), might be susceptible to the shaping of ideology. Therefore, 
while using force against some disobedient inhabitants, the Dutch set up religious 
schools, where Formosan students were taught Christian faith in the local languages and 
learned how to write their native languages in Latin letters (ibid: 179-180, 540). While 
the Dutch tried to obtain Formosan obedience through evangelization, they also took 
harsh administration policies and suppressed local revolts by force from time to time 
(Chiu, 2008: 210-217). The carrot and stick strategies seemed to work. In spite of the 
short duration and the limited scope18 of the Dutch rule, some of the people of Taiwan, 
if not many, had identity shift towards the Dutch at the time (Campbell, 1903: 162-163, 
182,  232),  and  the  Hollandiseering  of  some  of  the  people  of  Taiwan  may  have  still  
remained at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century (Pickering, 1898: 117).  
When Cheng Cheng-kung, a Míng China loyalist better known to the West as 
Koxinga, won the victory over the Dutch and established the first Chinese regime in 
                                                        
18 For example, some mountainous areas were out of the Dutch’s reach. 
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Taiwan in 1662, he billed his Cheng regime as a continuation of Míng China19 (Cha, 
1961: 74-75). In addition to erasing the Hollandiseering legacy through force (Pickering, 
1898: 64), the Cheng regime transplanted the Han Chinese political, cultural, and 
educational systems from China to Taiwan and had the first temple of Confucius built in 
Taiwan for the purpose of sinicizing the people of Taiwan (Jiang, 1958). In 1683, 
Taiwan was seized by QƯng China, which aimed to eliminate the Míng China loyalists 
and treated Taiwan lightly until Japan’s attack on Taiwan in 1874 (Huang, 2006: 79). 
Although the sinicization policies were expanded and strengthened, the people of 
Taiwan developed group identity instead of national identity because of being treated 
unequally  in  terms  of  social  status,  ethnic  origin,  and  degree  of  civilization  under  the  
rule of hegemonic and ethnocentric QƯng China (Hsu, 2000; Wang, 2002: 66-68).  
In  1895,  Taiwan  was  ceded  to  Japan  after  the  defeat  of  QƯng  China  at  the  First  
Sino-Japan War. To turn the people of Taiwan into Japanese, assimilation policies were 
carried out in a carrot and stick way (Chou, 1996). Meanwhile, to sever the relations 
between Taiwan and China and boost Japanese identity in the people of Taiwan, the 
Japanese authorities carefully designed the contents of the school textbooks for the 
people of Taiwan by, among the others, replacing the Chinese history with Japanese 
culture and history (Nishikawa, 1938, February), enhancing the image of Japan and 
downgrading that of Taiwan (Sakai, 2010), and speaking highly of specific figures 
whose stories might help boost the Japanese spirit (Ang, 1986). Japan might be the first 
external power that developed a strong sense of national identity in at least some of the 
people of Taiwan (Ching, 2007). During the fifty-year Japanese rule, examples in which 
people of Taiwan demonstrated their strong identity towards Japan occurred across 
Taiwan, such as the suicide of Hanaoka Ichiro (Tierney, 2010: 60-61) and the case of 
the Takasago Volunteer Army (Huang, 2005: 88-92). Nowadays, there is still pro-Japan 
                                                        
19 In 1644, Míng China lost its ruling power in China proper to the Manchurians, who then established 
the QƯng Empire. 
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sentiment across Taiwan’s society20 (Deans, 2002).  
 
2.5.2 Ideology shaping and manipulation in post-1945 Taiwan 
 
While the P.R.C. claims that Taiwan is part  of China,  some people of Taiwan are 
regarding themselves as Chinese as well. Figure 2 below, which shows the changes in 
the Taiwanese/Chinese identity of the people of Taiwan between 1992 and 2012, may 
serve as an important reference for Taiwan identities studies.    
 
Figure  2.  The  Changes  in  the  Taiwanese/Chinese  Identity  of  the  People  of  Taiwan  
between 1992 and 2012. Courtesy of the Election Study Center, NCCU. 
 
The surveys, which investigate the identities of the people of Taiwan, show that in the 
past two decades, ‘Taiwanese’ identity rose and ‘Chinese’ identity dropped in a steady 
manner, and the identity of ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’ remained significant. At first 
                                                        
20 Also see Wang, 2002: 97-109 for the reasons behind the pro-Japan sentiment across Taiwan.  
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glance, the results of the 1992 survey and those of the immediate following three years 
may lead people to think that most of the people of Taiwan originally considered 
themselves to be Chinese and Taiwanese identity might have been reinforced under the 
leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party (DDP), which may be further simplified 
and misinterpreted into another idea that Taiwan is part of China but attempts to obtain 
its independence. Nonetheless, to look deep into the results shown in figure 2, there are 
some questions that need to be answered: Are Taiwanese Chinese? Why were there 
more respondents considering themselves to be Chinese than those who regarded 
themselves as Taiwanese at the beginning of the surveys? Why did ‘Taiwanese’ identity 
go up and down under the eight-year pro-independence DDP administration (mid 2000 - 
mid 2008) but rise sharply after the pro-unification KMT Party restored its status as the 
ruling party? The answers to these questions may be made manifest in a brief review of 
how the ideologies of the people of Taiwan have been shaped and manipulated since the 
R.O.C. regime started its ruling of Taiwan in the late 1940s.  
 Although there had been some identity shifts towards Japan across Taiwan, many 
Taiwanese felt they had been treated as second-class citizens during the Japanese rule, 
and therefore, they were excited about being freed from the colonization of Japan when 
Japan was defeated in World War II  and looking forward to the coming of the R.O.C. 
government  based  in  China,  which  had  claimed  China  as  the  motherland  of  Taiwan.  
Little had they expected that the R.O.C. government treated Taiwan as a colony rather 
than an ordinary part of its territory, and soon they were increasingly disillusioned by 
the ethnocentric, hegemonic, and authoritarian mindset of this Han Chinese regime 
(Wang, 2002: 97-110). The widespread resentment of the people of Taiwan against the 
KMT-led R.O.C. government as well as the Mainlanders, who generally have enjoyed 
more social resources and privileges than the native inhabitants of Taiwan even until 
now (Li, 2007, 4 October), resulted in mass protests and revolts across Taiwan in early 
85 
 
1947, which in turn led to the 228 Incident, a massacre of the people of Taiwan ordered 
by the KMT-led R.O.C. government21. The martial law was imposed across Taiwan 
from mid 1949 till 1987, during which the KMT consolidated its power and prevented 
public revolts by every mean. In the following, the researcher will  discuss how public 
ideologies have been shaped and manipulated in post-1945 Taiwan through language, 
education, religion (including deification of political leaders), and control of mass 
media and publication. 
 
2.5.2.1 Language and education policy 
 
After the KMT-led R.O.C. government started its rule of Taiwan, the use of 
Japanese was strictly banned and the use of the local languages of Taiwan in public 
greatly refrained (Li, H., 1995). To make Mandarin Chinese the national language22, the 
KMT took a lot of harsh measures across Taiwan. For instance, county magistrate 
elections would not be possible until Mandarin Chinese had been widely used across 
Taiwan (Hsu, 1991: 96). For another instance, schoolchildren who were caught speaking 
local languages at school were humiliated by having a red circle drawn around their 
mouths and a large dog tag that said ‘I will speak the national language’ hung around 
their necks (Li, 2004). The drastic change of language use, which was aimed at 
eliminating the Japanese educational and cultural toxins and increasing the Chinese 
identity  of  the  people  of  Taiwan (Li,  H.,  1995:  180),  indirectly  limited  the  freedom of  
speech of the great majority of the people of Taiwan as they could express themselves in 
only Japanese and/or local languages at the time (Wang, 1991: 45-51) and directly made 
                                                        
21 According to Su (1980: 792), the names of more than one hundred thousand citizens of Taiwan were 
removed from household registration in 1953 as these people were reported missing, the great majority of 
whom might have been victims of the 228 Incident.  
22 The KMT authorities explicitly stated that the popularization of Mandarin Chinese was a means of 
promoting Chinese culture (Li, H., 1995: 177). 
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a lot of the native inhabitants of Taiwan gradually lose the ability to speak their mother 
tongue (e.g. Sung, 1995: 98-9). The sinicization policy was extended to the content of 
education  as  well.  In  addition  to  promoting  Chinese  culture  and  Confucianism,  the  
strong Chinese sense of cultural superiority was embedded in school textbooks for 
primary and secondary school education. For instance, (the Republic of) China was 
described as more civilized, virtuous, and peace-loving than the other countries in the 
world (Yang, 1994: 306-9). In fact, before the martial law was lifted in 1987, the themes 
of the school textbooks for the people of Taiwan were guided by the KMT leadership 
and mainly included boosting loyalty and obedience23, promoting ideas of fighting 
against Communism and reclaiming the Chinese mainland, and praising political leaders, 
such as Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek24 (ibid: 202-318). For instance, to arouse 
hatred towards the CCP and passion for reclaiming the Chinese mainland, people under 
the CCP regime were described as living in hell while Taiwan, governed by the R.O.C., 
was a paradise in the primary school textbooks used between the 1950s and 1980s (ibid: 
285-88). 
 
2.5.2.2 Religion and deification 
 
The oppression of the local faiths in Taiwan in the late period of the Japanese rule 
seemed to  end  with  the  defeat  of  Japan  in  the  Second Sino-Japan  War  in  1945.  Yet,  it  
was not long before the KMT-led R.O.C. government imposed on the people of Taiwan 
the ‘Regulations on Punishing Acts against Policeၴ᝾ᆦݤ25’ and the ‘Regulations on 
Banning Harmful Customsࢗ࿣όؼ॥߫ᒤݤ’ (Minbao Newspaper, 1947, 10 January), 
                                                        
23 Some lessons even encouraged young children to become patriotic martyrs (Yang, 1994: 293-295).  
24 See also the following discussion of the deification of Chiang Kai-shek in 2.5.2.2. 
25 The Regulations on Punishing Acts against Police came into effect in 1943 and were abolished in 1991. 
The detail may be accessed on the website of the Ministry of the Interior, ROC from 
http://glrs.moi.gov.tw/LawContentDetails.aspx?id=FL004513&KeyWordHL=&StyleType=1. 
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persecuting believers of the religions which opposed or showed little support for the 
government policy or which were suspected of conspiracy against the government. 
During the thirty-eight-year martial law period, religious freedom was restricted and 
most of the local faiths in Taiwan suffered more or less political persecution (Chü, 2006: 
1).  The  oppression  of  I-Kuan Tao (IKT)΋ೣၰ may be one of the notorious religious 
persecution cases in Taiwan. Since the 1950s numerous arrests of the IKT believers had 
been made as the IKT was labeled as an evil cult and accused of violating good customs, 
damaging national security and even conspiring with the Chinese Communist Party 
against the R.O.C. government. The ban on the IKT was finally lifted in 1987 (the same 
year in which the martial law period ended), which was largely attributed to the fact that 
the IKT had made much effort to demonstrate its loyalty to the government, built good 
relationships with some, if not many, high-ranking officials, and even entered into a 
political alliance with the government (Tsai, 1989: 220-223; Chü, 2006: 147-163). 
While suppressing the religions which might pose a challenge to the ruling power, the 
KMT-led R.O.C. government attempted to spread certain ideology among the people of 
Taiwan through the deification of the KMT political leaders. Chiang Kai-shek 
(1887-1975), who remained to be self-appointed President of the R.O.C. in Taiwan from 
1948 till 1975, might best demonstrate to what degree a human being could be deified 
by the KMT. Some stories about the ‘greatness’ of Chiang in his youth were written in 
school textbooks for children. For instance, when Chiang was little, he found small fish 
swimming against the current of a river and realized that he should always strive to 
conquer challenges as the fish (Chu, 1988: 15). For another instance, Chiang 
demonstrated a tendency to pursue democracy at the tender age of eleven by saying in 
front of his class that a president should be as down-to-earth as civilians because they 
were  all  human  beings  (ibid:  20).  After  Chiang’s  death,  the  KMT  took  a  series  of  
measures  to  highlight  the  significance  of  Chiang  to  the  people  of  Taiwan,  such  as  
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building the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and making the days of Chiang’s birth and 
death two national memorial days26.  Chiang  was  even  referred  to  as  ‘the  saviour  of  
mankindΓᜪޑ௱ࢃ’  and  ‘a  great  man  of  the  worldШࣚޑ଻Γ’ in the famous The 
Late President Lord Chiang Memorial SongӃᕴ಍ጯϦइۺᄺ, which  used  to  be  a  
must-sing song at school or at ceremonies before the 1990s and still remains one of the 
“practical” songs sung by the R.O.C. military.27 Nowadays, the KMT still pays tribute 
to Chiang on every anniversary of his death (Chou, 2011, 2 April). 
 
2.5.2.3 Control of mass media and publication 
 
It might be argued that the KMT-led R.O.C. government kept a tighter grip on the 
communication among the people of Taiwan than the previous foreign regimes in 
Taiwan. Take the newspaper sector for example. Immediately after the 228 Incident (in 
1947), the government sealed up more than a dozen of newspaper offices, seized the 
publications that were accused of inciting revolts, and arrested or killed some important 
figures in newspaper circles (Wu, 2002: 255). The freedom of speech and press was 
much more severely restricted when the martial law period started in mid 1949. Under 
rigorous and strict rules imposed on the newspaper sector, most of the newspapers 
became a mouthpiece for the government, and journalists might receive severe 
punishment anytime. For instance, in 1957 a newspaper editor named Lin Chenting݅
ਁ᎛was given a life sentence for being suspected of spying for the Chinese Communist 
Party just because he witnessed and reported a public protest around the U.S. embassy. 
Some other journalists were also put to jail because their academic connections with Lin 
                                                        
26 In late 2007, the DDP administration proposed canceling the two Chiang’s memorial days (Luo, et al., 
2007, 30 August), but in late 2008, the KMT administration made Chiang’s birthday a national memorial 
holiday again (Chen, 2008, 8 September).  
27 Information retrieved 23 August 2012 on the website of General Political Warfare Bureau, Ministry of 
Defense, R.O.C. from http://gpwd.mnd.gov.tw/onweb.jsp?webno=3333333124&webitem_no=467. 
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(Chen, 2003: 67-68). When the political control seemed to be loosened a little in the 
1980s, newspaper sector still needed to do self-censorship to avoid punishment (Chen, 
2006: 194-195). Nowadays, despite the lifting of the martial law, some newspapers still 
serve as a political instrument but mostly for financial reasons (ibid: 196-197). 
 
2.5.2.4 The social reality in Taiwan 
 
During the thirty-eight-year ‘White Terror’ period, Chinese identity was developed 
into the people of Taiwan through force and consent. While restricting freedom of 
speech and press through censorship and persecution (Chen, 2006: 190-194) and 
keeping a tight grip on politics, media, and education across Taiwan, the KMT adopted 
a lot of sinicization policies, such as making Mandarin Chinese the national language, 
promoting Chinese cultural tradition (Confucianism in particular) and emphasizing the 
historical relations between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland (Hsiau, 2010). Under the 
KMT authoritarian rule, the people of Taiwan were taught or forced to develop Chinese 
national identity, which, to most of the native inhabitants of Taiwan, was being built 
amid their resentment against the KMT hegemony and the unequal status and treatment 
among different ethnic groups in Taiwan, their desire for human rights and freedom, 
their  estrangement  from  the  Chinese  mainland,  and  their  disillusion  with  the  KMT’s  
empty boast about re-seizing the Chinese mainland (Makeham & Hsiau, 2005). As far 
as the Mainlanders are concerned, not only the social benefits they enjoy but also the 
Great China complex they hold may be handed down to their next generations in 
Taiwan (Lin, 2006; Corinus, 2010: 65-66), which may be one of the main reasons that 
cause conflicts over identity issue and divisions among ethnic groups in Taiwan. 
However, the appeal for indigenizing Taiwanese culture and politics began to sprout in 
the early 1970s, and the democratization of Taiwan as well as the development of 
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Taiwanese nationalism was boosted in the 1980s by some public protests in the wake of 
the Kaohsiung Incident28. Faced with the widespread outcry from the people of Taiwan, 
the KMT-led R.O.C. government finally lifted the martial law in 1987. It should be 
noted that the surveys as shown in figure 2 (see p. 83) started in 1992, which was just 
five years after the lifting of the martial law. Arguably, having been through sinicization 
process for nearly forty years and suddenly released from the KMT’s authoritarian and 
tyrannical  rule,  the  people  of  Taiwan  might  still  have  a  sense  of  insecurity  and  
uncertainty towards the change of the KMT and towards their national identity.   
With the steady progress in democratization and the growing Taiwanese awareness, 
the DDP won over the KMT in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. In general, 
during  his  two  terms,  President  Chen  Shui-bian  was  preparing  Taiwan  for  formal  
independence at some time in the future through some de-sinicization policies29 and 
attempted to help Taiwan return to the United Nations as a member state (Hsieh, 2007). 
Yet, his statement in his first inaugural address that he would not declare formal 
independence of Taiwan if the P.R.C. (China) had “no intention to use military force 
against Taiwan”30 greatly disappointed the pro-independence people in Taiwan (Yang, 
2005, 2 March). Also, the legitimacy of his winning of the 2004 presidential election in 
the wake of the 319 Shooting Incident31 was severely questioned by the opposition 
parties, which caused protracted power struggle between the ruling party and the 
opposition parties and might have blurred the focus of Taiwanization. It may be argued 
                                                        
28 The Kaohsiung Incidentऍ᜽৞٣ҹ was the second largest suppression of the people of Taiwan after 
the 228 Incident.  
29 For instance, the proportion of teaching of classical Chinese and the history of China in high school 
curriculum was reduced while that of the history and culture of Taiwan was increased. Also, the teaching 
of the local languages of Taiwan, including the Hoklo, Hakka, and Formosan languages, was provided in 
compulsory education.  
30 Information retrieved 23 August 2012 from 
http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=18907&rmid=2355&sd=2000/05/20&ed
=2000/05/20. 
31 On the eve of the 2004 presidential election, the DDP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian and his 
running mate Annette Lu were slightly injured from an assassination attempt while campaigning in 
southern Taiwan. The assassination was regarded by the opposition parties as well as some people of 
Taiwan as a trick to win sympathy votes (Chu, 2004).  
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that the great political power struggle inside Taiwan tired out its people who hoped for 
peace and prosperity and in turn discouraged them from asserting themselves politically 
at the time, which may be why there were slight increases or even decreases in the 
percentage of ‘Taiwanese’ identity under the eight-year DDP administration as shown 
in figure 2.  
Amid the prevailing public thinking that good relations between Taiwan and China 
might help boost the economy of Taiwan (Rigger, 2006), the KMT staged a comeback 
with Ma Ying-jeou, a second-generation Mainlander with Great China complex (Fan, 
2011, 2 October), winning the 2008 presidential election. Since then, Ma has adopted 
some sinicization and de-Taiwanization policies, such as increasing the lessons on 
classical Chinese, the history of China and Confucian thinking (Lin, 2011, 2 February), 
and officially renaming ‘Tái Y·Ѡᇟ(literally the Taiwanese language)’ ‘0΃n Nán Y·መ
ࠄᇟ32(literally the language of southern Fujian Province of China)’(Chiu, et al., 2011, 
24 May). Meanwhile, a series of pro-China policies have been implemented since 2008. 
For instance, in late June 2010, the Ma administration signed the ‘Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)’ with China, aiming to boost Taiwan’s 
economy through deep cooperation across the Strait (Hogg, 2010, 29 June). The Ma 
administration also welcomes tourists by group and by individual from the Chinese 
mainland in the hope of bringing the people of Taiwan as much economic benefit as 
possible and promoting direct exchange and communication between the peoples across 
the Strait (Jennings, 2011, 27 June). Given closer ties and warmer relations between 
Taiwan and China, why is there a surge of the public’s Taiwanese identity under the Ma 
administration as shown in figure 2? As it turns out, the direct and frequent contact with 
the people of China has generally contributed to the public realization in Taiwan that 
                                                        
32 ‘Min Nan Yu’ is an alternative invented and imposed by the KMT-led government to ‘Tai Yu’ in order 
to belittle the language that is used by the majority of the Taiwanese (Wang, 2002: 55) and to emphasize 
the historic relations between Taiwan and China. 
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there is much difference between both peoples, not only politically but also culturally 
(Fan, S., 2010: 259-263; Jacobs, 2011, 10 August), which may in turn strengthen 
Taiwanese identity across Taiwan. Also, as China never ceases showing its hegemony 
towards Taiwan through military threats and diplomatic pressure on the premise of the 
One China policy, many people of Taiwan may have turned their resistance to internal 
oppression from the past KMT one-party rule to resistance to external oppression from 
China (Jager, 2007:18). 
To readers of figure 2, the people of Taiwan may appear to be in a dilemma of 
choosing  to  be  Taiwanese  or  Chinese.  However,  in  light  of  the  colonial  history  of  
Taiwan, the results of the surveys (in figure 2) might have neglected the diversity of 
ethnicity and identity in Taiwan and might even arouse doubts about implications of 
sinicization. In fact, the meaning of ‘Taiwanese’ varies with context and so does 
‘Chinese’. From the Dutch occupation till 1945, the inhabitants of Taiwan were mainly 
the Formosans and the Chinese settlers who spoke the Hoklo or Hakka languages. After 
another large group of Chinese people, most of whom spoke Mandarin Chinese, came to 
settle down in Taiwan after 1945, the early Chinese settlers were referred to as 
Taiwanese, and the Chinese newcomers as well as their next generations ‘Mainlanders’. 
When it comes to the relations between China and Taiwan, ‘Taiwanese’ becomes a term 
referring to the Formosans, the Taiwanese, and the Mainlanders altogether. Likewise, 
the term ‘Chinese’ may refer to the people of the P.R.C. (China) in cross-strait context 
or refer to the Mainlanders as opposed to the Taiwanese in Taiwan. Also, the 
Mainlanders with Chinese identity consider Taiwan to be part of the Republic of China, 
which they think should have sovereignty over the Chinese mainland, while the people 
with  Taiwanese  identity  see  ‘Taiwan’  as  a  sovereign  country  (Wu,  1993).  Yet,  having  
lived in Taiwan for decades, some of the Mainlanders turn to regard themselves as both 
Chinese and Taiwanese (Fan, Y., 2010). So, are Taiwanese Chinese? Or in other words, 
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is Taiwan part of China? Having been ruled by different external powers and inhabited 
by people from different ethnic backgrounds, Taiwan now is an independent political 
and economic entity, and more and more inhabitants of this place are asserting 
themselves as ‘Taiwanese’.   
 
2.6 Summary of Chapter 2 
 
As the main aim of this study is to investigate whether ideologies of hegemony or 
resistance may be embodied in language use (discourse) of simultaneous interpreters of 
China and Taiwan in unequal power relations, the researcher reviews and discusses in 
this chapter previous studies on the key concepts relevant to the aim of this study.  
In Chapter 2.1, the definitions of ideology, power and identity and how these 
elements are embodied, sustained or strengthened in discourse are briefly discussed. 
Ideology and identity are not changed or (re)shaped easily and quickly. They are what 
people obtain and share in the socialization process through discourse. Yet, once 
developed firmly, ideology and identity will have influence on one’s thinking and 
behaviour, which is why those in power spare no effort in developing into general 
public certain ideologies and identities that can legitimate and sustain the ruling power. 
Discourse, which is speech in writing and speaking as a form of social practice, is not 
only the tool for socialization but also a mirror of ideologies and identities of the 
discourse producer. As a result, analyzing discourse may disclose how certain ideologies 
or identities are being constructed and sustained.  
Translated/Interpreted texts are also a form of discourse involving elements of 
ideology, identity, power and so on. The discussion in Chapter 2.3 demonstrates the 
interaction among these elements in translation/interpreting and the precarious 
situations that translators and interpreters may need to deal with. Translation and 
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interpreting  are  also  sites  of  struggles  of  ideologies  and  unequal  cultures  or  powers.  
While translation/interpreting is used as a tool for spreading ideology and sustaining 
hegemony, translated texts as well as translators and interpreters may show resistance to 
hegemony in various manners. The literature review also addresses the difference 
between translation and interpreting in some aspects, such as the way in which 
translated texts are produced. Yet, while the influence of ideologies on translation and 
translators is fully disclosed in translation studies, the link between an interpreter’s 
ideology and his/her rendition remains much less explored. To address ideology issue in 
interpreting,  this  study  chooses  to  put  such  research  in  the  setting  of  the  status  quo  
across the Taiwan Strait, with China and Taiwan on either side. 
China, as an overwhelming hegemony in terms of politics, economy and culture, 
has always reiterated its One China policy on international occasions. It insists that 
Taiwan, an island off southeast China, has long been part of it. However, democratic 
Taiwan has its government, land and people, and is recognized as a country by another 
twenty-something countries in the world. The historical relations between China and 
Taiwan and their social realities in recent decades are briefly reviewed in Chapters 2.5 
and  2.6,  which  may help  give  a  clear  picture  of  why the  relations  between China  and  
Taiwan are hegemony versus resistance.  
The literature review of the relationships among power, ideology, identity in 
discourse and translation/interpreting and the status quo between China and Taiwan 
should make it reasonable to presume in this study that the conflicts of ideologies and 
identities between peoples of China and Taiwan over the One China policy may be 
embodied in SI monologic discourse that interpreters produce in response to the speaker. 
In the following chapters, the researcher will engage in the investigation into this 
presumption.  
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Research Design  
 
In Chapter 2, the definitions of ideology, power and identity and how these elements are 
embodied, sustained or strengthened through discourse have been briefly discussed. Discourse 
as  a  form  of  social  practice,  is  not  only  the  tool  for  socialization  but  also  a  mirror  of  
ideologies and identities of the discourse producer. Translation/interpreting text as a form of 
discourse is also closely linked with ideology, identity, and power. That the translator’s 
behaviour is subject to the influence of his/her ideology and identity has been confirmed in 
translation studies. By contrast, the same issue has not been adequately investigated in 
interpreting studies. To investigate the relationship among ideology, identity and interpreting, 
this  study  chooses  to  put  such  research  in  the  setting  of  the  status  quo  between  China  and  
Taiwan, in both of which Mandarin Chinese is adopted as the official language and Chinese 
culture is practiced. The two nations are in unequal power relations, and both peoples have 
conflicting ideologies and identities over the One China policy. It is presumed that different 
political ideologies and national identities between both peoples may cause differences in 
interpretation and reproduction of source language texts in cross-strait political context 
between Taiwanese interpreters (interpreters from Taiwan) and Chinese interpreters 
(interpreters from China). Based on the research aims and objectives specified in Chapter 1 
and the previous literature review of ideology and identity research in the CDA, translation 
and interpreting studies in Chapter 2, the research methods of this study include (1) a 
simultaneous interpreting (SI) experiment for collecting SI data; (2) survey questionnaires for 
enhancing  the  validity  of  the  results  of  SI  rendition  analysis  to  avoid  criticism  of  the  CDA  
analysis for being ‘interpretative’ or ‘subjective’; (3) post-experiment interviews for the 
purpose of obtaining specific opinions from the subjects. The questionnaire surveys and 
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interviews are playing a subordinate and preceding role within the methodology of this study. 
Both of them are designed to complement the CDA analysis and increase the validity of the 
research findings of ideological signs in simultaneous renditions. More specifically, 42 trainee 
interpreters are recruited to be experiment subjects. Five Mandarin speeches, divided into six 
SI sessions, are used as source speeches in the experiment (also referred to as the data 
collection throughout the study). The data collection is divided into two stages. At the first 
stage, the subjects are asked to attend four simultaneous interpreting sessions. A student 
interpreter background questionnaire is filled in at the very beginning of the experiment and a 
specific retrospective questionnaire after each interpreting session. At the second-stage data 
collection, the subjects are asked to attend two simultaneous interpreting sessions and fill in 
the national identity scale questionnaire and the post-experiment questionnaire. Some of the 
subjects also opt for an individual interview. The overall data collection process is shown in 
Diagram 3 below. 
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Diagram 3 Data Collection Procedure 
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While using the CDA method to analyze the renditions, the researcher also refers to the 
results of the questionnaires and/or the in-depth interviews. For example, if one rendition 
produced by a subject in one speech is not evidently ideological but deviant from its source 
language text to the extent that the source messages are overstated, understated or distorted, 
the researcher will examine the subject's rendering of the speech as a whole and see if there 
are other possible or evident ideological signs in the same speech rendering. If so, the subject 
may have a tendency to bring his/her ideology into his/her interpreting, and that rendition may 
be viewed as an ideological sign. If not, the researcher will continue to examine the subject’s 
rendering of the other speeches and see if more deviant ideological signs are found. The 
results of the questionnaires the subject has filled in and/or the data of the individual interview 
the subject has given will be reviewed in the CDA process in order to find further evidence of 
whether the deviant rendition can be seen as ideological. Those deviant renditions that may be 
slips of tongue or are corrected by the subject immediately may not be counted as ideological 
unless strong evidence, such as the subject’s acknowledgement of his/her own ideological 
signs, is found. The cross-referencing process is called the ‘CDA Filter Process’ in this study 
(see Chapter 3.2.4). Detailed explanation of the research design and methods used in the 
present study is given in the following sections.  
 
3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
 Among a variety of qualitative research methods, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 
emerging in the 1990s and ‘ideologically’ analyzing ideology, gradually assumes its 
prominence in different academic fields. While criticized as subjective and biased (e.g. 
Widdowson, 1995; Jones, 2007), CDA has been recognized as a very useful research method 
in various domains. With combined perspectives of linguistics and neo-Marxist sociology, 
CDA has become a thriving concept in social sciences as it views text as products of social 
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structure, examines text within social context, discloses ideologies embedded in discourse, 
and in some cases analyzes discourse in a broader historical and cultural context. 
 In order to uncover ideological signs embodied in simultaneous renditions of cross-strait 
political texts, i.e. signs of hegemony or resistance, the present study conducts SI data 
collection, questionnaire surveys and interviews, brings extra-linguistic factual considerations 
to CDA analysis of the renditions within specific social, political and historical contexts, and 
statistically demonstrates the findings of the ideological signs detected through CDA analysis. 
The combination of the qualitative (CDA and individual interviews) and quantitative (surveys 
and statistical analysis) research methods applied in the study is created on the basis of the 
CDA literature review and features of translation and interpreting practices in the hope of 
dealing with ideology issue in interpreting studies in a scientific manner. 
 To ensure the scientism and objectivity of the simultaneous interpreting experiment, all 
of  the  subjects  are  asked  to  fill  in  four  different  kinds  of  questionnaires  given  to  them  at  
different stages of the experiment. The first questionnaire is to obtain the background 
information of the subjects. The other three questionnaires are used for the purpose of 
obtaining concrete and supporting information about the subjects’ (political) ideologies as 
reference for the CDA analysis (see Chapter 3.4). The brief introduction of CDA and why it is 
the major research method of the present study are presented in the following sections.  
 
3.2.1 The origin of CDA 
 
 CDA is often considered to evolve from Critical Linguistics (CL). The development of 
CDA and CL was under the profound influence of Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar 
(SFG), also known as Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). The term ‘Critical Linguistics’ 
was coined by Roger Fowler and some other researchers at the University of East Anglia in 
the UK (Simpson & Mayr, 2009: 50) and developed on the basis of systemic functional 
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linguistics (see Halliday, 1970, 1978 & 1985). Since then, CL has gradually become one of 
the important schools in the field of linguistics. Renowned CL researchers include Roger 
Fowler, Gunther Kress, Bob Hodge, and Tony Trew (see Wodak & Meyer, 2009). In addition 
to following the Hallidayan tradition, according to Threadgold (2003: 17), CL also draws 
inspiration from the works of Sapir (1921), Barthes (1953), Whorf (1956), and Bernstein 
(1990), Chomsky’s transformational linguistics (1957), early French semiotics, Prague School 
linguistics and semiotics, British structuralist-functionalist anthropology, and so on. As an 
interdisciplinary approach, CL combines textual analysis method in linguistics with the 
political and ideological functions of language specified in the social theory. The analysis of 
CL puts much focus on grammar and vocabulary of texts, particularly on such aspects as 
transitivity, modality, transformation, classification, and coherence (Fowler & Kress, 1979). 
CL aims to interpret specific texts with critical attitude and disclose the embedded ideologies, 
demonstrating the social meanings of discourse through analyzing linguistic structures within 
broad social contexts (ibid: 195-196; Fairclough, 1992: 26-27).  
 However,  Fairclough argues that CL has its  limitations and proposes replacing CL with 
CDA. According to Fairclough (1992: 28-29), the limitations of CL are: 
1) CL sees text as ‘product’ but seldom addresses how such product is produced or 
interpreted. 
2)  CL  does  not  recognize  discourse  as  a  domain  where  social  struggle  exists  or  attribute  
change in discourse to change of social or cultural context; instead, it overemphasizes ‘the 
effects of discourse in social reproduction of existing social relations and structures.’ 
3) CL defines the interface between ideology and language in a narrow sense. Only focusing 
on grammar and vocabulary, CL neglects ideological significance of texts. In addition, CL 
mainly discusses ideological aspects of ‘written monologue' rather than spoken dialogue. 
CL also places great stress on the embodiment of ideologies in texts without addressing 
processes of interpretation.  
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While Fairclough considers CDA to be more thoroughly rounded than CL, both CDA and CL 
in a broad sense pay attention to structural relations of domination, discrimination, power, and 
control  that  are  either  obvious  or  opaque  in  discourse.  Arguably,  CDA  and  CL  are  closely  
related, with a considerable overlap of research domain between the two, and both of them 
deal critically with texts. Whether one of them is a subordinate or successor to the other will 
not be further discussed here. The present study will adopt CDA as the main research method.  
 CDA also owes its theoretical origins to some significant Marxist figures and movements, 
including Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, and the Frankfurt School. Gramsci proposes the 
concept of ‘cultural hegemony’ and describes it as the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the 
majority to civil society manipulated by the dominant group (Gramsci, 1971: 12; see also 
Chapter 2.2.1). More specifically, the general public are manipulated without self awareness 
by the superstructure through instilment of ideology. As time goes by, a collective ideology is 
formed among the general public, which in turn encourages more active public participation 
in preserving and reinforcing such ideology. Althusser provides a more detailed description of 
the effects of ideology. Pointing out that ‘ideology has no history (1971: 160),' Althusser 
explains the function and power of ideological state apparatuses which overwhelm and 
manipulate human individuals and mould them into subjects fitting in with social expectations. 
Gramsci’s and Althusser’s viewpoints on ideology have influenced many CDA practitioners. 
The Frankfurt School of Philosophy sees the limitations of traditional Marxist theory and has 
created neo-Marxist interdisciplinary social theory. Of all the Frankfurt School theorists, 
Habermas (1984) has given great inspiration to some studies in CDA. He considers that a 
critical science must be ‘self-reflexive' and look at linguistic and social interactions within 
historical contexts. Also, he believes rational discourse could overcome opaque and 
ideological discourse (cited from Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 261). In addition, studies of 
Russian linguist Valentin Volosinov and philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin about linguistic theory 
of ideology have a profound impact on CDA. Volosinov suggests the materiality of linguistic 
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signs which ‘becomes an arena of the class struggle (1986: 23)’ and the ideological effects of 
language use. Bakhtin maintains: ‘Any utterance is a link in a very complexly organized chain 
of other utterances (1986: 69),’ emphasizing the dialogicality of language. Bakhtin’s concept 
of ‘intertextuality’ in discourse gives insight into ‘the nature of the process through which 
discourse is both shaped by language structures yet works them and ultimately transforms 
them as well as reproducing them (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 49)’. French philosopher 
and  historian  Michel  Foucault’s  work  on  discourse  and  power  (e.g.  1972)  is  also  a  very  
important source of inspiration to some CDA practitioners. Foucault maintains that discourse 
can reflect power structures (ibid), and therefore, by analyzing discourse, CDA analysts may 
uncover power struggles and promote equalities.    
 The initial development of CDA was facilitated by several academic publications, such 
as van Dijk’s Prejudice in Discourse (1984), Fairclough’s Language and Power (1989), 
Wodak’s Language, Power and Ideology (1989), and the journal of Discourse and Society 
initiated by van Dijk in 1990. Continuing CL’s critical attitude toward discourse, the CDA 
network started to take concrete form subsequent to a symposium held in Amsterdam in 1991, 
where five important scholars, including Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, 
Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak, exchanged ideas of theoretical and methodological 
aspects of CDA. Since then, CDA has become more international and heterogeneous (Wodak, 
2001a: 4). Nonetheless, whether CDA is an independent methodological discipline remains a 
much-debated topic. One of the CDA initiators, Teun van Dijk, who prefers to use the term 
Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), argues on his ‘Discourse in Society’ website that 
CDA/CDS is not a method of research but “an academic movement of a group of socially and 
politically  committed  scholars,  or,  more  individually,  a  socially  critical  attitude  of  doing  
discourse studies (2007).” It may be argued that CDA can be seen as a branch of discourse 
analysis (e.g. Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 2001:352). Now, more and more scholars or 
researchers find CDA a very useful research method for furthering understanding of 
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discursive implications that involve unequal social relations. The research foci or domains of 
CDA practitioners include political discourse (e.g. Wodak, 1989), racism (e.g. van Dijk, 2005), 
gender (e.g. Wodak & Benke, 1996), media language (e.g. van Dijk, 1988), ideology (e.g. van 
Dijk, 1998), strategy (e.g. Vaara, 2010), education (e.g. Rogers, 2004), economics (e.g. Jessop 
et al., 2008), institutional discourse (e.g. Wodak, 1996), etc.  
 Although CDA has become a widely-recognized paradigm in linguistics (Wodak, 2001a), 
it has come under severe criticism for its lack of clarification on how to demarcate the 
discursive from the non-discursive and how to verify the dialectic relationship between 
discourse and social practices (Widdowson, 1995; Jørgenson & Phillips, 2002: 89-92). 
Widdowson (1995, 2004) also considers that CDA uses selective and ideological 
interpretation to support its belief that discourse as social action is ideological by nature, and 
therefore, CDA is criticized for being biased. Nevertheless, in providing an overview of CDA, 
Fairclough and  Wodak (1997)  maintain  that  CDA has  always  taken  an  explicit  position  as  a  
socially and politically committed paradigm, and its interpretative and explanatory analysis is 
always dynamic and open. Also,  the CDA practitioners’ efforts to call  for social  action have 
indeed made a difference in some ways. For example, van Dijk’s analysis of Dutch 
schoolbooks (1993) uncovers hidden racism within and leads to corrections of school 
textbooks.  
 
3.2.2 The content of CDA 
 
 With the example of Michael Charlton’s interview with Margaret Thatcher, former Prime 
Minister of the U.K., which was broadcast on BBC Radio 3 on 17 December 1985, 
Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 268-280) demonstrate eight principles of analyzing discourse 
through use of the CDA method, five of which are shared by all approaches within CDA 
while the others spark off a heated debate that still continues. The eight principles are 
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1. CDA addresses social problems: 
  CDA researchers consider that social and cultural processes and structures have partially 
linguistic-discursive character. Through analysis of discourse with critical attitude, CDA 
uncovers social problems and power struggles of the dominated. 
2. Power relations are discursive: 
  Power relations are reproduced, negotiated, or transformed in discourse. CDA recognizes 
and stresses the linguistic and discursive nature of power relations in society. 
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture: 
  Discourse is part of society and culture, and at the same time it facilitates constitution of 
identities and reproduction and/or transformation of society and culture.  
4. Discourse does ideological work: 
  Ideology, embedded in discursive practices, can reflect social reality and construct 
identities, and it is “most effective when its workings are least visible (Fairclough, 1989: 
85)”.  
5. Discourse is historical: 
  Discourses are always produced within context and connected to the past; therefore, to 
understand discourses, one must analyze them within context.  
6. The link between text and society is mediated: 
  It is “orders of discourse” that mainly mediate the link between text and society (Fairclough 
& Wodak, 1997: 277). The other views of such mediation include Smith’s ‘practices of 
social actors’ (1990) and van Dijk’s socio-cognitive processes (e.g. 1984). 
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory: 
  CDA  adopts  “a  systematic  methodology  and  a  thorough  investigation  of  the  context”  in  
order to interpret the opaqueness of discourse and display “different implications of 
different readings” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 279). 
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8. Discourse is a form of social action: 
  CDA practitioners are socially and politically motivated and active in disclosing 
discrimination in gender, class, race, ethnicity, etc through critical analysis of discourse in 
the hope of promoting non-discriminatory language use and eliminating inequalities. 
 According to Fairclough and Wodak’s CDA overview (1997), the following features are 
generally characteristic of the CDA approaches (see also Jørgenson & Phillips, 2002: 60-64): 
1) CDA addresses social problems by examining the linguistic-discursive aspects, which are 
partly characteristic of social and cultural processes and structures; 
2) Discourse is both constitutive of and constituted by society and culture. 
3) Discourse is a context-based product and should be examined within its social or cultural 
context. 
4) Discourse may carry and reinforce ideology that constructs and represents inequalities in 
society, gender, race, ethnicity, etc. 
5) With critical attitude, CDA aims to uncover inequalities, raise public awareness and strive 
for equalities. 
CDA draws much inspiration from Halliday’s three linguistic functions: ideational, 
interpersonal, and textual functions (Halliday, 1971; 1978). As Halliday (1971: 332-335) 
suggests, language is programmed to fulfil ideational, interpersonal, and textual functions, 
and it is through the ideational function that one’s real-world experience and internal 
consciousness are embodied in his use of language. Here, Halliday’s internal consciousness 
includes reactions, cognitions, perceptions, and linguistic acts of speaking and understanding. 
Fairclough also recognizes the importance of the ideational function of language, emphasizing 
that use of language can “signify the world (1992: 64)”. Use of language is a deterministic 
process: language is acquired through socialization, while social reality is constructed through 
use of language. More specifically, when one acquires a language, he is being instilled with 
ideologies carried by language, and in turn his linguistic performance tends to conform to 
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social norms and embody the ideologies (Fowler & Kress, 1979: 194). It can be argued that 
use of language, in an ideational sense, is ideological and usually reflects the speaker’s 
thoughts or ideology. Even translations, which are supposed to be faithful renditions of source 
text, are found to be ideologically-embedded practices (Schäffner, 2003) and more and more 
translation studies provide empirical evidence for the close link between ideology and 
translation (e.g. Tymoczko & Gentzler, 2002; also see Chapter 2.3.1). Compared with 
translators, interpreters enjoy much more freedom and discretion in certain aspects. Although 
both translators and interpreters may be commissioned to do their tasks and may be subject to 
requirements or opinions of agents or clients, written translation texts are destined to come 
under greater ideological influences of ‘patronage (Lefevere, 1992b)’ and/or ‘censorship 
(Schäffner, 2007: 138-140)’ in that interpreting is characteristic of evanescence (Seleskovitch, 
1994: 12-18) and is often not subject to prior censorship. Once spoken, words are fading and 
only meanings may stay in the minds of listeners, and people do not know exactly how they 
are going to express themselves until they open their mouths. In this sense, whether 
interpreters, who may serve as a communicative role between addressors and addressees, can 
convey messages in a faithful way with ideology-free use of language or to what extent an 
interpreter’s ideology interferes with his/her rendition remains doubtful and needs further 
investigation. Only a few researchers started to explore the link between ideology and 
interpreting in recent decades (e.g. Baker, 2006; Beaton, 2007) but more empirical evidence is 
still needed to demonstrate to what extent interpreting renditions may be under the influence 
of ideology, which is why this research addresses ideology issue in simultaneous interpreting 
on an empirical basis.  
 Meanwhile, the interpersonal function of language proposed by Halliday is further 
divided into the identity function and relational function by Fairclough (1992: 64). The 
identity function is about how social identities are constructed in discourse, while the 
relational function refers to “how social relationships between discourse participants are 
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enacted and negotiated (ibid)”. The three functions of language – the ideational, identity, and 
relational functions – elaborated by Fairclough in his discussion of discourse are indeed 
closely related to the present study. In terms of the ideational function, it is assumed that the 
trainee interpreters’ real-world experience and personal ideologies will be embodied in their 
use of language, i.e. 'interpreting renditions’ in this research. While social identities are 
established in discourse, one’s national identity should be embodied in one’s language use in 
specific political texts involving national identity. As for the relational function, since there 
are inequalities of power and international status between Taiwan and China, the relationships 
between discourse participants (e.g. a Chinese speaker and a Taiwanese interpreter) may be 
enacted and negotiated in the way in which hegemony and resistance interact with each other. 
 Despite the common features, the CDA approaches differ in research focus, social 
domains, and theoretical legacy. Fairclough & Wodak (1997) list eight important theoretical 
approaches to CDA, including French discourse analysis, critical linguistics, social semiotics, 
sociocultural and discursive change, socio-cognitive studies, discourse-historical method, 
reading analysis, and Duisburg School. Of the eight approaches, the socio-cognitive approach 
and the discourse-historical approach within CDA are the main methodological focus of the 
present study. Acknowledging CDA's failure to give an explicit account of the role of 
knowledge in discourse comprehension and production, van Dijk draws inspiration from 
philosophy, linguistics, psychology, sociology and anthropology and proposes a 
socio-cognitive approach to uncovering inequalities embodied in discursive or interpretative 
acts (e.g. 1998). The approach, mainly developed on the basis of social representation theory 
(e.g. Moscovici, 2000), highlights that the production of texts and talks that represents one’s 
personal experience and consciousness of selecting relevant information to construct 
discourse is actually built on collective perceptions, namely socially or culturally shared 
general knowledge (van Dijk, 1997: 189-190). More specifically, van Dijk points out the 
significance of knowledge in context models that act as a fundamental interface between 
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social and cognitive dimensions of discourse context lies in its power of controlling discourse 
meaning and interpretation in many aspects (2003: 97). As a result, an analysis of pragmatic 
and  semantic  features  of  discourse  in  social  and  cultural  dimensions  helps  uncover  how  
language users bring their collective knowledge and ideologies to their text processing and 
production. Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach within CDA may suggest a strong link 
between social representations and the choices of translators/interpreters made in the process 
of rendering. 
 The discourse-historical approach was developed mainly by Ruth Wodak under the 
influence of the Bernsteinian tradition and the Frankfurt School. Dealing in a pragmatic sense 
with discourse, which both the discourse-historical approach and van Dijk’s socio-cognitive 
theory consider to be “structured forms of knowledge (Wodak & Meyer, 2009: 6)”, Wodak 
(1986) developed the approach from the study of anti-Semitic discourse during the Waldheim 
affair in Austria. In the study, Wodak analyzed the texts and discourses about the Wehrmacht 
(the unified armed forces of Germany from 1935 to 1945) and Kurt Waldheim (who was 
accused of his participation or complicity in Nazi crimes against Jewish people while running 
for presidency of Austria) in different settings, including related historic documents, 
Waldheim’s and his opponents’ speeches, international and domestic media coverage of 
Waldheim, and public opinions in the form of conversations on the street. Analyzing the texts 
and discourses with historical knowledge, Wodak provided strong and convincing evidence 
for the anti-Semitic ideologies embodied in texts and discourses.  
To  employ  the  DHA,  one  needs  to  follow  the  ‘principle  of  triangulation’,  which  takes  
into holistic consideration the research data, theoretical base, and background information, 
and the application of the DHA is three-dimensional, including (1) identification of specific 
contents or topics of a specific discourse, (2) investigation of discursive strategies, and (3) 
examination of “linguistic mans” and the “specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations” 
(Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 93; see also Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 44). The application of the 
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DHA may be targeted at the following five questions especially when the discourse under 
investigation concerns national(ist) rhetoric (Reisigl 2008: 99): 
(1) How are phenomena/events, processes, actions, persons, and objects named and referred 
to in linguistic terms in a specific discourse? 
(2) What features, qualities, and characteristics are assigned to those named or referred to in 
the discourse? 
(3) What arguments are specified in the discourse? 
(4) From what perspective are those involved in the above three questions expressed? 
(5) Are any utterances in the discourse intensified or mitigated? 
To demystify the ideologies embedded in discourse, the DHA practitioners aim to answer the 
above five questions by examining specific themes and claims of a specific discourse and 
investigating the discursive strategies used in a specific discourse. The definition of “strategy” 
in the DHA is “a more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) 
adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal (ibid: 94)”. 
And the  discursive  strategies  that  may concern  national  or  ethnic  issues  in  the  DHA studies  
may include referential/nomination strategies, predicational strategies, perspectivation/ 
framing/discourse representation strategies, intensifying/mitigation strategies, and 
argumentation strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 44). More specifically, social actors may be 
constructed and represented by use of referential or nomination strategies. For instance, if one 
identifies a group of people by “naming them derogatorily, debasingly or vituperatively (ibid: 
45)”, s/he is showing linguistic discrimination against the group through use of referential/ 
nomination strategies. Predicational strategies may involve linguistic devices which explicitly 
or implicitly express “stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits (ibid: 
45)”, while through strategies of perspectivation, framing or discourse representation, 
speakers demonstrate linguistically their stance on discriminatory issues and their 
involvement in discourse. Intensifying strategies and mitigation strategies are two opposite 
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strategies, but both may influence the original illocutionary force of discriminatory utterances. 
Argumentation strategies, of which topoi (plausible argumentation schemes) and fallacies are 
two main features, help justify positive and negative attributions of specific persons or groups 
(ibid: 45). These strategies involve a variety of linguistic devices to achieve certain specific 
objectives as mostly demonstrated in the following table 4.   
Also, this study is to investigate the embodiment of hegemony and resistance ideologies 
in cross-strait trainee interpreters’ renditions, the specific contents or topics of the discourse 
under scrutiny will be those concerning the One China ideology or the Taiwan independence 
issue. As Fairclough (1989: 19) maintains, CDA practitioners should focus on not only the 
texts themselves but also the process of producing and interpreting those texts. Ideologies, 
especially collective ones, are formed and reinforced in a political-historical context, so texts 
or discourse should be analyzed in a broad context. By applying the CDA to analysis of 
interpreting renditions, the research is aimed at not only disclosing the (political) ideologies 
embedded in simultaneous interpreting renditions produced by Mandarin trainee interpreters 
but also discussing and presenting the reasons and processes of how the ideologies are formed 
and changed within social-historical contexts. 
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Strategy Objectives Devices 
nomination 
 
discursive construction of social 
actors, objects/phenomena/ 
events and processes/actions 
z membership categorization devices, deictics, 
anthroponyms, etc. 
z tropes such as metaphors, metonymies and 
synecdoches (pars pro toto, totum pro parte) 
z verbs and nouns used to denote processes and 
actions, etc. 
predication discursive qualification of social 
actors, objects, phenomena, 
events/processes and actions 
(more or less positively or 
negatively) 
z stereotypical, evaluative attributions of 
negative or positive straits (e.g. in the form of 
adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, 
relative clauses, conjunctional clauses, 
infinitive clauses and participial clauses or 
groups) 
z explicit predicates or predicative 
nouns/adjectives/pronouns 
z collocations 
z explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and 
other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, 
hyperboles, litotes, euphemisms) 
z allusions, evocations, 
presuppositions/implicatures, etc. 
argumentation justification and questioning of 
claims of truth and normative 
rightness 
z topoi (formal or more content-related) 
z fallacies 
perspectivization, 
framing or 
discourse 
representation 
positioning speaker’s or writer’s 
point of view and expressing 
involvement or distance 
z deicitcs 
z direct, indirect or free indirect speech 
z quotation marks, discourse markers/particles 
z metaphors 
z animating prosody, etc. 
intensification, 
mitigation 
modifying (intensifying or 
mitigating) the illocutionary 
force and thus the epistemic or 
deontic status of utterances 
z diminutives or augmentatives 
z (modal) particles, tag questions, subjunctive, 
hesitations, vague expressions, etc. 
z hyperboles, litotes 
z indirect speech acts (e.g. question instead of 
assertion) 
z verbs of saying, feeling, thinking, etc. 
Table 4 A Selection of Discursive Strategies (as exactly shown in Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 94) 
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3.2.3 How is CDA applied in this study? 
 
 To address the issue of ideology in simultaneous interpreting, CDA is applied to analysis 
of simultaneous renditions collected in an experiment specially designed for the purpose of 
the study. In the experiment, trainee interpreters as subjects perform tasks of simultaneously 
interpreting, from Mandarin into English, authentic political speeches concerning the relations 
between Taiwan and China or the status of Taiwan as an independent country. The comparison 
of source texts and target texts, which is also known as a textual analysis approach, is 
commonly adopted in translation studies for identifying textual alterations that may be caused 
by the translator’s ideology. In the present study, the political speeches used in the experiment 
are referred to as source language texts and the trainee interpreters’ renditions as target 
language texts in translation/interpreting terms. Both texts will be analyzed, but simultaneous 
renditions become the main focus for the critical discourse analysis. 
The  CDA  method  in  this  study  will  not  be  used  in  a  conventional  way  as  CDA  
practitioners usually do. As discussed in Chapter 3.2.2, CDA practitioners tend to be socially 
or politically committed to addressing the issue of inequalities by linguistic means, and the 
interpretive nature of CDA has often come under severe attack (e.g. Widdowson 1995, 2004; 
Jones, 2007). Jones criticises CDA for its failure to “reconcile the use of linguistic methods 
and constructs with ‘extra-linguistic’ considerations of truth (2007: 365; original emphasis)” 
and disapproves Fairclough’s belief that CDA can help determine existence of ideological 
signs in discourse without taking facts and truth into consideration (ibid). In consequence, to 
avoid criticism about CDA’s interpretative nature and lack of factual considerations, the 
rendition data analysis in this study will begin with a textual analysis by comparing the 
researcher’s literal translations of the source speech texts and the subjects’ renditions of the 
same source texts and see if there is discrepancy at the lexicogrammatical level between the 
two. The literal translations are converted from the source texts in the plainest and most 
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complete manner in order to let readers know the complete original messages conveyed by the 
speakers. As the translations are produced under no time constraints in a written form, it 
should be reasonable that there is discrepancy in accuracy, completeness, and register between 
the written translations and the interpreting renditions. The focus of the textual analysis in this 
study will be on lexicogrammatical choice, disinterpreted messages and the meaning of a 
rendered  text  as  a  whole.  In  consequence,  a  ‘deviant’  rendition  is  defined  in  this  study  as  a  
rendition containing misinterpreted or disinterpreted messages which lead to overstatement, 
understatement, or distortion of the meanings that the source speakers originally expressed. 
The deviant renditions will be dealt critically with on linguistic level through the CDA 
method, with a reference to extra-linguistic facts or information obtained in the surveys and/or 
interview (see the following sections), and will be considered within social, cultural, or 
historical contexts to seek cause for the existence of deviant renditions and provide evidence 
for  confirming  whether  the  deviant  renditions  are  signs  of  hegemony  or  resistance.  The  
process of comparison and cross-referencing within CDA analysis in this study is called the 
‘CDA Filter Process’ (see Diagram 5 below).  
 As  shown in  Diagram 5,  the  CDA Filter  Process  is  designed  to  seek  solid  evidence  for  
the existence of ideological signs and to determine whether the signs are those of hegemony 
or resistance to hegemony. To confirm whether a rendition is deviant and ideological, the 
researcher will first examine the wording of the rendition and see whether the rendition 
deviates from the source text to the extent that it overstates, understates or distorts the original 
meaning. The wording of the deviant rendition per se may be obviously ideological when 
analyzed within specific historic, cultural or social contexts. Then the researcher will move on 
to determine whether the deviant rendition is a sign of hegemony or resistance to hegemony 
by referring to the other ideological signs made by the subject in the renditions of the same or 
other source speeches (where applicable), the survey results, and/or interview data produced 
by the subject. Evidence for the existence of the ideological sign may be obtained at any stage 
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of cross-referencing shown in Diagram 5, which means the filter process may stop whenever 
reasonable grounds for ideological deviancy are found. It is not subjective or biased 
interpretation but objective comparison and cross-referencing that will determine the 
existence of ideological signs. Thus, the practice of the CDA method in this research may 
avoid common criticism of CDA as subjectively and ideologically interpreting discourse.  
    
Diagram 5. CDA Filter Process 
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By applying the CDA method to analysis of deviant renditions, discursive strategies and 
linguistic devices through which political ideologies of the interpreter subjects are embodied 
in their renditions will be carefully investigated. While striving to see if it is possible in this 
study to find a general trend in how ideologies of hegemony and resistance of cross-strait 
interpreter subjects are realized linguistically, it should also be kept in mind that Munday 
(2007) points out that the traditional CDA analysis within monolingual discourse may not 
always be the most suitable for detecting and classifying textual alterations in translated texts 
as translators are usually “guided by intuition and previous linguistic experience of the two 
languages alone” and variants in translated texts are usually not introduced in “systematic” 
manner (ibid: 204). Yet, despite the non-systematic variations in translated texts, in his 
analysis of different English translation versions of the same Spanish political speeches given 
by such revolutionary leaders in Latin America as Catro, Marcos, and Chavez, Munday still 
finds that “the perspective of the [source] message is blurred by translation choices that affect 
the transitivity structures, the interpersonal function and the spatio-temporal deixis 
particularly  (ibid:  213)”.  In  other  words,  the  application  of  the  CDA  method  in  analysis  of  
renditions may help disclose vividly linguistic means through which translated texts become a 
site for representation of an interpreter’s ideology.   
 In addition to the CDA Filter Process, an overview of the ideological signs produced by 
each student interpreter will be presented in two separate tables, one for the China group and 
the other the Taiwan group, displaying the existence of ideological signs both by individual 
and by group. Moreover, the Chi-square statistical analysis of the ideological signs of each 
source speech will be conducted. The statistical analysis of the ideological signs can not only 
represent power struggles between Taiwan and China but also provide clear insights into the 
issue of ideology in simultaneous interpreting. It is the researcher’s belief that with survey 
questionnaires and statistical instruments, the application of the CDA method in the present 
study can adequately uncover ideologies embodied in simultaneous renditions. 
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3.3 Simultaneous Interpreting Data Collection 
 
 In order to obtain sufficient data for CDA analysis and to prevent subjects from tiredness, 
the SI data collection is conducted on the same subjects at two different stages. The interval 
between the  two stages  is  around five  to  six  months,  with  the  first  conducted  by  the  end  of  
December of a certain academic year and the second by the end of the following April of the 
same academic year1.   
 The SI data collection procedure begins with a brief introduction of the data collection to 
the subjects, who are told only that their data will be used in studies of the correlation 
between cultural background and interpreting performance and that the information they 
provide will be regarded as strictly confidential2. None of them know the actual focus of the 
research, and thus they are not likely to produce rendition that they think the researcher wants 
to hear. In advance of each interpreting session, the subjects are given a wordlist relevant to 
the source speech concerned. The terminology list only provides the names of countries, 
political parties, etc. in both Mandarin and English, all of which are irrelevant to the research 
focus and used only to prevent the subjects from being stuck in these proper nouns in the 
rendering process. Also, the topic of the speech and the speaker’s name are written in 
Mandarin and shown on the wordlist  to inform the subjects of whose speech and what topic 
they are going to interpret. As note-taking skills are irrelevant to the research focus, the 
subjects are allowed to take anything down on the terminology list during the rendering 
process. The detail of the elements of the SI data collection is given below. 
 
 
 
                                               
1 As the student subjects were recruited from the one-year Translating & Interpreting MA programs offered by 
two UK universities, the timing of the data collection had to be at their convenience.  
2 Note that the subjects are informed of the actual research focus at the end of the experiment and have the right 
to decide whether their data may be used in the present study. 
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3.3.1 Subjects 
  
 Forty-two trainee interpreters are recruited as the subjects of the experiment, who are 
registered with the simultaneous interpreting module at the time of participating in the 
experiment. Half of the subjects are from Taiwan (or hereinafter Taiwanese subjects) and the 
other half from China (or hereinafter Chinese subjects). All but two of the subjects are aged 
between 20 and 30 at the time of participating in the data collection. Two of the subjects are 
male, and forty female. In order to preserve the anonymity of the subjects, those from Taiwan 
are coded and numbered with an initial letter ‘T’, while those from China ‘C’, and the 
researcher will use the third person singular pronoun ‘she/her/herself’3 when referring to any 
one  of  them.  Before  attending  the  interpreting  programs,  16  of  the  42  subjects  have  had  
interpreting or translating experience. During the second-stage data collection, one Taiwanese 
subject (numbered T016) dropped out, and the renditions of a Chinese subject (numbered 
C009) are missing due to unknown equipment malfunctions. However, the data that have been 
obtained from these two subjects remain valid and are used in the research. All of the subjects 
have given their consent to the researcher for using their data for research purposes.  
 
3.3.1.1 The advantages and disadvantages of using trainee interpreters 
 
According to Pöchhacker (2011: 317-18), one of the common challenges for SI 
interpreting studies is the “relatively small number of conference interpreters with the same 
language combination and professional background in any given location” and “the reluctance 
of such practitioners to have their work recorded and analysed for research purposes”, which 
indeed has been reflected in my discussion in Chapter 2.3.3 about some previous studies of 
interpreting renditions, which often involve a very limited number of professional interpreters. 
                                               
3 Note that the choice of the singular pronoun for referring to the subjects has no feminist implications here. It is 
just because the great majority of the subjects are female. 
118 
 
It may then follow that the small sample size leads to the failure to generalize findings as 
there tends to be a “high degree of individual variability in professional performance (ibid: 
318)”. Note that the aim of this present study is to observe whether there is an ideological tug 
of war between hegemony and resistance among the interpreters across the Taiwan Strait, and 
therefore the study needs to recruit from either side a relatively large and equal number of 
interpreters who are willing to have their renditions analyzed in order to confirm the existence 
of such ideological war. Given the lack of funding and professional connections, it would be 
more feasible and cost-efficient to use trainee interpreters in this study. Also, the location of 
the study is a key to recruitment of Mandarin interpreters. At present, only a limited number 
of  Chinese  people  are  allowed  to  study  in  Taiwan,  which  makes  it  not  possible  to  recruit  a  
large number of Chinese trainee interpreters who are studying in Taiwan if the research were 
to be conducted in Taiwan. Likewise, there seems to be few Taiwanese students studying 
interpreting in China for the moment. It may be argued that only the interpreting programs 
offered in English-speaking countries, such as the UK, can attract students from Taiwan and 
from  China  at  the  same  time,  which  is  why  this  study  can  recruit  an  equal  number  of  
Taiwanese and Chinese trainee interpreters. The use of trainee interpreters may also contribute 
to the homogeneity of the subjects. Most of the trainee interpreters, after obtaining a 
bachelor’s degree, enter the interpreting training program in their twenties. Those of similar 
age should have received similar degree and content of socialization in their host cultures, 
which might reduce the possibilities of a high degree of individual variability in perceiving 
the source texts.   
The difference between trainee interpreters and professional interpreters, which has been 
roughly discussed in Chapter 2.3.3.4, mainly involves quality of interpreting. Previous studies 
show that trainee interpreters may outperform professionals in some aspects, such as working 
memory (e.g. Kopke & Nespoulous, 2006) or linguistic autonomy in terms of restructuring or 
reformulation (Setton & Motta, 2007). Although it is widely recognized that accumulated 
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experience may be why professional interpreters can give a higher level of performance 
through different strategies than trainees, Korpal’s study (2012) finds that there is no 
significant difference between the groups of professionals and trainees in terms of the use of 
the omission strategy if the speaker’s delivery rate is not taken into consideration, which 
indicates that trainees may be able to achieve a higher level of accuracy or completeness in 
their rendition if the source delivery rate is reasonably slow. Therefore, in this present study, 
all of the source texts used in the SI experiment will be recorded at a reasonably slow rate to 
reduce the SI difficulties to the trainee subjects.  
There are also disadvantages of using trainee interpreters in interpreting studies. One of 
the major disadvantages is that the results may not be generalized to what would happen to 
professional interpreters. As mentioned above, accumulated experience may equip 
professional interpreters with better ability to cope with SI difficulties, and what they utter 
during an interpreting process, even in a laboratory setting, may be what really takes place in 
reality. By contrast, trainees may produce immature rendering performance due to lack of 
experience and interaction with real speakers and/or audience. However, as the aim of this 
study is to investigate the direct representation of one’s ideology in discourse, trainees, who 
have not worked in institutional settings, may show their ideology instinctively. Some studies 
have shown that interpreters who work for certain institutions or agencies tend to show strong 
institutionalized ideology in their rendition (e.g. Beaton, 2007). Also, the two genuine 
examples given in Chapter 2.4.4, where Chinese interpreters were defending their One China 
ideology (intentionally or unintentionally), indicate rendition deviancy caused by strong 
political ideology. Therefore, it would not be likely to confirm whether ideologies signs of 
trainees will be stronger or weaker than professional interpreters at the end of this experiment.          
 Some might wonder whether novice interpreting, in which radical summarising, 
omission, changes from ST meaning, etc may take place, might result in stronger 
subject-ideology effects than with professionals. Note that interpreting from Mandarin 
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Chinese into English is mainly on a meaning basis. The genuine SI examples produced by 
professional Mandarin interpreters based in Taiwan (Chang & Schallert, 2007; see also 
Chapter 2.3.3.3) have demonstrated this principle very clearly. More specifically, three 
professional Mandarin interpreters rendered the same source text and produced renditions of 
various lengths. The Mandarin source text selected as the example contains 59 Mandarin 
characters. While Chang & Schallert’s written translation contains 37 English words, the word 
counts  of  the  three  SI  renditions  are  47,  27,  and  20  English  words  respectively.  (All  of  the  
word counts here include punctuation marks.) Generally, these renditions of various lengths 
are all acceptable, and the length of a rendition is not necessarily correlated with the quality of 
interpreting. Viezzi (1993) compares the renditions of the same source text interpreted from 
English into Italian in the consecutive and simultaneous modes in terms of the length, speed, 
clarity, completeness, etc. and finds simultaneous rendition too wordy as the interpreter tends 
to render everything heard. Stenzl (1983: 29f) also maintains that completeness should not be 
achieved “at the cost of clarity and intelligibility”, which is confirmed by Kurz’s study (1993) 
of user expectations that sense consistency with original message is much more important 
than completeness of interpretation. It may be likely that renditions of trainees tend to be 
meaning and summary-based due to the general principle in interpreting from Mandarin into 
English and due to trainees’ limited experience in coping with SI difficulties. Yet, note that the 
aim of this study is to observe how ideology is embodied in interpreting rendition. The 
embodiment of ideology in discourse should be more correlated with choice of words or 
meaning of sentences than the length of a rendition.  
 
3.3.2 SI source text 
 
 The unequal power relations between China and Taiwan is often manifest in the political 
speeches made by leaders on both sides. An analysis of the language used in the interpreters’ 
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renditions of the speeches may reveal hegemony or resistance in the interpreter. Hence, five 
Mandarin speeches are used as source texts in the SI experiment. The speeches were given by 
the political leaders from Taiwan and from China, where some sensitive issues concerning the 
relations between Taiwan and China, such as the One China policy maintained by China, the 
Taiwan independence issue (also known as the Taiwan issue), or the role of Taiwan as a 
country, are talked of. As Taiwan is geographically divided from China by the Taiwan Strait, 
the relations between Taiwan and China are often referred to as ‘cross-strait relations’. All of 
the speeches were made in public, which means the ‘interpretability’ of the speeches has been 
approved (Napier, 2004). In order to avoid accent problems which might have an impact on 
the subjects’ understanding the content of the speeches, the speeches were transcribed and all 
the transcripts of the source speeches were spoken and recorded at a reasonable speed 
(namely around 155 Chinese characters per minute) by a female Mandarin speaker. According 
to the results of the retrospective questionnaire surveys, none of the subjects consider the 
speech rates to be fast (see Chapter 4.2). Therefore, the speech rate has been proved not to be 
an issue in the SI experiment. The five speeches are numbered according to the sequence in 
which they are used, with the code (C) attached to those given by the Chinese politicians and 
(T) the Taiwanese politicians. The first three speeches are used in the first-stage data 
collection, and the remaining two in the second stage. The structure and genre of each source 
speech will be analyzed in the following sections. Also, a comparison of the source speeches 
will be provided in Chapter 3.3.2.6.  
Identifying the genre of a talk is important. According to Chilton & Schäffner (2002: 19), 
genres can be defined as “global linguistic patterns which have historically developed in a 
linguistic community for fulfilling specific communicative tasks in specific situation” and 
“reflect the effective, conscious and situationally appropriate choice of linguistic means”. As 
relatively stable linguistic patters may be shared as common knowledge of a specific 
linguistic community, the genre analysis of the source speeches in this study may help 
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interpret the renditions of the trainee subjects.  
 
3.3.2.1 Speech 1 (C) by Hu Jintao 
 
Speech 1 (C): Hu Jintao’s speech on the sixtieth anniversary of the victory in the Second 
          Sino-Japan War and the World Anti-Fascism War, 3 September 2005.4 
            Character Count: Original 10,924, edited down to 2,448  
                          (punctuation  marks  included)  
            Length:  Part  1:  8.29  min;  Part  2:  7.46  min.  
            Speaker:  Hu  Jintao,  President  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  (PRC)   
since 2003 
 
Throughout the speech in memory of China’s victory of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War 
War,  Hu  talks  about  the  role  of  Taiwan  in  the  War.  Originally  part  of  the  territory  of  the  
Chinese State of QƯng, Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 after the defeat of QƯng China in 
the First Sino-Japan war. In 1945, the defeat of Japan in the Second Sino-Japan War (part of 
the Second World War) caused the handover of Taiwan to the Republic of China (the R.O.C.). 
In 1949, the R.O.C. government lost the civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
fled  to  Taiwan.  Since  then,  the  CCP  has  established  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  (the  
P.R.C.) and claimed that the P.R.C. represents legitimate China. Despite the fact that Taiwan 
has never been under the P.R.C.'s control, the P.R.C. still views Taiwan as part of its territory, 
which is why Hu uses ‘compatriotӕझ’ in this speech when referring to the people of Taiwan. 
Although the Chinese Communist Party also joined the Second Sino-Japan War, which is also 
known  as  the  ‘ZKǀng Guó Rén Mín Kàng Rì Zhàn ZhƝng ύ୯Γ҇לВᏯݾ(Chinese 
Anti-Japanese War)’, the War was officially between Japan and the R.O.C. With the change of 
the political  landscape in the Chinese mainland after 1949, it  is  not surprising that while the 
R.O.C. in Taiwan keeps telling its people that the R.O.C. won the Second Sino-Japan War, the 
P.R.C. (now better known as China) interprets the history of the War differently from the 
                                               
4 Retrieved 09 September 2006 from http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-09-03/17216854040s.shtml. 
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R.O.C. and claims to have played the leading role in the War (Ho, 1986). Meanwhile, it 
should be noted that the anti-Japan events or rallies have taken place in China from time to 
time in recent decades, which is thought to be the political manipulation of Chinese patriotism 
(Liu, 2005). By contrast, due to its Japanese colonial history and constant encounters with 
powers from outside, Taiwan has developed a rapport with Japan5. In consequence, the people 
of China might in general hold a more hostile or unfriendly attitude towards Japan than the 
people of Taiwan do. 
 In this SI experiment,  Hu’s speech is split  into two parts in order to ease the burden of 
the subjects and prevent distraction from tiredness. The researcher does not add any words to 
the original text but omit much of the description of how the Second Sino-Japan War and the 
World Anti-Fascism War broke out and proceeded. The abridged speech retains Hu’s original 
tone and style as well as the main historical context of the Second Sino-Japan War which 
involves the role of Taiwan in the War and the Taiwan independence issue. The analysis of 
the macro- and mesostructure of this speech is shown in table 6. 
 
Table 6 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 1 (C) 
 Macro- and 
mesostructure 
Beijing, 3 September 2005 Place and date 
A speech to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the victory in the Second Sino-Japan War 
and the World Anti-Fascism War 
Commemorative 
(sub)genre 
Part I 
਼㜎Ԝˈ਼ᘇԜˈᴻ৻Ԝ 
Compatriots, comrades, and friends 
Addressing an 
audience – particularly 
targeted at all Chinese 
people and members of 
Chinese Communist 
Party 
Paragraph 1 
ӺཙˈᱟѝഭӪ≁ᣇᰕᡈҹ㜌࡙㓚ᘥᰕˈҏᱟц⭼৽⌅㾯ᯟᡈҹ㜌࡙㓚ᘥᰕǄᡁ
Ԝ൘䘉䟼䲶䟽䳶Պˈ਼ц⭼਴ഭӪ≁а䚃ˈ㓚ᘥѝഭӪ≁ᣇᰕᡈҹ᳘ц⭼৽⌅㾯
Section 1:  
Marking the 60th 
anniversary of the 
                                               
5 For example, Taiwan provided the largest donations in the world in aid of Japan’s 2011 Tǀhoku earthquake and 
tsunami (Taipei Times, 2011, 17 April).  
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ᯟᡈҹ㜌࡙ 60ઘᒤˈ㓚ᘥ䘉а↓ѹᡈ㜌䛚ᚦǃݹ᰾ᡈ㜌唁᳇ǃ䘋↕ᡈ㜌৽ࣘⲴ
Տབྷ㜌࡙Ǆ 
Today is the anniversary of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War and also the anniversary of 
the World Anti-Fascism War. We gather here in a solemn ceremony with the people all 
over the world to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the victory against the 
Chinese Anti-Japanese War and the World Anti-Fascism War, to commemorate the 
great victory of justice against evil, light against darkness, and progression against 
conservatism. 
Wars – the anniversary 
is commemorated by 
people all over the 
world and the winning 
sides, including China, 
are representatives of 
justice.  
 
Paragraph 2 
ѝഭӪ≁ᣇᰕᡈҹⲴՏབྷ㜌࡙ˈᱟѝॾ≁᯿ޘփ਼㜎ഒ㔃ཻᯇⲴ㔃᷌ˈҏᱟѝഭ
Ӫ≁਼ц⭼৽⌅㾯ᯟ਼ⴏഭӪ≁ᒦ㛙ᡈᯇⲴ㔃᷌ǄѝഭӪ≁ѪਆᗇᣇᰕᡈҹⲴՏ
བྷ㜌࡙ᝏࡠ傴ۢˈҏѪ਼ц⭼਴ഭӪ≁а䚃ਆᗇц⭼৽⌅㾯ᯟᡈҹⲴՏབྷ㜌࡙ᝏ
ࡠ㠚䊚Ǆ 
The great victory against the Chinese Anti-Japanese War was the results of the 
solidarity and struggle of all of the people of the Chinese race and the results of the 
joint efforts of the Chinese people and the people of the allied countries against the 
World Anti-Fascism. Chinese people are proud of winning the great victory against the 
Chinese Anti-Japanese War and proud of winning with the people all over the world 
the great victory against the World Anti-Fascism War. 
Emphasizing the 
victory was the result 
of Chinese solidarity – 
Chinese people are 
proud of the victory. 
Paragraph 3 
൘䘉њᒴѕⲴᰦ࡫ˈᡁ㾱ੁѪѝഭӪ≁ᣇᰕᡈҹ㜌࡙ᔪ・Ҷঃ㪇࣏ࣻⲴ⎧޵ཆѝ
ॾݯྣˈ㠤ԕጷ儈Ⲵᮜ᜿ʽੁ᭟ᤱ઼ᑞࣙ䗷ѝഭӪ≁ᣇᰕᡈҹⲴཆഭ᭯ᓌ઼ഭ䱵
৻Ӫˈ㺘⽪㺧ᗳⲴᝏ䉒ʽ 
At this solemn moment, I would like to pay great tribute to the Chinese people at home 
and abroad who provided meritorious services for the victory against the Chinese 
Anti-Japanese War! I would like to express heartfelt gratitude for the foreign 
governments and international friends who offered support and help for the Chinese 
Anti-Japanese War! 
Giving credits to 
everyone that 
contributed to the 
victory – specifying 
the involvement of 
Chinese people all 
over the world.  
਼㜎Ԝˈ਼ᘇԜˈᴻ৻Ԝ 
Compatriots, comrades, and friends  
Addressing the same 
audience  
Paragraph 4 
ѝഭӪ≁ᣇᰕᡈҹᱟц⭼৽⌅㾯ᯟᡈҹⲴ䟽㾱㓴ᡀ䜘࠶ˈᱟц⭼৽⌅㾯ᯟᡈҹⲴ
ьᯩѫᡈ൪ǄӾ 19ц㓚ਾॺਦ䎧ˈᰕᵜ䙀⑀䎠кߋഭѫѹ䚃䐟ˈਁ઼ࣘ৲࣐Ҷ
а㌫ࡇץ⮕ᡈҹˈަѝབྷཊᮠᱟץॾᡈҹǄᰕᵜ 1874ᒤ䘋⣟ਠ⒮ˈ1894ᒤ᥁䎧
⭢ॸᡈҹᒦץঐਠ⒮ˈ1904ᒤਁࣘᰕ״ᡈҹץ⣟ѝഭьे亶൏઼ѫᵳˈ1931ᒤ
ㆆࣘҍаޛһਈᒦঐ亶ѝഭьेйⴱ 1ˈ935ᒤࡦ䙐ॾेһਈ 勨ˈ੎ѝഭⲴ䟾ᗳᰕ
⳺㟘㛰Ǆԕ 1937ᒤ 7ᴸ 7ᰕᰕߋ⛞䖠ᇋᒣ৯෾ǃ䘋᭫঒⋏ẕѪḷᘇˈᰕᵜਁࣘ
Ҷޘ䶒ץॾᡈҹǄᰕᵜץ⮕㘵ݸਾ䐥䐿Ҷѝഭབྷ⡷൏ൠˈץঐҶѝഭབྷ䜘࠶䟽㾱
෾ᐲˈԱമᢺѝഭਈѪᰕᵜⲴ⇆≁ൠˈ䘋㘼੎ᒦӊ⍢ǃ〠䵨ц⭼Ǆ 
Section 2:  
Reviewing the history 
of Japanese wars 
against China – 
specifying Taiwan as 
part of China’s 
territory in the wartime 
context; emphasizing 
Japan’s ambition to 
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The Chinese Anti-Japanese War is an important component of the World Anti-Fascism 
War and the main oriental battlefield of the World Anti-Fascism War. Since the second 
half of the nineteenth century, Japan gradually walked on the road of militarism, 
launched and joined a series of invasion wars. Most of the wars were invading China. 
Japan invaded Taiwan in eighteen seventy-four, started the first Sino-Japan war in 
eighteen ninety-four and occupied Taiwan, and started the Japan-Russia war in 
nineteen zero four and invaded the territory and sovereignty of northeast China, in 
nineteen thirty-one staged the 918 Incident and occupied three provinces in northeast 
China, in nineteen thirty-five created several incidents in north China, showing 
growing ambition to swallow China. With Japanese military’s bombing Wanping 
County and attacking the Lugou Bridge on 7 July nineteen thirty-seven as a landmark, 
Japan launched a full-scale war of invading China. Japanese invaders trampled over a 
large piece of land of China, occupied most of China’s important cities, attempted to 
turn China into Japan’s colony and further annex Asia, dominate the world. 
conquer China  
Paragraph 5 
൘⌒◌༞䱄Ⲵޘ≁᯿ᣇᡈѝˈޘփѝॾݯྣзՇаᗳǃՇᘇᡀ෾ˈ਴ފ⍮ǃ਴≁
᯿ǃ਴䱦㓗ǃ਴䱦ቲǃ਴ഒփ਼ӷ᭼ᘮˈޡ䎤ഭ䳮Ǆ䮯෾޵ཆˈབྷ⊏ইेˈࡠ༴
⟳䎧ᣇᰕⲴ✭⚛Ǆᒯབྷ⑟◣਼㜎ǃਠ⒮਼㜎ǃ⎧ཆט㜎઼⎧ཆॾӪˈо⾆ഭ਼બ
੨ǃޡભ䘀ˈԕ਴⿽ᯩᔿ৲઼࣐᭟ᤱ⾆ഭӪ≁ᣇᡈˈнቁ਼㜎Ѫഭᦀ䓟Ǆ൘ᰕᵜ
ץঐਠ⒮Ⲵॺњц㓚䟼ˈਠ⒮਼㜎нᯝ䘋㹼৽ᣇˈޡᴹ 65зӪ༞⛸⢪⢢Ǆ1945
ᒤ 9ᴸ 2ᰕˈᰕᵜ᭯ᓌ↓ᔿㆮ㖢ᣅ䱽Җˈᇓ੺Ҷᰕᵜץ⮕㘵Ⲵᖫᓅཡ䍕઼ц⭼৽
⌅㾯ᯟᡈҹⲴᴰਾ㜌࡙ǄѝഭӪ≁ᣇᰕᡈҹ઼ц⭼৽⌅㾯ᯟᡈҹԕѝഭӪ≁઼ц
⭼਴ഭӪ≁Ⲵᖫᓅ㜌࡙䖭ޕҶਢ޼ʽ 
During the magnificent all-[Chinese] race fight, all of the Chinese men and women 
concentrated on one goal with a unified will. Every party, every ethnicity, every rank, 
every class, and every group shared the same hatred and fought against the common 
enemy, made united efforts to save the nation. Inside and outside of the Great Wall, in 
the south and north of the Yangtze River, everywhere were lit beacon fires against 
Japan. A lot of Hong Kong and Macau compatriots, Taiwanese compatriots, overseas 
Chinese compatriots, and Chinese people abroad breathed and shared the fate with the 
motherland, joined and supported the people in the motherland to fight in the war in a 
variety of ways. A lot of compatriots died for the country. During the half century 
when Japan occupied Taiwan, Taiwanese compatriots kept revolting. Six hundred and 
fifty thousand people in total sacrificed lives. On 2 September 1945 Japan’s 
government officially signed the Instrument of Surrender, proclaimed Japanese 
invaders’ crushing defeat and the final victory against the World Anti-Fascism War. 
The Chinese Anti-Japanese War and the World Anti-Fascism War ended with Chinese 
people and all the other country people's great victory being recorded in history! 
Describing how 
Chinese people fought 
against Japan for the 
final victory – 
specifying Taiwan as 
part of China’s 
territory under the 
invasion of Japan and 
how Taiwanese people 
fought against Japan 
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਼㜎Ԝˈ਼ᘇԜˈᴻ৻Ԝ 
Compatriots, comrades, and friends  
Addressing the same 
audience 
Paragraph 6 
ѝഭӪ≁ᣇᰕᡈҹⲴ㜌࡙ˈᖫᓅᢃ䍕Ҷᰕᵜץ⮕㘵ˈ᥽ছҶѝഭⲴഭᇦѫᵳ઼亶
൏ᆼᮤˈ֯ѝॾ≁᯿䚯ݽҶ䚝ਇ⇆≁ྤᖩⲴ঴䘀Ǆѝॾ≁᯿൘ӄॳཊᒤⲴশਢਁ
ኅѝࡋ䙐ҶѮц䰫਽Ⲵ⚯⛲᮷᰾ˈᴮ㓿䮯ᰦᵏ䎠൘ц⭼ࡽࡇǄնᱟˈ⭡Ҿሱᔪ㔏
⋫Ⲵ㞀䍕઼ᶏ㕊ˈѝഭ⑀⑀㩭ਾҶǄӾ 1840ᒤ䎧ˈѝഭኑ䚝ᑍഭѫѹࡇᕪⲴץ
⮕઼䑲䒿ˈഭᇦѫᵳ઼亶൏ᆼᮤнᯝਇࡠץ㲰ˈѝॾ≁᯿Ⲵ⚮䳮ᰕ⳺␡䟽Ǆѝഭ
Ӫ≁ཻ䎧ᣇࠫཆ᭼ޕץˈ৸а⅑⅑䚝ࡠཡ䍕Ǆ❦㘼ˈ䘉а⅑ˈѝഭӪ≁ᖫᓅ㊹⺾
Ҷᰕᵜߋഭѫѹ⚝ӑѝഭⲴԱമˈᖫᓅ᭩ਈҶѝഭ䘁ԓԕਾ価ਇཆᶕץ⮕Ⲵቸ䗡
শਢˈ᥽ছҶѝॾ≁᯿ᮠॳᒤਁኅⲴ᮷᰾ᡀ᷌ǄᣇᰕᡈҹⲴ㜌࡙ˈ㔃ᶏҶᰕᵜ൘
ਠ⒮ 50ᒤⲴ⇆≁㔏⋫ˈ֯ਠ⒮എࡠ⾆ഭᘰᣡǄѝഭ৲оਁ䎧ᡀ・㚄ਸഭᒦᡀѪ
㚄ਸഭᆹ⨶Պᑨԫ⨶һഭˈᱮ㪇ᨀ儈ҶѝഭⲴഭ䱵ൠս઼ഭ䱵ᖡ૽ǄѝഭӪ≁ᣇ
ᰕᡈҹ㜌࡙Ⲵশਢ㺘᰾ˈѝॾ≁᯿ᴹ਼㠚ᐡⲴ᭼Ӫ㹰ᡈࡠᓅⲴ≄ᾲˈᴹ൘㠚࣋ᴤ
⭏Ⲵส⹰кݹ༽ᰗ⢙Ⲵߣᗳˈᴹ㠚・Ҿц⭼≁᯿ѻ᷇Ⲵ㜭࣋Ǆ 
The victory in the Chinese Anti-Japanese War completely defeated Japanese invaders, 
defended China’s national sovereignty and territory integrity, prevented the doom for 
the Chinese race being colonized and slaved. The Chinese race in the 
five-thousand-year historical development created a world-famous splendid 
civilization, for a long time had walked in the front row of the world [countries]. 
However, due to feudalistic ruling’s corruption and restriction, China gradually lagged 
behind. From eighteen forty onwards, China was repeatedly invaded and trampled 
over by imperialist powers. The national sovereignty and territory integrity were being 
eroded. The disasters for the Chinese race were greater and greater. Chinese people 
rose to fight against enemies from outside but were defeated over and over again. 
However, this time Chinese people completely shattered Japanese militarism’s attempt 
at destroying China, completely changed China’s history of being humiliated by 
foreign invasion since modern times, and safeguarded the Chinese race’s civilization 
results developed in the past several thousand years. The victory of the Chinese 
Anti-Japanese War ended Japan’s fifty-year colonial rule of Taiwan, made Taiwan 
return to the motherland’s embrace. China participated in founding the United Nations 
and became one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, [which] 
noticeably raised China’s international status and international influence. The history 
of the victory of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War shows that the Chinese race has the 
spirit to fight against enemies to the death, the determination to revive the glorious 
past through own efforts, and the ability to stand among the world races. 
Section 3: 
Highlighting the 
impact of the war 
victory on China and 
its people –specifying 
the victory made China 
win back Taiwan from 
Japan; specifying the 
solidarity of Chinese 
people has brought 
good results   
Part II 
਼㜎Ԝˈ਼ᘇԜˈᴻ৻Ԝ 
Compatriots, comrades, and friends 
Addressing the same 
audience 
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Paragraph 7 
60ᒤࡽ䛓൪ߣᇊц⭼ࡽ䙄ભ䘀ⲴՏབྷ㜌࡙ ≨ˈ䘌䬝䇠൘ᡰᴹ⡡ྭ઼ᒣо↓ѹⲴӪ
≁ᗳѝǄᡁԜ䲶䟽㓚ᘥ䛓൪Տབྷ㜌࡙ˈቡᱟ㾱⢒䇠শਢǃнᘈ䗷৫ǃ⧽⡡઼ᒣǃ
ᔰࡋᵚᶕˈᴤྭൠ᧘䘋ޘ䶒ᔪ䇮ሿᓧ⽮Պǃᇎ⧠ѝॾ≁᯿Տབྷ༽ޤⲴݹ䖹һъˈ
ᴤྭൠ׳䘋Ӫ㊫઼ᒣоਁኅⲴጷ儈һъǄ 
The great victory that decided the fate of the world sixty years ago will be always 
remembered by people who love peace and justice. We commemorate that great 
victory in a solemn ceremony in order to remember the history, forget not the past, 
cherish peace, create the future, further move to build a basically well-off society, 
realize the glorious business of the Chinese race’s great rejuvenation, and better 
promote the noble business of mankind’s peace and development. 
Section 4: 
Highlighting the 
importance of marking 
the victory – China 
wants to resume its 
leading role in the 
world and has an 
ability to contribute to 
the world. 
Paragraph 8 
ᡁԜ㾱ඊᇊн〫ൠᐙപѝॾ≁᯿Ⲵབྷഒ㔃 ᕈˈᢜՏབྷⲴ≁᯿㋮⾎Ǆवᤜ⑟◣਼㜎ǃ
ਠ⒮਼㜎ǃ⎧ཆט㜎൘޵Ⲵޘഭ਴᯿Ӫ≁઼㺧ޡ⍾ǃഒ㔃ཻᯇˈᱟѝॾ≁᯿䎠ੁ
Տབྷ༽ޤⲴ࣋䟿Ⓚ⋹ǄᡁԜ㾱㔗㔝ᐙപޘഭ਴᯿Ӫ≁Ⲵབྷഒ㔃ˈᐙപ⎧޵ཆѝॾ
ݯྣⲴབྷഒ㔃ˈᴰབྷ䲀ᓖൠᢺޘ≁᯿Ⲵ࣋䟿ࠍ㚊䎧ᶕˈᖒᡀѝॾ≁᯿㠚ᕪн᚟ǃ
ཻࣷࡽ䘋Ⲵᐘབྷ࣋䟿ǄᡁԜ㾱ॱ࠶⧽ᜌᡁഭ㑱㦓ਁኅǃᆹᇊഒ㔃Ⲵ㢟ྭተ䶒ˈޡ
਼㔤ᣔ᭩䶙ਁኅっᇊⲴབྷተˈзՇаᗳൠᢺ᭩䶙ᔰ઼᭮⧠ԓॆᔪ䇮һънᯝ᧘ੁ
ࡽ䘋ǄᡁԜ㾱བྷ࣋ᕈᢜԕ⡡ഭѫѹѪṨᗳⲴ≁᯿㋮⾎ Ѫˈᡁഭ਴᯿Ӫ≁仾䴘਼㡏ǃ
ᔰᤃ䘋ਆᨀ׋ᕪབྷ㋮⾎᭟ḡˈ啃㡎઼◰࣡аԓ৸аԓѝॾݯྣѪᇎ⧠ഭᇦ㑱㦓ᇼ
ᕪ㘼ഒ㔃ཻᯇǄ 
We need to unswervingly consolidate the the Chinese race’s unity, promote great 
national spirit. Including Hong Kong and Macau compatriots, Taiwanese compatriots, 
and overseas Chinese, people of every ethnicity all over the country work together 
with one heart, unite and fight together, [which] is a source of power for the Chinese 
race to walk towards great rejuvenation. We need to consolidate the great solidarity of 
every ethnicity all over the country, consolidate the great solidarity of Chinese people 
at home and abroad, and gather maximum power of all the race to form a giant force to 
make the Chinese race prosper and move forward. We need to cherish very much our 
country’s prosperous development, stability and solidarity, jointly maintain the stable 
condition of the reform development, and work together with one heart to move 
forward the reform, opening-up, and business of modernized construction. We need to 
greatly promote the national spirit with patriotism at the core to provide people of 
every ethnicity of our country with strong spiritual support to share a common fate and 
to pioneer and make progress, and to encourage and inspire generations of Chinese 
men and women to consolidate and fight for the realization of the country’s prosperity 
and strength. 
Section 5: 
Highlighting the 
importance of the 
solidarity of Chinese 
people – referring to 
Taiwanese as members 
of Chinese people; 
attempting to mobilize 
people of China 
through promotion of 
patriotism 
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Paragraph 9 
ᡁԜ㾱ඊᇊн〫ൠ㔤ᣔഭᇦѫᵳ઼亶൏ᆼᮤˈ〟ᶱ᧘䘋⾆ഭ઼ᒣ㔏аབྷъǄѝഭ
Ӫ≁✝⡡㠚ᐡⲴഭᇦˈ࿻㓸ඊᇊн〫ൠ㔤ᣔഭᇦѫᵳǃ亶൏ᆼᮤ઼≁᯿ሺѕˈߣ
нݱ䇨ԫօ࣯࣋ץ⣟ǄᡁԜ㾱࣐ᕪഭ䱢઼ߋ䱏⧠ԓॆᔪ䇮ˈඊᤱ〟ᶱ䱢ᗑⲴߋһ
ᡈ⮕ᯩ䪸ˈнᯝ᧘䘋ѝഭ⢩㢢ߋһਈ䶙ˈᨀ儈ؑ᚟ॆᶑԦлⲴ䱢ছ֌ᡈ㜭࣋ˈѪ
㔤ᣔഭᇦѫᵳ઼亶൏ᆼᮤᨀ׋ඊᕪⲴᆹޘ؍䳌ǄᡁԜሶඊᤱ“઼ᒣ㔏аǃаഭє
ࡦ”Ⲵสᵜᯩ䪸઼⧠䱦⇥ਁኅєየޣ㌫ǃ᧘䘋⾆ഭ઼ᒣ㔏а䘋〻Ⲵޛ亩ѫᕐˈඊ
ᤱањѝഭ৏ࡉߣнࣘ᩷ˈҹਆ઼ᒣ㔏аⲴࣚ࣋ߣн᭮ᔳˈ䍟ᖫᇴᐼᵋҾਠ⒮Ӫ
≁Ⲵᯩ䪸ߣн᭩ਈˈ৽ሩ“ਠ⤜”࠶㻲⍫ࣘߣн࿕ॿǄᡁԜሶ䇔ⵏ㩭ᇎ਼ѝഭഭ≁
ފǃӢ≁ފǃᯠފⲴ亶ሬӪՊ䈸ᡰ䗮ᡀⲴ਴亩ᡀ᷌ˈ䟷ਆа࠷〟ᶱ᧚ᯭˈ࣐ᕪє
የ਴亶ฏⲴӔ⍱ਸ֌ˈ׳䘋Ӫઈᖰᶕˈᇶ࠷єየ਼㜎ᝏᛵˈݵ࠶➗亮ਠ⒮਼㜎࡙
⳺ˈ׳䘋єየޣ㌫઼ᒣっᇊਁኅˈ㔤ᣔਠ⎧ൠ४઼ᒣっᇊǄᡁԜඊߣ৽ሩ“ਠ⤜”
࠶㻲࣯࣋৺ަ⍫ࣘˈ㔍нݱ䇨“ਠ⤜”࠶㻲࣯࣋ԕԫօ਽ѹǃԫօᯩᔿᢺਠ⒮Ӿ⾆
ഭ࠶㻲ࠪ৫ǄᡁԜሶ㔗㔝਼ᒯབྷਠ⒮਼㜎а䚃ˈޡ਼᢯ᣵ䎧৽ሩ࠶㻲ഭᇦǃ׳䘋
઼ᒣ㔏аⲴ⾎൓֯ભǄ 
We need to firmly maintain the national sovereignty and territory integrity, actively 
promote peaceful unification of the motherland. Chinese people love own country, 
always firmly protect the national sovereignty, territory integrity, and the national 
dignity, and never allow any force to invade [China]. We need to strengthen the 
modernization of national defence and military forces, insist on active, defensive 
military strategies, continuously promote military reform with Chinese characteristics, 
enhance the defence capability in the information warfare, and provide strong secure 
protection for maintaining the national sovereignty and territory integrity. We will 
insist on “peaceful unification, one country two systems” as the basic policy, develop 
at the current stage the cross-strait relations and push forward the motherland’s 
peaceful unification according to the eight principles, insist on the one China principle 
and never sway, never give up fighting for peaceful unification, implement the policy 
of having expectations of Taiwanese people and never change [this policy], oppose 
“Taiwan’s independence” separatist activities and never compromise. We will 
seriously implement with leaders of Kuomintang, People First Party and New Party 
various results achieved in the meetings, adopt every active measure, strengthen in 
every field cross-strait exchange and cooperation, boost interaction between people, 
develop cross-strait compatriot feelings, fully take care of Taiwanese compatriots’ 
benefit, promote peaceful and stable development of the cross-strait relations, maintain 
peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We firmly oppose “Taiwan independence” 
separatist forces and the related activities, never allow “Taiwan independence” 
separatist forces to separate Taiwan from the motherland in any name or in any way. 
We will continuously with vast numbers of Taiwanese compatriots together shoulder 
the sacred mission to oppose division of the country and promote peaceful unification. 
Section 6: 
Insisting on the One 
China policy – 
specifying how China 
will maintain its 
sovereignty and 
territorial integrity; 
reiterating the One 
China stance and 
opposing Taiwan 
independence by 
emphasizing Chinese 
patriotism and China’s 
good will towards 
Taiwan.   
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਼㜎Ԝˈ਼ᘇԜˈᴻ৻Ԝ 
Compatriots, comrades, and friends 
Addressing the same 
audience 
Paragraph 10 
എ俆ᖰһˈᡁԜᰐ䲀ᝏម˗ኅᵋᵚᶕˈᡁԜݵ┑ؑᗳǄӄॳཊᒤᶕˈѝॾ≁᯿শ
㓿⼘䳮ত࿻㓸㠚ᕪн᚟ˈѪӪ㊫᮷᰾䘋↕֌ࠪҶнਟ⼘⚝Ⲵ䍑⥞ǄӺཙˈѝॾ≁
᯿Ⲵਁኅ↓䶒Ѥ⵰䳮ᗇⲴশਢᵪ䙷ˈѝॾ≁᯿Տབྷ༽ޤⲴݹ䖹ࡽᲟᐢ㓿ኅ⧠൘ᡁ
Ԝ䶒ࡽǄवᤜབྷ䱶਼㜎ǃ⑟◣਼㜎ǃਠ⒮਼㜎ǃ⎧ཆט㜎൘޵Ⲵޘփѝॾݯྣˈ
䜭ᓄ䈕Ѫ㠚ᐡᱟѝॾ≁᯿Ⲵᡀઈ㘼ᝏࡠᰐ∄㠚䊚ˈ䜭ᓄ䈕᢯ᣵ䎧ᇎ⧠ѝॾ≁᯿Տ
བྷ༽ޤⲴশਢ䍓ԫˈ䜭ᓄ䈕ԕ㠚ᐡⲴࣚ࣋Ѫѝॾ≁᯿ਁኅਢ㔝߉ᯠⲴݹ䖹ㇷㄐǄ
䇙ᡁԜᴤ࣐㍗ᇶൠഒ㔃䎧ᶕˈѪޘ䶒ᔪ䇮ሿᓧ⽮Պǃᇎ⧠ѝॾ≁᯿ⲴՏབྷ༽ޤ㘼
㔗㔝ཻࣚ࣋ᯇʽѪᔪ䇮ањ઼ᒣਁኅǃ᮷᰾䘋↕Ⲵц⭼㘼㔗㔝ཻࣚ࣋ᯇʽ 
Looking back at the past, we sign with emotion. Looking into the future, we are full of 
confidence. During the period of more than five thousand years, the Chinese race 
always strives continually to make progress and makes indelible contributions to the 
advancement of human civilization. Today, the development of the Chinese race is 
facing a rare historical opportunity. The prospect of the Chinese race’s great 
rejuvenation has been displayed in front of us. Including compatriots from China, from 
Hong Kong and Macao, from Taiwan, and from overseas, all Chinese people should 
feel proud of being members of the Chinese race, shoulder the historical responsibility 
to revive the greatness of the Chinese race, and should make effort to write new 
chapters of glory in the history of the Chinese race development. Let’s be united more 
closely and keep working hard to build a basically well-off society and fulfil the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese race. Let’s keep working hard to build a world of peaceful 
development and advanced civilization. 
Section 9: 
Conclusion – 
attempting to mobilize 
Chinese people to fight 
for the glory of China; 
specifying the 
involvement of 
Taiwanese as members 
of Chinese people.  
 
3.3.2.2 Speech 2 (T) by Chen Shui-bian 
 
Speech 2 (T): Chen Shui-bian’s speech to the parliament of the Republic of Nauru on his state 
visit to the Republic of Nauru, 6 September 20066 
           Character Count: Original 1,514, edited down to 1,334  
                         (punctuation  marks  included)  
           Length:  8.17  min  
           Speaker: Chen Shui-bian, President of the Republic of China (ROC) from 2000 
 to 2008 
 
                                               
6 Retrieved 09 September 2006 from the website of the Office of the President, Republic of China 
  (Taiwan) at http://www.president.gov.tw 
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 Note that one short paragraph containing many proper nouns referring to the First 
Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit in the original source speech is omitted in this abridged text 
version as it is not only irrelevant to cross-strait relations but also may add to SI difficulties.  
 The genre of the speech is a speech on the occasion of a state visit, and the field of action 
involves organization of international/interstate relations (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 90-91). 
This speech content involves no cross-strait issues; however, Taiwan is talked of as an 
independent country throughout the speech. The macro- and mesostructure of this abridged 
speech is analyzed in the following table 7. 
 
Table 7 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 2 (T) 
 Macro- and mesostructure 
The Parliament of the Republic of Nauru, 6 September 2006 Place and date 
ഋНࡧೖୢᒍᎹǴჹᒍᎹ୯཮ว߄ᄽᇥ 
Chen Shui-bian visited the Republic of Nauru, giving a speech to the Nauru 
parliament 
State visit speech 
(sub)genre 
Paragraph 1 
Ԝԛᔈўё्ᕴ಍ሙΠ၈⨜ޑᗎፎǴ౗ი߻ٰ຦୯ೖୢǴჹҁΓٰᇥཀက
ߚதख़εǴӢࣁಖܭёаֹԋფགྷǴၹೖ܌Ԗᆵ᡼ӧϼѳࢩޑٖҬ୯Ǵऍ
᜽ޑᒍᎹࣁҁΓԋ൩Αϼѳࢩ༝ფϐਓǶ 
This time in response to His Excellency President Scotty’s sincere invitation, 
[I] lead a delegation to visit your esteemed country. To me, the significance is 
very great because finally [I] can realize the dream of visiting all of Taiwan’s 
diplomatic allies in the Pacific Ocean. Beautiful Nauru for me completed a trip 
to realizing the dream in the Pacific. 
Section 1: 
Specifying the significance 
of visiting Nauru to the 
speaker – highlighting the 
speaker as Taiwan’s 
president has completed the 
mission of visiting 
Taiwan’s diplomatic allies 
in the Pacific area. 
Paragraph 2 
ҁΓࢂύ๮҇୯ಃ΋Տ߻ٰ຦୯ೖୢޑ୯ৎϡ२Ǵߚதᄪ۩ૈڙᗎډ຦୯
നଯޑ҇Ь྅୸ȋᒍᎹӅک୯୯཮ว߄ᄽᇥǶ२ӃǴᙣж߄ך୯ࡹ۬ϷΒ
ίΟԭ࿤Γ҇ǴӛӚՏ᝼঩ठཀǴΨाӛ຦୯ࡹ۬ᆶΓ҇߄ၲന၈ኑޑག
ᖴϐཀǶ 
I am the Republic of China’s first national leader that visits your esteemed 
country, very honored to be invited to your esteemed country’s highest 
democracy hall - the Parliament of the Republic of Nauru – to give a speech. 
First, [I] would like to, on behalf of my/our country’s government and 
twenty-three million people, pay tribute to every parliament member, and, to 
Giving thanks to Nauru’s 
government and people for 
the visit invitation – 
highlighting the speaker as 
the first Taiwan’s president 
to visit Nauru 
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your esteemed country’s government and people, express sincerest thanks. 
Paragraph 3 
຦୯வ΋ΐϤΖԃᐱҥаٰǴӧၸѐΟΜΖԃ྽ύǴ୯཮܌৖౜ޑԋዕ҇
ЬᡏڋǴჹ຦୯ޑ୯ৎว৖תᄽΑཱུࣁख़ाޑفՅǶҁΓΨමӧ΋ΐΐ˝
ԃԿ΋ΐΐѤԃ໔ᏼҺ୯཮᝼঩Ǵӧٿۛҥݤہ঩ҺයϣǴӧך୯ҥݤଣ
ࣁΓ҇ോՁǵࣁ҇ЬᏟରǶ 
Your esteemed country in nineteen sixty-eight declared independence, over the 
past thirty-eight years, the mature democratic system demonstrated by the 
parliament has played an extremely important role to your esteemed country’s 
national development. I also once from nineteen ninety to nineteen ninety-four 
served as a parliament member. During the two terms in office as a legislator, 
in our country’s Legislative Yuan [I] voiced for people, fought for democracy. 
Section 2: 
Reviewing the similarities 
and connections between 
both countries - associating 
the speaker with the 
Nauru’s MPs and 
specifying Taiwan as a 
country has its own 
parliament and Chen once 
worked at Taiwan’s 
parliament 
Paragraph 4 
ԶҁΓ௃ӕЋىޑӳܻ϶ǵᒃஏޑӳл׌ўё्ᕴ಍ሙΠǴΨමӧΐ˝ԃ
ж҃යԿΒ˝˝˝ԃ໔ᏼҺ୯཮᝼ߏǴ܌аǴӧ຦ךٿ୯ޑ҇Ьϐၡ΢Ǵ
ᕴ಍ሙΠϷҁΓёᇥම࿶کӚՏ୯཮᝼঩΋ኬǴ೿ࢂתᄽ௢ЋϷᅱ࿎ޣޑ
فՅǶ 
And my good friend as close as a sibling, close good brother His Excellency 
President Ludwig Scotty, also once from the late nineteen nineties to two 
thousand worked as Speaker of the Parliament. Therefore, on the road to 
democracy of our both countries, His Excellency President and I were just as 
every parliament member [here] playing a role as a pusher and supervisor. 
Associating the speaker 
with Nauru’s president – 
both of them work for 
democracy of one’s own 
country 
Paragraph 5 
ٿ୯ᗨฅӦ౛΢࣬ຯᇿᇻǴՠᆵ᡼চՐ҇ᆶᒍᎹΓ҇ӕឦࠄ৞ᇟسǴӧЎ
ϯǵՈጔǵᇟقϷ॥߫ಞᄍ΢೿Ԗ೚ӭ࣬՟ϐೀǴ೭Ψࢂࣁϙሶᆵ᡼Γ҇
ჹ຦୯ޑΓ҇཮ԾฅԶฅޑԖ΋ҽᒃϪགǴԶЪٿ୯Γ҇ࡐ৒ܰ൩ёаམ
ଆ϶ፉޑᐏኺǶ 
Although both countries are far apart geographically, Taiwanese aboriginals 
and Nauru people both belong to the Austronesian family. In terms of culture, 
origin, language and customs there are many similarities. This is also why 
Taiwanese people towards your esteemed country’s people naturally feel 
friendly, and people of both countries very easily build a bridge of friendship. 
Associating Taiwan’s 
people with Nauru’s 
people – both Taiwan’s 
aboriginals and Nauru’s 
people belong to the 
Austronesian family 
Paragraph 6 
܌аǴҁΓ੝ձᗎፎΑΒՏচՐ҇ޑ୯཮᝼঩΋ଆӕՉǴӧԜၟӚՏϟಏǴ
ಃ΋Տࢂж߄୺ࡹޑ҇Ь຾؁លᆶڒࠄ௼ޑഋዝہ঩ǴಃΒՏࢂж߄ᒃ҇
ᵫᆶߓऍ௼ޑ݅҅Βہ঩Ƕ೭ΒՏہ঩খӳж߄ᆵ᡼ٿঁЬाࡹលᆶٿঁ
όӕޑচՐ҇௼ဂǴᡉҢᆵ᡼ࢂ΋ঁ҇ЬǵЎϯǵ௼ဂӭϡޑ୯ৎǴฅԶ
ӧჹѦܗ৖ѦҬπբਔǴךॺޑཀדᆶᖂॣ೿ࢂი่΋ठޑǶ 
Therefore, I specially invited two aboriginal parliament members to come with 
Section 3: 
Introducing two Taiwan’s 
MPs who came to Nauru 
with the speaker –   
highlighting Taiwan as a 
democratic, multi-ethnic 
and cultural country 
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me. Here [I] introduce [them] to everyone. The first one represents the ruling 
Democratic Progressive Party and the Puyuma tribe, Legislator Chen Ying. The 
second one represents the People First Party and the Amis tribe, Legislator Lin 
Cheng-er. These two legislators represent Taiwan’s two major political parties 
and two different aboriginal tribes, [which] shows that Taiwan is a democratic, 
culturally and ethnically diverse country. However, while expanding diplomatic 
affairs to the outside, our wills and voices are united and uniform. 
Paragraph 7 
ܭۧ੥२۬࢒ᛥѱᖐՉޑȨಃ΋ۛᆵ᡼ᆶϼѳࢩ϶ٖϡ२ଯঢ়཮᝼ȩࢂᆵ
᡼ᜫཀଅ᝘୯ሞޗ཮ǴठΚଓ؃ך୯ک϶ٖӝբӅᄪҞ኱ޑڀᡏ߄౜Ǵך
ॺයࡑаനԖਏ౗ޑБԄပჴ཮᝼่݀Ǵ೴؁ගϲᆵ᡼Ϸځϼѳࢩ϶ٖޑ
୯ৎჴΚǴ٠ԋࣁܭΒΜ΋Шइ୯ሞޗ཮ύǴჴ፬҇ЬǵکѳǵԾҗǵΓ
៾฻දШሽॶޑኳጄ୯ৎǶ 
Held in Koror, the capital of Palau, ‘the First Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit’ is 
a concrete demonstration of Taiwan’s willingness to contribute to the 
international community, to pursue the goal of my/our country and [our] allies’ 
cooperating for common prosperity. We expect to in the most efficient ways 
implement the Summit’s results, gradually enhance Taiwan and [its] Pacific 
allies’ national strength, and become in 21st-century international community a 
model country which puts into practice democracy, peace, freedom, human 
rights etc common values. 
Section 4: 
Specifying Taiwan’s effort 
in maintaining its relations 
with Asia-Pacific allies - 
using the First 
Taiwan-Pacific Allies 
Summit as an example to 
highlight Taiwan would like 
to work with its Pacific 
allies and become a model 
country in the world. 
Paragraph 8 
ӧ຦ךٿ୯ӝբБय़ǴϞԃΒДٿ୯ᛝ࿿ၭמӝբڐۓࡕǴך୯ᎫᒍᎹמ
ೌიςഌុӧ຦୯೛ҥҢጄၭ൑ǵНౢᎦ෗൑Ϸৎ੬ҢጄႩᎦ൑Ǵ҂ٰஒ
཮ഌុғౢӚ໨ጫ๼ǵН݀ǵങᜪ฻ၭᅕౢࠔǴך୯מೌიი঩Ψीฝ΋
Њ΋ЊޑᒃيҢጄ௲ᏤǴ࣬ߞ຦୯Γ҇ёаவ೭ኬޑᏢಞύڙ੻ؼӭǶ 
In terms of cooperation between both countries, this February both countries 
signed the agricultural and technical cooperation agreement. [Since this] 
my/our country’s technical delegation based in Nauru has one after another in 
your esteemed country set up demonstration farms, fish farms and 
demonstration domestic animal farms. In the future [ ] will one after another 
produce a variety of vegetables, fruits, fishes, [and other] agricultural-fishery 
products. My/our country’s technical delegation members also plan to from 
household to household give demonstrations in person. [I] believe your 
esteemed country’s people can from such learning benefit a lot. 
Section 5: 
Specifying cooperation 
between Taiwan and 
Nauru – highlighting  
Taiwan’s help for Nauru’s 
agriculture and fishing 
industry 
Paragraph 9 
ԜѦǴࣁуமᆶᒍᎹΓω୻૽Бय़ޑҬࢬǴҞ߻ך୯؂ԃගٮӄᚐዛᏢߎ
ϒᒍᎹΟՏᏢғॅᆵ᡼൩᠐εᏢǴ٠ගٮӭ໨ӧᙍ૽ግ܈஑཰ᖱಞǴԿϞ
ςԖӭΓ߻۳Ǵ҂ٰΨ཮ഌុᒤ౛ΓωҬࢬࢲ୏Ƕ࣬ߞ೭٤ᏢғᏢԋ߇୯
Example of talent exchange 
between Taiwan and 
Nauru – highlighting 
Taiwan’s help for training 
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ࡕǴ΋ۓёаԋࣁ຦୯௢୏Ӛ໨ࡌ೛ޑख़ाᅿηǶ 
In addition, to strengthen exchange in terms of Nauru talent training, at present 
my/our country every year provides full scholarships to three students from 
Nauru to go to Taiwan and study at university, and provide many on-the-job 
training [programs] or professional lectures. So far many people have gone 
[there]. In the future, [ ] will one after another hold talent-exchanging activities. 
[I] believe that these students, after finishing studies and returning to the 
country can surely become your esteemed country’s important seeds of 
promoting a variety of constructions. 
Nauru’s talent 
Paragraph 10 
ҁΓΨाᙖԜᐒ཮Ǵж߄ύ๮҇୯ࡹ۬ᆶΒίΟԭ࿤ᆵ᡼Γ҇Ǵགᖴ຦୯
ࡹ۬ᆶ୯཮୲ۓЍ࡭ᆵ᡼ୖᆶᖄӝ୯ǵШࣚፁғಔᙃϷځѬ୯ሞಔᙃޑո
ΚǴ຦୯ޑЍ࡭ᆶ϶ፉǴᆵ᡼ӄᡏΓ҇ు߄གᖴᆶལཀǴΨයࣰ຦୯҂ٰ
ૈ୼ᝩុӧ୯ሞޗ཮ࣁᆵ᡼Ь࡭҅ကǴ๏ϒᆵ᡼ڐշǴᡣᆵ᡼ӧ୯ሞᆸᆵ
๓ᅰೢҺǶ 
I also would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the R.O.C. government 
and the twenty-three million Taiwanese people, to thank your esteemed 
country’s government and parliament for firmly supporting Taiwan to 
participate in the United Nations, the World Health Organization and other 
international organizations. Your esteemed country’s support and friendship, all 
Taiwanese people feel deeply gratitude and respect. [ ] also hope your esteemed 
country in the future can continuously in the international community uphold 
for Taiwan justice, offer Taiwan help, let Taiwan on the international stage 
fulfill responsibility. 
Section 6: 
Showing gratitude and 
appealing for Nauru’s 
continuous support for 
Taiwan’s participation in 
international community–   
highlighting Taiwan’s 
political predicament in 
terms of its international 
status 
Paragraph 11 
΋ঁ୯ৎޑ଻εᆶցǴόӧܭ୯βय़ᑈελǴΨόӧܭΓαԖӭϿǴԶࢂ
ӧܭ೭୯ৎΓ҇ЈύޑΚໆԖӭεǶᆵ᡼کᒍᎹ೿ࢂλ୯ǴฅԶٿ୯Γ҇
ޑΚໆࢂคज़ޑǴ຦ךٿ୯ޑ҂ٰкᅈᐒ཮ᆶ׆ఈǶ 
Whether a country is great or not does not lie in the size of territory or how 
much the population is, but lies in how much this country’s people’s mental 
strength is. Taiwan and Nauru are both small countries. However, both 
countries’ people’s power is limitless, the future of both countries is full of 
opportunity and hope. 
Section 7: 
Conclusion: Giving wishes 
to both Taiwan and Nauru – 
highlighting Taiwan as a 
small country still has 
strength and opportunity 
Paragraph 12 
നࡕǴӆԛགᖴўё्ᕴ಍ሙΠǵࡋᆢ϶݀᝼ߏሙΠǴ٠ઔᅽ຦୯୯҇୯
ၮܱໜǴўё्ᕴ಍ᆶ׹ᆢ϶݀᝼ߏǵӚՏ᝼঩ǵӚՏሙ঩ǴӚՏ຦ᇯǴ
аϷ܌ԖᒍᎹΓ҇يЈ଼நǵ࿤٣ӵཀǶAt last, [I] would like to thank again 
His Excellency President Ludwig Scotty and His Distinguished Speaker of the 
Parliament of Nauru, Mr. Bernard Dowiyogo and wish your esteemed country’s 
Closing remarks - giving 
thanks and wishes to 
Nauru’s government and 
people 
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people a prosperous future of the country. [I] wish His Excellency President 
Ludwig Scotty, His Distinguished Speaker of the Parliament of Nauru, Mr. 
Bernard Dowiyogo, every parliament member, every cabinet minister, every 
distinguished guest, and all of Nauru people good health and happiness. 
 
3.3.2.3 Speech 3 (T) by Chen Shui-bian 
 
Speech 3 (T): Chen Shui-bian’s speech on the flag presentation to Taiwan’s delegation to the 
2005 World Games, 6 July 20057 
            Character Count: Original 1,290, edited down to 1,012  
                         (punctuation  marks  included)  
           Length:  6.24  min  
           Speaker: Chen Shui-bian, President of the Republic of China (ROC) from 2000 
to 2008 
 
 Two short paragraphs in the original speech are omitted. One concerns historical review 
of Taiwan’s presence in the World Games and the other how Taiwan’s government has helped 
to win the bid to host the World Games 2009. The omission is aimed at reducing renditions of 
proper nouns. The genre of this speech is a pep talk given by Taiwan’s president to Taiwan’s 
athletes who were going to attend the World Games 2005. The macro- and mesostructure of 
this abridged speech is analyzed in the following table 8. 
 
Table 8 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 3 (T)  
 Macro- and mesostructure 
Taipei, 6 July 2005 Place and date 
ഋНࡧࣁѠ᡼ୖуȨ2005Шࣚၮ୏཮ж߄იȩ௤ᄡठຒ 
Chen Shui-bian’s speech on the flag presentation to Taiwan’s  
delegation to the 2005 World Games 
Pep talk for sports 
delegation (sub)genre 
Paragraph 1 
२Ӄाৰ഻܌Ԗж߄იԋ঩Ǵջஒж߄Ѡ᡼ᇻॅቺ୯׹ܰථൕǴୖу؂Ѥԃ
ᖐᒤ΋ԛޑȨШࣚၮ୏཮ȩǴӚՏ೿ࢂѠ᡼നᓬذޑၮ୏঩ǴӧଯЋ໦໣ޑ
Section 1: 
Highlighting the honor to 
represent one’s own 
                                               
7 Retrieved 10 September 2006 from the website of the Office of the President, Republic of China 
  (Taiwan) at http://www.president.gov.tw 
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୯ЋᒧܘၸำύಥᑉԶрǴᕇளԋࣁ୯ৎж߄იԋ঩ޑനଯਸᄪǴҁΓᙣж
߄ࡹ۬Ϸӄᡏ୯ΓǴჹӚՏߏයӧᡏػၮ୏ሦୱޑбрϷണр߄౜Ǵ߄ၲന
၈ኑޑৰລǵ჏ࠀϷޭۓϐཀǶ 
First [I] would like to congratulate all of the delegation members that [you] are 
going on behalf of Taiwan to Duisburg, Germany to attend the 
once-every-four-year ‘World Games’. Everyone [of you] is Taiwan’s most 
excellent athlete, standing out [from the others] in the process of selecting 
national sports delegates among whom there were many experts, winning the 
highest honor of being the national delegation members. I, on behalf of the 
government and all the country’s people, for everyone’s long-term effort and 
excellent performance in the field of sports, express the sincerest congratulations, 
encouragement and recognition. 
country in international 
sports games – 
congratulations to 
Taiwanese sports 
delegation  
Paragraph 2 
ϞԃǴջஒฦ൑ޑҁۛШၮ཮ύǴך୯ж߄იୖᖻޑᅿᜪхࡴӝ਻ၰǵࡌΚǵ
ӝౚǵናౚǵߥសౚǵܘݞǵྖ፺྘ӇǵޜЋၰǵচഁ৔ጂǵᓪՃ฻ 11໨
ၮ୏КᖻǴी 79ՏᒧЋஒӧШၮ཮ޑᝡמᆸѠ΋৖ߏωǶߓࡧԖߞЈǴϞ
ԃεৎϝஒӄΚаॅǴҥדၲԋന٫ᝡᖻԋᕮǴࣁךॺ୯ৎӆԛቪΠᐕўइ
ᒵǶ 
This year, in the forthcoming World Games, our country’s delegation will attend 
such sports events as Aikido, powerlifting, korfball, billiards, bowling, tug of 
war, roller sports, karate, field archery, and dragon boat race, eleven sports events 
(in total). In total seventy-nine athletes will on the contest stage of the World 
Games show talent. I [A-bian] have confidence this year everyone will still try 
the best, be determined to achieve the best competition results, and for our 
country again set historical records. 
Listing the sports events 
which Taiwanese athletes 
will attend in the World  
Games – encouraging the 
athletes to glorify Taiwan 
as a country 
Paragraph 3 
ᗋा੝ձගډޑࢂǴଯ໢ѱ೭ԛԋфڗளȨ2009ԃШࣚၮ୏཮ȩЬᒤ៾Ǵό
໻஥୏ΑѠ᡼ޑᡏػ॥ዊǴΨᡣӄ୯΢Π؇੆ӧ߆ௗȨଯ໢Шၮ཮ȩޑ៿ݒ
਻ݗύǴႣ՗ۛਔஒԖٰԾШࣚӚӦຬၸ΋ԭঁ୯ৎӅᖪ౰ᖐǴୖᖻᒧЋΓ
ኧΨஒଯၲΟίΓǶᙖҗᖐᒤȨ2009ԃଯ໢Шၮ཮ȩǴѠ᡼ஒ៌ϲԋࣁ୯ሞ
നεࠠᡏػᖻ٣ޑЬᒤ୯Ǵ҂ٰΨஒԖ΋ঁന٫ޑᐒ཮Ǵӛӄౚ৖౜ך୯ӭ
ϡЎϯǵаϷӚБय़ࡌ೛຾؁ᆶᕷᄪޑԋ݀Ǵ٠຾΋؁ගϲѠ᡼ޑ୯ሞӦՏ
ϷૈـࡋǶჹԜǴךॺԖࡐుޑයࡑǴΨයࣰӧ҂ٰ൳ԃޑྗഢπբύǴε
ৎૈ୼ሸЈڐΚǴวච౲דԋࠤޑᆒઓǴᡣѠ᡼ԋࣁШࣚᡏᏝޑന٫ЬفǴ
ࣁѺ೷ך୯ᓬ፦ЪࡠѶޑᡏػཥШइٰӅӕոΚǶӢԜǴӚՏᒧЋӧҁۛШ
ၮ཮ޑ߄౜ǴஒԖᐒ཮ࣁѤԃࡕޑȨ2009ଯ໢Шၮ཮ȩѺៜಃ΋ઍǴ٠໒ബ
΋ঁന٫ޑ୷ᘵǴ׆ఈεৎӳӳඓඝᐒ཮ǴวචԾךჴΚǴаݾڗനଯޑᄪ
៉ǼǶ 
 
Section 2: 
Associating the sports 
delegation with 
Kaohsiung City’s winning 
the bid to host the World 
Games 2009 – 
highlighting Taiwan’s 
effort to increase its 
international visibility and 
recognition as a country 
and encouraging the 
delegates to glorify the 
country 
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[I] also need to particularly mention that Kaohsiung City this time succeeded in 
winning the bid to host ‘the 2009 World Games’, [which] not only promotes 
Taiwan’s sport trend but also lets the whole country soak in the rejoicing 
atmosphere of greeting ‘the World Games in Kaohsiung’. It is estimated that at 
that time there will be from all over the world more than one hundred countries 
coming to join the games, and the number of participating athletes will be up to 
three thousand. By hosting ‘World Games 2009 in Kaohsiung’, Taiwan will 
become the largest international sports event’s host country. In the future, [ ] also 
will have the best opportunity to show the world our country’s diverse cultures 
and results of construction progress and prosperity in every aspect, and further 
enhance Taiwan’s international status and visibility. Towards this, we have high 
expectations, also hope that during the future several years of preparation 
everyone can work together and keep up the spirit that unity is strength to let 
Taiwan become the best leading role in the world sports field, to create our 
country’s quality and splendid new century of sports with common efforts. 
Therefore, every athlete’s performance in this World Games will give a first 
opportunity to advertise the four-year-later ‘World Games 2009 in Kaohsiung’, 
and create the best foundation. [I] hope everyone seizes well the opportunity and 
perform well to win the highest honor! 
Paragraph 4 
ၸѐߓࡧΨම࿶ӭԛࣁךॺ୯ৎж߄໗ୖᆶ୯ሞᖻ཮௤ᄡǴ٠ୖуᖻࡕቼф
৏Ǵ؂ԛ࣮ډύ๮ၮ୏଼ٽӧᡏᏝаే᝝ᏟวޑରדǴࣁ୯ݾӀǵඦӜ୯ሞǴ
ߓࡧၟቶεޑѠ᡼҇౲΋ኬǴ೿ࣁεৎᏟରޑᆒઓϷڑຫ߄౜གډᠠ໹Ƕখ
ωߓࡧҬډ໳ЬৢЋύޑ୯ᄡکიᄡǴ΋य़ࢂ୯ৎᄪ៉ޑຝቻǴќ΋य़߾ࢂ
୯ৎж߄იޑᆒઓ኱ᇞǹߓࡧ૱Ј׆ఈӧ೭ٿय़ᄡተޑᏤЇΠǴӚՏૈ୼ᄡ
໒ளയǵគளനᓬ౦ޑԋᕮǶΨ׆ఈӚՏ௴ำ߻۳ȨШࣚၮ୏཮ȩਔǴૈ୼
όाב૶ǴεৎޑՉ៶ύᅈၩΑٿίΟԭ࿤୯ΓӕझჹӚՏޑคज़ઔᅽǵന
εޑЍ࡭ǵکന਺ϪޑයࣰǶ 
In the past, I [A-bian] also for many times gave our country’s national 
delegations attending international contests flags and attended after-contest 
celebration parties. Whenever seeing Zhonghua athletes in the sports field, with 
endeavoring will to fight, winning honor for the country and becoming famous 
internationally, I [A-bian] as well as many other Taiwanese people, feel proud of 
everyone’s fighting spirit and excellent performance. Just now I [A-bian] gave 
Chairman Huang the national flag and the delegation flag. One is a symbol of the 
country’s honor. The other is the spiritual sign of the national delegation. I 
[A-bian] sincerely hope that under the guidance of these two flags everyone can 
win speedy success and achieve the best results, also hope that when everyone 
starts the journey to the ‘World Games’, [everyone] may not forget everyone’s 
Section 3: 
Presenting two flags to 
Taiwan’s sports 
delegation – highlighting 
the expectations of 
Taiwan’s government and 
people towards the sports 
delegation 
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luggage is filled with the twenty-three million countrymen and compatriots’ 
limitless wishes, strongest support and greatest expectation to everyone. 
Paragraph 5 
ߓࡧۈಖ୲ߞǴȨոΚуԾߞ฻ܭԋфȩǴӚՏѳਔԠࢬ੒ङǵᓨᓨधግޑ
ոΚǴς࿶ࢂԋфޑ΋ъΑǴԖбр൩ԖԏᛘǴයࣰӚՏૈ୼ᝩុаߞЈǵ
،ЈǵϷܮ౰ޑҾკЈǴӧШၮ཮΢රӛȨԋ൩ԾρǵӀᝬѠ᡼ȩޑҞ኱ᗌ
຾Ƕ 
I[A-bian] always firmly believe that ‘hard work plus self-confidence equals 
success’. Everyone daily works hard and practices silently and has obtained half 
of success. Effort will be rewarded. [I] hope everyone can go on with confidence, 
determination, and high ambition in the World Games to move towards the goal 
of ‘self-fulfilling yourself and glorifying Taiwan’. 
Section 4: 
Conclusion – encouraging 
Taiwanese athletes to 
glorify Taiwan 
നࡕǴઔᅽεৎيᡏ଼நǴയճӧఈǴуݨǴӆуݨǼ 
Finally, I wish everyone heath and triumph. Go, go, go! 
Closing remarks – giving 
wishes to Taiwanese 
athletes 
 
3.3.2.4 Speech 4 (C) by Jia Qinglin 
 
Speech 4(C): Jia Qinglin’s speech themed ‘Enhancing communication and cooperation and 
jointly creating a beautiful future’ given at a welcoming party held by 
Indonesian people of all circles on his visit to Indonesia, 26 March 20068 
           Character Count: Original 3,177, edited down to 1,939  
                         (punctuation  marks  included)  
           Length:  12.43  min 
           Speaker:  Jia  Qinglin,  Chairman  of  the  People’s  Political  Consultative  
Conference, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 2003 
 
 Four paragraphs in the original speech are omitted in this abridged version. Two of them 
concern the economic development of China, and the others the connections between China 
and other Asian countries in terms of trade development. These paragraphs have nothing to do 
with  the  cross-strait  issues  and  contain  a  lot  of  numbers  that  are  very  likely  to  add  to  SI  
difficulties. The abridged speech retains Jia’s original tone and style as well as the main 
historical and political context of the Sino-Indonesian relations. The genre of this speech is a 
                                               
8 Retrieved 10 September 2006 from the website of Xinhua News Agency at http://www.chinaview.cn 
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speech on the occasion of a state visit, and the field of action involves organization of 
international/interstate relations. The macro- and mesostructure of this abridged speech is 
analyzed in the following table 9: 
 
Table 9 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 4 (C) 
 Macro- and mesostructure 
Jakarta, 26 March 2006 Place and date 
ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭޘഭ᭯ॿѫᑝ䍮ᒶ᷇ “࣐ᕪӔ⍱ਸ֌ޡࡋ㖾ྭᵚᶕü൘ঠ
ቬ਴⭼Ӫ༛⅒䗾⍫ࣘкⲴ╄䇢”   
Jia Qinglin as Chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC)  gave a speech themed ‘enhancing 
communication and cooperation and jointly creating a beautiful future’ at a 
welcoming party held by Indonesian people of all circles  
State visit speech 
(sub)genre 
ሺᮜⲴঠቬӪ≁ॿ୶Պ䇞࢟ѫᑝ⌅⢩⬖ˈሺᮜⲴঠቬˉѝഭ㓿⍾ǃ⽮Պǃ᮷
ॆਸ֌ॿՊᙫѫᑝ㣿ൾ䗮ቬˈሺᮜⲴঠቬᐕ୶Պѫᑝᐼ䗮ӊ⢩ˈྣ༛Ԝˈݸ
⭏Ԝˈᴻ৻Ԝ˖ 
Respected Mr. Fatwa, Vice President of Indonesian People’s Consultative 
Assembly, Respected Dr. Sukamdani, President of the Association of 
Indonesia-China Economic, Social and Cultural Cooperation, Respected Mr. 
Hidayad, President of the Indonesia Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Ladies, 
Gentlemen, and Friends: 
Addressing the Indonesian 
audience – specifying the 
important Indonesian 
politicians present and 
then the common 
audience 
Paragraph 1 
൘ᡁሩ㖾ѭⲴॳዋѻഭ——ঠቬ䘋㹼↓ᔿ৻ྭ䇯䰞ѻ䱵ˈᴹ ᵪՊоঠቬⲴᐕ
୶⭼ԕ৺ަԆ਴⭼ᴻ৻⅒㚊аาˈޡਉ৻䈺ˈᝏࡠॱ࠶儈ޤǄ俆ݸˈ䈧ݱ䇨
ᡁሩঠቬ਴⭼ᴻ৻Ѫᡁ઼ᡁⲴԓ㺘ഒѮ㹼ྲ↔ⴋབྷⲴ⅒䗾⍫ࣘ 㺘ˈ⽪⭡㺧Ⲵ
ᝏ䉒Ǆُ↔ᵪՊˈᡁᝯ䖜䗮ѝഭӪ≁ሩঠቬӪ≁Ⲵ䈊᥊䰞ى઼㢟ྭ⾍ᝯʽ 
While I am paying official friendly visit to the beautiful country of a thousand 
islands – Indonesia, [I] have the opportunity to be with friends in the industrial 
and commercial circles and in other circles of Indonesia gathering together and 
renew the friendship, [about which] I am extremely glad. First of all, please allow 
me to express sincere thanks towards friends in every circle of Indonesia who for 
me and my delegation hold such a grand welcoming activity. With this 
opportunity, I would like to forward Chinese people’s sincere greetings and good 
wishes to the people of Indonesia. 
Section 1: 
Giving thanks for the 
welcoming party held by 
Indonesia – pointing out 
the speaker’s role as 
China’s official 
representative 
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Paragraph 2 
ѝഭоঠቬᱟ৻ྭ䛫䛖 Րˈ㔏৻䈺Ⓚ䘌⍱䮯Ǆ2000ཊᒤࡽ ѝˈഭቡᴮ᧕ᖵ䗷
ᶕ㠚⡚૷Ⲵ⢩֯ˈᔰ੟Ҷєഭ৻ྭӔᖰⲴশਢǄ600ཊᒤࡽˈѝഭ᰾ᵍ㡚⎧
ᇦ䜁઼гл㾯⌻ˈཊ⅑ࡠ䗷⡚૷ㅹൠˈ⮉л䇨ཊ㠣ӺӽᒯѪՐ亲Ⲵ֣䈍Ǆк
њц㓚ࡽਦˈ൘ҹਆഭᇦ⤜・઼≁᯿䀓᭮ⲴᯇҹѝˈѝঠቬӪ≁࿻㓸ㄉ൘а
䎧ˈ⴨ӂ᭟ᤱǃ⴨ӂ啃࣡ˈޡ਼䉡߉Ҷᣇࠫץ⮕㘵Ⲵ༞ѭ䈇ㇷǄ50ᒤࡽˈѝ
ഭоঠቬㅹӊ䶎ਁኅѝഭᇦа䚃ˈޡ਼⺞・Ҷԕ઼ᒣޡ༴Ѫส⹰Ⲵз䲶㋮
⾎ˈᒦ֯ѻᡀѪഭ䱵кޜ䇔Ⲵ༴⨶ഭᇦ䰤ޣ㌫Ⲵสᵜ߶ࡉˈѪ࣐ᕪਁኅѝഭ
ᇦⲴഒ㔃оਸ֌ˈ֌ࠪҶশਢᙗⲴ䍑⥞Ǆѝঠቬєഭ઼єഭӪ≁൘䮯ᵏⲴশ
ਢ䘋〻ѝ㔃лⲴ␡৊৻ᛵˈᐢ㓿ᡀѪৼᯩޡ਼ᤕᴹⲴᇍ䍥㋮⾎䍒ᇼǄ 
China and Indonesia are friendly neighboring countries. The traditional 
friendship started a long time ago. More than two thousand years ago, China once 
received an envoy from Java, [which] started both countries’ history of friendly 
exchange. More than six hundred years ago, Ming China’s voyager Zheng He 
went to the Western Ocean seven times, went to Java many times, left many good 
stories that have still been told now. In the first half of the last century, during the 
struggle for national independence and racial liberation, Chinese people and 
Indonesian people always stood together, supported each other, encouraged each 
other, and jointly wrote splendid poetry about resistance to and attack on 
invaders. Fifty years ago, China, Indonesia, and some other Asian and African 
developing countries jointly established the Bandung spirit on the basis of 
peaceful coexistence and made it an internationally recognized basic principle for 
dealing with international relations, [which] made a historical contribution to 
enhancing solidarity and cooperation among developing countries. Both China 
and Indonesia as well as both countries’ people in the long-term historical 
development have established deep friendship, [which] has become valuable 
spiritual treasure shared mutually by both sides. 
Section 2: 
Talking about the 
development of both 
countries’ relations - 
specifying the historical 
relations between China 
and Indonesia , which 
may imply the superior 
status of Ancient China 
over the other countries in 
the neighborhood and 
emphasize the relations 
between both countries 
have turned equal in 
modern times 
Paragraph 3 
ঠቬᱟᴰᰙоѝഭᔪӔⲴഭᇦѻаǄ50ཊᒤᶕˈєഭޣ㌫ਆᗇҶ䮯䏣ਁኅǄ
൘єഭ᭯ᓌ઼Ӫ≁Ⲵޡ਼ࣚ࣋л ѝˈഭ઼ঠቬޣ㌫ᐢ㓿䘋ޕޘ䶒ਁኅⲴᯠᰦ
ᵏǄৼᯩ᭯⋫ӂؑнᯝ໎ᕪˈ㓿䍨ਸ֌ᡀ᷌ᯀ❦Ǆєഭ൘㜭Ⓚǃ䍴Ⓚᔰਁ઼
ส⹰䇮ᯭㅹ亶ฏ੟ࣘҶа㌫ࡇབྷරਸ֌亩ⴞˈ᧘ࣘҶৼ䗩㓿䍨ޣ㌫ਁኅˈ㔉
єഭӪ≁ᑖᶕҶ䎺ᶕ䎺ཊⲴᇎᜐǄєഭ൘᮷ॆǃᮉ㛢ǃছ⭏ǃ、ᢰㅹ亶ฏⲴ
ਸ֌нᯝ␡ॆˈ൘ഭ䱵઼ൠ४һ࣑ѝ؍ᤱ⵰ᇶ࠷Ⲵॿ䈳о䝽ਸǄ൘ঠቬӪ≁
䚝ਇⲴ䛓൪㖅㿱Ⲵൠ䴷⎧ந⚮䳮ѝˈѝഭ᭯ᓌ઼Ӫ≁ᝏ਼䓛ਇˈኅᔰҶᯠѝ
ഭশਢкᴰབྷ㿴⁑Ⲵሩཆᮁᨤ㹼ࣘˈփ⧠ҶѝഭӪ≁оঠቬӪ≁ӂᑞӂࣙǃ
਼㡏ޡ⍾Ⲵ␡ᛵ৊䈺Ǆ 
Indonesia is one of the countries that first established diplomatic relations with 
China. For more than fifty years, both countries’ relations have obtained 
Specifying the 
development of the 
relations between 
Indonesia and the 
People’s Republic of 
China – speaking of the 
cooperation between both 
countries in many aspects 
and emphasizing the 
PRC’s contribution to 
soothing Indonesia’s 
suffering from the 2004 
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development. With joint effort of both countries’ governments and peoples, the 
relations between China and Indonesia have entered a new era of full 
development. Both sides’ political mutual trust is continuously deepening, and 
economic and trade cooperation has achieved great results. Both countries, in the 
fields of energy, resource development and infrastructure, have launched a series 
of large-scale cooperation projects, [which] promotes the bilateral economic and 
trade relations development and brings both peoples more and more benefits. 
Both countries in the fields of culture, education, hygiene, and technology 
cooperate deeply, and in terms of international and regional affairs maintain close 
coordination and cooperation. During the rarely-seen earthquake-tsunami disaster 
that the Indonesia people suffered, China’s government and people felt the same 
and launched the largest foreign rescue aid in new China’s history, [which] 
shows mutual help and deep friendship between China’s and Indonesian people. 
Indian Ocean earthquake 
and tsunami 
Paragraph 4 
৫ᒤᱟѝঠቬޣ㌫ਢкާᴹ䟽㾱᜿ѹⲴаᒤǄ㜑䭖⏋ѫᑝо㣿㾯⍋ᙫ㔏ㆮ㖢
ҶޣҾᔪ・ѝঠቬᡈ⮕Չդޣ㌫Ⲵ㚄ਸᇓ䀰 Ӿˈᡈ⮕儈ᓖѪєഭޣ㌫Ⲵᵚᶕ
ਁኅᤷ᰾Ҷᯩੁˈᔰ੟Ҷৼ䗩ޣ㌫ањ፝ᯠⲴশਢᰦᵏǄ֌Ѫєњ䟽㾱Ⲵਁ
ኅѝഭᇦˈѝഭ਼ঠቬᔪ・Ⲵᡈ⮕Չդޣ㌫ˈᱟн㔃ⴏǃнሩᣇǃн䪸ሩԫ
օㅜйᯩⲴᯠරഭᇦޣ㌫ˈᇇᰘᱟ㔤ᣔц⭼઼ᒣǃ׳䘋ޡ਼ਁኅǄ൘ц⭼ཊ
ᶱॆ઼㓿⍾ޘ⨳ॆ䎻࣯␡ޕਁኅⲴᯠᖒ࣯л ѝˈഭ઼ঠቬᴹ⵰ᒯ⌋Ⲵޡ਼࡙
⳺ˈৼᯩਁኅᡈ⮕Չդޣ㌫ㅖਸєഭ઼єഭӪ≁Ⲵṩᵜ࡙⳺ˈᴹ࡙Ҿൠ४Ⲵ
઼ᒣǃっᇊоਁኅǄᡁ⴨ؑˈ൘ᡁԜৼᯩޡ਼ࣚ࣋лˈѝঠቬޣ㌫аᇊՊᴹ
ᴤ࣐㖾ྭⲴᵚᶕǄ 
Last year was in the history of the relations between China and Indonesia a 
highly significant year. President Hu Jintao and President Susilo signed a joint 
declaration concerning the establishment of the Sino-Indonesian strategic 
partnership, [which] from strategic height for the future of both countries’ 
relations clearly points out a direction and starts a brand-new historical period of 
the bilateral relations. As two important developing countries, the strategic 
partnership between China and Indonesia is a new type relation between 
countries, [which is] non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-targeting at any 
third party. The purpose is to maintain world peace and promote common 
development. Under the new circumstances of world multi-polarization and 
economic globalization that develop deeply, China and Indonesia share extensive 
mutual interests, and that both parties develop the strategic partnership meet the 
fundamental interests of both countries and both countries’ people, [which] is 
helpful to the regional peace, stability, and development. I believe with the joint 
efforts of our both parties, the China-Indonesian relations will have a better 
future. 
Specifying the latest 
strategic cooperation 
between both countries – 
pointing out the 
importance of the strategic 
partnership between both 
countries is to promote 
world peace and common 
prosperity 
 
141 
 
ྣ༛Ԝǃݸ⭏Ԝʽ 
Ladies and Gentlemen! 
Addressing the common 
audience – calling for 
attention from everyone 
present for the turn of the 
speech topic 
Paragraph 5 
ᡁԜ䎎䍿ঠቬ᭯ᓌ઼Ӫ≁䮯ᵏԕᶕ൘ਠ⒮䰞仈к㔉ҸѝഭⲴᇍ䍥᭟ᤱǄՇᡰ
ઘ⸕ˈਠ⒮ᱟѝഭ亶൏нਟ࠶ࢢⲴа䜘࠶ˈ䘉ᱟޣ㌫ࡠ 13ӯѝഭӪ≁≁᯿
ᝏᛵⲴ䟽བྷ᭿ᝏ䰞仈Ǆ 
We appreciate the Indonesian government and people’s long-term valuable 
support for China in terms of the Taiwan issue. Everyone knows Taiwan is an 
inseparable part of China’s territory. This is a major and sensitive issue 
concerning the national feelings of the 1.3 billion Chinese people. 
Section 3: 
Raising the topic of the 
Taiwan issue - giving 
thanks to Indonesia for the 
support of the Taiwan 
issue  
Paragraph 6 
৫ᒤԕᶕˈᡁԜ䟷ਆҶа㌫ࡇ〟ᶱ઼ᔪ䇮ᙗⲴѮ᧚ˈ᧘ࣘєየޣ㌫ᵍ⵰઼ᒣ
っᇊⲴᯩੁਁኅˈᗇࡠਠ⒮਼㜎Ⲵᒯ⌋䎎਼ˈҏਇࡠഭ䱵⽮ՊⲴᲞ䙽⅒䗾Ǆ
նᱟˈਠ⒮ᖃተ亭പඊᤱĀਠ⤜ā࠶㻲・൪ˈ࣐㍗ӾһĀਠ⤜ā࠶㻲⍫ࣘǄ
Ӻᒤԕᶕˈᴤᱟ࣐㍗䙊䗷Āᇚ᭯᭩䙐āˈമ䈻Āਠ⒮⌅⨶⤜・āǄ⢩࡛ᱟн
亮ዋ޵ཆⲴᕪ⛸৽ሩˈᕪ㹼㓸→Āഭ㔏Պā઼Āഭ㔏㓢亶āˈ䘉ᱟሩഭ䱵⽮
ՊᲞ䙽ඊᤱањѝഭ৏ࡉ઼ਠ⎧઼ᒣっᇊⲴѕ䟽᥁㹵Ǆ৽ሩĀਠ⤜ā࠶㻲࣯
࣋৺ަ⍫ࣘˈ㔤ᣔਠ⎧઼ᒣっᇊˈᱟᡁԜඊᇊн〫Ⲵ᜿ᘇ઼ߣᗳǄᡁԜሶ㔗
㔝ࣚ࣋ҹਆ઼ᒣ㔏аⲴࡽᲟˈն㔍нݱ䇨ᢺਠ⒮Ӿѝഭ࠶ࢢࠪ৫ǄĀਠ⤜”
࠶㻲࣯࣋Ⲵ㹼ᖴнӵᱟሩєየޣ㌫Ⲵޜ❦᥁㹵 ҏˈⴤ᧕ေ㛱ࡠӊཚൠ४Ⲵ઼
ᒣоっᇊǄ൘䘉а䟽བྷ䰞仈кˈᡁԜᐼᵋঠቬ਴⭼ᴻ৻਼ᡁԜа䚃ˈޡ਼৽
ሩĀਠ⤜āˈޡ਼㔤ᣔᵜൠ४Ⲵ઼ᒣоᆹᆱǄ 
Since last year, we have adopted a series of active and constructive measures to 
move the cross-strait relations towards peace and stability, [which] wins 
Taiwanese compatriots’ extensive agreement and is widely welcomed by the 
international community. However, Taiwan’s authorities stubbornly insist on 
‘Taiwan independence’ separatist stance, step up doing ‘Taiwan independence’ 
separatist activities. Since this year, [ ] even stepped up passing ‘the 
constitutional reform’, attempting to achieve ‘Taiwan legal independence’. In 
particular, [ ] disregarded the strong opposition inside and outside the island, 
forcibly terminated the ‘National Unification Council’ and the ‘National 
Unification Guidelines'. This is a severe provocation to the one China principle 
widely held by the international community and to the peace and stability across 
the Taiwan Strait. Opposing ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and [their] 
activities and maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is our firm 
will and determination. We will keep working hard for the prospect of peaceful 
Reiterating the PRC’s 
stance on the One China 
policy and appealing for 
Indonesia’s support – 
specifying the PRC’s 
opposition to the recent 
Taiwan independence 
activities and emphasizing 
the Taiwan issue is key to 
the peace in the Pacific 
Asia area 
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unification but never allow Taiwan to be separated from China. The ‘Taiwan 
independence’ separatist forces’ actions are not only openly provocative to 
cross-strait relations but also directly threatening the peace and stability of the 
Asia Pacific region. In terms of this important issue, we hope Indonesian friends 
of every circle with us jointly oppose ‘Taiwan independence’ and jointly 
maintain the peace and quiet of this region. 
ྣ༛Ԝǃݸ⭏Ԝʽ 
Ladies and Gentlemen! 
Addressing the common 
audience 
Paragraph 7 
ඊᤱ઼ᒣਁኅⲴ䚃䐟ˈᱟѝഭӪ≁ඊᇊн〫Ⲵ䘹ᤙǄᰐ䇪ᱟ≹ୀᰦᵏᔰ䗏䙊
ᖰ㾯ฏⲴĀэ㔨ѻ䐟āˈ䘈ᱟ᰾ᵍ㪇਽㡚⎧ᇦ䜁઼гл㾯⌻ˈ㔉ᴹޣഭᇦ઼
Ӫ≁ᑖ৫Ⲵ䜭ᱟ࣐ᕪӔ⍱оਸ֌Ⲵ䈊᜿ˈՐ䙂Ⲵ䜭ᱟ໎䘋৻ྭᛵ䈺Ⲵᗳ༠Ǆ
ѝഭӪ≁␡࡫䇔䇶ࡠˈਚᴹ䙊䗷઼ᒣᯩᔿᇎ⧠Ⲵਁኅ᡽ᱟᤱѵⲴǃ⢒䶐Ⲵਁ
ኅˈҏ᡽ᱟᰒᴹ࡙ҾѝഭӪ≁ҏᴹ࡙Ҿц⭼਴ഭӪ≁ⲴਁኅǄѝഭሶ࿻㓸儈
Ѯ઼ᒣǃਁኅǃਸ֌Ⲵᰇᑌˈ࿻㓸ཹ㹼⤜・㠚ѫⲴ઼ᒣཆӔ᭯ㆆˈඊᇊн〫
ൠ䎠઼ᒣਁኅ䚃䐟ǄѝഭⲴਁኅнՊ࿘⺽ԫօӪˈҏнՊေ㛱ԫօӪˈਚՊ
ᴹ࡙Ҿц⭼Ⲵ઼ᒣっᇊǃޡ਼㑱㦓Ǆ 
Insisting on the peaceful development road is Chinese people’s unswerving 
choice. Either the ‘silk road’ pioneered and led to Xiyu (the Western Regions) 
during the periods of Han China and Tang China or the Ming China’s famous 
voyager Zheng He’s seven voyages to the Western Ocean brought the countries 
and peoples concerned the sincerity in enhancing exchange and cooperation and 
communicated thoughts of promoting good-willed friendship. Chinese people 
deeply realize that only the development realized through peaceful means is 
lasting and firm development, is also the development that benefit not only 
Chinese people but also the development of the world countries’ peoples. China 
will always hold high the flag of peace, development and cooperation, always 
adopt independent peaceful diplomatic policies, and firmly walk on the road of 
peaceful development. China’s development will not impede anyone, not threaten 
anyone, only benefit world peace, stability, and common prosperity. 
Section 4: 
Reiterating the PRC’s 
diplomatic policy of 
peaceful development – 
emphasizing the policy of 
peaceful development has 
been followed by China 
since ancient times and 
reassuring the PRC would 
not be a hegemon to the 
world 
ྣ༛Ԝǃݸ⭏Ԝʽ 
Ladies and Gentlemen! 
Addressing the common 
audience 
Paragraph 8 
ѝഭоঠቬᱟӊ⍢єњ䟽㾱ⲴਁኅѝഭᇦǄ㲭❦ᡁԜ⴨䳄䚕䘌ˈն⎙♊Ⲵ⎧
⌻䱫ᥑнҶᡁԜⲴ৻ྭӔᖰǄ↓ྲঠቬᴻ৻൘ⅼѝᡰୡⲴ˖Ā㲭❦ᡁԜ⴨䳄
з≤ॳኡˈਟᱟᡁԜⲴᗳ㍗㍗⴨䘎ǄӾ䳵࣐䗮ࡠेӜˈа䐟ᛐᢜⲴⅼ༠ˈⅼ
亲ᡁԜєഭӪ≁ྲݴᕏа㡜ǄāᱟⲴˈޡ਼ⲴⴞḷᢺᡁԜ㚄㔃൘а䎧ˈޡ਼
Ⲵ᥁ᡈ䴰㾱ᡁԜഒ㔃൘а䎧Ǆ䇙ᡁԜᩪ䎧᡻ᶕˈѪӊ⍢Ⲵ઼ᒣоਁኅˈѪᔪ
䇮ањᤱѵ઼ᒣǃޡ਼㑱㦓Ⲵ઼䉀ц⭼㘼ཻࣚ࣋ᯇʽ 䉒䉒བྷᇦǄ 
Section 5: 
Conclusion – emphasizing 
the close relations 
between and the mutual 
goals of China and 
Indonesia 
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China and Indonesia are in Asia two important developing countries. Although 
we are far apart, the vast ocean cannot stop our friendly relations. Just as 
Indonesian friends sing in a song, ‘Although we are separated by ten thousands 
of waters and thousands of mountains, however our hearts are connected closely. 
From Jakarta to Beijing, the heavenly singing voice all the way praises our two 
countries’ peoples are like brothers’. Yes, the common goals connect us. The 
common challenges require us to be united. Let’s hand in hand, for the peace and 
development of Asia, for constructing a peace-lasting, commonly-prosperous 
harmonious world, work hard! Thank all of you. 
 
3.3.2.5 Speech 5 (T) by Annette Lu 
 
Speech 5(T): Annette Lu’s speech themed ‘New Century, New Thinking, and New 
Cross-Strait Arrangement’ broadcast on the Voice of America, 1 October 
20029  
            Character Count: Original 4,370, edited down to 2,151  
                          (punctuation  marks  included)  
            Length:  14.05  min 
            Speaker: Annette Lu, Vice President of the Republic of China (ROC) from 
 2000 to 2008 
 
 Several paragraphs of the speech are omitted, which detail the difference between China 
and Taiwan in economy, culture, and politics. Although these paragraphs concern the 
cross-strait issues, removing them from the original speech may greatly reduce SI difficulties 
and  the  experiment  duration  without  changing  Lu’s  original  tone  and  style  as  well  as  Lu’s  
appeal for new cross-strait relations. It should be noted that despite her outspokenness, Lu is 
very careful in her wording of the relations between Taiwan and China. Throughout this 
speech, she always says ‘Li΁ng àn ٿ۞(literally two sides [of the Taiwan Strait]’ to refer to 
both Taiwan and China instead of ‘Liang Guo ٿ୯ (literally two countries/nations)’. ‘Li΁ng 
àn ٿ۞’ may be a noun phrase widely translated into ‘both sides’ or ‘both parties’ or an 
                                               
9 Retrieved 9 September 2006 from the website of the Office of the President, Republic of China  
  (Taiwan) at http://www.president.gov.tw. 
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adjective rendered into ‘cross-strait’. By using the term ‘both sides’ instead of ‘both 
countries’, Lu may assert the status of Taiwan in an implicit manner. Although the Mandarin 
title  of  this  speech  uses  the  word  ‘interview’,  Lu  is  actually  giving  a  speech  on  the  radio  
without being interrupted by questions. Therefore, the genre of this speech is not a radio 
interview as widely perceived in the West but a speech on the radio appealing for new and 
peaceful relations between Taiwan and China. The macro- and mesostructure of this abridged 
speech is analyzed in the following table 10. 
 
Table 10 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 5 (T) 
 Macro- and mesostructure 
Taipei, 1 October 2002 Place and date 
ཥШइΆཥࡘᆢΆཥٿ۞թֽ 
ୋᕴ಍ௗڙȨऍ୯ϐॣȩ૶ޣੇᔱ஑ೖ 
Vice-President [Annette Lu] was given an interview themed ‘New century, new 
thinking, and new cross-strait arrangement’ by Haitao, reporter of the Voice of 
America.    
Peace speech 
(sub)genre 
ӚՏύ୯εഌޑ᠋౲ܻ϶ӳǼ 
Hello, all the listeners of the Chinese mainland! 
Addressing the Chinese 
mainland’s audience   
Paragraph 1 
ϞϺࢂύ๮Γ҇Ӆک୯ޑ୯ቼВǴགྷѸᖐ୯ប៿Ǵሹ҇ӕቼǶ႖๱Ѡ᡼ੇ৙Ǵ
೸ၸऍ୯ϐॣޑቶኞǴҁΓ੝Ԝж߄Ѡ᡼Γ҇ӕҙઔລǴઔ຦୯୯ၮܱໜǼ
ύ๮Γ҇Ӆک୯ԾԋҥϖΜΟԃٰǴӭБय़೿Ԗߏىޑว৖ᆶ຾؁Ǵ੝ձࢂ
ӧၸѐΒΜԃޑׯॠ໒ܫࡹ฼ΠǴ࿶ᔮǵࡌ೛کᡏػ฻฻ԋ݀ςڙډᖐШޑ
ᢋҞǶ႖ੇޑѠ᡼Γ҇Ψ኷ـύ୯ޑ຾؁ᕷᄪǶ΋ԭӭԃ߻ύ୯ႫڙϣኁѦ
஻ᆶϺؠΓᅾϐधǴ٬ύ୯Γుག਋שǶϞϺǴύ୯೴ᅌو΢൤மϐၡǴΓ
҇ғࢲВ੻ׯ๓Ǵ୯ሞӦՏВ੻ගϲǴ೭ࢂύ୯ࡹ۬ᆶΓ҇ᖑٌᏟରޑԋ
݀ǴзΓ෕ٵǶ 
Today is the People’s Republic of China’s national day. [I] think the whole 
country must be happy and billions of people must be celebrating [the day]. 
Across the Taiwan Strait, over the broadcast of the Voice of America, I 
particularly would like to, on behalf of Taiwan’s people, extend congratulations 
and wish your esteemed country prosperity! Since the People’s Republic of 
China was established more than fifty-three years ago, many aspects have seen 
much development and progress. In particular, under the past-twenty-year’s 
Section 1: 
Congratulations on the 
PRC’s national day  – 
praising the PRC’s 
achievements since its 
establishment in 1949 
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reform and open-up policy, the achievements in economy, construction, and 
sports have drawn international attention. Taiwan’s people on the other side of 
the Strait are also glad to see China’s progress and prosperity. More than one 
hundred years ago, China suffered internal revolt, foreign invasion, natural 
disasters, and man-made calamities, [which] deeply frustrated Chinese people. 
Today, China is gradually walking on a path towards prosperity and strength, the 
life of people is being improved, and the international status is being raised. This 
is the result of the hard work of the Chinese government and people. It is 
admiring. 
Paragraph 2 
ҁΓନΑा႖ੇӛӚՏၰລѦǴΨགྷӧ೭္ගр΋٤ය೚ᆶࡌ᝼ǶҁΓᇡ
ࣁǴύ๮Γ҇Ӆک୯բࣁ΋ঁε୯Ǵӧቼઔࡌ୯इۺВਔǴί࿤όૈᒪבբ
ࣁε୯ޑೢҺᆶ॥ጄǴᔈࣁ٥ϼӦ୔ޑکѳᆶ຾؁଺рଅ᝘ǴЀځࢂǴѠੇ
ٿ۞Ոྍ࣬ӕǴࡽࢂᇻᒃǴΨࢂ߈ᎃǴᚈБόᔈݓΚ࣬ӛǴԶᔈکѳӅೀǴ
ӝբϩ٦Ƕ 
I, in addition to congratulations to everyone across the Strait, would also like to 
offer some expectations and suggestions. I think the People's Republic of China 
as a big country, while celebrating the national day, must not forget a big 
country’s responsibility and manner and should make contribution to peace and 
progress of the Asia Pacific area. Particularly, both sides across the Taiwan Strait 
are of the same blood, are not only distant relatives but also near neighbors. Both 
sides should not fight against each other by force but coexist peacefully and 
cooperate and share [with each other]. 
Offering her suggestions 
to the PRC – pointing out 
the peace across the 
Taiwan Strait is down to 
the PRC.  
Paragraph 3 
΋ޔаٰǴч٧ࡹ۬Ь஭Ѡ᡼Ѹ໪ௗڙȨ΋ঁύ୯ȩচ߾Ǵ٠୲࡭Ѡ᡼ࢂύ
୯ޑ΋೽ϩǴԶύ๮Γ҇Ӆک୯ωૈж߄ύ୯Ǵ೭ࢂѠ᡼Γ҇܌όૈௗڙǴ
ΨࢂҞ߻ٿ۞ᜢ߯ว৖คݤ҅தϯޑനεምᛖǶ౲܌ࣣޕǴύ๮Γ҇Ӆک୯
Ծவ΋ΐѤΐԃࡌҥаٰǴவ҂මӧѠ᡼Չ٬ၸҺՖԖਏЬ៾ǴԶύ๮҇୯
ӧѠ᡼ԖԾρޑࡹ۬ǵβӦکΓ҇ǴٿᜐϕόᗧឦǴӚՉځࢂςԖъШइϐ
ΦǴ೭ࢂόݾޑ٣ჴǶҁΓᇡࣁǴٿ۞ޑᜢ߯ᔈჴ٣؃ࢂǴԶЪଯᘳᇻᢋǴ
ωૈᕇளӝ౛ޑว৖ǶाѠ᡼ௗڙȨ΋ঁύ୯ȩǴ฻ܭाѠ᡼ӄय़׫फ़Ǵ੿
ࢂமΓ܌ᜤǶ 
For a long time, Beijing government has maintained that Taiwan must accept the 
‘One China’ principle and insisted that Taiwan is part of China and only the 
People’s Republic of China can represent China. This is what Taiwan’s people 
cannot accept and is also at present the biggest obstacle to the normalization of 
the cross-strait relations. Everyone knows that the People’s Republic of China, 
since in 1949 [it] was established, has never exercised in Taiwan any effective 
sovereignty, and the Republic of China in Taiwan has [its] own government, 
Section 2: 
Pointing out the 
infeasibility of the One 
China policy – specifying 
Taiwan’s autonomous 
reality  
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land, and people. Both sides do not belong to each other and have developed 
self-autonomy for half a century. This is an undisputed fact. I think the 
cross-strait relations should be based on facts and look beyond in order to obtain 
reasonable development. Asking Taiwan to accept ‘One China’ equals asking 
Taiwan to fully surrender, [which] is against peope’s will. 
Paragraph 4 
Ѡੇٿ۞سрӕྍǴՠࣁՖч٧ޑࡹ៾ၟѠчޑࡹ៾ӧࡹݯ΢ӵԜ੄෭ϩ
ܴǴࣗԿᆙ஭ჹҥǻচӢӧܭٿ۞ࡹ۬ჹܭΓ៾ǵ҇ЬکԾҗ฻ሽॶᢀֹӄ
όӕ܌ठǶӧѠ᡼ΓΓԖࡘགྷǵقፕǵے௲ک໣཮่ޗޑԾҗǴࡹ۬ჹҺՖ
΋ঁΓޑғԴੰԝǴѸ໪๓ᅰྣ៝ϐೢǴҺՖΓӢࡹ۬ό྽Չ٬Ϧ៾ΚԶᎁ
ڙཞ্Ǵ୯ৎѸ໪ॄଆ፝ᓭೢҺǶΓ҇ωࢂ୯ৎޑЬΓǴคፕύѧ܈ӦБࡹ
۬ޑ२ߏǴ೿ࢂҗΓ҇ᒧᖐрٰǴ଺όӳǴΓ҇൩཮ӧΠԛᒧᖐᡣдΠᆵǶ
଺όჹǴᗋԖݤࡓჹдڋຊǶፎୢǴύ୯εഌࢂόࢂ೭ኬګǻҗܭΓЎሽॶ
ޑਸ౦Ǵω཮р౜ч٧کѠчٿঁᄒฅόӕޑࡹ៾ǴᏃᆅ࿶ᔮճ੻࣬ӕǴՠ
ӧٿ۞ΓЎሽॶᖿܭ΋ठа߻Ǵ୽ፋࡹݯ಍ӝࢂόϪჴሞޑǴԶЪᆶΓ܄ޑ
ሡ؃ङၰԶႭǶ 
Both sides across the Taiwan Strait are of the same origin, but why are the 
Beijing regime and the Taipei regime so clearly different in politics or are even 
[full of] tension and confrontation? The reason is that both governments in terms 
of the values [such as] human rights, democracy, and freedom have completely 
different [values]. In Taiwan everyone has freedom of thought, speech, religion, 
assembly and association. The government must take good care of everyone from 
birth to death. If anyone suffers damage caused by improper use of public power, 
the country must bear the responsibility of compensation. The people are the 
master of the country. Whether central or local government leaders are elected by 
the people. If [ ] does not perform well, the people will let him step down in the 
next election. If [ ] does something wrong, there are laws punishing him. [I] 
would like to ask: is it the same in the Chinese mainland? The differences in 
human values result in the existence of Beijing government and the Taipei 
government that are totally different [from each other]. Although the economic 
interests are the same, however before both sides share the same human values, 
talking about political unification is unrealistic and runs in the direction opposite 
to human needs. 
Pointing out the political 
difference between 
Taiwan and China – 
specifying Taiwan’s 
democratic system and the 
unrealistic idea of 
Taiwan’s unification with 
communist China 
Paragraph 5 
җܭч٧ޑค௃ѺᓸǴѠ᡼ֹӄ೏௨ନӧ୯ሞᆸѠǴ೭ࢂѠ᡼Γനགډόᅈ
ޑ٣Ƕࡐӭ୯ৎҁٰ೿ᜫཀၟךॺࡌҬǴࠅӢύ୯ޑѺᓸԶόඪ܍ᇡύ๮҇
୯ǶЀځӧᖄӝ୯Ǵύ๮҇୯ࢂബۈ཮঩୯ǴΨࢂӼ౛཮தҺ౛٣୯Ǵՠ΋
ΐΎ΋ԃଆ೏ύ๮Γ҇Ӆک୯ڗжǴவԜч٧྽ֽӆΨόᡣѠ᡼ୖуᖄӝ
୯Ǵӧ܌Ԗ୯ሞ൑ӝჹѠ᡼ཱུᅰߔᘋ߬ଋϐૈ٣Ƕᖄӝ୯ޑԋҥےԑࢂ཮ᝤ
Section 3: 
Accusing the PRC of 
bullying Taiwan – 
specifying why Taiwan 
cannot join the United 
Nations 
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දၹϯচ߾ǴՠࠅᐱᐱஒѠ᡼௨ନӧѦǴόࢂӢࣁѠ᡼ό୼ӳǴԶࢂӢࣁч
٧ѺᓸǶፎ ǴୢύӅࡹ۬ӵԜුॄѠ᡼ǴћѠ᡼Γ҇Ξ࡛ኬૈ୼഻៿ύ୯ګǻ 
Due to Beijing’s ruthless suppression, Taiwan is completely excluded from the 
international stage. This is what Taiwan’s people are most dissatisfied with. 
Many countries originally would like to establish diplomatic relations with us, 
but because of China’s suppression dare not recognize the Republic of China 
(ROC). Particularly in the United Nations, the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan) 
was one of the founding member states and one of the permanent members of the 
UN Security Council. But since 1971 [the ROC] has been replaced by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and since then Beijing authorities have never 
let Taiwan join the UN, has blocked and insulted Taiwan on all international 
occasions. The founding philosophy of the United Nations is the principle of 
universality of membership but [the UN] only excludes Taiwan. [It’s] not 
because Taiwan is not good enough but because of Beijing’s suppression. [I] 
would like to ask: the Chinese communist government bullies Taiwan so much, 
how can Taiwan’s people like China? 
Paragraph 6 
ᗨฅךॺЬ஭ύ๮҇୯όᗧឦܭύ๮Γ҇Ӆک୯Ǵՠךॺᇡࣁٿ۞Γ҇ό໻
คঌคϜԶЪёа϶ӳӝբǶᒿ๱ٿ۞ҬࢬǴ߈ԃٰѠ୘຾Εύ୯εഌޑ׫
ၗሦୱനӭΨനቶǶѠ୘ό໻๏ύ୯ബ೷൩཰ᐒ཮کѦ༊ӸۭǴΨ஥ѐמೌ
ᆶᆅ౛Ǵ೭ࢂ߈ԃٰύ୯εഌ࿶ᔮૈ୼ᕷᄪޑख़ा୏ΚǶό໻໺಍ౢ཰ǴѠ
୘Ψᑈཱུӧύ୯εഌ׫ၗଯࣽמǴаᑈᡏႝၡౢ཰ࣁٯǴ೭ٿԃύ୯εഌς
ԋࣁӄౚಃΟεౢࠔрα୯Ǵठ٬Ѡ᡼җচٰޑಃΟӜफ़ࣁಃѤӜǴՠࢂգ
ॺޕၰ༏ǻεഌᑈᡏႝၡޑᕴౢॶԭϩϐΎΜࢂҗѠ୘܌ғౢޑǴѠ᡼ჹύ
୯όᘐᒡΕၗߎǵמೌᆶᆅ౛Ǵ೷൩Αύ୯࿶ᔮޑזೲԋߏᆶࠔ፦ගϲǶѠ
᡼Γᆃᅰ܌ૈڐշգॺǴԶգॺࠅӧ୯ሞ΢ೀೀ࠾ఠǵѺᓸǴ٠ᑈཱུӧܿࠄ
ݮੇ೽࿿०ቸǴࡤᓵᆶ࠶ુѠ᡼ǶӵԜৱஒϜൔǴፎୢǴѠ᡼ΓբՖགགྷǻ
ԖՈ܄ԖؼЈޑύ୯εഌޑܻ϶ॺΞբՖགགྷǻ 
Although we maintain that the Republic of China (ROC) does not belong to the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), we consider that both sides’ people not only 
have no hatred [towards each other] but also can be friendly and cooperate [with 
each other]. With the cross-strait exchanges, in recent years Taiwan’s 
businessmen have made the largest and most extensive investments in the 
Chinese mainland. Taiwan’s businessmen have not only created job opportunities 
and foreign reserve for China but also brought techniques and management. This 
is an important driving force for recent-year Chinese mainland’s economy’s 
prosperity. In addition to traditional industry, Taiwan’s businessmen also actively 
in the Chinese mainland invest in high technology. Take integrated circuits 
industry for example. In recent two years the Chinese mainland has become the 
Appealing for Chinese 
people’s conscience - 
specifying Taiwan’s 
economic contribution to 
China while accusing 
China’s bully behavior 
towards Taiwan  
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third largest exporting country globally, making Taiwan's ranking down from the 
original third to the fourth. But do you know [that]? Seventy percent of the gross 
output of the Chinese mainland’s integrated circuits is produced by Taiwan’s 
businessmen. Taiwan keeps importing capital, technology, and management into 
China, contributing to China's fast economic growth and quality improvement. 
Taiwan’s people try the best to help you, whereas you internationally keep 
blocking and suppressing [Taiwan], and actively along the southeastern coastline 
deploy missiles to intimidate and threaten Taiwan. Such behavior of returning 
evil for good. [I] would like to ask: How do Taiwan’s people feel? How do the 
Chinese mainland’s friends who have uprightness and conscience feel? 
Paragraph 7 
๱Ӝޑч٧ޗࣽଣ୯௃ࣴزύЈЬҺच᎟ᒳ௲௤ࡰрǴ྽߻ύ୯εഌ٣ჴ΢
ςϩԋѤঁШࣚǺಃ΋Шࣚ-΢ੇǵч٧ᆶుӥǹಃΒШࣚ-Ϻࢭǵቶܿǵੈ
ԢکԢ᝵ǹಃΟШࣚ-ύ฻ԏΕӦ୔ǹಃѤШࣚ-೦֚Ӧ୔ǶᢀჸৎႣෳǴᒿ
๱ύӅуΕШࣚຩܰಔᙃȐWTOȑǴ೦൤ৡຯ཮ᝩុᘉεǴࠤໂৡຯǵޕ
᛽ৡຯΨஒᝩុᘉεǶ 
Famous director of the Social Survey Center, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, Professor Hu Angang, points out that at present the Chinese mainland 
in fact has been divided into four worlds: First World – Shanghai, Beijing and 
Shenzhen; Second World – Tianjing, Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu; Third 
World – middle income areas; Forth World – poor areas. Observers estimate that 
with Chinese Communist Party’s entry to the WTO, the wealth gap will keep 
widening. The gap between urban and rural areas and the knowledge gap will 
keep widening too. 
Section 4: 
Pointing out China’s own 
domestic problems - 
specifying the widening 
wealth gap in China 
Paragraph 8 
྽΋ঁ୯ৎ׎ԋѤঁϺᝆϐձޑШࣚਔǴୢᚒჴςډΑόૈόᝄ๘य़ჹޑӦ
؁ǶᐕўࡰрǴᝄख़ޑ೦൤ᝌਸ۳۳Ꮴठࡹݯ୏ᕏǴԶ΋ѿୢᚒᛈวǴό໻
ύ୯ޑԭۉڙधڙᜤǴڬᜐхࡴѠ᡼ӧϣޑ୯ৎ೿ाᎁࢢǶҗԜٰ࣮Ǵч٧
྽୍ϐ࡚ᔈӧܭӵՖ෧եैഢႣᆉǴቚуޗ཮ᅽճᆶ௲ػ࿶຤Ǵ٠ӳӳճҔ
ٿ۞ޑϕշӝբǴගܹ୯ৎғౢΚǴബ೷׳ӭޑ൩཰ᐒ཮ǴԶߚጁծᢚݓǴ
ᘉкैഢǴᏵ୯ሞᢀჸৎࡰрǴч٧ന߈൳ԃ؂ԃ޸ӧ୯ٛݓᏔޑ຤Ҕऊӧ
ϖǵϤԭሹऍߎǶགྷགྷ࣮Ǵٗ٤ᒲӵ݀޸ӧΓ҇ޑғࢲکӦБࡌ೛Ǵଁό׳
ૈᅽ୯ճ҇ǻѤԭݍ०ቸ܌޸ޑᒲӵ݀ҔӧදϷΓ҇௲ػǴׯ๓ᙴᕍፁғǴ
࣬ߞύ୯εഌޑΓ҇ᔈ၀׳ࣁགᐟǶ 
When a country becomes four totally different worlds, the problem actually has 
reached a degree that [the problem] needs to be seriously taken. History points 
out that a serious wealth gap usually leads to political unrest. And once the 
problem explodes, not only will China’s people suffer but also the neighboring 
countries including Taiwan will suffer. Accordingly, Beijing’s urgent priority 
Pointing out China’s 
priority should be to solve 
its domestic problems 
instead of bullying 
Taiwan 
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should be how to reduce military budget, increase social welfare and education 
expenses, make good use of cross-strait mutual help and cooperation, enhance 
national productivity, and create more job opportunities rather than engage in 
military aggression and expand weaponry. According to international observers, 
Beijing in recent years spent about fifty to sixty billion U.S. dollars each year on 
defense weaponry. Think about it. If the money had been spent on people’s life 
and local infrastructure, wouldn’t [it] have brought welfare to the country and 
benefited people? If the money that was spent on the four hundred missiles had 
been used to provide education for people and improve medical care and hygiene, 
[I] believe the Chinese mainland’s people would have been more grateful. 
Paragraph 9 
ԾϦϡ 2000ԃ 5Д 20ВаٰǴഋНࡧᕴ಍මӭԛჹч٧ࡹ۬߄ၲ๓ཀᆶख़
௴ڐ୘εߐޑ၈ཀǴёெԿϞч٧྽ֽϝόᜫय़ჹ౜ჴǴࣗԿᡂҁу቉Ӧჹ
Ѡ᡼ޑ୯ሞғӸޜ໔ཱུᅰѺᓸᆶ࠾ఠϐૈ٣ǴӕਔǴΨόᘐӦаȨ΋ঁύ୯ȩ
ࣁ߻ගǴٰ݆လٿ۞ޑڐ୘Ǵᇙ೷ٿ۞Γ҇ҬࢬޑၡምǴзΓᒪᏬǶ 
Since May twentieth two thousand, President Chen Shui-bian for many times has 
showed the Beijing government good will and sincerity to reopen the gate of 
negotiation. Regrettably so far the Beijing authorities have still been reluctant to 
face the reality and even stepped up efforts to oppress and block Taiwan’s 
international survival space, and at the same time continue to boycott cross-strait 
negotiations on the ‘one China’ premise and produce barriers to exchanges 
between both sides’ peoples. [It is] regrettable. 
Section 5: 
Accusing China of 
bullying Taiwan under the 
One China policy – 
specifying China’s refusal 
to negotiate with Taiwan 
Paragraph 10 
ཥШइς࿶ډٰǶᘳఈ҂ٰǴΓ៾ǵ҇ЬǵکѳǵངЈᆶࣽמว৖ჴࣁ 21
ШइޑදШሽॶǴٿ۞ࡹ۬ϷΓ҇֡ᔈၢಥᐕўணՀǴҔ჻ཥޑࡘᆢǴܫ౳
ϺΠǴҥى٥ϼǴӅӕթࡌٿ۞ӅӸӅᄪᆶ҉ុว৖ޑཥֽǶ 
A new century has arrived. Looking into the future, human rights, democracy, 
peace, love, and technological development indeed will be the twenty-first 
century’s universal values. Both sides’ governments and peoples should jump 
beyond historically set patterns, use brand-new thinking, take a broad view at the 
world, stand firm in the Asia Pacific area, and jointly develop a new situation of 
both sides’ mutual prosperity and sustainable development. 
Section 6: 
Conclusion – hoping for 
the breakthrough in future 
cross-strait relations 
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3.3.2.6 A comparison of source speeches 
 
 The analysis of the genre and structure of the five source speeches shows that there are 
some differences between the speeches given by Chinese politician (or ‘China speeches’ in 
this section) and those by Taiwanese politicians (or ‘Taiwan speeches in this section): 
(1) Register: China speeches are in a formal register while Taiwan speeches are in a less 
formal register and use more emotional phrases.  
(2) Tone: Generally Taiwan’s speakers adopt a more humble position than China’s speakers 
when addressing audience. For instance, Annette Lu uses interrogative sentences and 
subjunctive mood in her speech to appeal for the audience’s identification in a less direct 
manner, while Chen tries connecting Taiwan with Nauru by listing the similarities of both 
countries. By contrast, China’s speakers may sound dogmatic or even hegemonic. For 
instance, the main theme of Hu Jintao’s speech is not to mark the 60th anniversary of the 
Chinese Anti-Japanese War but to arouse Chinese patriotism, consolidate Chinese people 
and urge Chinese people to oppose Taiwan independence. In Jia Qinglin’s speech, which 
addresses Indonesian audience in Speech 4 (C), China sounds like a big brother in Asia – 
from ancient times till nowadays China has been the main leader and helper to most of its 
neighboring countries. 
(3) Content: As shown in China’s speeches, ‘history’ plays an important part. China’s 
politicians seem to be proud of China’s long history and of continuing ancient China’s 
glory and leading status. By contrast, Taiwan’s speakers mainly focus on current 
situations. 
(4) Must-say parts: In China’s speeches there seems to be a ‘rule’: the One China policy must 
be reiterated regardless of the identity of audience and the speech occasion. By contrast, 
Taiwan’s speeches are more topic-oriented and the Taiwan issue is not necessarily an 
important or indispensible part. 
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There are also some similarities among the five source speeches, but most of them are 
derived from linguistic features of Mandarin Chinese. For instance, there are not very clear 
boundaries between sentences. In many sentences, the subject and/or the object are not 
specified. The possessive use is not common in these speeches. By using the five speeches 
which are of different topics and were originally given on different occasions and to different 
audience, the present study may prevent the interpreter subjects from knowing the actual 
research focus and thus producing unnatural response on purpose. Yet, there are still 
intertextual relationships among these five source speeches; regardless of the main topics, 
these speeches involve the One China ideology or the Taiwan independence issue. Therefore, 
these source texts should be suitable for this study, which aims to investigate whether the 
Chinese subjects may demonstrate their hegemonic thinking, particularly the One China 
ideology, in their renditions and whether the Taiwanese subjects may show resistance to such 
hegemonic thinking. 
  
3.4 Survey Questionnaires 
 
 To investigate whether there is a link between one’s political ideologies and one’s 
attitude towards the content of the source speeches, four kinds of questionnaires are applied in 
the experiment at different stages. The information obtained in the surveys may serve as 
reference for confirming existence of ideological signs in the CDA analysis process. 
Questions that are irrelevant to the research focus are dotted through all of the questionnaires 
except the national identity scale questionnaire in order to prevent the subjects from detecting 
the actual research focus and producing purposeful answers that they consider the researcher 
might prefer. As for the presentation of the results of each questionnaire, only the results 
relevant to the research focus are to be displayed in the main text of the present study. 
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3.4.1 Student interpreter background questionnaire 
 
 The student interpreter background questionnaire includes 22 items divided into three 
parts, which are explained below: 
Part I items: concerning the general and language background of the subjects. The most 
important focus is to investigate the nationality and the native language of the 
subjects. Since the research focus is on the power struggle between Taiwan and 
China,  the  subjects  should  come  from  either  Taiwan  or  China.  Also,  as  the  
experiment involves simultaneous interpreting from Mandarin to English, it is 
important to make sure that the subjects are native or near-native Mandarin 
speakers and have no difficulty comprehending the source texts used in the 
experiment. 
Part II items: concerning educational background and work experience, mainly used to 
investigate the homogeneity of the subjects as novice interpreters. In other words, 
if all or most of the subjects are novice interpreters, the level of accuracy of their 
interpreting renditions and the way the subjects deal with simultaneous 
interpreting should be similar.  
Part III items: concerning political and social participation, which mainly investigates how 
much the subjects are concerned about international affairs and the affairs related 
to Taiwan and China (also described as cross-strait affairs), whether the subjects 
are political party members, and what attitude they hold towards the future 
relations  between  Taiwan  and  China.  It  is  likely  that  if  the  subjects  pay  much  
attention to cross-strait affairs, they may have a better understanding of the 
source political texts used in the experiment. Also, one’s party membership and 
attitude towards Taiwan-China future relations may indicate the level of her 
involvement in politics. 
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 Item C-6, which concerns the subjects’ attitude towards Taiwan-China future relations, 
will serve as one of the references for determining whether one’s ideological signs in 
simultaneous renditions are signs of hegemony or resistance. According to the literature 
review in Chapters 2.3.3.3, 2.4 and 2.5, it may be possible that if the subjects are dissatisfied 
with the status quo of the relations between Taiwan and China (for example, when a 
Taiwanese student interpreter hopes for ‘independence’ of Taiwan in the future, or when a 
Chinese student interpreter favors ‘unification’ of China and Taiwan), they may have negative 
feelings or reaction towards something against their political ideology and the negative 
feelings may contribute to signs of hegemony or resistance in their simultaneous rendering of 
the source speeches used in the experiment. For a complete version of the questionnaire, see 
Appendix A. 
 
3.4.2 Retrospective questionnaire 
 
 The retrospective questionnaire, consisting of 16 items, is used after each of the six 
rendering sessions. Apart from the first source speech, which is divided into two interpreting 
sessions, the other four source speeches are on a one-speech-one-session basis. The first four 
items investigate whether the speech rate is appropriate for interpreting and whether the 
subjects have difficulty understanding the source text. Item 13 and 14 are the main focus of 
the retrospective questionnaire, both of which are meant to obtain the subjects’ opinions about 
the source text they have just interpreted. More specifically, these two items investigate 
whether the subjects agree or disagree with the content of the source speech and advise them 
to specify which part of the source speech they most agree or disagree with. It is likely that 
the clashing political ideologies between the speaker and the subject might contribute to the 
subject’s disagreement with the speech content, which may lead to production of deviant and 
ideological signs in the SI renditions. And the open-ended question that requests the subjects 
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to specify their opinions about the speech content may make clear the subjects’ political 
ideologies, which can help determine in the CDA analysis whether the deviant renditions 
produced  in  the  SI  experiment  are  signs  of  hegemony  or  resistance  to  hegemony.  For  a  
complete version of the questionnaire, see Appendix B. 
 
3.4.3 National identity scale questionnaire 
 
  This study is to investigate the ideological conflicts of trainee interpreters from Taiwan 
and  from  China.  Although  Taiwan  is  not  widely  recognized  as  a  country  at  present,  it  has  
every element that Smith refers to in his definition of a nation (see Chapter 2.1.3). It should be 
reasonable to treat it as a nation in this study and accordingly the national identity scale 
questionnaires may be administered on the trainee subjects of Taiwan. 
 The national identity scale questionnaire (NIS questionnaire), which consists of 20 
questions, was developed by Waldemar Lilli, Professor of Social Psychology at the University 
of Mannheim, and Michael Diehl, Professor of Social, Organisational and Personal 
Psychology at the University of Tuebingen (1999). They devoted themselves to the research 
on social identity for several years at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research 
(MZES) and conducted the study of ‘measuring national identity’ under the financial support 
of the German National Science Foundation.  
 Lilli & Diehl created a measure of national identity by modifying Luhtanen & Crocker’s 
Collective Self-esteem Scale (CSES). While most previous studies aimed to evaluate personal 
identity, Luhtanen & Crocker first developed a reliable and valid measure to assess one’s 
collective identity on the theoretical basis of social identity theory originally developed for 
investigating the psychological factors of intergroup discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
To focus on measuring ‘national identity,’ which was not included in the CSES scale, Lilli & 
Diehl replaced the word ‘group’ with ‘nation’ in the original CSES scale and added four new 
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items, thus producing a 20-item scale divided into five subscales: membership, private, public, 
identity, and comparison subscales.  
 In the present study, the subjects are advised to make judgements on a 7-choice national 
identity scale (1st choice = strongly agree, 7th choice = strongly disagree). The twenty items 
on the scale are arranged in the same order as they appear in Lilli & Diehl’s research. As Lilli 
& Diehl (1999: 8) concluded that the national identity scale may serve for ‘a more global 
distinction between subjects high or low in their basic national identity,’ the present study is 
aimed at investigating the strength of national identity in each subject and also in each group 
by using the national identity scale as one of the survey questionnaires in this study. It may be 
possible that if one has a strong sense of national identity, one is likely to feel uncomfortable 
or even have negative reaction when hearing something against his country or against his 
previous belief concerning his country. The results of this questionnaire may serve as 
reference for verifying the existence of ideological renditions and further determining whether 
the ideological renditions are signs of hegemony or signs of resistance to hegemony. For a 
complete version of the questionnaire, see Appendix C. 
  
3.4.4 Post-experiment questionnaire 
 
 The post-experiment questionnaire, consisting of 18 items, is developed by the 
researcher based on the research focus on the possible link between interpreters' political 
ideology and their feelings about the source speeches/speakers. As the questionnaire is given 
to the subjects at the end of the data collection and will have no influence on the subjects’ 
interpreting performance, some of the questionnaire items, namely Items 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 
10, request the subjects in an explicit and straightforward manner to state their attitude 
towards the issue of objectivity in interpreting, their feelings about interpreting for those they 
agree or disagree with, their attitude towards the relations between Taiwan and China, and 
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self-evaluation  of  their  interpreting  performance  in  terms  of  objectivity.  The  results  of  the  
questionnaire may provide concrete evidence for the link between interpreters’ ideologies and 
their reactions to the source speeches they interpret.    
  The questionnaire items specified above investigate the link between interpreters’ 
ideologies and their reactions to the source speeches/speakers from different aspects. Item 1 
explores the subjects’ attitude towards the objectivity issue in interpreting. If a subject does 
not take remaining neutral as one of the important priorities for interpreters, the objectivity of 
her renditions may vary. Items 4 and 10 ask the subjects whether they are comfortable about 
interpreting for speakers on either side across the Taiwan Strait. Items 5 and 7, concerning the 
issue of Taiwan independence, investigate whether the subjects are proponents of the One 
China policy or of Taiwan’s formal independence. It may be possible that if a Taiwanese 
subject rejects the One China policy or even supports Taiwan’s formal independence, he may 
feel uncomfortable about interpreting for speakers who claim that Taiwan is part of China or 
that China may seek reunification with Taiwan by force if necessary. Similarly, if a Chinese 
subject is intolerant of the idea that Taiwan is not part of China, he may feel uncomfortable 
about interpreting for speakers who assert that Taiwan  is  a  country.  Items  8  and  9  ask the 
subjects to evaluate the strength of their national identity awareness shown in the interpreting 
process and to judge whether their own renditions are objective. It may be possible that if a 
subject is aware of her national identity while interpreting for speakers whose opinions are 
against the subject’s political ideologies, particularly concerning one’s national identity, the 
subject may have negative feelings towards the speakers or the source speeches. Also, if a 
subject acknowledges her renditions to be culturally biased, it is very likely that she has 
produced ideological renditions during interpreting. 
 The results of the specified questionnaire items will serve as direct reference for 
confirming existence of ideological renditions in the CDA analysis and further determining 
whether  the  ideological  renditions  are  signs  of  hegemony  or  resistance  to  hegemony.  For  a  
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complete version of the questionnaire, see Appendix D and Appendix E. 
  
3.5 In-Depth Interview 
 
 The individual in-depth interview is one of the common qualitative research methods 
adopted for exploring human beings’ ideas, concepts, feelings, opinions, and so on. One of its 
benefits is that it provides an opportunity for interviewees to analyze their ‘motivations for a 
particular action (Kaar, 2009: 2).’ Compared with a questionnaire survey, which restricts its 
respondents to specific questions and limited space of expression, an individual interview 
allows its respondents much more freedom to express themselves. However, the individual 
in-depth interview is often criticized for its interpretative nature (ibid: 4). A in-depth interview 
may generate a huge amount of data, and the interviewer may interpret the data on a 
subjective basis to serve their needs.  
 With the above benefit and possible drawback of individual in-depth interviews taken 
into consideration, the researcher will not interpret the interview data by herself but request 
the interviewed subjects to provide appropriate clarifications regarding deviant but ambiguous 
wording of their renditions. It is likely that even with the supporting information from the 
survey questionnaires, some deviant renditions cannot be judged undoubtedly as ideological 
signs, and therefore, further inquiry about the motivations for producing these deviant 
renditions is necessary. The purpose of the in-depth interview is to obtain specific information 
as reference for the CDA analysis. The interview is conducted on a voluntary basis, which 
means not all of the subjects will be interviewed.    
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3.6 Overview of the CDA Filter Process Results 
 
 The preliminary results under the application of the CDA filter process show that the 
political struggle and inequality between Taiwan and China contributed to many signs of 
hegemony or resistance in the trainee interpreters’ SI renditions. The great majority of the 
hegemonic signs are produced by the China group, while the great majority of the ideological 
signs produced by the Taiwanese subjects are categorized into signs of resistance to the 
Chinese hegemony. The signs of hegemony or resistance are generally embodied through nine 
interpreting strategies, including 
(1) Substitution 
Some of the subjects, most of whom are from China, replace the source term ‘country’ 
with other terms, such as ‘region’ or ‘area’ when rendering the Taiwan’s speeches, 
through which the subjects may avoid recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign country. By 
contrast,  in  the  Taiwan  group,  some  of  the  subjects  use  the  term  ‘nation’  or  ‘country’  
instead  of  ‘party’  or  ‘side’  when  the  Taiwanese  speakers  refer  to  Taiwan,  which  may  
create an impression that the speakers are explicitly asserting Taiwan’s status as a country. 
(2) Addition 
Some of the Chinese subjects add the word ‘China’ or ‘Chinese’ to the source texts, which 
may ‘invent’ an emotional bonding between China and Taiwan or give an impression that 
Taiwan is part of China, while some of the Taiwanese subjects add the word ‘Taiwan’ or 
‘Taiwanese’ to the renditions whereas the speaker did not mention Taiwan, which may 
highlight the status of Taiwan or emphasize the role of Taiwan in international events. 
(3) Omission 
Some of the source texts that involve assertion of Taiwan’s sovereignty or bitter 
accusation of China’s bullying behaviour are not rendered by some of the Chinese 
subjects. By contrast, when the Chinese speakers refer to China as the ‘motherland’ of 
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Taiwan, some of the Taiwanese subjects remain silent.  
(4) Compression 
Some unusual compression cases are found in the results. Such compressed renditions are 
not ‘opposite’ to the reality or to what the speakers originally meant and seem plausible 
within the speech context, but these cases, most of which involve the Taiwan 
independence issue, actually blur the focus of what the speakers say. 
(5) Mitigation 
Some of the subjects render some of the source texts in a less assertive or less direct 
manner than the speakers. More specifically, those in the China group may mitigate the 
criticism  about  China  or  the  statement  which  indicates  Taiwan  is  a  country,  while  the  
Taiwanese subjects may use the mitigation strategy to downplay what the Chinese 
speakers say by using a less affirmative tense or structure or by using the wording that 
does not distort the source meaning but may downplay the original statement or 
implication that Taiwan is part of China. 
(6) Overstatement/Intensification 
Overstatement/intensification cases are found in both groups. For instance, while the 
Chinese  speakers  express  their  stance  on  the  One  China  policy,  some  of  the  Chinese  
subjects may explicitly show their contempt for or opposition to the Taiwan independence 
issue by using deviant wording. Similarly, some of the Taiwanese subjects may render 
what the Taiwanese speakers say in a more assertive or emotional manner to reinforce the 
speakers’ original resistance to hegemony. 
(7)  Distortion 
A distorted rendition in this study means the rendered meaning is opposite to or greatly 
deviates from what the speakers say or is very likely to be untrue to the reality. For 
instance, a few of the Taiwanese subjects produce renditions which are contradictory to 
the Chinese speakers say to show strong resistance to the Chinese hegemony. 
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(8) Prioritizing personal cognition 
Some of the subjects are found to have rendered the source texts according to their 
previous knowledge. More specifically, the cases produced by the Chinese subjects may 
lead listeners to think that Taiwan is part of China or may show the Chinese hegemony 
towards Taiwan, while those produced by the Taiwanese subjects may unmask the 
Chinese hegemony in the source texts or convey more resistance messages than what the 
speakers say. 
(9) Specification 
When the speakers talk of ‘cross-strait relations’, some of the Chinese subjects specify 
who  is  or  which  place  is  involved  in  the  relations  by  using  the  phrase  ‘mainland  and  
Taiwan’  or  ‘the  two sides  of  China’.  The  former  cases  may downgrade  the  autonomous  
status  of  Taiwan to  a  province  of  China  or  giving  rather  ambiguous  renditions  that  may 
lead to an impression that Taiwan is part of China, while in the latter cases the subjects are 
explicitly asserting their stance that Taiwan is part of China. By contrast, some of the 
Taiwanese subjects specify Taiwan’s status as a ‘country’ when the Taiwanese speakers 
do not explicitly say so. 
 
Notably, some special cases are found in both groups, which will be discussed separately 
in another section. For instance, two of the Taiwanese subjects produce three of the 
‘hegemonic’ signs through the ‘substitution’ strategy while some of the Chinese subjects 
show resistance to the Chinese hegemony in their renditions by prioritizing their personal 
cognition or feelings. Also, as Speech 1 (C) and Speech 4 (C) involve some other countries, 
such as Japan and Indonesia, some of the Chinese subjects are found to have produced 
hegemonic signs towards these countries. In Chapter 5, the CDA method will be used to 
investigate what discursive strategies and linguistic devices are used in these ideologically 
deviant renditions. 
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Chapter 4. Results of Survey Questionnaires and Interviews 
 
The survey questionnaires used in the study include a student interpreter 
background questionnaire, six retrospective questionnaires, a national identity scale 
questionnaire, and a post-experiment questionnaire. Meanwhile, 14 of the subjects were 
interviewed separately by the researcher after the completion of the SI experiment. The 
results of the surveys and interviews, as a whole, indicate a link between a subject’s 
ideology and identity and her perception of the cross-strait political speeches. Whether 
the link may contribute to the emergence of ideological signs in one’s simultaneous 
renditions will be investigated in the next chapter of the CDA analysis. In this chapter, 
the researcher will present and discuss the questionnaire and interview results that 
concern the research focus and may be used in the CDA analysis in Chapter 5. 
 
4.1 Results of Student Interpreter Background Questionnaire 
 
The results of the student interpreter background questionnaire (the SIB 
questionnaire) indicate high homogeneity of the subjects' background information in 
terms of age, language, education, and work experience. Only two of the subjects are 
male, and all but two of the subjects are aged between 20 and 30 at the time of 
completing this questionnaire. Half of the 42 subjects are from China and the other half 
from Taiwan. Almost every subject speaks Mandarin as their mother tongue. The 
majority of the subjects started learning English before reaching fifteen and have a first 
degree in English. In addition to the English learning experience, the subjects’ 
admission to the simultaneous interpreting program indicates the subjects should have 
similar levels of proficiency in English. Half of the subjects have limited experience in 
translating and/or interpreting, and therefore, in this study, all of the subjects may be 
described as trainee interpreters, which means the interpreting performance of these 
trainee interpreters may be of similar level in terms of accuracy and delivery.  
Most of the subjects pay attention to cross-strait political issues so the source 
speeches used in this study should not be quite strange to them. In terms of the attitude 
toward the future relations between China and Taiwan, five of the Taiwanese subjects 
hope for Taiwan’s formal independence and no subjects from the Taiwan group favour 
‘reunification.’  It  may imply  that  none  of  them see  Taiwan as  part  of  China  or  would  
like Taiwan to be part of China and that they may feel uncomfortable about the talks 
that promote reunification of Taiwan and China. By contrast, ten of the Chinese subjects 
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prefer reunification of Taiwan and China, and none of the Chinese subjects favour 
Taiwan’s formal independence. The results show that there is an apparent discrepancy in 
attitude towards future cross-strait relations between the two groups. The attitude of the 
subjects towards the future relations between Taiwan and China may be one of the 
useful references for confirming existence of ideological renditions in the CDA analysis 
and helping determine whether the ideological renditions are signs of hegemony or 
resistance to hegemony.  
 
4.2 Results of Retrospective Questionnaires 
  
4.2.1 General description 
 
Each of the six rendering sessions is accompanied by one retrospective 
questionnaire (Retro questionnaire).  The main purposes of the Retro questionnaire are: 
exploring whether the subjects have difficulty comprehending and interpreting the 
source speeches and investigating the subjects’ opinions about the content of the source 
speeches.  
According to the results of the Retro questionnaires, none of the subjects consider 
the speech rate of the source texts to be fast. The great majority of the subjects have no 
difficulty comprehending the source content, which is also reflected in the fact that most 
of the subjects produce a similar amount of interpreting output despite different levels 
of accuracy in the renditions. Hence, the interpreting data collected in the experiment 
may be sufficient for the CDA analysis.  
In terms of the opinions of the subjects about the content of the source speeches, 
the questionnaire results indicate that the clashing political ideologies between the 
speakers and the subjects may arouse uncomfortable feelings of the subjects during the 
interpreting sessions. The majority of the Taiwanese subjects explicitly or implicitly 
provide negative opinions about Chinese hegemony and disagree with the statement of 
the Chinese speakers that Taiwan is part of China and cannot be separated from China 
by any means. Compared with the Chinese subjects, the Taiwanese subjects feel more 
uncomfortable while interpreting for the Chinese political figures. More specifically, 
only  three  of  the  Taiwanese  subjects  do  not  explicitly  or  implicitly  express  their  
negative feelings towards Speech 1 (C), and 16 of the Taiwanese subjects express their 
disagreement with some of the content of Speech 4 (C). Similarly, most of the Chinese 
subjects feel uncomfortable while interpreting for the Taiwanese political figures. Seven 
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Chinese subjects explicitly or implicitly express their disagreement with the idea that 
Taiwan is a country after interpreting Speech 2 (T) and Speech 3 (T).  Speech 5 (T) by 
Annette Lu, who asserts Taiwan’s sovereignty in an even more straightforward manner 
as Vice-President of the R.O.C. in Taiwan, provokes much resentment among the 
Chinese subjects. All but seven of the Chinese subjects explicitly produce negative 
response to the content of Speech 5 (T). 
 
4.2.2 Results of Speech 1 (C) retrospective questionnaire 
 
Speech  1  (C)  is  divided  into  two  parts  (two  interpreting  sessions)  and  therefore  
accompanied by two retrospective questionnaires. As a whole, none of the subjects 
consider the speech rate of Speech 1 (C) to be fast, and the great majority of the subjects 
have little difficulty understanding the speech content. It implies that the subjects should 
be able to grasp much of the speech content. 11 of the Taiwanese subjects and one of the 
Chinese subjects disagree with the speech content. More precisely, the focus of the 
positive opinions given by most of the Chinese subjects is on the history of the Second 
Sino-Japan war, which may imply that there is little political ideological conflict 
between the Chinese subjects and the Chinese speaker (Hu Jintao). By contrast, only 
three of the Taiwanese subjects do not oppose the speaker’s statement of the One China 
policy or hold negative attitude towards Chinese hegemony, which may imply that there 
is conflict over political ideologies between the Taiwanese subjects and the Chinese 
speaker.  
 
4.2.3 Results of Speech 2 (T) retrospective questionnaire 
 
According to the results of Speech 2 (T) Retro questionnaire, none of the subjects 
consider the speech rate to be fast, and the great majority of them have little difficulty 
understanding the speech content. It implies that the subjects should be able to grasp 
much of the speech content. As the Taiwanese speaker, Chen Shui-bian, does not talk 
about the Taiwan issue towards Chinese people or Taiwanese people but pays tribute to 
a third party, namely the Nauru government, the speech does not arouse much negative 
reaction in the subjects. One Taiwanese subject and seven Chinese subjects disagree 
with the speech content. Why the Taiwanese subject disagrees with the speech content is 
that she ‘dislikes the speaker & his political tendencies’, while the major reason for the 
disagreement of the Chinese subjects with the speech is that they do not think of Taiwan 
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as a country and therefore produce negative response to the speaker’s assertion of 
Taiwan’s sovereignty. 
  
 4.2.4 Results of Speech 3 (T) retrospective questionnaire  
 
According to the results of Speech 3 (T) Retro questionnaire, none of the subjects 
consider the speech rate to be fast. The great majority of the subjects have little 
difficulty understanding the speech content. 17 of the 21 Taiwanese subjects fully agree 
or quite agree with the speech content, which may indicate that the speech, whose 
speaker and addressees are Taiwanese people, involves little conflict over national 
identity as far as the Taiwanese subjects are concerned. By contrast, only four of the 21 
Chinese subjects quite agree with the speech content, and another four Chinese subjects 
disagree with the speech content. More specifically, Subjects C008 and C016 express 
their  stance  on  the  One  China  policy  and  do  not  see  Taiwan  as  a  country.  Evidently,  
even though the speech content involves few sensitive wording or issues about cross-
strait relations, some of the Chinese subjects still feel uncomfortable about interpreting 
for Taiwanese political figures. The negative feelings may be attributed to the conflict 
over national identity between the Taiwanese speaker and the Chinese student 
interpreters. Whether the psychological conflict inside the Chinese subjects will 
contribute to ideological signs in their renditions needs to be investigated further 
through the CDA method in the next chapter. 
 
4.2.5 Results of Speech 4 (C) retrospective questionnaire  
 
At the second stage of the data collection, Subject C009’s rendering data is missing 
due to an equipment malfunction, but the results of her completed questionnaires, 
including Speech 4 (C) and Speech 5 (T) Retro questionnaires, the national identity 
scale questionnaire, and the post-experiment questionnaire, are counted in. Also, 
Subject T016 drops out of the second stage of the data collection so the total number of 
the subjects shown in the results of Speech 4 (C) Retro questionnaire is 41. According 
to  the  results  of  Speech  4  (C)  Retro  questionnaire,  none  of  the  subjects  consider  the  
speech rate to be fast. The majority of them have little difficulty understanding the 
speech content. Although two subjects report that they are completely lost in the speech, 
they still produce as much output as they can. 16 of the Taiwanese subjects express their 
negative feelings towards the source speech in which the Chinese speaker explicitly 
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states the One China policy, and 14 of the Taiwanese subjects clearly express their 
disagreement with the speech content, particularly with the Taiwan issue.  By contrast, 
none of the Chinese subjects disagree with the speech content, and 14 of them fully or 
quite agree with what the speaker says.   
 
4.2.6 Results of Speech 5 (T) retrospective questionnaire  
 
According to the results of Speech 5 (T) Retro questionnaire, none of the subjects 
consider the speech rate of Speech 5 (T) to be fast. Generally, most of the subjects have 
little difficulty understanding the speech content. The speech, given by Annette Lu, 
Vice-President of the ROC in Taiwan, is found very provocative to the Chinese subjects 
as Lu addresses her comments about the cross-strait relations to a Chinese audience in a 
straightforward tone. Two of the Taiwanese subjects, T013 and T015, also find Lu’s 
expressions too strong and aggressive. 10 of the Chinese subjects quite disagree or fully 
disagree with the speech content. More specifically, three of the Chinese subjects 
explicitly defend the Chinese government against Lu’s criticism while another eight of 
the Chinese subjects show explicit or implicit opposition to Lu’s statement that Taiwan 
is a country. By contrast, only one of the Taiwanese subjects, namely T015, quite 
disagrees with the speech content and considers the speaker's tone to be too aggressive. 
It should be noted here that T015, during the in-depth interview conducted after the SI 
experiment, clearly expresses that she totally identifies with what Lu says about how 
China oppresses Taiwan and Lu’s speech did arouse her patriotic feeling towards 
Taiwan. Therefore, it is evident that T015 disagrees with Lu’s provocative tone rather 
than the content of Speech 5. Meanwhile, 12 of the Taiwanese subjects echo Lu’s 
resentment against China’s hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan on the international 
stage. The results of Speech 5 (T) Retro questionnaire indicate that if Taiwanese 
speakers assert the status of Taiwan as an independent country in a straightforward 
manner, Chinese interpreters are likely to feel uncomfortable. The results also show that 
the Taiwan group generally agree with Lu’s speech, which may be attributed to little 
conflict over political ideologies between the Taiwanese subjects and the Taiwanese 
speaker.  
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4.2.7 Conclusion of the retrospective questionnaire results 
 
As  shown  above,  the  Taiwanese  subjects  tend  to  feel  uncomfortable  while  
interpreting for the Chinese political figures, and the Chinese subjects tend to feel 
uncomfortable while interpreting for the Taiwanese political figures. The results indicate 
that the subjects tend to agree with the speakers from the same side of the Strait as them. 
The immediate investigation into the subjects’ feelings about the source speeches after 
the  interpreting  shows  that  most  of  the  subjects  do  not  remain  neutral  on  a  
psychological basis while interpreting. Instead, they, as interpreters, judge the speech 
content (or even the speakers) and choose to like or dislike what they need to interpret. 
The major reason behind the subjects’ negative feelings in the SI experiment is the One 
China policy. Whether ideological signs exist in the collected renditions will be 
analyzed and shown in the CDA analysis later on, but the results of the Retro 
questionnaires indicate a general trend that the subjects tend to show negative response 
to the political speeches made by the leaders from the other side of the Strait, especially 
when the speech content involves the One China policy. 
 
4.3 Results of Post-Experiment Questionnaire (PE Questionnaire) 
 
One Taiwanese subject (T016) dropped out of the second stage of the data 
collection so the total number of the subjects that filled in this questionnaire is 41. The 
present research focus is to investigate whether there is a link between an interpreter’s 
ideology and identity and her feelings about the source speeches/speakers. Only the 
results of those items that concern the research focus will be presented and discussed. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3.4.4,  Items 1,  4,  5,  7,  8,  9,  and 10 are specially designed to 
request explicitly the subjects to state their attitude towards the objectivity issue in 
interpreting, their feelings about interpreting for those they agree or disagree with, their 
attitude towards the relations between Taiwan and China, and self-evaluation of their 
interpreting performance in terms of objectivity.   
Item 1 requests the subjects to rethink whether ‘interpreters should provide 
objective and professional service for any client regardless of race, ethnicity, nationality, 
or gender’ and express their attitude towards the objectivity issue in interpreting. The 
great majority of the subjects agree that interpreters should remain neutral and provide 
professional service for any client. However, three of the Chinese subjects (namely 
C002, C009, and C018) and two of the Taiwanese subjects (namely T005 and T006) 
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disagree with this ethic of remaining objectivity and treating clients on an equal basis. 
Items 4 and 10 ask the subjects whether they are comfortable about interpreting for 
political leaders on both sides. The great majority of the subjects feel comfortable about 
interpreting for leaders from the same side as them. One Chinese subject and two 
Taiwanese subjects are reserved about this item. Four of the Chinese subjects give 
negative response to this item, while none of the Taiwanese subjects feel uncomfortable 
about interpreting for leaders from Taiwan. When it comes to interpreting for leaders 
from the opposite side, more than half of the subjects feel uncomfortable, and another 
seven of the subjects are reserved about this item. More specifically, 14 of the Chinese 
subjects and nine of the Taiwanese subjects explicitly express their negative feelings 
about this item.  
As discussed in the previous section about the results of the Retro questionnaires, 
each of the subjects is asked to specify whether they disagree or agree with the content 
of each source speech, and the results of the Retro questionnaires indicate a general 
trend that the subjects tend to produce negative response to the speakers from the 
opposite side and positive response to the speakers from the same side. Here in the PE 
questionnaire, the purpose of Items 4 and 10 is to request the subjects to give a general 
evaluation of their feelings about interpreting for the political leaders from both sides at 
the end of the SI experiment, and the results of these two items seem to echo those 
obtained from the Retro questionnaires. In consequence, it may be argued that conflicts 
over political ideologies or national identity between speakers and interpreters may 
arouse negative feelings in interpreters.   
Items 5 and 7 focus on the issue of Taiwan independence, investigating the 
subjects’ attitude towards the cross-strait relations. More specifically, Item 5 asks 
whether the subjects will support the Chinese government to attack Taiwan by force if 
Taiwan declares its independence formally. None of the Taiwanese subjects agree with 
the possible military attack launched by China on Taiwan, and only one of the 
Taiwanese subjects, namely T004, remains reserved about this item. By contrast, three 
of the Chinese subjects, namely C004, C016, and C018, support their government to 
attack Taiwan if necessary, while another nine of the Chinese subjects neither agree nor 
disagree with the possible attack of China on Taiwan. In other words,  less than half  of 
the Chinese subjects disagree with China’s possible attack on Taiwan. The results may 
indicate that most of the Chinese subjects hold a hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan 
just as the Chinese government does. 
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Item 7 investigates whether the subjects consider Taiwan to be part of China and 
disagree with Taiwan’s separation from China. 18 of the 20 Taiwanese subjects oppose 
the One China policy, while only one of the Chinese subjects, namely C006, somewhat 
disagrees with the inseparability of Taiwan and China. Although nine of the Chinese 
subjects remain reserved about this item, still nearly more than half of the Chinese 
subjects explicitly support the One China policy and view Taiwan as part of China. The 
only one Taiwanese subject that agrees somewhat with inseparability of Taiwan and 
China is T004, who actually has expressed negative opinions about the speeches given 
by the Chinese leaders and echoed Lu’s resentment against China’s oppression of 
Taiwan. The combined results of T004’s questionnaires indicate that T004 may identify 
with ‘the Republic of China (the ROC)’ rather than ‘Taiwan’ and consider Taiwan to be 
part  of  the  ROC  rather  than  part  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  (the  PRC).  As  a  
whole, the results of Items 5 and 7 show that there is a huge cognitive difference in the 
cross-strait relations between the Taiwan group and the China group.  
Item 8 asks the subjects to evaluate the strength of their national identity awareness 
shown in the interpreting process.  16 of the Chinese subjects and 10 of the Taiwanese 
subjects agree that they are aware of their own national identity when interpreting for 
the speakers from the opposite side. Four of the Chinese subjects and five of the 
Taiwanese subjects consider themselves to have interpreted for the leaders from the 
opposite side without being aware of their own national identity. Cross-referencing the 
results of the Retro questionnaires, the researcher finds that nine of the ten Taiwanese 
subjects who are aware of their national identity when interpreting for the leaders from 
the opposite side have explicitly expressed their opposition to the One China policy, 
while 10 of the 16 Chinese subjects with national identity awareness during the 
interpreting explicitly express their opposition to Taiwan's sovereign status. Meanwhile, 
as far as those subjects who claim to be unaware of their  own national identity during 
the interpreting are concerned, none of the four Chinese subjects have shown negative 
feelings about the Taiwanese speakers’ statement that Taiwan is a country, while three of 
the five Taiwanese subjects have given explicit opposition to the One China policy 
stated by the Chinese leaders.  
Only one of the Chinese subjects, C016, remains reserved about Item 8; however, a 
review of C016’s Retro questionnaire results shows that C016 has expressed strong 
opposition to the statement of the Taiwanese speakers that Taiwan is a country. 
Furthermore, as for the five of the Taiwanese subjects who remain reserved about this 
item, all of them have in their Retro questionnaires explicitly expressed negative 
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response to the One China policy or the Chinese hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan. 
The results of Item 8, as a whole, show that when one subject claims to have been aware 
of one’s own national identity during the interpreting for the leaders from the opposite 
side, it does not follow that the subject will produce negative response to the source 
speeches concerned. It may also be argued that those subjects who claim themselves to 
be unaware of their own national identity or do not show specific attitude towards Item 
8 may still produce negative reaction to the source speeches concerned. In other words, 
the results of Item 8 generally echo what previous studies of ideology have found: 
ideology may work invisibly and subconsciously. Although one’s self report of national 
identity awareness during the interpreting may not be highly correlated with one’s 
factual reaction or response to what has been interpreted, the results of Item 8 can still 
serve as one of the useful references for exploring the influence of an interpreter’s 
political ideology over her/his simultaneous renditions.   
Item 9 asks the subjects to judge whether their own renditions are objective. Seven 
of the Chinese subjects and none of the Taiwanese subjects feel that their own renditions 
in the data collection are not objective but culturally biased. Cross-referencing the 
results of the Retro questionnaires completed by these seven Chinese subjects, the 
researcher  finds  that  six  of  them  explicitly  express  their  opposition  to  Taiwan’s  
sovereign status or show negative reaction to the speeches made by the Taiwanese 
leaders. Five of the Taiwanese subjects remain reserved about this item, and the cross-
referencing of their Retro questionnaire results show that all of them explicitly express 
their  opposition  to  the  One  China  policy  or  show  their  resentment  about  China’s  
hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan. As for those who consider their renditions to be 
objective, nine of the fourteen Chinese subjects have explicitly showed their support of 
the One China policy or expressed their disagreement with the content of the speeches 
made by the Taiwanese leaders; eleven of the fifteen Taiwanese subjects have explicitly 
showed their resentment about the One China policy or expressed their disagreement 
with the content of the speeches made by the Chinese leaders. As the cross-referenced 
results indicate, nearly all of the subjects who think of their renditions as culturally 
biased or are not positively sure of the objectivity of their  renditions have shown their  
disagreement with the political stance of the leaders from the opposite side on the One 
China policy, which may imply that these subjects have perceived the influence of their 
political ideologies on their simultaneous interpreting for the leaders from the opposite 
side.  Meanwhile,  still  the  majority  of  the  subjects  who  consider  themselves  to  have  
produced objective renditions have shown disagreement with the content of the 
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speeches given by the leaders from the opposite side. Whether the subjects will bring 
their ideologies to their renditions and produce ideological signs will be investigated 
through the CDA analysis. 
 
4.4 Results of National Identity Scale Questionnaire (NIS Questionnaire) 
 
As one of the Taiwanese subjects, T016, drops out of the second stage of the data 
collection, the total number of the subjects who have filled in this questionnaire is 41. 
The number of the subjects is large in terms of a qualitative research but the data 
generated by these 41 subjects may not be sufficient for complex statistical analysis. In 
consequence, instead of conducting a t-test analysis to find the difference in strength of 
national identity between the Taiwan group and the China group or a factor analysis to 
determine significance of subscales, the researcher chooses to focus on the strength of 
each subject’s national identity and present each subject’s score ranking compared with 
the other subjects within the same group. The more scores one obtains on the national 
identity scale, the higher ranking one has among the subjects. One’s high ranking on the 
scale indicates her relatively stronger sense of national identity compared with the other 
subjects. 14 of the Chinese subjects and six of the Taiwanese subjects score higher than 
the mean (approximately 107). It seems that the China group as a whole has a stronger 
sense of national identity than the Taiwan group, which may echo the previous literature 
review of the identity shaping in China and in Taiwan. When cross-referencing the 
results of the Retro questionnaires, the researcher finds that those who score higher than 
the mean on the national identity scale tend to show disagreement with the content of 
the speeches given by the leaders from the opposite side; more specifically, only four 
Chinese subjects of those high scorers have not produced explicit disagreement with the 
content of the political speeches made by the leaders from the opposite side. Meanwhile, 
as far as the subjects who rank bottom 10 on the scale are concerned, only two of them 
have not produced negative reaction to the speeches made by the leaders from the 
opposite side. The results of cross-referencing the Retro questionnaires and the national 
identity scale questionnaire imply that one's strength of national identity is not highly 
correlated with one’s negative reaction to the speeches made by the leaders from the 
opposite side.  
With  cross-referencing  the  results  of  the  post-experiment  questionnaire,  seven  of  
the Chinese subjects who rank top 10 within the China group on the national identity 
scale produce negative response to Item 4 regarding whether the subjects feel 
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comfortable about interpreting for the leaders from the opposite side, while four of their 
Taiwanese counterparts give negative response to the same item. As far as those who 
rank bottom ten within their own group on the scale, only three of the Chinese subjects 
and two of the Taiwanese subjects have not produced negative response to Item 4. As it 
shows on a group basis, there is no link between one’s strength of national identity and 
one’s feelings towards the speeches made by the leaders from the opposite side.  
As the results of Item 7 in the post-experiment questionnaire regarding the attitude 
towards the ‘inseparability’ of Taiwan and China show that there is sharp contrast 
between the two groups, it may not be meaningful to check if there is a link between the 
results of Item 7 and one's strength of national identity.  
With the cross-referencing of the results of Item 8 in the post-experiment 
questionnaire regarding the subjects’ awareness of their national identity while 
interpreting for the leaders from the opposite side, only two of the Chinese subjects who 
rank top 10 within the China group on the national identity scale report being unaware 
of their national identity; by contrast, only five of their Taiwanese counterparts express 
that they are aware of their national identity. As far as those who rank bottom 10 within 
their own group are concerned, three of the Chinese subjects and five of the Taiwanese 
subjects do not report their national identity awareness during interpreting. As it shows 
on a group basis, there is no link between one’s strength of national identity and one’s 
national identity awareness during interpreting for the leaders from the opposite side. 
As a whole, the national identity scale questionnaire results only indicate a general 
trend that the China group has a stronger sense of national identity than the Taiwan 
group. Cross-referencing the results of the other questionnaires does not show any other 
general trend on a group basis. As it is likely that one’s strong sense of national identity 
may contribute to his/her negative feelings towards something against his/her country, 
the results of the national identity scale questionnaire may be used as a reference on an 
individual basis for helping confirm whether one has produced deviant renditions and 
whether one’s deviant renditions are signs of hegemony or resistance to hegemony.  
 
4.5 Results of Individual In-Depth Interview  
 
The purpose of the in-depth interview in this study is to obtain concrete 
information and help with the confirmation of ideological signs in a situation where a 
deviant rendition is too ambiguous to be categorized as an ideological sign just through 
the use of the CDA method. If a subject can recall in the interview what she has been 
172 
 
thinking  about  some  specific  source  texts  or  how  she  has  come  up  with  some  
ambiguous renditions, the data of the interview may be a testimony of the ideological 
signs in her renditions. The following is the general description of the in-depth 
interview conducted for this study. 
Three of the Chinese subjects and nine of the Taiwanese subjects opted 
independently for the in-depth interview, during which each of them was requested to 
clarify their own ambiguously deviant renditions. Some of the subjects felt surprised at 
their own deviant renditions and did not know why they themselves had produced such 
deviancy. However, most of the subjects could vividly recall how they had come up 
with their deviant renditions in response to the speeches. More precisely, during the 
individual in-depth interview, all of the nine Taiwanese subjects explicitly stated that 
some of their deviant renditions had been attributed to their disagreement with the One 
China policy. By contrast, two of the three Chinese subjects admitted that their Chinese 
identity had directly influenced their objectivity while they interpreted for the 
Taiwanese speakers. The interview data that appear as strong evidence for existence of 
ideological signs will be used in the CDA analysis. With clear statement or clarification 
of the subjects themselves, the confirmation of the ideological signs may be well-
grounded and reasonable.  
 
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion of Survey Results 
 
The purpose of the survey questionnaires used in this study is to obtain the 
opinions of the subjects about the source speeches and investigate the link between an 
interpreter’s political ideology and his/her personal feelings about the cross-strait 
political source speeches. On the whole, the survey results suggest that the conflict over 
political ideologies between a speaker and an interpreter may arouse negative 
psychological reaction of the interpreter during interpreting.  
In terms of the subjects’ opinions about the future relations between Taiwan and 
China, ten Chinese subjects support ‘reunification’ between Taiwan and China while 
there are five pro-independence Taiwanese subjects. Further review of the retrospective 
questionnaire results produced by these fifteen subjects shows that six of the ten 
Chinese subjects disagree with the content of at least one of the source speeches 
produced by the Taiwanese political figures, and none of these ten Chinese subjects 
disagree with any one of the source speeches produced by the Chinese political figures. 
As for the five pro-independence Taiwanese subjects, four of them show disagreement 
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with the content of at least one of the source speeches given by the Chinese political 
figures, and only one of the five pro-independence Taiwanese subjects disagrees with 
the content of one of the source speeches made by the Taiwanese political figures1. The 
above-mentioned results may imply that if the subjects are dissatisfied with the status 
quo of the relations between Taiwan and China (more precisely, when a Taiwanese 
student interpreter hopes for ‘independence’ of Taiwan in the future, or when a Chinese 
student interpreter favors ‘reunification’ of China and Taiwan), they may have negative 
feelings or reaction towards a source speech which contains something against their 
political ideology. The responses of these fifteen subjects indeed suggest a link between 
a Mandarin interpreter’s political ideology and his/her feelings about the cross-strait 
political speeches. 
According to the results of the post-experiment questionnaire survey, fourteen 
Chinese subjects and nine Taiwanese subjects explicitly state that they feel 
uncomfortable when interpreting for political figures from the other side of the Taiwan 
Strait. Further review of the retrospective questionnaire results produced by these 
twenty-three subjects, ten of the fourteen Chinese subjects explicitly disagree with the 
content of at least one of the source speeches made by the Taiwanese political figures, 
while all of the nine Taiwanese subjects disagree with the content of at least one of the 
source speeches made by the Chinese political figures. This shows that in some 
interpreters conflicting ideologies do give rise to uncomfortable feelings during 
interpreting. Meanwhile, most of the Taiwanese subjects report their disagreement with 
the statement of the Chinese speakers that Taiwan is part of China. Their negative 
responses to the One China policy will be very important references for the CDA 
confirmation of existence of ideological signs in simultaneous renditions shown as 
resistance to China’s hegemony. By contrast, most of the Chinese subjects express their 
disagreement with the idea that Taiwan is a sovereign country. Their hegemonic attitude 
towards Taiwan has already been manifested in the results of the questionnaire surveys. 
In terms of the national identity scale questionnaire results, the China group as a 
whole has a much stronger sense of national identity than the Taiwan group. Fourteen of 
the Chinese subjects and six of the Taiwanese subjects score higher than the mean 
(approximately 107) on the national identity scale.  Further review of the results of the 
post-experiment questionnaire, twelve of these fourteen Chinese subjects and four of 
these six Taiwanese subjects report that they are aware of their national identity during 
                                               
1 Only one of the five pro-independence Taiwanese subjects, namely T015, ‘disagrees’ with Lu’s speech 
as she considers the language use of that speech to be aggressive. However, in her in-depth interview, 
T015 explicitly states that she strongly identifies with what Lu said about how China oppresses Taiwan. 
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their interpreting for the political leaders from the other side of the Strait, which may 
indicate that an interpreter with a strong sense of nationality tends to be aware of her 
national identity when interpreting for those whose political ideologies are contradictory 
to hers. Therefore, the results of the national identity scale questionnaire may be a 
useful reference for helping confirm the existence of ideological signs in the collected 
simultaneous renditions. However, it should be noted that some of the Taiwanese 
subjects, in spite of having a relatively weak sense of nationality, are among those who 
explicitly report their negative feelings about the Chinese hegemony, which may be 
attributed to the fact that the people of Taiwan are faced with an identity crisis but they 
may still feel resistant to the Chinese hegemony that threatens the survival of Taiwan in 
diplomatic terms (see also Chapter 2.5.2.4). Also, some of the Chinese subjects who are 
aware of their national identity during interpreting state that they do not feel 
uncomfortable about interpreting for the Taiwanese political figures. All of the above 
results indicate that although there may be a link between one’s political ideologies and 
one’s feelings about the cross-strait political figures and the speeches they make, not 
every subject reacts in the same way. And even some of the subjects may not have 
consistent reactions throughout the experiment. Therefore, the results of the 
questionnaire surveys are very useful but cannot be counted on as the main means to 
explore how an interpreter’s ideology works in simultaneous renditions. It is the 
renditions that are the main product of a simultaneous interpreting activity. Only by 
analyzing the renditions can one possibly find ideological signs that are produced either 
consciously or subconsciously.  
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Chapter 5. CDA Analysis and Discussion 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, critical discourse analysis is used as the main research 
method of this study to detect ideological signs embodied in simultaneous (SI) 
renditions. To prevent the common criticism of CDA for being subjective and biased, a 
CDA Filter Process is created, in which a subject’s renditions, survey questionnaire 
results, and/or interview data will be reviewed as a whole in order to find evidence for 
the embodiment of ideological signs in her SI renditions (see Chapter 3.2.3 for the detail 
of the CDA Filter Process). 
 In  addition  to  the  CDA  Filter  Process,  statistical  analysis  of  the  CDA  qualitative  
results will be conducted for the purposes of increasing the validity of the research 
findings and presenting sharp contrasts between the Taiwan group and the China group 
in terms of producing signs of hegemony or resistance. The overall statistical results 
displayed in two separate tables (see Chapter 5.6) will show an overview of the type of 
ideological signs (i.e. hegemony or resistance signs) on a group basis. The statistical 
analysis of ideological signs may demonstrate not only the qualitative analysis results in 
a scientifically quantitative manner but also power struggles between Taiwan and China 
embodied in political SI renditions.  
 
5.1 General Description of the CDA Analysis in the Present Study 
 
 As mentioned in Chapter 3.6, the preliminary results under the application of the 
CDA filter process show that the political struggle and inequality between Taiwan and 
China contributed to many signs of hegemony or resistance in the trainee interpreters’ 
SI  renditions.  The  great  majority  of  the  hegemonic  signs  are  produced  by  the  China  
group, while the great majority of the ideological signs produced by the Taiwanese 
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subjects are categorized into signs of resistance to the Chinese hegemony. The signs of 
hegemony or resistance are generally embodied through nine interpreting strategies, 
including substitution, addition, omission, compression, mitigation, overstatement or 
intensification, distortion, prioritizing personal cognition, and specification. Note that 
the  way  in  which  some  of  the  deviant  renditions  are  produced  may  be  easily  to  be  
categorized into one of the interpreting strategies while the categorization of some 
others may not be so definite. In the following sections, the CDA method will be used 
to investigate what discursive strategies and linguistic devices are used by the trainee 
interpreters to show their ideology and identity in the renditions under the 
categorization of the above nine interpreting strategies, and the discussion will be 
divided into the China group, the Taiwan group, and the Special Case. Meanwhile, the 
results of the survey questionnaires and/or interviews will be referenced in the analysis 
process and may serve as evidence for confirming the existence of ideological 
renditions or explaining why these ideological renditions are produced. After the 
discussion of the discursive strategies under the interpreting strategies categorization, 
the researcher will, by answering the five most frequently asked questions in the DHA 
analysis (see Chapter 3.2.2), provide a detailed table specifying the discursive strategies 
through which Chinese hegemonic ideology towards Taiwan is embodied and those 
through which Taiwanese resistance to Chinese hegemony is demonstrated, which may 
give a general picture of how Chinese hegemony and Taiwanese resistance are 
confronting each other in SI renditions. At the end of Chapter 5, a statistical analysis of 
the CDA qualitative results will be conducted for the purposes of increasing the validity 
of the research findings and presenting sharp contrasts between the Taiwan group and 
the China group in terms of producing signs of hegemony or resistance. The overall 
statistical results, displayed in two separate tables (see Chapter 5.6), will show an 
overview of the type of ideological signs (i.e. hegemony or resistance signs) on a group 
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basis. It should also be noted that as the tradition of the CDA method applied to analysis 
of political speeches or rhetoric involves monolingual texts, the analysis of the 
discursive strategies or linguistic devices used in the selected source texts in this study 
should be focused on and conducted in the Mandarin source texts. Although a near 
literal written translation will be attached to the source texts for reference, any 
translation of the source texts may fail to represent the discursive strategies that the 
speakers originally used and thus reduce the validity of the political rhetoric analysis. 
 
5.2 CDA Analysis – the China Group 
 
5.2.1 Substitution 
 
Substitution is found to be the most frequently used interpreting strategy by the 
Chinese (and Taiwanese) trainee subjects to have their ideology embodied in the 
renditions. Some of the Chinese subjects replace the source term ‘country’ with other 
terms, such as ‘region’ or ‘area’ when rendering the Taiwan’s speeches, through which 
the subjects may avoid recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign country. In some other cases, 
the word ‘Taiwan’, Taiwan’s national title ‘the Republic of China’ is even replaced with 
the  word  ‘China’.  In  still  some  other  cases,  when  Annette  Lu,  then  Taiwan’s  
Vice-President, says ‘the Chinese mainland/mainland China’ or ‘the People’s Republic 
of China’, some of the Chinese subjects use the word ‘mainland’ instead. The following 
are Examples 1 and 2 under this category. 
 
 
 
 
178 
 
Example 1: 
Speech 2 (T) 
ҁΓࢂύ๮҇୯ಃ΋Տ߻ٰ຦୯ೖୢޑ୯ৎϡ२Ǵߚதᄪ۩ૈڙᗎډ຦୯നଯޑ
҇Ь྅୸—ᒍᎹӅک୯୯཮ว߄ᄽᇥǶ 
I am the Republic of China’s first national leader that visits your esteemed country, very 
honored to be invited to your esteemed country’s highest democracy hall - the 
Parliament of the Republic of Nauru – to give a speech.  
 
C008: I am the first to come to visit Nauru of all people from China, of all people from 
China. And  it  is  an  honor  to  me  to  address  the  parliament  of  the  Republic  of  
Nauru.   
 
 The comparison of the source text and C008’s rendition in Example 1 shows that 
the subject replaced Taiwan’s national title with “China”, which may leave audience 
mistaking the speaker as a Chinese representative. Linguistically, C008 was expressing 
her stance on the One China policy by using the referential/nomination strategy. Her 
repetition of the prepositional phrase “of all people from China” while referring to the 
speaker may give an impression that she was categorizing the Taiwanese speaker as a 
member of Chinese people and thus declaring Taiwan is part of China. Also, C008 did 
not render the term ‘Guó JiƗ Yuán Sh΅u୯ৎϡ२(president/national leader)’, which 
may imply her contempt for the speaker’s status or her unwillingness to recognize 
Taiwan as a country (and therefore Chen was never a ‘national leader’ to the subject). In 
the corresponding Retro questionnaire, C008 expressed her disagreement with the 
content of Speech 2 (T) and gave the reason: “the One China policy instilled by the 
China government”. She also ‘strongly agreed’ that she had been quite aware of her 
Chinese national identity while interpreting for the Taiwanese leaders. In light of the 
evidence presented above, this example is very likely to be a sign of C008’s hegemonic 
attitude towards Taiwan.  
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Example 2: 
Speech 5 (T) 
ᐕўࡰрǴᝄख़ޑ೦൤ᝌਸ۳۳Ꮴठࡹݯ୏ᕏǴԶ΋ѿୢᚒᛈวǴό໻ύ୯ޑԭ
ۉڙधڙᜤǴڬᜐхࡴѠ᡼ӧϣޑ୯ৎ೿ाᎁࢢǶ  
History points out that  a serious wealth gap usually leads to political  unrest.  And once 
the problem explodes, not only will China’s people suffer but also the neighboring 
countries including Taiwan will suffer. 
 
C021: We know from history that large income gap will lead to political turmoil. If that 
happens, Chinese people will suffer a lot. The surrounding area including Taiwan 
will also suffer. 
 
By replacing the noun “country” with another noun “area”, C021 is using the 
referential/nomination strategy in linguistic terms to define Taiwan’s status as part of 
China. In her in-depth interview, C021 gave an explanation for such replacement: 
 
…the speaker said ‘Taiwan is a country’, which is strange to me. I was a little 
confused at hearing the sentence because I seldom hear people say ‘Taiwan is a 
county.’ Therefore, when I interpreted this part, I stopped to think whether there’s 
something wrong with my listening, as the sentence is opposite to my previous 
concept. I used the word ‘area’ instead of ‘country’ mainly because I was afraid to 
make mistakes. Taiwanese speakers use the word ‘country’ but in China, Chinese 
use the word ‘area’ when referring to Taiwan. 
 
In rendering Speech 3 (T), C021 also used the word ‘area’ when the Taiwanese speaker 
referred to Taiwan as a ‘country/nation’. C021’s use of the referential/nomination 
strategy also echoes what Li Zhaoxing, former foreign minister of the P.R.C., has 
emphasized in his talk about the translation of Taiwan’s status (see Chapter 2.4.4). It is 
clear that C021 did bring her Chinese hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan to her 
renditions. 
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5.2.2 Addition 
 
 Previous studies suggest that SI interpreters use “neutral padding expressions” 
before a workable delivery unit is obtained or make additions to “fill hesitation pauses” 
to enhance interpreter performance (Kirchhoff 2002[1976]: 116). Yet, this study finds 
that some of the Chinese subjects add ‘non-neutral’ expressions to their renditions, 
which may lead the listener to think that Taiwan is part of China. 
 
Example 3: 
Speech 3 (T) 
…Ψ׆ఈӚՏ௴ำ߻۳ȨШࣚၮ୏཮ȩਔǴૈ୼όाב૶ǴεৎޑՉ៶ύᅈၩΑ
ٿίΟԭ࿤୯ΓӕझჹӚՏޑคज़ઔᅽǵനεޑЍ࡭ǵکന਺ϪޑයࣰǶ  
…also hope that when everyone starts the journey to the ‘World Games’, [everyone] 
may not forget everyone’s luggage is filled with the twenty-three million countrymen 
and compatriots’ limitless wishes, strongest support and greatest expectation to 
everyone. 
 
C011:  I  hope  when  you  perform  on  the  sports  games,  you  will  remember  our  best  
wishes from Chinese people and hope from Taiwanese people in your luggage and 
keep them in your heart when you perform on the stage. 
 
 By adding the noun phrase ‘Chinese people’ to her rendition, C011 was using the 
referential/nomination strategies to include the Taiwanese speaker as a member of 
Chinese people, which may further imply that Taiwan is part of China. In her another 
deviant rendition produced in rendering the same speech, she replaced the noun phrase 
“Taiwanese people” with “Chinese people”, showing an even stronger attempt to imply 
that Taiwan is part of China. C011 ‘agreed somewhat’ that she had been quite aware of 
her Chinese national identity when interpreting for the Taiwanese leaders, and she also 
‘agreed somewhat’ that Taiwan is part of China and cannot be separated from China. 
Her One China ideology is clearly embodied through the referential/nomination strategy 
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in her rendition. 
 
5.2.3 Omission 
 
This  study  finds  that  some  of  the  Chinese  participants  omit  part  of  a  source  
sentence or even a much longer source text that may be contradictory to their One China 
ideology. More specifically, they use the omission strategy to avoid recognizing Taiwan 
as a country when interpreting for Taiwanese politicians, which may be exemplified by 
Examples 4 & 5.  
 
Example 4: 
Speech 3 (T) 
খωߓࡧҬډ໳ЬৢЋύޑ୯ᄡکიᄡǴ΋य़ࢂ୯ৎᄪ៉ޑຝቻǴќ΋य़߾ࢂ୯
ৎж߄იޑᆒઓ኱ᇞǹߓࡧ૱Ј׆ఈӧ೭ٿय़ᄡተޑᏤЇΠǴӚՏૈ୼ᄡ໒ளയǵ
គளനᓬ౦ޑԋᕮǶ 
Just now I [A-bian] gave Chairman Huang the national flag and the delegation flag. One 
is a symbol of the country’s honor. The other is the spiritual sign of the national 
delegation. 
 
C015: Just right now, the flag I gave to the chairman is a symbol of our reputation. On 
the one side is the honour and  other  side  is  the  spirit  of  the  people.  Under  two  
flags I hope that you can achieve the best results. 
 
The comparison of the source text and C015’s rendition shows that C015 added 
vagueness  to  what  the  speaker  had  said  by  omitting  such  words  as  “national”  or  
“country”. Apparently, the omission mitigates the original illocutionary force. The 
speaker had meant to encourage the Taiwanese athletes to glorify Taiwan as a country, 
but the vagueness of the rendered text reduced the illocutionary force of the words of 
the speaker as Taiwan’s President. In addition to this example, it is also found that when 
rendering Speech 5 (T), C015 omitted a sentence where the Taiwanese speaker 
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explicitly declared that Taiwan does not belong to China. Compared with the other 
Chinese subjects, C015 had a relatively strong sense of national identity (ranked 3rd in 
her group). Although she ‘moderately disagreed’ that she had been aware of her Chinese 
identity when interpreting for the Taiwanese leaders, she was found to produce 
hegemonic signs in rendering four of the five speeches in the SI experiment. It may be 
argued that C015 was demonstrating her One China ideology by using the mitigation 
strategy on linguistic level in Example 4.  
 
Example 5: 
Speech 5 (T) 
ԾϦϡ 2000 ԃ 5 Д 20 ВаٰǴഋНࡧᕴ಍මӭԛჹч٧ࡹ۬߄ၲ๓ཀᆶख़௴ڐ
୘εߐޑ၈ཀǴёெԿϞч٧྽ֽϝόᜫय़ჹ౜ჴǴࣗԿᡂҁу቉ӦჹѠ᡼ޑ୯
ሞғӸޜ໔ཱུᅰѺᓸᆶ࠾ఠϐૈ٣ǴӕਔǴΨόᘐӦаȨ΋ঁύ୯ȩࣁ߻ගǴٰ
݆လٿ۞ޑڐ୘Ǵᇙ೷ٿ۞Γ҇ҬࢬޑၡምǴзΓᒪᏬǶ 
Since May twentieth two thousand, President Chen Shui-bian for many times has 
showed the Beijing government good will and sincerity to reopen the gate of negotiation. 
Regrettably so far the Beijing authorities have still been reluctant to face the reality and 
even stepped up efforts to oppress and block Taiwan’s international survival space, and 
at the same time continue to boycott cross-strait negotiations on the ‘one China’ premise 
and produce barriers to exchanges between both sides’ peoples. [It is] regrettable. 
 
C004: Since twenty-first to May two thousand, China, Chinese government reject our 
friendship.  
 
 Note that the extremely-shortened rendered text had nothing to do with the 
malfunction of the recording facilities as the sound of C004’s breathing as well  as the 
speaker’s voice was being recorded clearly and also later on C004 continued to interpret 
the next paragraph. While the Taiwanese speaker accused China of bullying Taiwan 
under the One China policy, C004 remained silent and did not render most part of the 
source text. The severe omission has greatly mitigated the original resentful tone. In the 
corresponding Retro questionnaire, C004 ‘fully disagreed’ with all of the content of this 
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speech, which may be the reason for this severe omission. Her strong stance on the One 
China policy was made manifest in her moderately support for the Chinese 
government’s attack on Taiwan by force if Taiwan declares independence formally. 
Also, since she ‘moderately agreed’ that she had been quite aware of her Chinese 
national identity when interpreting for the Taiwanese leaders, it is very likely that she 
was dealing with what clashed with her hegemonic ideology by using the mitigation 
strategy on linguistic level intentionally.  
 
5.2.4 Compression 
 
Some  unusual  compression  cases  are  found  in  the  CDA  analysis  results.  Such  
compressed renditions are not ‘opposite’ to the reality or to what the speakers originally 
meant and seem plausible within the speech context (cf. Schjoldager, 1995; see also 
Chapter 2.3.3.4) but these cases, most of which involve the Taiwan issue, actually blur 
the focus of what the speakers have said or even bring vagueness to the source texts.  
 
Example 6: 
Speech 5 (T) 
ᐕўࡰрǴᝄख़ޑ೦൤ᝌਸ۳۳Ꮴठࡹݯ୏ᕏǴԶ΋ѿୢᚒᛈวǴό໻ύ୯ޑԭ
ۉڙधڙᜤǴڬᜐхࡴѠ᡼ӧϣޑ୯ৎ೿ाᎁࢢǶ  
History points out that  a serious wealth gap usually leads to political  unrest.  And once 
the problem explodes, not only will China’s people suffer but also the neighboring 
countries including Taiwan will suffer. 
 
C003: The history tell us that the gap between the poor and the rich would led to the,  
would lead to the political upheaval, and Chinese people would suffer from it,  
including Taiwanese. 
 
By omitting the noun phrase “the neighboring countries” and turning the noun 
“Taiwan” into another noun “Taiwanese”, C003 was compressing the source text into 
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another sentence whose meaning deviated from what the speaker had said. On linguistic 
level, C003 was using the referential/nomination strategy to categorize Taiwanese 
people as members of Chinese people. According to the survey results, C003 ‘strongly 
agreed’ that she had been quite aware of her Chinese national identity when interpreting 
for the Taiwanese leaders. Also, while rendering Speech 1 (C), she referred to the 
“cross-strait” development as development of “two part[s] of China, which explicitly 
indicates her One China ideology (see also Chapter 2.4.4). It may be argued that C003 
was showing her hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan intentionally through the 
referential/nomination strategy in Example 6. 
 
5.2.5 Mitigation 
 
Some of the subjects produce their rendition in a less assertive or less direct 
manner than the speakers. More specifically, those in the China group may mitigate the 
criticism about China or the statement which indicates Taiwan is a country. 
 
Example 7: 
Speech 5 (T) 
΋ޔаٰǴч٧ࡹ۬Ь஭Ѡ᡼Ѹ໪ௗڙȨ΋ঁύ୯ȩচ߾Ǵ٠୲࡭Ѡ᡼ࢂύ୯ޑ
΋೽ϩǴԶύ๮Γ҇Ӆک୯ωૈж߄ύ୯Ǵ೭ࢂѠ᡼Γ҇܌όૈௗڙǴΨࢂҞ߻
ٿ۞ᜢ߯ว৖คݤ҅தϯޑനεምᛖǶ  
For a long time, Beijing government has maintained that Taiwan must accept the ‘One 
China’ principle and insisted that Taiwan is part of China and only the People’s 
Republic of China can represent China. This is what Taiwan’s people cannot accept and 
is also at present the biggest obstacle to the normalization of the cross-strait relations. 
 
C006: The Beijing government has imposed us to accept the idea that China, there’s  
only one China which should be represented by P.R.C. I’m afraid this is probably  
the biggest obstacle between Chinese and Taiwanese. 
 
185 
 
 The phrase “I’m afraid” and the adverb “probably” have added hesitations to what 
the Taiwanese speaker said. Obviously, C006 was modifying the original illocutionary 
force by using the mitigation strategy on linguistic level. While the speaker explicitly 
and firmly gave her negative comment on the One China policy, the deviant rendition, 
which was added by C006, made the speaker sound less affirmative. Also, by turning 
the obstacles in the “cross-strait relations” into the obstacles between “Chinese and 
Taiwanese”, C006 might reduce the Taiwan issue from international level to a domestic 
problem. Although C006 had the weakest sense of national identity among her group 
members and she ‘strongly disagreed’ that she had been aware of her Chinese identity 
when interpreting for the Taiwanese leaders, however, it is found that when rendering 
Speech  5  (T),  C006 omitted  the  official  title  of  Chen Shui-bian  as  Taiwan’s  President  
and referred to China as the “mainland government” in relation to Taiwan. As a result, it 
is  likely  that  in  Example  7,  C006  was  unintentionally  disclosing  her  One  China  
ideology through the mitigation strategy.   
 
5.2.6 Overstatement/Intensification 
 
It is found that while the Chinese speakers express their stance on the One China 
policy, some of the Chinese subjects may explicitly show their contempt for or 
opposition to the Taiwan independence issue by using deviant wording. 
 
Example 8: 
Speech 4 (C) 
ՠࢂǴѠ㵈㜾ֽ勮ڰ䢊࡭“Ѡ㧆”ϩ຋ҥ䢉Ǵу䴿㚸٣“Ѡ㧆”ϩ຋ࢲ㜥ǶϞԃа䗂 
׳ࢂу䴿೯㠤“䤄ࡹׯ೷”Ǵ䡾俽“Ѡ㵈ݤ౛㧆ҥ”Ƕ੝㞄ࢂό勯䤱㚵Ѧ㳾ਗ਼ϸ㛱Ǵ㳾
Չ䶁З“㡚䶘㜘”ک“㡚䶘䵫勷”Ǵ㤄ࢂ㛱㡚劤ޗ㜘දၹ䢊࡭΋㚚ύ㡚চ䞩کѠੇکѳ
䳅ۓޑ䛸ख़ࡷ㱦Ƕ  
However, Taiwan’s authorities stubbornly insist on ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist 
stance, step up doing ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities. Since this year, [ ] 
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even stepped up passing ‘the constitutional reform’, attempting to achieve ‘Taiwan legal 
independence’. In particular, [ ] disregarded the strong opposition inside and outside the 
island, forcibly terminated the ‘National Unification Council’ and the ‘National 
Unification Guidelines'. This is a severe provocation to the one China principle widely 
held by the international community and to the peace and stability across the Taiwan 
Strait. 
 
C003: However, the Taiwan, Taiwan stick to the independence, the so-called 
independence. And this year they have the constitution reform and want to achieve 
the so-called independence, without regard to the opposition in both part, both 
area. So the international community support our peaceful cooperation. 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2.4.4, the adjective “so-called” is widely used in China to 
give negative traits to Taiwan independence. It is therefore very clear that C003 is using 
the predication strategy in linguistic terms to show her contempt for the Taiwan 
independence issue. Meanwhile, the prepositional phrase “in both area[s]” also indicates 
that C003 was rendering cross-strait issues according to the principles that a ‘patriotic’ 
Chinese interpreter/translator should follow (see Chapter 2.4.4). C003’s active sentence 
“the international community support…” at the last of the rendered text also intensified 
the international legitimacy of the One China policy. Also, C003 had a relatively strong 
sense of national identity toward China (ranked 10th out of the 41 subjects). It may be 
argued that C003 demonstrated strong Chinese hegemonic thinking towards Taiwan in 
Example 8. 
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5.2.7 Distortion 
 
A distorted rendition in this study means the rendered meaning is opposite to or 
greatly deviates from what the speakers say or is very likely to be untrue to the reality. 
Example 9 shows a slight change of wording may lead to fabrication of reality. 
 
Example 9: 
Source Text: 
ך䜹偳偤ӑѭࡹ۬کΓ҇剟යа䗂ӧѠ㵈剱匉΢䶒ϒύ㡚ޑ㡸偊Ѝ࡭Ƕ㜚܌ڬޕǴ
Ѡ㵈ࢂύ㡚勷βόёϩപޑ΋೽ϩǴ㤄ࢂ䞄سډ 13䜰ύ㡚Γ҇҇௼ག௃ޑख़ε௵
ག剱匉Ƕ  
We appreciate the Indonesian government and people’s long-term valuable support for 
China in terms of the Taiwan issue. Everyone knows Taiwan is an inseparable part of 
China’s territory. This is a major and sensitive issue concerning the national feelings of 
the 1.3 billion Chinese people. 
 
C011: We, we appreciate the stand point of Indonesia government on the matter of 
Taiwan and China issue. It is known to all that Taiwan is in our sovereignty. This 
is an important emotion issue to Chinese people. 
 
 What the Chinese speaker said, “Everyone knows Taiwan is an inseparable art of 
China’s  territory”  was  a  topoi  or  fallacy  of  the  cross-strait  relations.  Yet,  by  using  the  
prepositional phrase “in our sovereignty”, C011 was linguistically distorting the status 
quo of cross-strait relations through the predication strategy and misleading the listener 
into thinking that Taiwan has been part of China and governed by the Chinese 
government, while as a matter of fact Taiwan has never been under the control of the 
P.R.C. (see Chapter 2.5.2.4). Given her relatively strong sense of national identity 
(ranked 7th out of 41) and her support for the One China policy indicated by her 
post-experiment questionnaire results, it is very likely that C011 had brought her 
hegemonic thinking into Example 9.   
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5.2.8 Prioritizing personal cognition 
 
Some of the subjects are found to have rendered the source texts according to their 
previous knowledge. More specifically, the cases produced by the Chinese subjects may 
lead listeners to think that Taiwan is part of China or may show the Chinese hegemony 
towards Taiwan. 
 
Example 10: 
Speech 1 (C) 
ך䜹䢊㜞ϸ㛱“Ѡ㧆”ϩ຋㡆ΚϷځࢲ㜥Ǵ䶖όϢ侪“Ѡ㧆”ϩ຋㡆ΚаҺՖӜ㚜ǵҺ
ՖБԄעѠ㵈㚸઒㡚ϩ຋рѐǶך䜹㩲䶠䶦ӕ㚬εѠ㵈ӕझ΋ၰǴӅӕ܍㢢ଆϸ
㛱ϩ຋㡚ৎǵߦ僳کѳ䶘΋ޑઓᣓ٬ڮǶ 
We firmly oppose “Taiwan independence” separatist forces and the related activities, 
never allow “Taiwan independence” separatist forces to separate Taiwan from the 
motherland in any name or in any way.  We  will  continuously  with  vast  numbers  of  
Taiwanese compatriots together shoulder the sacred mission to oppose division of the 
country and promote peaceful unification. 
 
C015: We oppose the separate activity. We don’t allow this kind of activities in the name 
of people interest. With Taiwanese compatriot we will undergo, we undertake this 
task of reunification. 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2.4.4, one of the cross-strait fallacies that Chinese 
authorities have created is: 
 
کѳှ㜞Ѡ㵈剱匉಄ӝхࡴѠ㵈ӕझӧ㚵ޑӄᥟύ㡚Γ҇ޑਥҁճ੻Ƕ 
 A peaceful solution to the Taiwan question serves the interests of all Chinese 
    people, including our compatriots in Taiwan. 
 
Clearly, the phrase “in the name of people interest” produced by C015 in Example 10 
may indicate that the above fallacy may have become part of the common knowledge 
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shared by Chinese people. More specifically, by reproducing such fallacy in a 
spontaneous manner in her rendition, C015 was using the argumentation strategy on 
linguistic  level  to  justify  China’s  attempt  at  seizing  Taiwan.  Compared  with  the  other  
subjects, C015 had a relatively strong sense of national identity (ranked 4th out of the 41 
subjects) and was found to have produced other hegemonic signs in rendering another 
three speeches, including Speech 1 (C), Speech 3 (T) and Speech 5 (T). As a result, it 
should be reasonable to see Example 10 as an embodiment of C015’s hegemonic 
thinking. 
 
Example 11: 
Speech 4 (C) 
ϸ㛱“Ѡ㧆”ϩ຋㡆ΚϷځࢲ㜥Ǵ䶭䧭Ѡੇکѳ䳅ۓǴࢂך䜹䢊ۓό౽ޑཀדک㜞ЈǶ
ך䜹㩲䶠䶦ոΚ㜋ڗکѳ䶘΋ޑ߻ඳǴՠ䶖όϢ侪עѠ㵈㚸ύ㡚ϩപрѐǶ“Ѡ㧆”
ϩ຋㡆ΚޑՉ㢐ό㚶ࢂ㛱㝫۞䞄سޑϦฅࡷ㱦ǴΨޔௗ࠶丨ډ䜦ϼӦ㛂ޑکѳᢳ
䳅ۓǶ 
Opposing ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and [their] activities and maintaining 
peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is our firm will and determination. We will 
keep working hard for the prospect of peaceful unification but never allow Taiwan to be 
separated from China. The ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces’ actions are not 
only openly provocative to cross-strait relations but also directly threatening the peace 
and stability of the Asia Pacific region. 
 
C007: We are determined and continue to try our best for unification of country. 
However, we do not want to lose Taiwan. And separatist behaviour is not only a 
threat to our country but also a threat to Asia Pacific area. 
 
 The fallacy that Taiwan independence will pose a threat to the peace across the 
Taiwan Strait has been widely circulated in China (see Chapter 2.4.4). As a matter of 
fact, China has maintained that it will attack Taiwan by force if Taiwan overtly defies 
the One China policy through formal independence, which is perhaps why C007 
explicitly referred to Taiwan independence as “a threat” to China. It may be argued that 
C007’s deviant rendition is another fallacy which is expressed in a more blatant and 
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direct manner than the Chinese speaker. Accordingly, C007 was using the 
argumentation strategy on linguistic level to show her hegemonic attitude towards 
Taiwan. C007 did not have a relatively strong sense of national identity (ranked 13th in 
her  group)  compared  with  her  group  members.  Yet,  she  ‘strongly  disagreed’  in  the  
post-experiment questionnaire that her rendition in the SI experiment was objective. 
Perhaps she was aware of having producing some ideologically deviant signs. For 
instance, when interpreting Speech 2 (T), she referred to the Taiwanese speaker as a 
leader from “China” and representing “China” to show gratitude for Nauru’s help. For 
another instance, she omitted the phrase “President Chen Shui-bain” when interpreting 
Speech 5 (T). It may be likely that at least some of her ideologically deviant renditions 
were produced intentionally. 
 
5.2.9 Specification 
 
Example 12: 
౲܌ࣣޕǴύ๮Γ҇Ӆک୯Ծவ΋ΐѤΐԃࡌҥаٰǴவ҂මӧѠ᡼Չ٬ၸҺՖ
ԖਏЬ៾ǴԶύ๮҇୯ӧѠ᡼ԖԾρޑࡹ۬ǵβӦکΓ҇ǴٿᜐϕόᗧឦǴӚՉ
ځࢂςԖъШइϐΦǴ೭ࢂόݾޑ٣ჴǶ  
Everyone knows that the People’s Republic of China, since in 1949 [it] was established, 
has never exercised in Taiwan any effective sovereignty, and the Republic of China in 
Taiwan has [its] own government, land, and people. Both sides do not belong to each 
other and have developed self-autonomy for half a century. This is an undisputed fact. 
 
C017: As you all know, since nineteen forty-nine, People’s Republic of China hasn’t 
exercised any sovereignty over the Taiwan island. Taiwan has its own land, people 
and it didn’t belong to mainland.  And  it  has  their  own  policy.  This  is  an  
established fact. 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2.4.4, from public sectors to academic circles, many 
people in China, especially the authorities concerned, provide their opinions about the 
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code of ethics for Chinese interpreters and give specific instructions for translations. For 
instance, Shi Yanhuaࡼᐪ๮, a former Chinese interpreter-turned-diplomat, explicitly 
points  out  that  when  it  comes  to  ‘Taiwan’,  China  should  be  referred  to  as  ‘China’s  
mainland’ or ‘the mainland of China’ rather than ‘the mainland China’ in order to avoid 
an implication of two Chinas (Shi, 2007). Still some other people in China think the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait should be referred to as ‘Taiwan and the mainland’ in English 
in order not to damage China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (He & Li, 2011: 8-9). 
In Chapter 2.4.4, the researcher has also discussed the hegemonic implications of the 
phrase  ‘Taiwan  island’  within  political  context.  Therefore,  it  is  very  likely  that  C017  
was using the referential/nomination strategy to downgrade Taiwan’s status and imply 
that Taiwan is part of China. C017 also ‘strongly agreed’ that she had been quite aware 
of her Chinese national identity when interpreting for the Taiwanese leaders and 
‘moderately agreed’ that Taiwan can never be separated from China, both of which may 
indicate her firm stance on the One China policy.  
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5.3 CDA Analysis – the Taiwan Group 
 
5.3.1 Substitution 
 
In  the  Taiwan  group,  some  of  the  subjects  use  the  term  ‘nation’  or  ‘country’  
instead of ‘party’ or ‘side’ when the speakers refer to Taiwan, which may create an 
impression that the speakers are explicitly asserting Taiwan’s status as a country. When 
they interpret the China speeches, some of them avoid repeating the source phrases, 
which refer to China as Taiwan’s motherland, by using other more detached or neutral 
phrases.  
 
Example 13: 
Speech 1 (C) 
ך䜹ा䢊ۓό౽Ӧ䶭䧭㡚ৎЬ䩯ک勷βֹ᏾Ǵ䲹᫾௢僳઒㡚کѳ䶘΋ε䛳Ƕύ㡚
Γ҇䮔䮫Ծρޑ㡚ৎǴۈ䶁䢊ۓό౽Ӧ䶭䧭㡚ৎЬ䩯ǵ勷βֹ᏾ک҇௼൧䛸Ǵ㜞
όϢ侪ҺՖ㡆ΚߟҍǶ 
We need to firmly maintain the national sovereignty and territory integrity, actively 
promote peaceful unification of the motherland. Chinese people love own country, 
always firmly protect the national sovereignty, territory integrity, and the national 
dignity, and never allow any force to invade [China]. 
 
T007: We have to maintain this territory unification and wish to unify this nation one 
day. This country will still insist to obtain our territory, territory and we will not 
allow any force to invade. 
 
 T007 used the noun phrase “this nation” instead of repeating the Chinese speaker’s 
phrase “the motherland” in Example 13. In her corresponding retro questionnaire, T007 
explicitly expressed her disagreement with the One Country Two Systems mentioned by 
the Chinese speaker. In her another retro questionnaire after interpreting Speech 4 (C), 
she explicitly wrote, “Taiwan does not belong to China”, obviously showing her 
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opposition  to  the  One  China  policy.  It  is  very  likely  that  T007  was  using  the  
referential/nomination strategy on linguistic level in Example 13 to resist referring to 
China as “motherland”. Since she thought “Taiwan does not belong to China”, it would 
be against her will to recognize China as the motherland of Taiwan. To deal with her 
ideological conflict with what the Chinese speaker said, she referred to China as “this 
nation” instead. 
 
Example 14: 
Speech 1 (C) 
לВ㥾㜋ޑᴏճǴ䶌״ΑВҁӧѠ㵈 50ԃޑ෗҇䶘ݯǴ٬Ѡ㵈ӣډ઒㡚ᧃܤǶ 
The victory of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War ended Japan’s fifty-year colonial rule of 
Taiwan, made Taiwan return to the motherland’s embrace. 
 
T011: The victory of the war finish the fifty years of occupation by Japan so that Taiwan 
can return to the original country.   
 
T011 expressed her strong disagreement with the speaker’s statement that Taiwan 
is part of China by writing “Taiwan is not part of China, what the hell of unification!!!” 
in her corresponding retro questionnaire. In the in-depth interview, T011 further 
explained why she had rendered ‘]· guó઒㡚(motherland/mother country)’ into ‘the 
original country’: 
 
When I hear the term ]· guó, I kind of resisted it. I didn’t want to interpret it but I 
couldn’t skip it. Originally, I should have interpreted it into ‘motherland’ or 
‘mother  country,’  but  I  didn’t  agree  with  the  idea.  So  I  invented another strange 
term ‘the original country’ instead (my underlined emphasis). 
 
Obviously, T011 was quite aware of her resistance to the Chinese hegemony during the 
SI  process.  It  is  also  surprising  that  under  tight  time  constraints  she  could  ‘invent’  
another  term  to  replace  the  commonly  used  one.  As  a  result,  it  is  clear  that  in  this  
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example T011 was using the referential/nomination strategy to show her resistance to 
the Chinese hegemony. 
 
5.3.2 Addition 
 
Some of the Taiwanese subjects add the word ‘Taiwan’ or ‘Taiwanese’ to the 
renditions whereas the speaker did not mention Taiwan, which may highlight the status 
of Taiwan or emphasize the role of Taiwan in international events. 
 
Example 15: 
Speech 1 (C) 
1945ԃ 9Д 2ВǴВҁࡹ۬҅Ԅ䳼࿿׫फ़䜐Ǵ࠹֋ΑВҁߟౣޣޑ䦒ۭѨ债کШ
ࣚϸݤՋථ㥾㜋ޑനӟᴏճǶύ㡚Γ҇לВ㥾㜋کШࣚϸݤՋථ㥾㜋аύ㡚Γ҇
کШࣚӚ㡚Γ҇ޑ䦒ۭᴏճ僇ΕΑў㛘Ǽ 
On 2 September 1945 Japan’s government officially signed the Instrument of Surrender, 
proclaimed Japanese invaders’ crushing defeat and the final victory against the World 
Anti-Fascism War. The Chinese Anti-Japanese War and the World Anti-Fascism War 
ended with Chinese people and all the other country people's great victory being 
recorded in history! 
 
T017: In nineteen sixty-five, Japanese government they signed an agreement that shows 
they have been defeated in the war and also for fascism. That is the total victory 
for Chinese and Taiwanese people in Anti-fascism war. 
 
 The fact that Taiwan’s version of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War is different from 
China’s has been discussed in Chapter 3.3.2.1. People in Taiwan have been educated 
that  the  victory  of  the  war  was  won by  the  R.O.C.,  which  is  now based  in  Taiwan.  It  
may be likely that T017 would like to specify Taiwan’s contribution to the victory. As 
the Chinese speaker always referred to Taiwan’s people as Chinese compatriots, it may 
be likely that T017 would like to make clear that Taiwanese people are not members of 
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Chinese people by using the referential/nomination strategy on linguistic level to 
distinguish Taiwanese from Chinese. Although in the corresponding retro questionnaires, 
T017 did not show resentment against the Chinese hegemony. Also, in her 
post-experiment questionnaire, she ‘moderately disagreed’ that she had been aware of 
her Taiwanese national identity in the process of interpreting for the Chinese leaders, 
and she ‘moderately agreed’ that her renditions in the SI experiment were objective. 
However, in the in-depth interview, T017 explicitly said, “in my opinion, Taiwan’s 
motherland is Taiwan”, which indicates T017’s opposition to the One China policy.  
 
5.3.3 Omission 
 
It  is  found  in  this  study  that  when  the  Chinese  speakers  refer  to  China  as  the  
‘motherland’  of  Taiwan,  some  of  the  Taiwanese  subjects  remain  silent,  and  some  of  
them who have given an interview after the SI experiment admit their awareness of 
omitting something clashing with their ideology. 
 
Example 16: 
Speech 1 (C) 
לВ㥾㜋ޑᴏճǴ䶌״ΑВҁӧѠ㵈 50ԃޑ෗҇䶘ݯǴ٬Ѡ㵈ӣډ઒㡚ᧃܤǶ  
The victory of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War ended Japan’s fifty-year colonial rule of 
Taiwan, made Taiwan return to the motherland’s embrace. 
 
T010: The victory ended the colonism of fifty years in Taiwan.  
 
 The Chinese speaker used ‘zԃ guó઒㡚(motherland/mother country)’ in Example 
16 to describe the relations between China and Taiwan; however, T010 did not render 
the part concerning the ‘motherland’. The omission mitigated the speaker’s intention to 
state that Taiwan is part of China, leaving the rendered text a neutral sentence depicting 
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the commonly known fact that the defeated Japan stopped ruling Taiwan after the war. 
In her in-depth interview, T010 gave an explanation for this omission. She said, ‘Partly 
because I didn’t know how to express it [motherland] and partly because I didn’t agree 
with the speaker’. She also explicitly stated that she was ‘kind of confined to’ her own 
[Taiwanese] identity when interpreting for the Chinese leaders. Evidently, this example 
is very likely to be a sign of her resistance to the Chinese hegemony. 
 
5.3.4 Compression 
 
The compression strategy is usually used to cope with high-density information. 
The  following  example  shows  compression  may  lead  to  an  interpreter’s  assertion  of  
his/her political ideology. 
 
Example 17: 
Speech 5 (T) 
Γ҇ωࢂ୯ৎޑЬΓǴคፕύѧ܈ӦБࡹ۬ޑ२ߏǴ೿ࢂҗΓ҇ᒧᖐрٰǴ଺ό
ӳǴΓ҇൩཮ӧΠԛᒧᖐᡣдΠᆵǶ଺όჹǴᗋԖݤࡓჹдڋຊǶፎୢǴύ୯ε
ഌࢂόࢂ೭ኬګǻ 
The people are the master of the country. Whether central or local government leaders 
are elected by the people. If [ ] does not perform well, the people will let him step down 
in  the  next  election.  If  [  ]  does  something  wrong,  there  are  laws  punishing  him.  [I]  
would like to ask: is it the same in the Chinese mainland? 
 
T004: In Taiwan people are the boss of the nation. And all the gov, official governments 
are public servants. It’s a democratic country. So if they do not do well in the 
government, they will, the laws, regulations, and if they don’t do well people 
won’t let them, vote them next time. Will it the same situation in China? 
 
 While the Taiwanese speaker explained the voting system in a democracy, T004 
explicitly specified what the speaker said was about the democratic system in Taiwan. 
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T004 also compressed the source text by referring to Taiwan as a “democratic country”. 
Linguistically, T004 was attaching the positive adjective “democratic” to Taiwan 
through the predication strategy and defined Taiwan as a country through the 
referential/nomination strategy. Notably, T004 had the weakest sense of national 
identity  among  all  of  the  subjects  (ranked  41  out  of  41),  and  she  “agreed  somewhat”  
that Taiwan is part of China in the post-experiment questionnaire. Of all the Taiwanese 
subjects, only T004 agreed with the idea that Taiwan is part of China. Yet, in her retro 
questionnaire for Speech 5 (T), she explicitly agreed that the Taiwanese speaker accused 
China of threatening Taiwan with missiles and replacing Taiwan in the United Nations. 
In her retro questionnaires for Speech 1 (C), she expressed her negative feelings towards 
the speech content by specifying that China’s victory over Japan in the war was not that 
splendid and that China as a communist country was not different from fascism. And in 
her retro questionnaire for Speech 4 (C), she disagreed about the Chinese speaker’s 
negative description of Taiwan independence. Her wish that the cross-strait relations 
remain the status quo was also made clear in her student interpreter background 
questionnaire. According to the above evidence, her idea that Taiwan is part of China 
may result from the sinicization policy that the KMT-led R.O.C. government has 
implemented in Taiwan for several decades, which emphasizes Taiwan is part of the 
Republic of China rather than the People’s Republic of China (see Chapter 2.5.2). 
Therefore, when confronted with Chinese hegemony, she, as a member of Taiwan’s 
people, still showed resistance. 
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5.3.5 Mitigation 
 
Some  of  the  Taiwanese  subjects,  by  using  a  less  affirmative  tense  or  structure,  
downplay the Chinese speakers’ statement or implication that Taiwan is part of China. 
 
Example 18: 
Speech 1 (C) 
ך䜹㩲䢊࡭“کѳ䶘΋ǵ΋㡚㝫ڋ”ޑ୷ҁБ兮ک䯢劢ࢤ䠁৖㝫۞䞄سǵ௢僳઒㡚ک
ѳ䶘΋僳ำޑΖ勪Ь䦄Ǵ䢊࡭΋㚚ύ㡚চ䞩㜞ό㜥㹜Ǵ㜋ڗکѳ䶘΋ޑոΚ㜞ό
ܫ㟏Ǵ偄䦒஌׆ఈΪѠ㵈Γ҇ޑБ兮㜞όׯ䠃Ǵϸ㛱“Ѡ㧆”ϩ຋ࢲ㜥㜞όִ㜧Ƕ 
We will insist on “peaceful unification, one country two systems” as the basic policy, 
develop at the current stage the cross-strait relations and push forward the motherland’s 
peaceful unification according to the eight principles, insist on the one China principle 
and never sway, never give up fighting for peaceful unification, implement the policy of 
having expectations of Taiwanese people and never change [this policy], oppose 
“Taiwan’s independence” separatist activities and never compromise. 
 
T005: One system and peaceful reunification and remaining the principle are important. 
These, there are eight principles to improve our reunification. We insist on one 
China policy and we hope Chi, Taiwan will become our province and  we would  
never negotiate with people who support Taiwan independence. 
 
 China always insists that Taiwan be part of China and views Taiwan as a renegade 
province. By using the verb ‘hope’ and the modal verb ‘will’, T005 greatly mitigated the 
hegemonic tone of the Chinese speaker. In the two corresponding retro questionnaires, 
she explicitly voiced her negative feelings towards Speech 1 (C). In terms of Part I, 
Speech 1 (C), she said: 
  
The topic is for the celebration of victory but it sounds like speaker takes a hostile 
attitude towards Japan. Moreover, the message was ၅ႬΑ [exaggerated]. It 
sounds very unnatural to me.  
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In terms of Part II, Speech 1 (C), she said: 
 
  Again the register and tone are praising China's hardworking but actually it 
 claims  that  Taiwan  should  be  part  of  China  which  is  not  comfortable  for  me  to  
 listen to. It's a threatening article in disguise. 
 
Obviously, while interpreting for the Chinese speaker, T005 was quite aware of Chinese 
hegemony, whether towards Others or Taiwan, throughout the speech. Her strong 
opposition to the One China policy was also made clear in the results of her 
post-experiment questionnaire. Accordingly, it is very likely that she used the mitigation 
strategy on linguistic level in Example 18 to show her resistance to Chinese hegemony. 
 
5.3.6 Overstatement/Intensification 
 
Some of the Taiwanese subjects may render what the Taiwanese speakers say in a 
more assertive or emotional manner to reinforce the speakers’ original resistance to 
hegemony. 
 
Example 19: 
Speech 5 (T) 
Ѡ᡼Γᆃᅰ܌ૈڐշգॺǴԶգॺࠅӧ୯ሞ΢ೀೀ࠾ఠǵѺᓸǴ٠ᑈཱུӧܿࠄݮ
ੇ೽࿿०ቸǴࡤᓵᆶ࠶ુѠ᡼ǶӵԜৱஒϜൔǴፎୢǴѠ᡼ΓբՖགགྷǻ 
Taiwan’s people try the best to help you, whereas you internationally keep blocking and 
suppressing [Taiwan], and actively along the southeastern coastline deploy missiles to 
intimidate and threaten Taiwan. Such behavior of returning evil for good. [I] would like 
to ask: How do Taiwan’s people feel? 
 
T006:  People  from  Taiwan  have  assisted  as  possible  as  they  can  to.  However,  the  
Chinese government has bullied Taiwan and threatens Taiwan and deploys many 
missiles. Of course Taiwanese people will feel very betrayed. 
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 By turning the Taiwanese speaker’s question into an outspoken assertion, T006 was 
using the intensification strategy on linguistic level to show her resistance to Chinese 
hegemony. T006’s direct and resentful tone may result from her strong opposition to the 
One China policy. In the Speech 4 (C) retro questionnaire, T006 explicitly expressed her 
disagreement with the Chinese speaker’s statement that Taiwan is part of China, while 
in her post-experiment questionnaire, she ‘strongly disagreed’ that Taiwan is part of 
China. Therefore, it is very likely that she had her resistance ideology embodied in this 
example.  
 
5.3.7 Distortion 
 
A distorted rendition in this study means the rendered meaning is opposite to or 
greatly deviates from what the speakers say or is very likely to be untrue to the reality. 
For instance, a few of the Taiwanese subjects produce renditions which are 
contradictory to what the Chinese speakers say to show strong resistance to the Chinese 
hegemony. 
 
Example 20: 
Speech 4 (C) 
ӧ㤄΋ख़ε剱匉΢Ǵך䜹׆ఈӑѭӚܻࣚ϶ӕך䜹΋ၰǴӅӕϸ㛱“Ѡ㧆”ǴӅӕ䶭
䧭ҁӦ㛂ޑکѳᢳӼᣖǶ 
In terms of this important issue, we hope Indonesian friends of every circle with us 
jointly oppose ‘Taiwan independence’ and jointly maintain the peace and quiet of this 
region. 
 
T018: In this issue we hope Indonesian government and people will help us to      
     maintain a peaceful relation with Taiwan. 
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 As shown above, the underlined rendition has greatly deviated from the source text. 
The Chinese speaker originally appealed for the Indonesian support for the One China 
policy, but T018 distorted the source text and greatly mitigated the Chinese hegemonic 
tone. In her in-depth interview, T018 explained why she gave such a distorted rendition: 
 
I remember that when I interpreted this paragraph, I fully disagreed with what Jia 
[Jia Qinglin] said. He stated that China’s policy of the Taiwan issue was supported 
by  Taiwanese  people,  which  I  think  was  totally  untrue.  Probably  I  didn’t  want  to  
render what he said so I sort of changed his original wording. 
 
T018’s use of the mitigation strategy in linguistic terms was also found in her rendering 
of another sentence in the same speech, in which she distorted the Chinese speaker’s 
fallacy that Taiwan independence activities are provocative to the cross-strait relations 
into “The act has violated our hope on remaining peaceful relation with Taiwan”. It 
seems that T018 may tend to use the mitigation strategy to show her resistance to 
Chinese hegemony. 
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5.3.8 Prioritizing personal cognition 
 
Some of the subjects are found to have rendered the source texts according to their 
previous knowledge. More specifically, such renditions produced by the Taiwanese 
subjects may unmask the Chinese hegemony in the source texts or convey more 
resistance messages than what the Taiwanese speakers express. 
 
Example 21: 
Speech 1 (C) 
[ύ䟠҇௼]ම䶈剟㟭යوӧШࣚ߻ӈǶՠࢂǴҗΪ࠾ࡌ䶘ݯޑᆭ债ک״䷓Ǵύ㡚䭍
䭍ပӟΑǶ  
[The Chinese race] for a long time had walked in the front row of the world [countries]. 
However, due to feudalistic ruling’s corruption and restriction, China gradually lagged 
behind. 
 
T007: For many years, China has been in the leading place in the world. But because    
of some policies, it become the very closed, uncommunicated country. 
 
By describing China as a “closed, uncommunicated country”, T007 was 
linguistically using the predication strategy to express her previous negative impression 
about China. Although the specific predicative phrase used by T007 deviated from the 
wording of the Chinese speaker, the former was not opposite or completely untrue to the 
reality,  or  more  precisely,  to  the  reality  about  the  Chinese  mainland  that  people  of  
Taiwan have been told by the KMT-led R.O.C. government for decades (see Chapter 
2.5.2.1). Also, T007’s strong opposition to the One China policy was made clear in her 
retro questionnaire for Speech 4 (C) and in her post-experiment questionnaire. 
Accordingly, it is very likely that T007 was showing her resistance to Chinese 
hegemony through the predication strategy in this example. 
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Example 22: 
Speech 5 (T) 
…ࣁՖч٧ޑࡹ៾ၟѠчޑࡹ៾ӧࡹݯ΢ӵԜ੄෭ϩܴǴࣗԿᆙ஭ჹҥǻচӢӧ
ܭٿ۞ࡹ۬ჹܭΓ៾ǵ҇ЬکԾҗ฻ሽॶᢀֹӄόӕ܌ठǶ 
…why are the Beijing regime and the Taipei regime so clearly different in politics or 
are even [full of] tension and confrontation? The reason is that both governments in 
terms of the values [such as] human rights, democracy, and freedom have completely 
different [values]. 
 
T018: Taiwanese people and Chinese people have share similar views. How come we 
have such intense relation? This is, this results from different nations about 
sovereignty and identity.   
 
In her in-depth interview, T018 gave an explanation for the above underlined 
deviancy: 
 
Probably I used to think that the differences between both sides lie in sovereignty 
and identity so I slipped them out. 
 
This may indicate that “sovereignty” and “identity” were what concerned her most in 
terms  of  the  cross-strait  issues.  Also  note  that  T018 explicitly  referred  to  Taiwan as  a  
“nation” in this example. Clearly, T018 was using the referential/nomination strategy to 
define Taiwan as a nation. In fact, in her in-depth interview, T018 said, “I do not 
consider China to be the motherland of Taiwan” and she further described how she felt 
when the Chinese speakers mentioned the Taiwan issue/One China policy in the 
speeches: 
 
I  was  thinking  ‘Come  on!  What  are  you  talking  about?  This  is  not  true!’  But  I  
could only shout in silence in my mind and still tried to render the source text.     
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Given her negative feelings towards Chinese hegemony and her awareness of Chinese 
hegemony during interpreting, it is not surprising that she used the referential/ 
nomination strategy to show her resistance to Chinese hegemony in this example 
 
5.3.9 Specification 
 
It is found that some of the Taiwanese subjects specify the ‘cross-strait relations’ 
as the relations between ‘countries’. In addition, when the Taiwanese speakers do not 
explicitly refer to Taiwan as a country, some of the Taiwanese subjects make the status 
of Taiwan as a sovereign country in their renditions. 
 
Example 23: 
Speech 3 (T) 
…යࣰӚՏૈ୼ᝩុаߞЈǵ،ЈǵϷܮ౰ޑҾკЈǴӧШၮ཮΢රӛȨԋ൩Ծ
ρǵӀᝬѠ᡼ȩޑҞ኱ᗌ຾Ƕ  
[I] hope everyone can go on with confidence, determination, and high ambition in the 
World Games to move towards the goal of ‘self-fulfilling yourself and glorifying 
Taiwan’. 
 
T005: I hope with your ambition you will, you are on the way to make Taiwan a good 
nation. 
 
 As shown in this example, T005 used the adjective “good” to describe Taiwan, 
highlighting positive traits of Taiwan. Also, she explicitly referred to Taiwan as a 
“nation” when the Taiwanese speaker did not say so. T005’s identification with the 
Taiwanese speakers was made clear in her post-experiment questionnaire, in which she 
expressed that she “moderately” felt comfortable about interpreting for the Taiwanese 
speakers but “strongly” uncomfortable about interpreting for the Chinese speakers and 
that she disagreed with the idea that Taiwan is part of China. It may be likely that T005 
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was using linguistically the predication strategy in this example to show her recognition 
of Taiwan as a country and her resistance to the One China policy. 
 
5.4 CDA Analysis – Special Cases 
 
5.4.1 Special cases – the China group 
 
 In addition to expressing a hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan, some of the 
Chinese subjects also show Chinese hegemony towards the Others,  which  in  this  SI  
experiment involve Japan and Indonesia. There are also some resistance signs found in 
the China group during the interpreting of Speech 5 (T).  
 
5.4.1.1 Chinese hegemony towards the others 
 
 Some of the deviant renditions produced by the Chinese subjects demonstrated 
Chinese ethnocentrism or a Chinese sense of cultural superiority towards the Others. 
 
Example 24: 
Speech 4 (C) 
΢㚚Ш䵣߻㛥Ǵӧ㜋ڗ㡚ৎ㧆ҥک҇௼ှܫޑЏ㜋ύǴύӑѭΓ҇ۈ䶁ઠӧ΋ଆǴ
࣬ϕЍ࡭ǵ࣬ϕႴ䟃ǴӅӕ倣㛙Αל䞤ߟౣޣޑ㜷㠯俉ጇǶ 
In the first half of the last century, during the struggle for national independence and 
racial liberation, Chinese people and Indonesian people always stood together, 
supported each other, encouraged each other, and jointly wrote splendid poetry about 
resistance to and attack on invaders. 
  
C002: In the fight for freedom of your country, we Chinese always support your people 
and support each other, making the history of grand magnitude. 
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In the source text, the Chinese speaker emphasized the friendship between China 
and Indonesia was partly derived from the mutual support and encouragement between 
both  countries  in  the  past.  Yet,  by  using  the  deictic  words  as  your and we in her 
rendition, C002 turned the mutual relations into unequal ones, making China a 
patronizing big brother to Indonesia. It may be likely that C002 was not familiar with 
the historical relations between China and Indonesia specified in this example and 
therefore she may have thought, according to Sinocentrism or Chinese sense of cultural 
superiority, that it should have been Indonesia alone to fight for national independence 
and that China should have been in a superior position to help those inferior to China.  
Arguably, C002 was using the referential/nomination strategy to show her Chinese 
hegemony towards the Others in this example.  
 
Example 25: 
Speech 1 (C) 
ฅԶǴ㤄΋ԛǴύ㡚Γ҇䦒ۭણ࿗ΑВҁ䞎㡚Ь㚜䮀Ϋύ㡚ޑҾ䡾 
However, this time Chinese people completely shattered Japanese militarism’s attempt 
at destroying China… 
 
C011: And this, this, and this time China completely damage Japanese evil intention to 
occupy China… 
 
As shown in the underlined deviancy, Japanese intention was predicated with a 
negative trait “evil” by C011. She also used the adjective “evil” to describe the 918 
Incident, in which Japan occupied part of northeast China, while rendering the same 
speech. As discussed in Chapter 3.3.2.1, the anti-Japan events or rallies have taken 
place in China from time to time in recent decades, which is thought to be the political 
manipulation of Chinese patriotism (Liu, 2005). The negative predicative adjective 
used by C011 to describe Japan may indicate that the Chinese government’s 
manipulation of public ideology has worked. By accusing Japan of being evil through 
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the predication strategy, C011 was asserting China as a representative of justice and 
justifying Chinese hatred towards Japan. 
 
5.4.1.2 Chinese resistance 
 
 Although the China group as a whole has a tendency to show Chinese hegemony in 
the  SI  renditions,  seven  of  the  Chinese  subjects  also  showed resistance  to  the  Chinese  
hegemony, which may be attributed to the following two reasons: 
 
(1) Prioritizing personal cognition:  
Some of the Chinese subjects explicitly referred to Taiwan as a country or nation 
when interpreting Speech 5 (T). It may be argued that these subjects, although instilled 
with Chinese collective ideology, perceive the fact that Taiwan enjoys its autonomy 
instead of being governed by China. It should be noted that only in rendering Speech 5 
(T), which was given by then Taiwan’s Vice-President, did these Chinese subjects 
produce resistance signs, which may indicate that they considered it appropriate to refer 
to Taiwan as a country when the speaker was from Taiwan. 
 
Example 26: 
Speech 5 (T) 
ٿ۞ࡹ۬ϷΓ҇֡ᔈၢಥᐕўணՀǴҔ჻ཥޑࡘᆢǴܫ౳ϺΠǴҥى٥ϼǴӅӕ
թࡌٿ۞ӅӸӅᄪᆶ҉ុว৖ޑཥֽǶ 
Both sides’ governments and peoples should jump beyond historically set patterns, use 
brand-new thinking, take a broad view at the world, stand firm in the Asia Pacific area, 
and jointly develop a new situation of both sides’ mutual prosperity and sustainable 
development. 
 
C013: I hope the two countries between the two sides should cooperate with each other  
and contribute to the prosperity in Asia and the world. 
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 C013 was the only Chinese subject that did not produce any hegemonic signs in 
the SI experiment.  In her retro questionnaires,  C013, compared with the other Chinese 
subjects, showed more sympathy for Taiwan (independence). For instance, in terms of 
Speech 1 (C), she pointed out that it should be the KMT rather than the Chinese 
Communist Party had functioned greatly in the war against Japan, while in terms of 
Speech 5 (T), she agreed with what the Taiwanese speaker said about how the Chinese 
government isolated Taiwan from the world. She also remained reserved about the idea 
that Taiwan is part of China as indicated in her post-experiment questionnaire. Judging 
from the evidence, C013 may not hold Chinese hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan. As 
a result,  it  may not be surprising that she perceived Taiwan as a country in reality and 
referred to Taiwan as a country (the referential/nomination strategy) when interpreting 
for the Taiwanese speaker. 
 
(2) Resistance to Chinese totalitarianism 
When the Taiwanese speaker made comparison between Taiwan's democracy and 
China’s totalitarianism in Speech 5 (T),  some of the Chinese subjects seemed to show 
their support for democracy by intensifying the speaker’s resistance tone, which may 
further indicate that they were dissatisfied about or even despised Chinese 
totalitarianism. 
 
Example 27: 
Speech 5 (T) 
คፕύѧ܈ӦБࡹ۬ޑ२ߏǴ೿ࢂҗΓ҇ᒧᖐрٰǴ଺όӳǴΓ҇൩཮ӧΠԛᒧ
ᖐᡣдΠᆵǶ଺όჹǴᗋԖݤࡓჹдڋຊǶፎୢǴύ୯εഌࢂόࢂ೭ኬګǻ 
Whether central or local government leaders are elected by the people. If [ ] does not 
perform well, the people will let him step down in the next election. If [ ] does 
something wrong, there are laws punishing him. [I] would like to ask: is it the same in 
the Chinese mainland? 
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C010: No matter the leader in the central or local, they were elected by the people. If the 
officials did wrong, they will be punished by law. However, in the mainland China 
the situation is totally different. 
 
 By replacing the speaker’s question with an assertion as shown in the above 
underlined rendition, C010 intensified the speaker’s disagreement with China’s political 
system. It is likely that C010 was communicating her opinion about the totalitarian 
political system implemented in China. Previous literature about domestic resistance to 
Chinese hegemony has been addressed in Chapter 2.2.2. Therefore, the deviancy of the 
above underlined rendition may be the embodiment of C010’s resentment against 
China’s political system and thus be regarded as a resistance sign. It should be noted 
that the Chinese people who have a strong sense of national identity may not fully agree 
with the communist regime and long for democracy. The Epoch Timesεइϡ could be 
a typical example1. On the other hand, the Chinese people who enjoy democracy abroad 
as Chinese emigrants may still feel greatly attached to China and oppose the 
‘interference’  of  foreign  countries  in  China’s  ‘domestic’  affairs.  For  instance,  some  
overseas Chinese living in Madrid sent an open letter to the U.S. President Barack 
Obama in February 2010, expressing their anger at the U.S.’s attempt to 
‘internationalize’ the Tibet issue and to ruin the integrity of Chinese territory2. In a word, 
there is no absolute correlation between one’s patriotic feeling and one’s political 
ideology. Take C010 for example. She had a relatively weak sense of national identity 
toward her country (ranked 14th out of 21). While C010 showed resistance to Chinese 
hegemony in this example, her support for the One China policy was made clear in her 
post-experiment questionnaire. Given the evidence presented here, it is likely that 
                                               
1 The Epoch Times is famous for its anti-CCP (the Chinese Communist Party) reports; yet, it pays great 
attention to everything concerning China. See its website at http://www.epochtimes.com/.   
2 English news report retrieved 10 September 2012 from the website of Xinhua News Agency at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-02/21/c_13181321.htm; the Chinese news report 
retrieved 10 September 2012 at http://chinese.people.com.cn/GB/10982464.html. 
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C010’s resistance sign was a manifestation of acknowledgement of or disagreement 
with China’s totalitarian regime rather than an act of defiance against her own country. 
 
5.4.2 Special cases – the Taiwan group 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2.5, the shaping and reshaping of ideologies and identities 
causes a national identity crisis among people of Taiwan. For those Mainlanders who 
fled  with  Chiang  Kai-shek  to  Taiwan  after  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  seized  the  
Chinese mainland, they and their immediate descendants tend to regard Taiwan as a 
province of the Republic of China (the R.O.C.) and hope one day both sides across the 
Taiwan Strait may be reunited. By contrast, those who are native inhabitants of Taiwan 
tend  to  identify  with  ‘Taiwan’  rather  than  ‘the  R.O.C.’  and  resist  the  idea  of  being  
governed by Communist China if Taiwan is taken over by China. The national identity 
crisis has been further compounded by the KMT's attempt to resinizise the people of 
Taiwan. The KMT’s measures to shape Sinocentrist ideology through educational and 
media systems have made some, if not many, people of Taiwan stuck at the idea of 
whether  they  should  see  ‘China’  as  their  motherland.  As  a  result,  despite  a  growing  
trend in Taiwan in opposing the reunification with China at present, some Mainlanders 
and native Taiwanese still hold the KMT’s Sinocentrist ideology or suffer from its 
influence without self awareness, which may be why Sinocentrist ideology was 
embodied in some of the renditions produced by two of the Taiwanese subjects.  
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Example 28: 
Speech 3 (T) 
೭ΒՏہ঩খӳж߄ᆵ᡼ٿঁЬाࡹលᆶٿঁόӕޑচՐ҇௼ဂǴᡉҢᆵ᡼ࢂ΋
ঁ҇ЬǵЎϯǵ௼ဂӭϡޑ୯ৎǴฅԶӧჹѦܗ৖ѦҬπբਔǴךॺޑཀדᆶᖂ
ॣ೿ࢂი่΋ठޑǶ 
These two legislators represent Taiwan’s two major political parties and two different 
aboriginal tribes, [which] shows that Taiwan is a democratic, culturally and ethnically 
diverse country. However, while expanding diplomatic affairs to the outside, our wills 
and voices are united and uniform. 
 
T012: They represent two major parties in Taiwan and two major groups. It shows that 
Taiwan is a democratic and diverse society. However, our voice and determination 
is reunified in foreign affairs. 
 
 By replacing the word ‘country/nation’ with ‘society’, T012 was using the 
referential/nomination strategy to define Taiwan as a region rather than a country. In her 
in-depth interview, she gave the following explanation for this deviancy: 
 
Probably  I  didn't  follow  the  speaker  closely.  I  missed  the  last  part  of  the  source  
sentence.  So I  used the word ‘society’ to fill  the gap. I  think ‘society’ is  a neutral  
word. 
 
That T012 considered ‘society’ to be a neutral word for describing the status of Taiwan 
may imply that she did not see Taiwan as a country. Yet, when she further elaborated 
why she might in the future turn down a request for providing interpreting service for 
someone she did not agree with, she said: 
 
As long as the cases do not exceed my limit, I will take them. For example, I don’t 
feel uncomfortable about interpreting for Chinese leaders when they talk about the 
Taiwan issue. Their political stance on the unification of Taiwan and China has 
always  been  clear.  It  is  not  surprising  to  me  that  they  always  make  that  kind  of  
political  statement.  But,  if  a  KMT  official  flatters  China  in  his  talks,  I  won’t  be  
able to accept it and thus will refuse to take the case. (my underlined emphasis)   
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It seems that T012 felt resistant to the idea that Taiwan is part of China. The 
contradictory behaviour of T012 – not acknowledging Taiwan as a country while not 
favouring the One China policy – may indicate that what she identified was the 
Republic of China, whose territory should have covered the Chinese mainland, and that 
she might possess Chinese identity, which she might have obtained from her previous 
generations or from the Chinese culture education imposed by the KMT (see Chapter 
2.5). As suggested by Wodak (2004: 103), that T012 produced contradictory statements 
and faced ideological dilemmas is not unusual in identity studies. Judging her 
statements as a whole, the narrative identity held by T012 may indicate that although 
her deviant rendition in this example is categorized as a Chinese hegemonic sign, there 
is difference between T012’s Chinese identity and the Chinese identity possessed by the 
people of China. 
                
5.5 Discursive Overview of Chinese Hegemony vs. Taiwanese Resistance 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3.2.2, to demystify the ideologies embedded in discourse, 
the DHA practitioners aim to answer the following five questions by examining specific 
themes and claims of a specific discourse and investigating the discursive strategies 
used in a specific discourse (Reisigl, 2008: 99): 
(1) How are phenomena/events, processes, actions, persons, and objects named and 
referred to in linguistic terms in a specific discourse? 
(2) What features, qualities, and characteristics are assigned to those named or referred 
to in the discourse? 
(3) What arguments are specified in the discourse? 
(4) From what perspective are those involved in the above three questions expressed? 
(5) Are any utterances in the discourse intensified or mitigated? 
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In this section, the research will examine all of the ideological signs found in this study, 
the special cases excluded, and answer these questions by presenting tables 11 and 12, 
which shows a general picture of what discursive strategies and linguistic devices are 
used by both groups to linguistically represent their ideology and identity about the One 
China policy or the Taiwan independence issue. More specifically, table 11 will show 
how the Chinese subjects linguistically demonstrate their One China ideology towards 
Taiwan and how they discursively construct the image of the Others in their deviant 
renditions, while table 12 will display how the Taiwanese subjects linguistically resist 
the One China policy, demonstrate their national identity in their deviant renditions and 
construct the image of the Others. 
 
Table 11 Discursive Strategies and Linguistic Devices in Chinese Hegemonic Signs 
 
Questions 
Discursive  
Strategies 
 
Purpose 
How are persons, objects, 
phenomena/events, processed 
and actions related to the 
Taiwan issue named and 
referred to linguistically? 
referential/nomination 
strategy 
discursive construction of China: 
z metaphors: 
motherland 
z referents: 
Chinese mainland and Taiwan,  
mainland and Taiwan, the country, the  
central government, mainland  
government, the mainland 
discursive construction of Taiwan/ 
Taiwanese: 
z referents of Taiwan: 
Taiwan island, island, region, area,  
city, (part of) China  
z referents of Taiwanese: 
Chinese, Chinese people, people from 
China  
z omitting Taiwanese leaders’ official 
title shown in square brackets: 
[President] Chen Shui-bian 
discursive construction of both Taiwan 
and China: 
z referents: 
the country, the whole China, the two 
sides of China, two parts of China 
discursive construction of processes and 
actions of making Taiwan part of China: 
z nouns : 
liberation, (China’s) right 
z verbs: 
protect (people in Taiwan), fight 
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against (Taiwan independence), not 
allow to give Taiwan away, not want 
to lose Taiwan 
What characteristics, qualities 
and features are attributed to 
Taiwan/Taiwanese/Taiwan 
independence, 
China/Chinese/One China 
policy, or Others? 
predication strategies discursive characterization/qualification 
of Taiwan (more or less positively or 
negatively) 
z adjectives: 
dependent, suffered  
discursive characterization/qualification 
of China (more or less positively or 
negatively) 
z adjectives: 
great 
z nouns: 
faith in maintaining world peace and 
globalization 
z verbs: 
support (Others) 
discursive characterization/qualification 
of Others (more or less positively or 
negatively) 
z adjectives: 
evil (Japan) 
Which arguments are 
employed in discourses about 
the Taiwan issue? 
argumentation 
strategies 
persuading addressees of the truth and 
normative rightness of claims 
z fallacy/topos: 
Taiwan separatist activities are against 
the interest of mainland China/against 
the will of the people, we don’t allow 
this kind of activities [Taiwan 
independence] in the name of people 
interest, [Taiwan independence] 
disregard opposition from both island 
and mainland, Taiwan independence 
is harmful/a threat to China, Taiwan 
authority won’t accept unification 
Are the respective utterances 
articulated overtly, are they 
intensified or mitigated? 
mitigation and 
intensification 
strategies 
modifying the illocutionary force of 
utterances 
¾ mitigation 
z omitting identity parts shown in 
square brackets: 
the first president [from Taiwan], 
[Taiwanese] people are happy, the 
honor [of national glory], [Taiwan is a 
country], [ROC doesn’t belong to 
PRC]  
z vague expressions: 
looking forward to more 
cooperation/hope Nauru will take part 
in UN to support the relationship of 
us (original: the speaker asked Nauru 
to support Taiwan to be recognized 
widely), still have a lot of 
problems/the governments have many 
disputes with each other (original: the 
unification of Taiwan and China is 
unrealistic)  
z omitting or downplaying criticism of 
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China: 
Chinese government is not very 
friendly (original: Chinese 
government refused to negotiate), 
[omitting how Taiwan was replaced 
by China in the UN] 
z (modal) verbs and hesitations: 
I’m afraid this, probably, want to 
(original: will be able to), want to 
help (the original: have helped) 
¾ intensification 
z verbs or adjectives with negative 
emotion: 
never forgive Taiwan independence, 
independence, so-called 
independence  
 
Table 12 Discursive Strategies and Linguistic Devices in Taiwanese Resistance Signs 
 
Questions 
Discursive  
Strategies 
 
Purpose 
How are persons, objects, 
phenomena/events, processed 
and actions related to the One 
China policy/Chinese 
hegemony named and referred 
to linguistically? 
referential/nomination 
strategy 
discursive construction of China: 
z referents: 
the original country/this nation/this  
country/nation/China (original:  
motherland) 
discursive construction of Taiwan/ 
Taiwanese: 
z distinguishing Taiwanese from 
Chinese: 
the victory for Chinese and Taiwanese 
people in the war   
z distinguishing Taiwan from China: 
prevent Taiwan from being a colony, 
Japanese gave up the rule of 
Taiwan/Japanese signed to give up 
Taiwan/Japanese said Taiwan win the 
war 
z referents of Taiwan: 
country, nation 
discursive construction of cross-strait 
relations: 
z referents: 
cross-countries, between two nations, 
cross nations, both nations, both 
countries, countries across the strait 
discursive construction of 
objects/phenomena/events of Taiwan 
independence: 
z ideological matters: 
diplomatic, independence, 
sovereignty, identity 
discursive construction of processes and 
actions of Taiwan independence: 
z verbs: 
fight for (independence) 
discursive construction of processes and 
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actions of One China policy: 
z verbs: 
force Taiwan, isolate Taiwan, Taiwan 
was kicked out, ignore Taiwan, 
threaten Taiwan, deploy a lot of 
missiles 
What characteristics, qualities 
and features are attributed to 
Taiwan/Taiwanese/Taiwan 
independence? 
predication strategies discursive characterization/qualification 
of Taiwan (more or less positively or 
negatively) 
z adjectives: 
good, democratic, independent  
discursive characterization/qualification 
of China (more or less positively or 
negatively) 
z adjectives: 
closed, uncommunicated 
z verb phrases: 
ignore human rights 
discursive characterization/qualification 
of One China policy (more or less 
positively or negatively) 
z adjectives: 
unfair, controversial, contradictory 
From what perspective are 
these nominations, 
attributions and arguments 
expressed? 
perspectivization 
strategies 
Positioning interpreter’s point of view 
and expressing involvement or distance 
z deictics: 
their motherland/their mother nation  
(original: motherland) 
z pointing out Taiwan independence 
challenges China only, which implies 
Taiwanese interpreters’ disagreement 
with the Chinese speaker: 
against China’s interest/affect China’s 
influence on the Taiwan Strait 
(original: Taiwan independence is a 
severe provocation to the peace and 
stability across the Taiwan Strait), 
     ignore opposition from China/ignore 
 people from China/ignore China’s 
disapproval (original: disregarded the 
strong opposition inside and outside  
the island), provoking to China/a 
challenge to China/a challenge to the 
Chinese government/provoke 
relations with China/a threat to China 
(original: Taiwan independence 
actions are not only openly 
provocative to cross-strait relations 
but also directly threatening the peace 
and stability of the Asia Pacific 
region)     
z directly expressing interpreter’s own 
opinion: 
the Chinese authorities were not glad 
to see this situation because they think 
Taiwan wants to be divided from 
China (original: Taiwan’s authorities 
stubbornly insist on ‘Taiwan 
independence’ separatist stance, step 
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up doing ‘Taiwan independence’ 
separatist activities), only if us use the 
name of China can we become part of 
the international society (original: 
China has insisted that Taiwan is part 
of China and only the People’s 
Republic of China can represent 
China), Taiwan’s government hasn’t 
performed any exact sovereignty in 
international society (original: the 
People’s Republic of China has never 
exercised in Taiwan any effective 
sovereignty) 
z giving interpreter’s own answer to the 
question raised by the Taiwanese 
speaker: 
do you have the same thing in China? 
No/Is it the same in China? I don’t 
think so. 
Are the respective utterances 
articulated overtly, are they 
intensified or mitigated? 
mitigation and 
intensification 
strategies 
modifying the illocutionary force of 
utterances 
¾ mitigation 
z omitting the parts where China is 
referred to as Taiwan’s motherland 
z vague expressions: 
to cooperate with Taiwan (original: to 
move the cross-strait relations 
towards peace and stability) 
z omitting or downplaying Chinese 
hegemony: 
Taiwan government did not accept 
our support, has violated China’s 
hope on remaining peaceful relation 
with Taiwan, Taiwan never spares 
their efforts to help us (original: 
Taiwan is an inseparable part of 
China), help us to maintain a peaceful 
relation with Taiwan (original: join us 
to oppose Taiwan independence) 
z (modal) verbs and hesitations: 
China want/try to be part of the UN 
(original: have become), hope Taiwan 
will become China’s province, not 
encourage the division, hope people 
in Taiwan can support and agree with 
the One China policy, should not 
separate Taiwan from China, this is 
possible to ruin regional peace 
¾ intensification 
z verb or adjective phrases with 
negative denotation: 
to sacrifice everything towards China, 
this is impossible to accept the One 
China policy, we [Taiwan] turn to 
nothing 
z direct speech acts (instead of 
questions): 
Taiwanese people are really hard to 
adore China/it’s unacceptable that 
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Taiwanese people will welcome 
China, of course Taiwanese people 
will feel very betrayed, it [democracy] 
is not the case in China 
 
5.6 Statistical Representation of CDA Analysis Results  
 
5.6.1 Overview of ideological signs on a group basis  
 
 The following two tables may give a general picture of the distribution of the 
hegemonic and resistance signs on a group basis found in this study. 
 
Table 13 Overview of Ideological Signs - the China Group 
Speech  1(C)  2(T)  3(T)  4(C)  5(T)  
     Sign Category 
Subject No. 
H R H R H R H R H R 
C001 ʄ  ʄ  ʄ  ʄ  ʄ  
C002       ʄ    
C003 ʄ  ʄ    ʄ  ʄ  
C004   ʄ    ʄ  ʄ  
C005   ʄ  ʄ  ʄ  ʄ  
C006         ʄ ʄ 
C007 ʄ  ʄ    ʄ  ʄ ʄ 
C008   ʄ    ʄ    
C009 ʄ      × × × × 
C010 ʄ        ʄ ʄ 
C011 ʄ    ʄ  ʄ  ʄ ʄ 
C012       ʄ    
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C013          ʄ 
C014 ʄ      ʄ   ʄ 
C015 ʄ    ʄ  ʄ  ʄ ʄ 
C016   ʄ  ʄ  ʄ    
C017   ʄ    ʄ  ʄ  
C018     ʄ  ʄ  ʄ  
C019 ʄ  ʄ      ʄ  
C020       ʄ    
C021   ʄ      ʄ  
Sum of Subjects 
with Signs 
 
9 
 
0 
 
10 
 
0 
 
6 
 
0 
 
15 
 
0 
 
13 
 
7 
Note: 
Speech 1(C) = Hu Jintao’s speech  
Speech 2(T) = Chen Shui-bian’s Nauru speech  
Speech 3(T) = Chen Shui-bian’s World Games speech  
Speech 4(C) = Jia Qinglin’s speech  
Speech 5(T) = Annette Lu’s speech 
Sign Category: H- hegemony  R – resistance to hegemony 
ʄ=  Sign(s)  found    ×=  Data  missing     
 
Table 14 Overview of Ideological Signs - the Taiwan Group 
Speech 1(C)  2(T)  3(T)  4(C)  5(T)  
     Sign Category 
Subject No. 
H R H R H R H R H R 
T001        ʄ   
T002        ʄ  ʄ 
T003   ʄ     ʄ  ʄ 
T004  ʄ        ʄ 
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T005  ʄ    ʄ  ʄ  ʄ 
T006  ʄ      ʄ  ʄ 
T007  ʄ      ʄ  ʄ 
T008  ʄ         
T009        ʄ  ʄ 
T010  ʄ      ʄ  ʄ 
T011  ʄ      ʄ   
T012   ʄ        
T013  ʄ      ʄ  ʄ 
T014  ʄ      ʄ  ʄ 
T015  ʄ      ʄ  ʄ 
T016       × × × × 
T017  ʄ      ʄ  ʄ 
T018  ʄ      ʄ  ʄ 
T019           
T020  ʄ      ʄ  ʄ 
T021  ʄ      ʄ  ʄ 
Sum of Subjects 
with Signs 
 
0 
 
14 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
16 
 
0 
 
15 
Note: 
Speech 1(C) = Hu Jintao’s speech  
Speech 2(T) = Chen Shui-bian’s Nauru speech  
Speech 3(T) = Chen Shui-bian’s World Games speech  
Speech 4(C) = Jia Qinglin’s speech  
Speech 5(T) = Annette Lu’s speech 
Sign Category: H- hegemony  R – resistance to hegemony 
ʄ=  Sign(s)  found    ×=  Data  missing     
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5.6.2 The CDA Chi-square statistical results 
 
In order to show the tug of war between hegemony and resistance in the SI 
political renditions of trainee interpreters across the Taiwan Strait, the Chi-square 
statistical results of each speech in terms of the number of the subjects who showed 
either hegemony or resistance in their renditions are displayed. The total number of the 
subjects is 42, with one half from China and the other half from Taiwan. Note that it is 
the subjects rather than the renditions that are the unit of the statistic calculation; in 
other words, the data shown in tables 13 and 14 are used for running Chi-square 
statistics. The variables associated include (1) hegemony and (2) resistance to 
hegemony. The results are demonstrated in table 15. 
 
Table 15 Chi-Square Results of the Five Speech Renditions on a Subject Basis 
Speech Hegemony Resistance  
Ȥ2 p value Ȥ2 p value 
1 (C) 11.182 0.001 20.500 0.000 
2 (T) 7.289 0.007 -- -- 
3 (T) 6.833 0.009 1.000 0.317 
4 (C) 23.400 0.000 26.000 0.000 
5 (T) 18.778 0.000 6.500 0.011 
 
 The statistical results show that all but Speech 2(T) and Speech 3(T) see 
significance in both two variables. As Speech 2(T) does not involve the One China 
policy and Speech 3(T) is given to Taiwanese audience at home only and no cross-strait 
issues are involved, the Taiwanese speaker shows little resistance to hegemony. 
Therefore, it should be reasonable that few Taiwanese trainee interpreters produce 
222 
 
resistance signs when interpreting these two speeches. In general, the Chi-square results 
indicate the ideological conflict between hegemony and resistance has been largely 
embodied  in  SI  renditions  given  by  the  student  interpreters  from  either  side  of  the  
Taiwan Strait. 
 
5.7 Conclusion of Chapter 5 
 
 The CDA analysis of the collected SI data, with reference to the results of the 
survey questionnaires and/or in-depth interviews, shows that the ideology and identity 
conflicts between trainee interpreters of Taiwan and China have contributed to 
ideological renditions in the SI mode, and these renditions may be generally divided 
into  signs  of  hegemony  and  signs  of  resistance  to  hegemony,  which  does  reflect  the  
status quo across the Taiwan Strait – the unequal power struggle between China and 
Taiwan.  The  signs  of  hegemony  or  resistance  are  generally  embodied  through  nine  
interpreting strategies, including substitution, addition, omission, compression, 
mitigation, overstatement or intensification, distortion, prioritizing personal cognition, 
and specification. Also, the discursive strategies used in producing these ideological 
renditions include strategies of referential/nomination, predication, argumentation, 
mitigation, intensification and perspectivization. Meanwhile, special cases, such as 
Chinese hegemony on the Taiwan side and Chinese resistance against Chinese 
totalitarianism,  are  also  found  in  this  study.  The  Chi-square  statistical  analysis  of  the  
CDA qualitative results demonstrates the contrasting tendency between the Taiwan 
group and the China group in terms of producing signs of hegemony or resistance. To 
sum up, one’s SI rendition may be under a profound influence of his/her own ideology 
and identity. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
6.1 Synopsis 
 
The link among ideology, power, and identity and how the three are developed and 
represented through discourse have been made aware particularly in the CDA studies as 
well as translation and interpreting studies. Ideologies and identities, which are shaped, 
sustained, or strengthened through discourse, tend to have a profound influence on the 
behavior of their holders, which is why those in power often legitimate and consolidate 
their domination by manipulating ideologies and identities of the dominated. 
Translation/interpreting as a form of discourse has long been one of the media for 
ideology and identity re(shaping) and spreading. The link between power and ideology/ 
identity makes translation/interpreting by nature a political act, cultural bound, and thus 
ideological.  
It is widely recognized that the translator’s behavior is influenced or controlled by 
his/her ideology. Every decision or choice the translator makes in the process of 
translating is under the influence of their surrounding “socio-political milieu” (Alvarez 
& Vidal, 1996: 5). Therefore, the translator may be ‘partisan’, steering ideologically- 
motivated translation movement towards his/her desired geopolitical results. The 
translator may help reviving or maintaining hegemony; they may also make their 
translations as resistance against oppression. There have been many examples of how 
translation is used as a tool for maintaining or challenging hegemony. Yet, translation on 
micro-level involves not only ideology of the translator but also ideologies of authors, 
critics, publishers, editors, and readers (Tahir-Gürça÷lar, 2003: 113), while on 
macro-level, translation serves as an instrument for power struggle between one culture 
and another or between the dominant and the dominated. The freedom of translators to 
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exercise their discretion over their translations or the possibility that translators may 
have the final say in the finalized version of their translations seems to have been 
inevitably restricted with the increasingly strong power of world hegemony in the form 
of various agents or patrons of translation (Venuti, 1995, 1998; see also Chapter 2.3.3.1). 
The link among power, ideology and translation has been disclosed fully in the field of 
translation studies. Yet, the link among power, ideology and interpreting remains much 
less explored. Previous interpreting studies have found that interpreters may choose 
what not to interpret or interpret at their discretion but few have addressed the link 
between an interpreter’s ideology and his/her renditions. More specifically, although 
since ancient times interpreting has served as an instrument for power struggle, the lack 
of past interpreting rendition records has made it difficult to observe how power 
relations, ideologies and identities are interacting with one another and embodied in 
interpreting renditions.  
Interpreting renditions may be described as an interpreter’s monologue that is not 
created freely but produced to convey faithfully what the speaker says, but previous 
studies have found that interpreters do exercise their discretion to some extent over their 
renditions (see Chapter 2.3.3.3). Indeed, although interpreters are supposed to use target 
languages on behalf of speakers, it is not possible that interpreters can always ‘interpret’ 
source texts in the same way as speakers do. Mason (1994: 23) explicitly maintains that 
translators as text users ‘bring their own assumptions, predispositions and general 
world-views  to  bear  on  their  processing  of  texts  at  all  levels’  consciously  or  
subconsciously. In a similar vein, an interpreter’s real-world experience, internal 
consciousness, or ideologies may also be embodied in his/her use of language at the 
time of processing source speech texts. Simultaneous interpreters, who have to perform 
their tasks within the limits of source language speeches and under severe time 
constraints, are very likely to count on their previous knowledge for quick 
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comprehension and reproduction of source texts. Fairclough emphasizes that the 
analysis focus of CDA should not be put just on texts themselves but also on the 
processes of text production and interpretation and how these cognitive processes are 
shaped within social contexts and by social conventions (1989: 19) as ideologies are 
produced and reproduced in the way he maintains (1989: 85): 
 
…when ideologies are brought to discourse not as explicit elements of the text, but 
as the background assumptions which on the one hand lead the text producer to 
‘textualize' the world in a particular way, and on the other hand lead the interpreter 
to interpret the text in a particular way. Texts do not typically spout ideology. They 
so position the interpreter through their cues that she brings ideologies to the 
interpretation of texts - and reproduces them in the process! 
 
Translations in written form frequently come under ideological influences of 
patronage and/or censorship, while interpreting, because of its evanescent and volatile 
nature, is not subject to prior censorship. And of all the interpreting modes, 
simultaneous interpreting, which is supposed to synchronize source delivery, may be 
most  likely  to  escape  censorship  and  win  trust  from  the  listener  when  it  is  being  
performed. In light of the extensive employment of SI at international settings and the 
relative lack of SI ideology research, an investigation into the effect of an interpreter’s 
ideology on his/her SI renditions may provide valuable information for those who 
would like to ensure the legitimization of their side of stories in the SI mode. To address 
ideology issue in interpreting, this study chooses to put such research in the setting of 
the  status  quo  across  the  Taiwan  Strait,  with  China  and  Taiwan  on  either  side.  The  
entangled historical relations between Taiwan and China and the rise of China as a 
regional or even global hegemon have compounded power struggles and unequal 
relations across the Taiwan Strait. China has long regarded Taiwan as its renegade 
province and appealed to the world for supporting the integration of Taiwan and China. 
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Having  experienced  a  long  period  of  colonial  rule,  the  people  of  Taiwan  are  walking  
slowly but steadily on their democratic path to building a collective national identity 
and asserting its sovereignty on the international stage. Despite close ties with China in 
historical and economic senses, the majority of the people of Taiwan reject the 
possibility of being governed by totalitarian China. Clearly, both nations, where 
Mandarin Chinese is the most widely used language and Chinese culture is practiced, 
have different political and social realities. Since language use may reflect “social 
reality (Sapir, 1929: 209; original emphasis)”, the simultaneous renditions produced by 
Mandarin interpreters from either nation may reflect the difference in their political 
ideologies and national identities, especially towards the One China issue.  
To investigate whether the conflicts of ideologies and identities between trainee 
interpreters of two nations of unequal power in relations as hegemony versus resistance 
may  be  embodied  in  simultaneous  interpreting  (SI)  renditions,  a  special  CDA  Filter  
Process is created for the methodology with reference to the previous literature review. 
More precisely, in the CDA Filter Process, this study analyzes the collected SI data 
produced by the twenty-one trainee interpreters from China and another twenty-one 
trainee interpreters from Taiwan when they simultaneously interpret three speeches 
given by Taiwanese political leaders and two speeches by Chinese political leaders, with 
the data obtained from the survey questionnaires and/or in-depth interviews being used 
as reference and evidence for the CDA analysis and interpretation of the SI renditions. 
The survey questionnaires are aimed at obtaining the information on the trainee 
interpreters’ background, political stance particularly on the cross-strait relations, 
opinions about the rendered source texts, strength of national identity and the self-report 
and evaluation of his/her feelings and thinking during and after the SI sessions. In the 
interviews, the participating trainee interpreters are asked to clarify or explain the 
deviant renditions they have produced or the responses they have given in their 
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questionnaires.  
 The CDA results of this study show that the SI trainee interpreters, under the 
severe time constraints, produce ideological renditions which are mainly triggered by 
the conflicts of ideologies and identities between peoples of both nations particularly on 
the One China policy. While the Chinese trainee interpreters intensify Chinese 
hegemony embedded in the China speeches or mitigate Taiwanese resistance expressed 
in the Taiwan speeches, the Taiwanese trainee interpreters are acting the other way 
round, which proves there is indeed a tug of ideological war between Chinese 
hegemony and resistance among the SI trainee interpreters from either nation. Also, the 
majority of the trainee interpreters report that they are aware of their national identity 
when interpreting for the political leaders of the other nation, and only 11 of the 41 
trainee interpreters report that they feel comfortable about interpreting for the political 
leaders of the other nation. It indicates that an interpreter’s identity does have an impact 
on his/her feelings towards the speaker, especially when there is conflict of identities 
between the interpreter and the speakers.  
The special status quo across the Taiwan Strait may be described as one of the 
most suitable contexts for the research into the effects of an interpreter’s ideology and 
identity  on  his/her  renditions  as  China  and  Taiwan  share  language  and  culture  (in  a  
broad sense) on an unequal footing and in an entangled but antagonistic relationship. 
There are still many other corners of the world where people may use the same 
language but possess different or even clashing ideologies and identities, such as 
Quebec within Canada or some countries in the Arabic world. While people may 
assume that interpreting is just a mechanism for facilitating oral communication, it may 
also be a site for different ideologies and identities to compete against one another in 
relations between hegemony and resistance. It is hoped that the present research may 
cast some light on how to explore the direct link between ideology and simultaneous 
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interpreting and raise public awareness of the power struggles behind interpreting 
practice. 
 
6.2 Research Findings 
 
The CDA analysis of the simultaneous renditions of the trainee interpreters from 
China and from Taiwan, with the use of the extra-linguistic information obtained from 
the survey questionnaires and the in-depth interviews, shows that the ideological 
conflicts over the One China/Taiwan independence issue are generally embodied 
through some linguistic devices and strategies in simultaneous interpreting renditions as 
hegemony versus resistance. More specifically, the great majority of the ideological 
hegemonic signs were produced by the Chinese trainee interpreters while the majority 
of the resistance signs were given by the Taiwanese trainee interpreters. And these 
ideological signs were mainly generated within the context of the One China policy or 
the Taiwan independence issue. Also, the link between one’s feelings or opinions 
towards what the speaker says and the occurrence of ideological renditions is confirmed. 
The Taiwanese trainee interpreters who have reported negative feelings towards the One 
China policy reiterated by the Chinese speakers tend to show resistance in their SI 
renditions, while the Chinese trainee interpreters who cannot accept the Taiwanese 
speakers’ statement that Taiwan is a country tend to show Chinese hegemony in their SI 
renditions. 
The results of the national identity scale questionnaires show that the Taiwan 
group as a whole has a weaker sense of national identity than the China group, and the 
special cases in which two of the Taiwanese trainee interpreters produce ideological 
signs of Chinese hegemony are indeed indicative of the national identity crisis facing 
Taiwan’s society. Yet, the resistance renditions produced by the Taiwanese subjects, the 
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answers provided by all of the Taiwanese trainee interpreters for the open-ended 
questions  in  the  surveys,  and  the  interview  data  given  by  nine  of  them  allow  the  
researcher to piece together and interpret the narrative identity of these Taiwanese 
subjects and present how they discursively construct their Taiwanese national identity. 
The study also finds that the Chinese trainee interpreters, by using some linguistic 
devices and strategies, discursively construct the image of their country, highlight 
Sinocentrism by distinguishing Chinese from others, and demonstrate the Chinese sense 
of  superiority  in  their  SI  renditions  as  well  as  the  data  obtained  from the  surveys  and  
interviews.     
Some of the ideological renditions found in this study were obviously deviant from 
the source texts, while some of them might be too subtle to be detected if without the 
confirmation of the producers themselves. Yet, the wide range of the ideological 
renditions detected in this study indicate that ideology, whether it works consciously or 
subconsciously, may have great effects on approaches to interpreting, and simultaneous 
interpreting as discourse may be a site of struggles among identity, power, and ideology. 
In the following sections, the researcher will give more detailed discussions about the 
findings. 
 
6.2.1 The discursive construction of national identity and others in simultaneous 
 interpreting 
 
It has been widely recognized that of all the interpreting modes, simultaneous 
interpreting allows the least time for interpreters to ponder source texts and produce 
target texts; yet, this study finds that SI trainee interpreters exercise their discretion and 
discursively construct their concept or image of their own nation and of the others 
through some linguistic devices and strategies. In the following sections, the researcher 
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will present how national identity and image of Others are linguistically constructed in 
SI by piecing together the deviant renditions found in this study and interpreting them 
as a whole. 
 
6.2.1.1 The China group 
 
 In terms of the China group, the data obtained from the surveys and interviews 
generally indicate their strong loyalty to and identification with their own nation. The 
history of China’s glorious past, which Chinese people commonly share and take pride 
in, proves to a very important element of the formation of Chinese national identity. 
Speech 1 (C), a commemorative speech given by China’s president to mark China’s 
victory over the Second Sino-Japan War, wins great identification and recognition from 
the Chinese subjects. As what Wodak, et al. (2009) suggest, commemorative speeches 
tend to be used to construct common identities and promote public consensus. The 
Chinese speaker of Speech 1 (C) indeed creates a bonding among Chinese people by 
praising their past courage and strength to ward off foreign invasion and safeguard 
China’s sovereignty and appealing for their continuous contribution to the rise of 
modern China for the sake of the interests of China and the world. China as a nation has 
been hailed as a strong nation that can withstand any test and lead the world with its 
splendid civilization, which is widely identified with by Chinese people. Also, by 
promoting an ‘emotional bonding’ between Taiwan and the people of China and 
emphasizing the link between territorial integrity and national dignity, the Chinese 
speaker has made ‘liberating Taiwan’ a general consensus among its people (Wachman, 
2007: 122; original emphasis). 
The survey results of this study show that the Chinese subjects as a whole have a 
strong sense of national identity and achieve a strong consensus on the One China 
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policy, which may be attributed to the long-lasting totalitarian system implemented in 
China since ancient times. As discussed in Chapters 2.2.2 and 2.4, China, as a country 
with a very long history, has maintained the political systems of totalitarianism and 
centralization, which in turn causes the economic and social structures in China to 
remain in a generally ‘stable’ condition. It may be argued that ‘national identity’ is thus 
multi-functionally powerful to both individuals and groups of China. The ‘stable’ and 
‘long-practiced’ totalitarian system legitimates the state control over Chinese territory, 
economy and politics, while socialization through education and media systems 
successfully develops a relatively homogeneous Chinese culture that Chinese people 
think is highly distinctive and should be protected from the Others. Chinese hegemony 
is being gained, maintained, or even strengthened through state force and public consent 
in a form of strong national identity. As discussed in Chapter 2.1.3, one’s strong sense of 
national identity may indicate his/her relatively strong willingness to promote social 
solidarity, to truly believe or pride in the common shared values and assets of the nation, 
to follow what the nation expects his/her to do, or to defend or justify his/her nation in 
various aspects in the face of outside threats or challenges, which has been fully 
exemplified by the SI deviant renditions produced by the Chinese subjects. 
 As shown in the SI deviant renditions produced by the Chinese subjects, different 
linguistic devices and strategies are employed to construct their national image of China 
and distinguish their own nation from the Others. By using the referential/nomination 
strategy, China is the ‘motherland’ of all the Chinese people. The Chinese government 
is  the  ‘mainland’  or  ‘central’  government  in  relation  to  Taiwan  ‘island’  or  ‘region’.  
Through the predication strategy, China is a ‘great’ nation which aims to ‘support’ poor 
nations and shoulders the responsibility of ‘maintaining world peace and globalization’. 
But the top priority for China and Chinese people is to recognize that the wholeness of 
the nation has been safeguarded against whatever invasion from outside and cannot be 
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damaged by any separatist activities from inside, thus justifying the One China policy as 
well as all the mitigation and intensification strategies the Chinese subjects use to 
legitimate China’s goal to seize Taiwan (see Chapter 6.2.3), which they think is 
inherently part of China. To the Chinese subjects, Taiwan is both part of China and the 
Other.  Taiwan  is  an  ‘island’,  a  ‘region’,  an  ‘area’,  or  even  a  ‘city’  of  China  through  
Chinese  use  of  the  referential/nomination  strategy.  The  Chinese  subjects  also  use  the  
predication strategy to describe Taiwan as ‘dependent’, ‘suffered’ and in need of 
‘protection’ from China as its ‘motherland’. Others who pose a threat to China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity are ‘evil’, ‘harmful’, and ‘against the will/interest of 
Chinese people’. Also, the Chinese sense of superiority is embodied in some deviant 
renditions in which Indonesia is described as subordinate to China, China is portrayed 
as the center of the world, and an Indonesian song is mistaken as being created by 
Chinese. These deviant renditions further prove the Chinese collective beliefs in their 
“cultural authenticity and unity” of the nation (Smith, 1991: 16) and the internalization 
of Sinocentrism and Chinese sense of cultural superiority. It may be argued that the SI 
deviant renditions produced by the Chinese subjects demonstrate a strong sense of 
Chinese national identity as a whole, which is being built on the glorious past of ancient 
China, the current powerful status of China on the international stage, and the common 
faith that China will play a significant role in world peace and prosperity. 
 
6.2.1.2 The Taiwan group 
 
In terms of the Taiwan group, the data obtained from the surveys and interviews 
indicate that the development of Taiwanese national identity generally corresponds to 
the results of the identity surveys conducted by the Election Study Center, NCCU 
between 1992 and 2012 (see Figure 1 in Chapter 2.5.2), which means although ‘Chinese’ 
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nationalism can still be found in Taiwan, the public awareness of and support for the 
independent status of Taiwan as a nation is growing.  
It may be argued that Taiwanese national identity is more like ‘narrative identity’, 
which often oscillates between sameness and selfhood under the political manipulation 
but allows “various, different, partly contradictory circumstances and experiences to be 
integrated into a coherent temporal structure (Wodak, et al., 2009: 14)”. As a colony of 
different external powers, Taiwan used to encounter drastic cultural, social and 
linguistic changes, which in turn caused constant (re)shaping of ideologies and 
identities of Taiwan’s people. In addition to the identities and ideologies imposed on by 
outside forces, the multi-ethnic and linguistic groups of Taiwan further compounds the 
difficulties of uniting people of Taiwan as a whole. Since 1945, people of Taiwan have 
not only been forced to give up part of their resource to Chinese newcomers from the 
Chinese mainland but to learn to be ‘Chinese’ in many aspects. Taiwan becomes a 
province  of  the  Republic  of  China  even  though  it  has  remained  the  major  part  of  the  
territory under the ROC rule. The native inhabitants of Taiwan, namely the Formosans 
and the early Chinese settlers, account for the great majority of the ROC population but 
become the dominated and oppressive under the rule of the minority Chinese 
Mainlanders. Having been educated to be ‘Chinese’ and to love ‘China’ as their nation 
for decades, people of Taiwan now need to face the reality that there is only one China 
widely recognized by the world, which is the People’s Republic of China, not the 
Republic of China. They need to fight for their freedom and survival amid the pressure 
and threat from the PRC. Just as what Wodak (2004) finds in her study on the formation 
of EU identities, in-group identities may get stronger in the face of out-groups. 
Taiwanese national identity is not strong among the in-group of the Taiwanese subjects 
as shown in the national identity survey results of this study, but when these subjects are 
confronted with China’s coercion or oppression on linguistic level during the SI 
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sessions, the distinction between Taiwanese and the Others is  instantly  clear,  which  is  
why a review of the deviant renditions produced by the Taiwanese subjects discloses 
how they discursively construct their Taiwanese national identity and depict the image 
of the Others, particularly China in this study. 
As shown in the SI deviant renditions produced by the Taiwanese subjects, 
different linguistic devices and strategies are employed to construct their national image 
of Taiwan and distinguish their own nation from China as the Other. By  using  the  
referential/nomination and predication strategies, Taiwan is described as a ‘good’, 
‘democratic’,  and  ‘independent’  ‘country’  or  ‘nation’  on  the  one  side  of  the  Taiwan  
Strait.  Taiwan  also  plays  a  significant  role  in  ‘winning’  the  victory  of  the  Second  
Sino-Japan War, which prevents Taiwan from being a colony. Under the pressure and 
military threat from China, Taiwan is ‘isolated’, ‘ignored’, or ‘kicked out’ from 
international community but it ‘fights for’ its independence and struggles over the 
issues of ‘diplomacy, sovereignty, and identity’. The Taiwanese subjects are also proud 
of Taiwan’s democracy especially when compared with China’s totalitarianism, which 
prompts  them  to  explicitly  boast  of  Taiwan’s  democracy  during  the  SI  sessions.  
Meanwhile, the Taiwanese subjects are found to use third person pronouns, 
anthroponymic generic terms, or determiners, such as ‘this’, when referring to China, 
which is a commonly seen referential/nomination strategy to make distinction between 
in-groups and out-groups (e.g. Wodak, et al, 2009). Also, China, as the Other to the 
Taiwanese subjects, is described as a ‘closed’ and ‘uncommunicated’ nation which 
‘ignores human rights’, and it is likely that such negative opinions of China may be 
partly attributed to the brainwashing education policy imposed by the KMT-led ROC 
government (see Chapter 2.5.2.1). 
As indicated above, Taiwanese national identity is not mainly built on its past 
colonial history but on the democratization of Taiwan that has taken place in recent 
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decades. The pressure and threat from China, which squeezes the international space for 
Taiwan and affects Taiwan’s domestic politics and economy, actually arouses 
resentment and resistance of people of Taiwan against China, which in turn strengthens 
Taiwanese  national  identity  and  shrinks  China’s  hope  for  unification  of  Taiwan  and  
China.  
 
6.2.1.3 The special cases 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, there are deviant renditions showing Chinese resistance. 
Some  of  the  Chinese  subjects  explicitly  refer  to  Taiwan  as  a  country  or  nation  when  
interpreting Speech 5 (T). It may be argued that these subjects, although sharing the 
social belief in China that Taiwan is part of China, perceive the fact that Taiwan enjoys 
its autonomy instead of being governed by China. It should be noted that only in 
rendering  Speech  5  (T),  which  was  given  by  then  Taiwan’s  Vice-President,  did  these  
Chinese subjects produce resistance signs, which may indicate that they considered it 
appropriate to refer to Taiwan as a country when the speaker was from Taiwan. 
Meanwhile, when the Taiwanese speaker makes comparison between Taiwan's 
democracy and China’s totalitarianism in Speech 5 (T), some of the Chinese subjects 
seem to show their support for democracy by intensifying the speaker’s resistance tone, 
which may further indicate that they are dissatisfied about Chinese totalitarianism or 
longing for democracy. According to these ‘Chinese resistance’ renditions produced by 
the Chinese subjects through referential/nomination and intensification strategies, 
people are the host of Taiwan as a ‘country’, while the situation is ‘totally different’ in 
China. There are also deviant renditions showing Chinese hegemony on the Taiwan side. 
As discussed in Chapter 2.5, the shaping and reshaping of ideologies and identities 
causes a national identity crisis among people of Taiwan. For those Mainlanders who 
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fled  with  Chiang  Kai-shek  to  Taiwan  after  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  seized  the  
Chinese mainland, they and their immediate descendants tend to regard Taiwan as a 
province of the Republic of China (the R.O.C.) and hope one day both sides across the 
Taiwan Strait may be reunited. By contrast, those who are native inhabitants of Taiwan 
tend  to  identify  with  ‘Taiwan’  rather  than  ‘the  R.O.C.’  and  resist  the  idea  of  being  
governed by Communist China if Taiwan is taken over by China. The national identity 
crisis has been further compounded by the KMT's attempt to resinizise the people of 
Taiwan, strengthen the historical relations between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, 
and make Taiwan only a province of the Republic of China. The KMT’s measures to 
shape Sinocentrist ideology through educational and media systems have made some, if 
not many, people of Taiwan stuck at the idea of whether they should see ‘China’ as their 
motherland or whether Taiwan is a nation instead of a province. According to the 
Chinese hegemony renditions produced by some Taiwanese subjects, the status of 
Taiwan is not a nation but a ‘society’, which indeed reflects the national identity crisis 
facing Taiwan at present.   
 
6.2.2 Influence of ideology and identity on simultaneous interpreting 
 
 The concept of ideology in this study is defined as “general and abstract social 
beliefs, shared by a group, that control or organize the more specific knowledge and 
opinions (attitudes) of a group” (van Dijk, 1998: 49; see also Chapter 2.1.1). As 
indicated by the SI experiment results and the data of the surveys and interviews, the 
great majority of the subjects is susceptible to influence of their own ideology and tends 
to have their ideology embodied in their SI renditions.  
How the Chinese government and the Taiwanese government have developed and 
(re)shaped ideologies of their people in the post-1945 period is discussed separately in 
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Chapters 2.4 and 2.5. While both governments attempt to destroy each other, both 
peoples are educated to view the opposite government as an enemy and to consider the 
people across the other side of the Taiwan Strait to be suffering and longing for rescue. 
As  a  result,  some  of  the  Chinese  subjects  describe  Taiwan  as  being  ‘suffering’  and  
making Taiwan part of China is ‘liberating’ or ‘protecting’ Taiwan, while China is 
‘closed’ and ‘uncommunicated’ and ‘ignores human rights’ to some Taiwanese subjects. 
Also, the One China policy, which is widely accepted and supported by Chinese people, 
prevents the Chinese subjects from faithfully rendering the Taiwan issue from 
perspectives of the Taiwanese speakers. Therefore, when Chinese subjects interpret for 
the Taiwanese speakers, Taiwan becomes an ‘island’, a ‘region’ or an ‘area, the official 
titles of the Taiwanese speakers are omitted, and any other source text that states or 
implies  the  sovereign  status  of  Taiwan  may  be  omitted  or  distorted.  The  Chinese  
subjects also cast doubts or disapproval on the Taiwan independence issue in their 
renditions, referring to it as ‘so-called’ independence which would undermine the 
interest  of  and  go  against  the  will  of  China  and  Chinese  people.  By  contrast,  many  
people of Taiwan regard Taiwan or the ROC as a country, which is why the Taiwanese 
subjects tend to refer to Taiwan as a nation or country even when they interpret for the 
Chinese speakers. Also, as the One China policy is contradictory to the social and 
political cognition of the Taiwanese subjects, they not only express explicit opposition 
to the One China policy in the surveys and/or interviews but also resist interpreting 
faithfully the One China ideology held and expressed by the Chinese speakers. For 
instance, when the Chinese speakers refer to China as the ‘motherland’ of Taiwan, the 
Taiwanese subjects turn to say ‘China’ instead. The One China policy is also described 
as ‘unfair’ or ‘controversial’, while the Taiwan independence issue, according to the 
Taiwanese subjects, only provokes and challenges China instead of damaging peace and 
stability of the Asia Pacific region.  
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It is also found that when the speakers mention an event or topic that the subjects 
have known or familiarized themselves with, the subjects tend to exercise greater 
discretion  over  what  to  interpret  or  how  to  interpret  it.  For  instance,  when  the  
Taiwanese speaker mentions how Taiwan was forced out of the United Nations because 
of China’s entry, several Chinese subjects stick to their previous knowledge that (the 
People’s Republic of) China has always been one of the founding members of the UN. 
By contrast, people of Taiwan have been educated that Taiwan (or more precisely the 
Republic  of  China)  won  the  Second  Sino-Japan  War.  Therefore,  when  the  Chinese  
speaker mentions the history of the War, some Taiwanese subjects make Taiwan the 
central focus of the War.  
As discussed in Chapter 2.3.3, simultaneous interpreters are generally expected to 
play the ‘ghost’ role and give accurate and complete renditions, but previous studies 
have found that interpreters may not faithfully render source texts due to various 
reasons, such as maintaining fluency or credibility, dealing with high information 
density, coping with dissimilarities in linguistic structure, or following institutionalized 
ideology. Few have found the direct link between an interpreter’s ideology and his/her 
renditions. More specifically, this present study finds that trainee interpreters, who work 
on a freelance basis, do have their own ideology interfere with their SI renditions, 
intentionally or unintentionally. The interview data show that some of them 
acknowledge the inappropriateness of intentional ideological manipulation of target 
texts, attributing it to reluctance to repeat something conflicting with their ideology or 
to emotional resonance with what the speakers say.  Some of them are surprised to see 
their own ideological renditions and offer possible reasons for the renditions or consider 
them to be honest mistakes. Still some of them, when their own ideological renditions 
are pointed out and presented before them, try to justify or legitimate the deviancy. The 
results of the SI experiment of this study indeed indicate how powerfully and invisibly 
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ideology may work and once ideology becomes commonly shared knowledge and 
opinions, biased attitudes may be reproduced and maintained through discourse without 
being noticed. The increasing global demand for SI interpreters, the widely-assumed 
ghost or bridge roles of SI interpreters, the evanescent nature of interpreting, and the 
infeasibility of prior censorship on simultaneous renditions all make SI users heavily 
rely on the competence and professionalism of SI interpreters. Compared with 
ideological manipulation of translated texts (see Chapter 2.3.1), the effects of an 
interpreter’s ideology on his/her renditions tend to be more direct and more difficult to 
prevent or rectify. Why the two genuine consecutive interpreting examples in which 
some Chinese interpreters ‘misinterpreted’ the Taiwan issue on international occasion 
can be detected on the spot (see Chapter 2.4.4) is mainly because the CI mode allows 
both the speaker and the listener, some of whom can understand bilingual texts, to 
access both source text and target text. While in the SI mode, the speaker usually does 
not know how his/her speech is interpreted and it  would be difficult  for the listener to 
listen closely and critically to both source text and target text at the same time. 
Therefore, how a SI interpreter’s ideology may affect his/her neutrality and faithfulness 
to source text and in turn affect the results of communication is indeed worth thinking 
deeply now.  
 
6.2.3 Hegemony and resistance in simultaneous interpreting 
 
The  results  of  this  study  find  that  the  conflicts  of  national  identity  and  political  
ideologies at the setting of the status quo relations between China and Taiwan as 
hegemony versus resistance may be embodied in simultaneous interpreting renditions. 
The large quantity of the deviant renditions found in this study indeed provides 
sufficient evidence for the discursive struggles between hegemony and resistance. 
240 
 
Analyzed from perspectives of interpreting profession, these deviant renditions may be 
demonstrated through strategies of substitution, addition, omission, compression, 
mitigation, overstatement and intensification, distortion, prioritizing personal cognition, 
specification, and so on, which are separately exemplified in Chapter 5. For instance, 
some Chinese subjects use the term ‘region’ or ‘area’ instead when the Taiwanese 
speakers refer to Taiwan as a country. Some even create an impression that the 
Taiwanese speakers are members of Chinese people, which may in turn imply Taiwan is 
part of China. By contrast, the Taiwanese subjects may explicitly specify Taiwan’s 
status  as  a  country/nation  when the  speakers,  either  from China  or  Taiwan,  use  vague  
terms.  They  may  also  omit  to  interpret  part  of  the  One  China  policy  that  the  Chinese  
speakers reiterate in the speeches. Analyzed from the CDA perspectives, these 
hegemonic or resistance renditions are often linguistically realized through strategies of 
referential/ nomination, predication, argumentation, and mitigation/intensification. Take 
argumentation strategies for instance. Some of the Chinese subjects give One China 
fallacies/topoi in their renditions by emphasizing Taiwan separatist activities are against 
the will of the people or disguised in the name of people’s interest. The statistical 
representation of CDA analysis results in Chapter 5.6 demonstrates that simultaneous 
interpreting  may  be  a  site  of  conflicts  and  struggles  of  ideologies  in  a  relationship  of  
hegemony versus resistance. 
That translation or interpreting is used as a tool of hegemony or resistance has long 
existed in human history. The act of translation itself may be a form of resistance, and 
politically-motivated translations may be a powerful instrument for shaping and 
spreading certain ideologies, whether hegemonic or resistant. In Chapter 2.4.4, the 
researcher has discussed how Chinese hegemony, particularly in terms of the One China 
ideology, has been spread and reinforced through translations and translation education, 
while in Chapter 2.2.2, how translation is used to resist Chinese hegemony is 
241 
 
exemplified by the foreignizing strategy adopted in the Chinese sutra translation and the 
patriotically-motivated translations of foreign cultural texts in the period of late Qing 
and early republic China. With the deepening globalization and advancing technology, 
hegemony or resistance in translation is no longer limited to certain space and time. 
Anglo-American cultural hegemony, which Venuti observes by examining the world 
publication industry and reviewing the canonized translation principles that have lasted 
for centuries, has been overwhelmingly sweeping the world. In fact, not only does 
Venuti propose resisting Anglo-American cultural hegemony through foreignizing 
translation and critical reading, but also China is developing and using ‘China English’ 
to counterattack Anglo-American cultural hegemony. And the latter may be argued to be 
another hegemony in the form of resistance to Anglo-American hegemony. All these 
examples have shown translation indeed is a site of power struggles and ideological 
conflicts. Note that hegemony or resistance embodied in translations is generally not 
under the sole control of translators. Translation by nature involves many factors before 
it’s finished and presented to the receiver, especially in modern times, and thus it can be 
highly manipulative and the receiver may be alerted to such manipulation beforehand or 
afterwards. That translated texts can be kept, spread, and re-examined may be said to 
have stronger ideological influence on the receiver than interpreting renditions. Yet, the 
fact that the manipulative elements of translated texts may be fully disclosed through 
re-examination may be reducing that ideological influence on the receiver at the same 
time.  
By contrast, the ideological power of oral renditions on the receiver may not be as 
strong as that of translated texts, but there are some reasons why the ideological 
influence, whether hegemonic or resistant, of simultaneous interpreting deserves 
attention and caution. The SI mode usually requires interpreters to react instantly and 
allows little room for any clarification or explanation of source text from the speaker. 
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Under severe time constraints, interpreters count mainly on their previous knowledge, 
and that’s where and when ideology creeps in and works. While translation is usually a 
product of careful deliberation, interpreting focuses on the fast and clear conveyance of 
meanings, which tends to be instantly accepted by the receiver. And that’s how ideology 
may be spread invisibly. Some previous interpreting studies find that interpreters may 
hold institutionalized ideology and act in favor of their agencies. What may not have 
been made aware is that ideologies are internalized and deeply rooted and 
institutionalized ideology is only one of the ideologies that an interpreter may hold. 
Ideology, just as identity, cannot be developed or eliminated easily or swiftly. When 
interpreters accept and internalize certain hegemonic ideology, they may tend to give 
‘consent’ to that hegemony and spontaneously become hegemonic ideology carriers as 
well as distributors. They then are equipped with an ability to “persuade others to see 
the world in terms favourable to the ascendancy of that hegemony’. And arguably, 
simultaneous interpreting, as a form of monologic professional discourse may be 
powerful in maintaining or strengthening hegemony. In this study, resistance as a form 
of “counter-power” is also embodied as deviant renditions in the SI mode. Faced with 
China as an overwhelmingly powerful hegemony, the Taiwanese subjects resist 
interpreting faithfully the One China policy, which they think is unreasonable and 
unrealistic to Taiwan, by producing ideologically motivated deviant renditions. The 
Taiwanese subjects’ resistance to Chinese hegemony is also spontaneously embodied in 
simultaneous interpreting as discourse responding to the speakers. Yet, ideology of 
resistance embodied in SI may also be seen as a form of hegemony to the receiver, who 
are generally incapable of challenging what interpreters provide for them. The findings 
of the study not only disclose how conflicting ideologies and identities of peoples of 
two political entities in power relations as hegemony versus resistance are embodied in 
simultaneous interpreting but also hope to raise awareness of the importance of an 
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interpreter’s neutrality to rendition receivers. 
 
6.3 Research Limitations 
 
There may be at least six limitations in terms of the research design for the present 
study, which are listed and explained below:  
 
(1) The subjects are trainee interpreters; therefore, whether the findings of the study can 
be generalized to professional interpreters needs further investigation. 
 
Due to lack of funding and resources, the researcher can only afford to recruit 
trainee interpreters. Special thanks must be given to these subjects, who participate in 
the experiment for little remuneration and strive to provide as accurate renditions as 
possible. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the subjects may have 
performed differently if paid generously. Professional interpreters who undertake 
interpreting  cases  for  a  living  may  pay  special  attention  to  work  ethics  and  neutrality  
issue or may follow the instructions of clients and work on the side of clients (e.g. 
Beaton, 2007). It is likely that the present study may come under criticism for being 
unable to make generalizations about whether professional interpreters will bring their 
ideologies to their renditions, to what extent their renditions deviate from source 
language texts, or how much impact the deviant renditions will have on listeners.  
One should note that ideologies are formed in the process of socialization through 
language use and often work invisibly. Whether a professional interpreter can work 
neutrally beyond the influence of his/her own ideologies, especially under severe time 
constraints in a simultaneous interpreting setting, in which s/he has no time to weigh the 
wording, needs further empirical investigation. However, it should be noted that the SI 
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experiment is divided into two stages with a five-to-six-month interval in between, and 
as shown in the following CDA analysis results, the frequency and density of 
ideological signs appearing during the SI sessions are more strongly correlated with the 
content of the source speech texts than with the timing of assigning interpreting tasks. 
Also, many trainee interpreters go straight into professional work after graduation, or 
even before graduation. It is not unreasonable to recruit would-be professional 
interpreters as the subjects of the SI experiment.  
 
(2) The subjects are not performing their interpreting tasks in a genuine setting, where 
they may have performed differently. 
 
 The SI experiment may draw criticism for collecting renditions in a simulated 
setting. Indeed, it is likely that with the presence of genuine speakers and audience, the 
subjects might have performed differently. However, a genuine SI setting involves 
careful planning of SI events and high costs of preparing conference venues and 
facilities and recruiting audience. Note that it would be extremely difficult to have 
'genuine’ political leaders across the Strait deliver specific speeches for this study. 
Taking all of the possible factors for consideration, the researcher finds a SI experiment 
a more feasible way of collecting a large amount of SI data. To add authenticity, genuine 
source speech texts are used in the experiment. Also, compared with consecutive 
interpreting or dialogue interpreting, simultaneous interpreting requires much less 
interaction among speakers, interpreters, and/or listeners. A lack of interaction with 
speakers and listeners in an experimental setting should not be an influential factor in 
the subjects’ interpreting performance. The experiment is actually conducted in the SI 
labs where these subjects learn and practice simultaneous interpreting, which enables 
the subjects to do the interpreting at ease. The main advantage of the experimental 
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setting is that  it  provides a level playing field – conditions are exactly the same for all  
subjects – this would not be the case in an authentic situation, where researchers would 
have to rely on a case study of one interpreter, and have no adequate means of 
comparison. In the SI experiment of this study, more than forty trainee interpreters 
render the same source language texts at a time, contributing to a rendition transcript of 
more than 100,000 words. The sufficient quantities of subjects and renditions greatly 
increase validity of the research findings. Also, 11 of the 14 subjects who gave an 
in-depth interview after the SI experiment were asked about their opinion of the 
difference between working in an experimental setting and in a genuine setting. Six of 
them thought they might have performed in the same way in a genuine setting as 
simultaneous interpreters were supposed to sit in a booth and to have little interaction 
with the speaker and the listener. The remaining five subjects thought they might have 
felt more nervous and performed ‘differently’. Surprisingly, some of them thought they 
might have paid attention to the response of the listener and tried not to ‘offend’ 
audience.  
 
(3) The ‘energy-intensive’ data collection procedure may exhaust the subjects and 
influence their performance. 
    
 Each stage of the SI data collection is completed within one to two hours,  during 
which the subjects need to undertake several tasks of doing simultaneous interpreting 
and answering questionnaires. The accuracy of the renditions may decrease with fatigue. 
It should be noted that all of the subjects are postgraduate students with a tight 
schooling schedule, and a lengthened process of data collection may reduce their 
willingness to attend the experiment. To address the concern over interpreting fatigue, 
the SI data collection is divided into two stages, and the length of each recording of the 
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source speeches is no more than fifteen minutes. This way, the researcher may collect as 
many renditions as possible and the subjects’ tiredness from intensive interpreting 
sessions may be reduced. 
    
(4) Only a few of the subjects give in-depth interviews. If every subject had joined the 
interview session, more solid evidence might have been found.  
 
 As most of the subjects are preoccupied with their finals and dissertation writing 
after the second-stage data collection, it is difficult to ask all of them to give an in-depth 
interview, which is conducted on a voluntary basis. The aim of the interview is to ask 
the subjects to clarify some ambiguous renditions and see if these renditions are 
ideological signs produced on purpose. Note that ideological signs are very likely to be 
embodied in SI renditions in an invisible and subconscious manner, and therefore, 
interview data should play a supportive role in the CDA process, during which the 
renditions themselves as well as the questionnaire survey results may be adequately 
sufficient for the application of the CDA method. 
 
(5) There is no interpreter control group that is made up of native English speakers. 
 
 It might have been more scientific if a group of native English interpreters 
participated in the experiment for comparison. However, native English speakers who 
master Mandarin and pursue an interpreter career are rarely seen. At the time of the 
experiment, the postgraduate programs where the subjects are being trained as 
interpreters have no students whose mother tongue is English. Also, the research design 
is to see how power struggles and unequal relations between Taiwan and China are 
embodied as ideological signs in the subjects’ simultaneous renditions. It would not be 
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practical to include native English-speaking interpreters in the experiment.  
 
(6) The use of the CDA method may come under criticism for being ideological or 
subjectively interpretative.  
 
 Some criticize CDA practitioners for selecting specific texts that may suit their 
political purposes and bringing their ideologies to the interpretation of the texts (e.g., 
Widdowson, 1995, 2004; Jones, 2007). The present study does select ‘specific' speeches 
as the source language texts for simultaneous interpreting. But the selection is a 
necessary means of investigating the power struggles between Taiwan and China. To 
strive for objectivity of the research, the amount of the source language text produced 
by  political  figures  from  Taiwan  and  from  China,  the  political  status  of  the  
speechmakers and the number of subjects from both regions are dealt with on equal 
terms, and each subject needs to interpret all of the source language texts. Although the 
content of the genuine source language texts may not be perfectly suitable for the 
present study, it adds authenticity and validity to the SI experiment. The large quantity 
of the ideological signs uncovered in the CDA analysis in the study also indicates that 
the researcher is not selective about the ‘texts’ for the CDA analysis. Furthermore, 
thanks to the nature of interpreting, the source speech texts serve as a solid basis for 
‘objective’ judgment about deviant renditions that are possibly ideological signs. The 
interpretation of the deviant renditions is supported by the use of the quantitative 
research method – questionnaire surveys- to increase credibility of the results. The 
statistical analysis of the CDA analysis results not only contributes to a clear picture of 
the subjects' tendency to bring their ideologies to their renditions but also demonstrates 
how language use reflects social realities, i.e. the existence of power struggles and 
unequal relations between Taiwan and China. In a word, the combination of qualitative 
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and quantitative research methods in the study should be able to reduce to the greatest 
degree the subjectivity of the researcher’s interpretation of the results.  
In conclusion, the present study is faced with at least six limitations mentioned 
above, for which the explanations of the researcher’s concerns are provided as 
thoroughly as possible. The issue of ideology is an emerging focus in interpreting 
studies. Although more research of the link between ideology and interpreting needs to 
be conducted, it is hoped that the present study can provide insights into how 
simultaneous interpreters may deal with their ideologies in the rendering process.   
 
6.4 Further Implications for Future Studies 
 
Many people consider that both interpreting and translation basically perform the 
same function (Gile, 2009: 52), which actually reflects the common misconception of 
language. Saussure distinguishes langue from langage by saying:  
 
But what is language [langue]?  It  is  not  to  be  confused  with  human  speech  
[langage], of which it is only a definite part, though certainly an essential one. It is 
both a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary 
conventions  that  have  been  adopted  by  a  social  body  to  permit  individuals  to  
exercise that faculty. Taken as a whole, speech is many-sided and heterogeneous; 
straddling several areas simultaneously - physical, physiological, and 
psychological - it belongs both to the individual and to society…(1966: 9; original 
brackets and italics). 
 
Saussure further suggests that the spoken forms of language alone constitute the object 
of language and the existence of writing is solely for representing language (ibid: 23-24), 
which explicitly points out the significance and importance of spoken language. The 
literature review in Chapters 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 of this present study shows that interpreting 
practices usually preceded translation practices and have played a significant role in 
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communication among different peoples. Yet, due to the evanescence of speech, what 
used to be preserved throughout history about interpreting were usually reported events 
that involved interpreting rather than the detail of interpreting practices, which made it 
difficult to observe the changes of interpreting practices over time or to investigate the 
effects of renditions on the results of a task. By contrast, written texts are regarded as 
‘permanent’ and ‘stable’ by people and thus given more importance than oral language 
(Saussure, 1966: 25; my emphasis), which may be why translation has assumed the 
prominence and taken the leading role in academic research.  
 Some, if not many, emphasize the communicative function of interpreting and 
translation; however, the communicative ‘nature’ of interpreting is different from that of 
translation. As Ricoeur (1981: 146-147) maintains, a text “produces a double eclipse of 
the reader and the writer” in that these two are absent from each other when the former 
performs an act of reading and the latter writing. By contrast, interpreting usually 
involves a ‘dialogue’ with the presence of both the addresser and the addressee (and an 
interpreter). In other words, interpreting bridges the linguistic gap directly and instantly, 
which may further suggest that interpreting may have greater power and efficacy than 
translation. Although ideological signs embodied in the simultaneous renditions are 
evanescent, they would surely spread among the listener without any prior censorship, 
which is often not the case in translation. Just as Venuti observes, it is often publishers 
or clients that decide the final version of a translated text (1998: 31-66). It is very likely 
that any ideological sign produced by the translator may have been detected and revised 
by any one of those involved in the process of creating the translated text. Translators 
themselves are allowed time to revise and polish their translation. Editors and publishers 
have their say in the final appearance of a translation. Therefore, the influence of a 
translator’s ideology on his/her translation may be minimized to subtlety (which is also 
what Venuti terms: translator’s invisibility). By sharp contrast, interpreters, especially 
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simultaneous interpreters, are not allowed time to ponder over their renditions, and 
therefore, their ideologies may play a significant role during the interpreting. The 
findings of the present study not only disclose the link between ideology and 
interpreting but also highlight the essential difference between interpreting and 
translation. Whether professional interpreters may bring their ideology to their 
renditions and the effects of the ideological renditions on the listener will need to be 
further investigated in the future. There are many other corners of the world where 
people may use the same language but possess different or conflicting ideologies and 
identities. The research methods used in this present study may be employed to 
investigate the link between ideology and interpreting in such places.   
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Appendix A. Student Interpreter Background Questionnaire 
 
Dear interpreter 
 
The information you provide will be regarded as strictly confidential, which shall be 
used in studies of the correlation between cultural background and interpreting 
performance. Your participation in this survey is extremely important and valuable. 
Please answer the following questions as honestly and accurately as you can. 
 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
 
Note: If you complete the questionnaire electronically, which is difficult for you to 
tick the boxes, you may delete those options that are not your answers.  
A General and Language Background 
Please fill in your answers and tick where applicable. 
A-1 Your Age: _____________ 
A-2 Your  sex:   ˎMale ˎFemale  
A-3 Your place of birth: 
County/Province:________________ Country: ______________ 
A-4 Your place of upbringing: 
County/Province:________________ Country: ______________ 
A-5 
Have you ever lived outside your country before studying at this 
University?  ˎYes   ˎNo 
If yes, please specify where and how long you have lived 
outside your country. 
Where: ________________  Duration: ________________ 
A-6 What language or languages were usually spoken in your home 
before? 
_______________________________________________ 
A-7 What language or languages did you speak before starting school? 
_______________________________________________ 
283 
 
A-8 What language did you first learn to read and write? 
_______________________________________________ 
A-9 How old were you when you started to learn English? 
ˎ1-4 years old     ˎ5-10 years old    ˎ11-15 years old 
ˎ 16-20 years old   ˎ21 years or older 
A-10 What was your previous IELTS result? 
Reading: _____ Listening:_____ Writing:____ Speaking: _____ 
Overall Band: _______    
Year of the Results: ___________ 
 If never taking any IELTS test, please specify the result of your 
previous language test and when you took the test. (e.g. TOFEL 
CBT 250)_____________________________________________ 
 
B Educational Background and Work Experience 
Please fill in your answers and tick where applicable. 
B-1 
What was the highest level of education you completed before 
studying interpreting and translating here? (e.g. BA in Law, MA in 
English Literature, etc.) ____________________________ 
 If your highest level of education was MA, what was your major as 
an undergraduate?________________________________ 
B-2 
 
 
Have you ever studied outside your country before studying 
interpreting and translating here? ˎYes   ˎNo 
If yes, please specify where and how long. 
Where: _______________   Duration: ___________________ 
B-3 
Have you ever worked as an interpreter before studying here? 
ˎYes   ˎNo 
If yes, please specify how many times you have done interpreting 
jobs or how long you have worked as an interpreter. 
_________________________________________________ 
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B-4 
Have you ever worked as a translator before studying here? 
ˎYes   ˎNo 
If yes, please specify how many times you have done translating 
jobs or how long you have worked as a translator. 
___________________________________________________ 
B-5 
If you have never been engaged in translating or interpreting, 
please specify your previous job or work experience. (e.g. high 
school English teacher, business executive, full-time 
undergraduate, etc.)____________________________________ 
B-6 What kinds of organisation have you worked for:  
ˎ Multi-national 
ˎ Local firm 
ˎ Local government 
ˎ National government 
ˎ NGO 
ˎ Other 
ˎ Never worked before 
C Political and Social Participation  
Please fill in your answers and tick where applicable. 
C-1 How do you obtain political information or news? Please tick all 
that apply. 
ˎ Newspapers     Magazines    Internet     Radio and TV 
   Books or brochures   Family, friends, or co-workers 
C-2 
How often did you pay attention to political issues at domestic 
level before studying here? 
  Never    Seldom    Sometimes    Often     Always 
C-3 How often did you pay attention to political issues at 
international level before studying here? 
  Never    Seldom    Sometimes    Often     Always 
C-4 
How often did you pay attention to cross-strait political issues 
(those regarding the relations between China and Taiwan) before 
studying here? 
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  Never    Seldom    Sometimes    Often     Always 
C-5 Have you joined any political party? ˎYes   ˎNo 
If yes, please specify: __________________________ 
C-6 What is your attitude toward the future relation between China and 
Taiwan? 
  Remain the status quo    Reunification     Independence 
 
End of the Questionnaire! Thank you very much for your effort! 
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Appendix B. Retrospective Questionnaire 
Topic of the Speech:  
Please tick where applicable or give your comments as honestly and accurately as you 
can. 
1 The speed of the speech is  
ˎVery slow ˎQuite slow ˎNeither slow nor fast ˎQuite fast ˎVery fast 
2 How difficult do you find interpreting the speech? 
ˎVery easy ˎQuite easy ˎNeither easy nor difficult ˎQuite difficult  
ˎVery difficult 
3 If it is difficult to you, which part do you consider the most difficult? (You may 
tick more than one box.) 
ˎ Understanding the content ˎInterpreting names ˎInterpreting numbers 
ˎ Producing proper sentence structure ˎLack of terminology ˎ
Keeping up the pace ˎOther (Please 
specify:                                   )  
4 How much do you understand the content of the speech? 
ˎ Fully understand ˎMostly understand ˎPartly understand ˎCompletely 
lost in the speech 
5 How difficult do you find interpreting proper nouns? (for instance, names of 
persons, countries, or titles) 
ˎ Very easy ˎQuite easy ˎNeither easy nor difficult ˎQuite difficult  
ˎVery difficult 
6 How difficult do you find putting the proper nouns in a proper place of a 
grammatical sentence? 
ˎ Very easy ˎQuite easy ˎNeither easy nor difficult ˎQuite difficult  
ˎVery difficult 
7 How difficult do you find interpreting numbers? 
ˎ Very easy ˎQuite easy ˎNeither easy nor difficult ˎQuite difficult  
ˎVery difficult 
8 Which kind of numbers do you find the most difficult for you to interpret? (You 
may tick more than one box.) 
ˎ Ordinal number ˎQuantity of people ˎYear ˎMonth ˎAll of the 
above ˎNone of the above ˎOther :_____________________________ 
9 How useful do you find the word/phrase list provided for you in advance of 
interpreting the speech? 
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ˎ Very useful ˎQuite useful ˎNeither useful nor useless ˎQuite useless 
ˎVery useless 
10 If the word/phrase is useless to you, why? (You may write in English or 
Mandarin.) 
(Please state the reason(s) as specifically as you can. For instance, you were too 
nervous to use the word/phrase list, etc.) 
 
 
11 How difficult do you find interpreting Chinese idioms into English equivalents? 
ˎ Very easy ˎQuite easy ˎNeither easy nor difficult ˎQuite difficult  
ˎVery difficult 
12 If it is difficult to you, which part do you consider the most difficult? (You may tick 
more than one box.) 
ˎ Fully understanding the original meaning of the Chinese idioms 
ˎ Failing to find English equivalents  
ˎ Using too long expressions, which caused lagging behind the speaker 
ˎ Other (Please specify:__________________________________________) 
13 How much do you agree/disagree with the content of the speech? 
ˎ Fully agree ˎQuite agree ˎNeither agree nor disagree ˎQuite disagree 
ˎFully disagree 
14 Which part of the speech do you most agree or disagree? (You may write in 
English or Mandarin.) 
 
 
15 Please give your overall impression/feelings about your interpreting. 
(You may write in English or Mandarin.) 
 
 
16 Please can you give your suggestions, comments, or opinions about this 
questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for answering these questions! 
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Appendix C. National Identity Scale Questionnaire 
 
1. The nation I belong to is an important reflection of who I am. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
2. In general, others respect the nation that I am a member of. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
3. I am a cooperative participant in the nation I belong to. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
4. Overall, I often feel that the nation of which I am a member is not worthwhile. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
5. I often feel I’m a useless member of the nation I belong to. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
6. The nation I belong to is superior to other nations in many respects. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
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7. All in all, my nation becomes less important in the world. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
8. Overall, my nation is considered good by others. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
9. In general, belonging to this nation is an important part of my self-image. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
10. I am a worthy member of the nation I belong to. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
11. I often regret that I belong to this nation. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
12. Overall, my nation has very little to do with how I feel about myself. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
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13. In general, I’m glad to be a member of the nation I belong to. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
14. The nation I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
15. Overall, the nation I belong to plays a more important role than other nations. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
16. I feel good about the nation I belong to. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
17. I feel I don’t have much to offer to the nation I belong to. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
18. Most people consider my nation to be more ineffective than other nations. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
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19. In competition with others my nation comes off worse. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
20. In general, others think that the nation I am a member of is unworthy. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
292 
 
Appendix D. Post-Experiment Questionnaire – The China Group 
 
1. Interpreters should provide objective and professional service for any client  
regardless of race, ethnicity, nationality, or gender. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
2. I will turn down a request for providing interpreting service for someone I do not 
agree with. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
3. If offered opportunities, I would like to provide interpreting service for political 
figures from Taiwan. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
4. I feel comfortable when I interpret the speeches given by leaders from Taiwan. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
5. If Taiwan declares its independence formally, I will support my government to 
attack Taiwan by force. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
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6. I prefer maintaining the status quo of the cross-strait relations to reunification of 
China and Taiwan by all means. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
7. No matter what, Taiwan is definitely part of China and cannot be separated from 
China. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
8. I am quite aware of my Chinese national identity when I interpret the speeches by 
the leaders from Taiwan. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
9. I consider my interpreting (rendition) in the two data collection is not culturally 
biased but objective. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
10. I feel comfortable when I interpret the speeches by leaders from China. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
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11. If offered opportunities, I would like to provide interpreting service for political 
figures from China. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
12. When I simultaneously interpret a speech, I always pretend to be the speaker. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
13. When I simultaneously interpret a speech, I focus only on how to give exact 
rendition for every moment without thinking about the content as a whole. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
14. After graduation, I would like to work for the following organizations in my  
country. (Please indicate your preference order. “1” means the most preferred  
choice, and “6” the least preferred choice.) 
ˎCentral government organizations  ˎLocal government organizations ˎIn-house 
Interpreters for private companies ˎNon-government organizations ˎNon-benefit  
charity organizations ˎLocal translation & interpreting agencies  
 
15. Objectivity has been the main emphasis and focus throughout the interpreting 
program in the U.K. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
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16. The training I have received in the U.K. helps me provide objective interpreting 
service. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
17. I have changed some language use due to the influence of my Taiwanese classmates. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
18. Because of my Taiwanese classmates, I have a clearer picture of the cross-strait 
situation. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
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Appendix E. Post-Experiment Questionnaire – The Taiwan Group 
 
1. Interpreters should provide objective and professional service for any client  
regardless of race, ethnicity, nationality, or gender. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
2. I will turn down a request for providing interpreting service for someone I do not 
agree with. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
3. If offered opportunities, I would like to provide interpreting service for political 
figures from China. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
4. I feel comfortable when I interpret the speeches given by leaders from China. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
5. If Taiwan declares its independence formally, I will support China’s government to 
attack Taiwan by force. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
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6. I prefer maintaining the status quo of the cross-strait relations to reunification of 
China and Taiwan by all means. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
7. No matter what, Taiwan is definitely part of China and cannot be separated from 
China. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
8. I am quite aware of my Taiwanese national identity when I interpret the speeches by 
the leaders from China. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree 
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
9. I consider my interpreting (rendition) in the two data collection is not culturally 
biased but objective. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
10. I feel comfortable when I interpret the speeches by leaders from Taiwan. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
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11. If offered opportunities, I would like to provide interpreting service for political 
figures from Taiwan. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
12. When I simultaneously interpret a speech, I always pretend to be the speaker. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
13. When I simultaneously interpret a speech, I focus only on how to give exact 
rendition for every moment without thinking about the content as a whole. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
14. After graduation, I would like to work for the following organizations in my country. 
(Please indicate your preference order. “1” means the most preferred choice, and “6” 
the least preferred choice.) 
ˎCentral government organizations  ˎLocal government organizations ˎIn-house 
Interpreters for private companies ˎNon-government organizations ˎNon-benefit charity 
organizations ˎLocal translation & interpreting agencies  
 
15. Objectivity has been the main emphasis and focus throughout the interpreting 
program in the U.K. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
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16. The training I have received in the U.K. helps me provide objective interpreting 
service. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
17. I have changed some language use due to the influence of my Chinese classmates. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
18. Because of my Chinese classmates, I have a clearer picture of the cross-strait 
situation. 
ˎStrongly Agree ˎModerately Agree ˎAgree Somewhat ˎNeither Agree Nor Disagree  
ˎSomewhat Disagree ˎModerately Disagree ˎStrongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
